china trade policy case study

Case Study: China's Trade Facilitation responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Written by: pamela ugaz and sijia sunarticle no. 52 [transport and trade facilitation newsletter, special covid-19 edition].

With the unprecedented global spread of COVID-19 in only one month, the World Health Organization has declared the virus a pandemic. The COVID-19 poses a severe global threat, not only substantially impacting people and public health, but also disrupting global trade. Border agencies face the challenge of expediting imports, including donations and emergency relief while ensuring epidemic prevention and providing adequate Customs clearance and compliance controls.

China has been at the epicentre of disease Covid-19, and it has launched a series of trade facilitation and compliance measures since January 2020. Maintaining incoming trade flows of medical supplies and food products has been seen as crucial. China also sought to minimize the disruption of COVID-19 on its export trade flows, which supplies nearly 20% of the global intermediate-goods trade .

Given its role in global value chains and being the first county to have taken wide-ranging measures in relation to trade flows as a reaction to Covid-19, China is a compelling case to study. Indeed, the Chinese experience in facilitating trade during tumultuous times may provide useful insights for response planning in other countries.

This article will first look at the process of adoption of a cross-border emergency plan in China. Then, it will provide information on concrete measures adopted by China from two perspectives: measures taken to relieve logistic bottlenecks that have affected trade in medicines, equipment and essential supplies to fight against the pandemic; and, measures to prevent supply chain disruption and to facilitate the resuming of business operations.

Operationalization of trade facilitation measures

China launched an emergency plan in which the central government and local agencies joined efforts to promote cross-border trade facilitation. With this goal in mind, the plan emphasized simplified customs procedures and reduced port charges, inspections and quarantine .

The General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) issued a series of measures such as the following ones, to ensure both effective control against the outbreak of COVID-19 and to facilitate resuming business operations:

• 10 facilitative measures as foreign-trade businesses begin to resume operations ,
• 10 measures to support the China Railway (CR) Express and
• List of measures for coordinating work to prevent and control the epidemic at ports and for facilitating customs clearance .

Local customs offices have refined the general measures of the GACC considering local conditions, in accordance with the process to elaborate plans in China, illustrated in Figure 1.

Since January 2020, China began implementing response measures to the Covid-19 pandemic, and relied extensively on its e-platforms for International Trade, namely the Single Window and the “Internet + Customs” platform . Electronic tools ensure epidemic prevention while providing effective customs clearance services. Affected by the epidemic, some manufacturing goods and electronic goods that used to be transported by road transportation and air transportation are gradually being transferred to the railway transportation, which also shows China's flexibility in response . From January to February 2020, the CR Express (Chengdu) put into service 269 trains, increasing transport capacity by more than 80% compared with the same period last year .

Measures to contain COVID-19

Getting medical supplies without delays required Chinese Customs and other compliance authorities to adopt several exceptional initiatives such as the following:

a) Speeding up the release of goods

During this health crisis, China deployed continuous efforts to facilitate epidemic relief. Chinese Customs managed to reduce the release time of relief cargo to 45 minutes by adopting:

• Special counters and green lanes to provide 24/7 clearance at critical ports across the country
• Pick-up service upon arrival for imported medicines and medical devices
• On-board inspections or door-to-door inspection , while preventing illegal activities taking advantage of the situation
• “Two-step declaration plus advance declaration” by importers and release upon registration before appropriate formalities are completed at Shanghai Customs. Release before the declaration was adopted by Qingdao Customs.
• Exclusive service window, designating in advance officers to communicate with importers, to track the entire clearance process, and to take quick inspections and release procedures in Changle Airport Customs .
• Prior coordination between Customs, freight depot operators and airlines, among others, to ensure timely unloading, warehousing and tally of the supplies on its arrival in Ningbo Airport Customs .
• Optimization of control procedures over medical items imported through postal and express services
• Expedited administrative penalty procedures without retention of the anti-epidemic supplies, transportation conveyances or account document. If the involved party has given prior consent, customs can send the legal record of administrative penalty through electronic ways such as by fax, e-mail, mobile phone or other means where reception can be confirmed

b) Enhancing access to information about new procedures

Customs set up online services to guide importers throughout the fast clearance of anti-epidemic supplies. Xiamen Customs is holding online meetings with importers, answers questions, and guides traders in filling in declaration forms.

c) Reducing tariffs

Import materials donated for epidemic prevention and control are exempted from import duties, import value-added tax and consumption tax.

d) Adopting more flexible sanitary requirements

Sanitary registration for donated medical items has been suspended. Customs can release directly selected medical items, such as vaccines, blood products, and reagents, essential to prevent, diagnose or cure COVID-19, according to the certificate issued by competent authorities, provided that the health risks can be controlled.

e) Keeping records

Customs must now keep a record of the importation of anti-epidemic supplies and compile relevant statistics, to support decision-making related to securing these supplies.

f) Coping with trade restrictions

A few countries have imposed restrictions on imports of live animals or animal products from China, or on exports of supplies such as masks, protective suits and disinfectant to China. To deal with this, the Chinese government is sending early warning information to the affected enterprises as well as providing targeted consulting services. It has also strengthened communication and coordination with trading partners to create an enabling environment for bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

Measures to prevent supply chain disruption

COVID-19 has slowed down global trade flows and, as a result, importers are struggling to get inputs and inventories are running low. China has adopted the following measures to prevent supply chain disruption and to facilitate resuming business operations:

a) Relaxing procedures and requirements

In the framework of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, China allows enterprises to choose clearance mode for goods transported by the CR Express either at ports of entry/exit or at local Customs. Besides, when a paper document is required for verification, its electronic copy can be accepted by Customs upon approval before the submission of the paper document.

As an alternative to on-site audits, Customs are conducting off-site audits via video or electronic data transmission or are basing the audit on the inventory data provided by enterprises. Finally, enterprises do not need to apply for changes in business registration until the outbreak ends (except for the business name, which requires an online application).

b) Expediting clearance

To facilitate the import of agri-food products, equipment and raw material , China has adopted the following measures:

• A shorter quarantine approval process
• Green lanes on a reservation basis
• Non-intrusive inspection equipment at railway ports of entry/exit to increase efficiency, together with the application of artificial intelligence image recognition technology
• Absence of consignees during an inspection provided that they entrust operators of the inspection yard or the person in charge of the transport conveyance to be on site. Consignees can notify Customs of their absence through e-mail or online platforms.
• Prioritization of test for products suspected to contain pests or disease
• Acceptance of third-party certificates, test reports or self-declaration on quality and safety instead of laboratory testing
• Optimization of pre-export control and certification services, ensuring the issuance of quarantine certificates, disposal certificates, origin certificates and sanitary certificates for export goods. The purpose is to support businesses in the export process
• Expedite administrative approval for registered exporters and training on dealing with technical trade barriers
• Enhanced mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) throughout the “Belt and Road” This measure has entailed implementing facilitative clearance measures and promoting credits to enterprises to qualify as AEOs
• Acceptance of electronic documents when the paper documents must be examined in person, provided that the latter are resubmitted latter upon approval
• Enhancing the application of the Single Window for international trade by expanding essential service functions
• Guidance with clearance formalities, especially for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. To minimize declaration errors and avoid procedural non-compliance, these companies can seek help from Customs authorities through a new media platform and a hotline.

c) Reducing costs

China Customs reduced costs by decreasing the number of declarations through manifest consolidation. Moreover, traders can apply for an exemption or reduction of the fee for delayed declaration in case the outbreak disrupted their operations or if funds are low upon the resumption of business. Importing enterprises, unable to pay taxes on schedule, may submit a payment schedule spread across a maximum duration of three months. Fees for late payment shall be exempted or reduced, provided that the enterprise complied to the payment schedule.

d) Enhancing logistic/transport capabilities

To boost the transport capacity , China is supporting the construction of transport hubs. Likewise, multimodal transport operations based on railway transport (i.e. CR Express) is expected to facilitate domestic customs transit among multiple customs districts.

e) International coordination

Mitigating the health risks and economic consequences from COVID-19 require coordinated preparedness and response.

International collaboration is essential, as well. China has proposed data exchange and information sharing among customs authorities in countries and regions along with the CR Express. Moreover, China has intended to strengthen international cooperation on epidemic prevention and control, as well as to work closely with the World Health Organization (WHO) .

Final remarks

Covid-19 is spreading across the globe and governments are struggling to mitigate its negative impact on international trade. It will be important to learn from experiences in different countries, carefully evaluating each country’s unique situation. As China was among the first countries confronted with this virus, we hope that readers may find the compilation of measures taken in China useful to prepare their own responses.

Contact the authors:

Pamela Ugaz | Economic Affairs Officer | UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Section | [email protected]

Sijia Sun | Junior Professional Officer | UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Section | [email protected]

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The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship

• U.S.-China trade exploded in the two decades after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.
• This trade has benefited U.S. and Chinese consumers and companies, but officials in Washington are increasingly concerned about the risks posed by Beijing’s state-led development.
• President Trump imposed heavy tariffs on Chinese goods. President Biden has maintained them and introduced several new trade restrictions.

Introduction

U.S. trade with China has grown enormously in recent decades and is crucial for both countries. Today, China is one of the largest export markets for U.S. goods and services, and the United States is the top export market for China. This trade has brought lower prices to U.S. consumers and higher profits for American corporations, but it has also come with costs.

The optimism that accompanied China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) twenty years ago has vanished as Beijing continues to embrace state-led development, pouring subsidies into targeted industries to the detriment of U.S. and foreign companies. Though U.S. consumers have benefited from the flood of cheaper goods from China, millions of Americans have lost their jobs due to import competition. Meanwhile, investment by Chinese companies is raising national security concerns. The United States has long accused China of pressuring American companies to hand over their technology, or of pilfering it outright. How to respond to China now sits at the center of the U.S. political debate, with President Joe Biden following his predecessor, Donald Trump, in adopting an aggressive economic approach.

What is the history of the U.S.-China trade relationship?

• World Trade Organization (WTO)

For thirty years following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, there was virtually no trade between the two countries; Washington had severed ties with the communist government in Beijing.

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China began a decades-long process of economic reform in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. His government loosened state control over the economy and allowed private industry to develop. In 1979, the United States and China normalized relations as Chinese policymakers aimed to boost trade and investment, and in 1986 Beijing applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO’s predecessor . After protracted negotiations with the United States and other WTO members, China joined the organization in December 2001. As a condition of admission, Beijing committed to a sweeping set of economic reforms , including steep tariff cuts for imported goods, protections for intellectual property (IP), and transparency around its laws and regulations.

At the time, U.S. President Bill Clinton and his advisors contended that bringing China into the global trading system would not only benefit the United States, but also foster economic and ultimately democratic reform in China. Still, the move was opposed by U.S. labor unions and many congressional Democrats, who argued [PDF] that China’s weak worker and environmental protections would incentivize similar practices elsewhere and bring about a “race to the bottom.”

Even before China joined the WTO, trade between the two countries was growing. But WTO membership ensured “permanent normal trade relations,” thereby providing U.S. and foreign companies additional certainty that they could produce in China and export to the United States. Trade surged: the value of U.S. goods imports from China rose from about $100 billion in 2001 to more than $400 billion in 2023. This leap in imports is due in part to China’s critical position in global supply chains ; Chinese factories assemble products for export to the United States using components from all over the world.

What are the benefits of this trade?

U.S. consumers have benefited from lower prices, and U.S. companies have profited immensely from access to China’s market. In a 2019 study, economists Xavier Jaravel and Erick Sager found that increased trade with China boosted the annual purchasing power of the average U.S. household by $1,500 between 2000 and 2007. China is now the third-largest export market for the United States, behind Canada and Mexico. A 2023 report by the U.S.-China Business Council, an industry group, found that exports to China supported more than one million jobs in the United States, or about 0.5 percent of the civilian labor force.

American companies earn hundreds of billions of dollars annually from sales in China—money they can then invest in their U.S. operations. Chinese companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the United States, though this investment has dwindled in recent years amid heightened U.S. government scrutiny. 

For China, the gains from trade with the United States and the rest of the world have been tremendous . Since 2001, China’s economy has grown more than five-fold, adjusted for inflation, and it is now the world’s second largest, behind only the United States. (By some measures, it is the largest.) Hundreds of millions of people have escaped extreme poverty as a result of this growth.

What issues has it created?

Though the trade relationship has undoubtedly brought benefits, it has also presented the United States and other countries with a host of problems. 

Manufacturing job losses . Research led by economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson found that the costs of boosting trade with China, the so-called China Shock , were more pronounced than those from increased trade with other countries, such as Japan. This was due to the speed at which imports rose, the vast size of China’s low-wage workforce, and the range of affected industries. Their research shows that political polarization also increased in the areas of the country most harmed by competition with China, which some analysts say helped to spur the rise of Donald Trump and populist political forces. In 2024, economists including CFR Senior Fellow Brad W. Setser referred to a renewed glut of Chinese exports—particularly in electric vehicles, solar panels, and other “green” technologies—as the “ second China shock .”

National security . U.S. policymakers are increasingly worried about Chinese efforts to spread disinformation and collect sensitive information on Americans. Wary of espionage , Washington has raised concerns that U.S. companies that use Chinese technology could be putting U.S. national security at risk. U.S. officials also fear that China’s acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology will bolster China’s military. They have repeatedly accused Beijing of stealing IP and requiring American companies to share their technologies as a condition of doing business in China, known as forced technology transfer. 

Subsidization and state-owned enterprises . To achieve its economic goals, the Chinese government has poured subsidies into a range of industries, including renewable energy, with the aim of creating “national champion” companies. Some experts argue that these subsidies are wasteful, but they can be disruptive to other countries whose companies cannot compete against such levels of state support. The United States argues that many Chinese state-owned enterprises are effectively arms of the government and, unlike their private competitors, do not make decisions based on market forces.

Currency manipulation . Many economists say China kept the value of its currency, the renminbi, artificially low in the decade after it joined the WTO by accumulating U.S. dollar reserves . A weaker renminbi makes Chinese products more affordable abroad and U.S. goods more expensive in China, thereby contributing to the United States’ trade deficit with China.

Labor and human rights violations . The United States has long been critical of China on human rights issues, and U.S. labor groups have persistently complained about poor working conditions in China. These concerns have resurfaced on the trade agenda in recent years with reports of forced labor in Xinjiang, where China is repressing millions of Uyghurs . Beijing’s 2020 national security law, which fundamentally altered Hong Kong’s freedoms , is another source of tension; experts say the law could make foreign firms hesitant to do business in the city, jeopardizing its standing as a global financial hub.

“You start to see how big a problem it is to try to live in this world in which China owns more and more markets and you can’t get in.”

At the heart of the trade conflict are the two countries’ competing economic systems. As journalist Paul Blustein details in his book Schism: China, America, and the Fracturing of the Global Trading System , Chinese officials enthusiastically implemented WTO requirements at first, engineering a profound transformation of the economy and legal system. But even as China liberalized its economy in some ways—giving rise to a thriving private sector—it never fully embraced the invisible hand of the market. The state, dominated by the Chinese Communist Party , oversees the economy through centralized management of state-owned enterprises, control over financial institutions, and a powerful economic planning commission. China’s leaders say their system is necessary to improve the lives of the Chinese people and is in line with the economic strategies used by Western countries at similar stages of development.  

CFR’s Jennifer Hillman says Beijing has perfected the model of obtaining Western technology; it uses it to develop domestic companies into giants, and then unleashes them into the world market—at which point foreign companies can no longer compete. Hillman cites 5G networks as an example of an industry in which China dominates. “You start to see how big a problem it is to try to live in this world in which China owns more and more markets and you can’t get in,” she says. The United States has been the most vocal critic of Chinese trade practices, but other countries including European Union (EU) members and Japan share these concerns .

How has the United States responded?

The United States has attempted to address its trade concerns with China through a mixture of negotiation, disputes at the WTO, heightened investment scrutiny, tariffs, and its own industrial policy . The relationship has grown more combative over the past decade as U.S. policymakers have charted a progressively more assertive course. But experts including CFR senior fellow Edward Alden say the United States lacks effective policies for managing economic disruptions.

As part of China’s entry into the WTO, U.S. negotiators demanded a temporary safeguard that could be used to limit imports from China, but this was hardly used before it expired twelve years later. Blustein writes that the George W. Bush administration was worried about cascading calls from U.S. companies for better protection and needed Beijing’s support for other foreign policy objectives, including the global war on terrorism . The Bush administration imposed some tariffs on a range of Chinese goods that were subsidized or “dumped” (i.e., sold at an abnormally low price). It also launched high-level dialogues with China to address trade issues.

These dialogues continued under President Barack Obama, whose administration cracked down on Beijing. Obama used the special safeguard to impose tariffs on imported tires, and his administration won a number of WTO disputes against China, while blocking new appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body. Scrutiny of Chinese investment also increased, with Obama taking the rare step of blocking two Chinese acquisitions on the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) , an interagency body that screens investments on national security grounds. His administration also concluded negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) , a mega-regional trade agreement that it billed as a way to confront China on trade. 

President Donald Trump took an even more assertive approach, imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese goods. Trump also withdrew from the TPP and negotiated a so-called Phase One agreement with China, which many experts criticized as punting on core U.S. concerns in exchange for a commitment by Beijing to purchase an additional $200 billion worth of U.S. goods—which it failed to live up to . Trump also designated China as a currency manipulator for the first time in decades and maintained the Obama administration’s block on new appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body , incapacitating the organization’s dispute settlement system. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress—responding mainly to fears over Chinese acquisition of U.S. technology—passed legislation expanding the role of CFIUS and tightening controls over high-tech exports. 

Under President Biden, Washington has taken the most serious steps yet toward weakening China’s play for economic dominance. He has signed legislation that could lead to the ban of China-owned social media giant TikTok; retained some $360 billion worth of tariffs as well as many sanctions applied by Trump on Chinese individuals associated with human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong; introduced unprecedented export controls that restrict Beijing’s ability to obtain advanced technology; and banned some U.S. investment in sensitive technologies that lawmakers fear could be used to aid China’s growing military. He has also quadrupled tariffs on electric vehicles made in China, tripled those on steel and aluminum, and doubled the duty on semiconductors. Meanwhile, several U.S. governors have signed laws preventing state pensions from investing in equities controlled by the Chinese state.

What lies ahead for U.S.-China trade?

Biden’s willingness to continue the economic confrontation with China has raised questions about the future of the trade relationship. Neither U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods (and retaliatory Chinese tariffs on U.S. exports) nor U.S. export controls has shown signs of being rolled back. Some legislators have introduced bills that would expand Biden’s investment restrictions to include more Chinese industries; other proposed legislation would require federal government investment plans to divest from Chinese companies. The renewed pressure on TikTok marks another major escalation. Beijing calls the move “bullying,” and TikTok is suing the U.S. government , arguing that the forced sale is not feasible and violates the First Amendment.

The rise of China, as well as a new appreciation for the fragility of global supply chains laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic, has contributed to the revival of industrial policy in the United States. The CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act , both passed in 2022, direct hundreds of billions of dollars to scientific research and domestic production of high-tech goods, such as semiconductors. Experts say the simultaneous efforts to impair competing Chinese industries, particularly export controls, could stifle China’s semiconductor industry. Biden administration officials argue that these restrictions are part of a “small yard, high fence” approach aimed at preserving national security, not a broader economic “decoupling.” During a visit to China in August 2023, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said that the United States believes “a strong Chinese economy is a good thing.”  

Meanwhile, some experts have questioned whether the WTO system is sufficient to address U.S. grievances and whether China’s economic model is fundamentally incompatible with global trading rules. The concept of a subsidy, for example, presupposes a bright line between the state and private industry that is increasingly blurry in China. In a 2022 report , the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) said it has become “widely accepted in the United States that WTO rules do not, and cannot, effectively discipline many of China’s most harmful policies and practices.” That view has informed the decisions of both Democrat and Republican leaders to continue neutering the WTO. 

CFR’s Hillman argues that allowing China into the WTO was not a mistake, but that the United States erred by failing to use the tools at its disposal to deter China’s unfair trade practices sooner. Although the WTO remains a valuable forum for the United States, Washington might need to look elsewhere, Hillman says. Some experts have suggested a compact among like-minded countries that would function in parallel with the WTO. Politicians have advocated for more extreme options; Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), for example, has called for abolishing the WTO altogether .

Henry Gao, a professor at Singapore Management University and an expert on Chinese law and international trade, says that the use of unilateral tariffs damages the United States’ image as a champion of free trade and cedes moral authority to China. Hillman and Gao agree that it was a mistake for U.S. leaders to assume that WTO membership would fundamentally change China. “I would take a step back and ask: was the WTO even designed to convert countries’ economic systems?” Gao says. “My answer to that is no.” Gao argues that China’s model is unsustainable, and says that the United States should therefore be patient and work within the WTO, negotiating new rules as needed. “If you try to compete with China by becoming China, what is the point even if you win in the end?” Gao says.

Recommended Resources

This Timeline charts the history of U.S.-China relations.

CFR’s Edward Alden compares semiconductor restrictions with Cold War–era export controls in this article.

In this Council Special Report, CFR fellows Jennifer Hillman and Inu Manak contend that U.S.-led changes to international rules on subsidies would give the United States a powerful tool to address its concerns over competition with China.

In a series of papers, economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson study the effects of increased trade with China on U.S. workers.

Singapore Management University’s Henry Gao looks at China’s changing view of the World Trade Organization in this November 2021 paper .

Will Merrow created the graphics for this Backgrounder.

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• February 2019 (Revised January 2022)
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The U.S. – China Trade War

• Format: Print
• | Language: English
• | Pages: 32

About The Author

Alberto F. Cavallo

Related work.

• September 2019 (Revised January 2022)
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• The U.S. – China Trade War  By: Alberto Cavallo
• The U.S. – China Trade War  By: Alberto Cavallo, Mariana Cal and Anne Laski

The Us–China Trade War: Deal or No Deal?

Darden Case No. UVA-GEM-0175

31 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2020 Last revised: 21 Oct 2021

Dennis Yang

University of virginia - darden school of business.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Gerry Yemen

UVA-GEM-0175

Rev. Apr. 7, 2022

The US–China Trade War: Deal or No Deal?

At its simplest, the intent of G20 summits was to encourage global economic growth through cooperation among governments, central banks, and international organizations. The seeds of the summits were planted in 1975, when heads of state from six countries, known as the G6, gathered to discuss economic issues. Nearly 45 years later, it had grown into a forum of 20 countries' leaders, and invited guests from nonmember countries and international organizations that met to exchange thoughts and expertise on topics such as economic growth and disparities, sustainable development goals, innovation, infrastructure, global health, and free trade. At the June 2019 G20 summit, two leaders—US president Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping—attracted a lot of attention because of the trade war between their countries.

A trade war was an economic conflict resulting from trade when nations used tariffs or other against each other to gain advantages in trade, business, economic, and political positions. Since 1947, tariffs between countries had been falling in line with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, originally signed by 22 countries) and its 1995 successor the World Trade Organization (WTO, with 164 member countries in 2018), from a global average of 22% to less than 5%. The resulting boom in trade led to the coining of the term globalization, meaning the integration of national and local economies, along with social and cultural elements. But in the second half of the 2010s, protectionism reasserted itself in grand fashion as the United States and China—the world's two economic superpowers—initiated rounds of tariffs, counter-tariffs, and uncertainties amid negotiations on a wide range of imports, exports, and structural trade issues.

By June 2019, the United States had set a 25% tariff on $250billion of Chinese imports, and China had retaliated with 20% to 25% tariffs on more than 5,000 US products, with the promise of more to come. In early August, Trump promised another 10% tariff on an additional $300billion of Chinese imports. The meeting between Trump and Xi at the G20 summit was a pivotal point, crucial to either ending the trade war or resuming stalled negotiations between trade representatives that had been underway for two years. The trade war contributed to China's slower GDP growth in the first quarter of 2019 (see Exhibit 1).

Keywords: macroeconomic imbalances, balance of payment, foreign reserves, tariffs, industrial policies, IP protection, consumption vs. production, trade and welfare, efficiency vs. distribution, global business strategy

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

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• Published: 10 August 2024

The impact of international logistics performance on import and export trade: an empirical case of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries

• Weixin Wang 1 ,
• Qiqi Wu 2 ,
• Jiafu Su   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6001-5744 3 &
• Bing li 2  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  11 , Article number:  1028 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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As an important foundation of cargo transportation, logistics plays a vital role in developing international trade. Based on the international logistics performance index (LPI) and the sample data of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries from 2011 to 2022, this paper uses the extended trade gravity model to explore the impact of the logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries on China’s import and export trade. The empirical results show that the improvement of the logistics performance level of the countries along the “Belt and Road” Initiative has a certain role in promoting the growth of China’s trade volume to the country, and the improvement of LPI has a more significant positive impact on China’s import and export to large-scale countries along the route. Finally, according to the analysis of empirical results, this paper puts forward specific suggestions to promote the development of logistics performance and import and export trade, which provides some reference value for implementing the “Belt and Road” initiative and improving national logistics and trade level.

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Introduction.

In the context of 'globalization', China and the countries along the “Belt and Road” Initiative have ushered in a high-speed development stage of comprehensive cooperation (Khan et al. 2022a ), working together to promote a higher level of trade facilitation development trend and promote the further expansion of trade scale (Khan et al. 2022b ). The proportion of the trade scale between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries in China’s overall foreign trade continues to grow (Mena et al. 2022 ), reaching 34.7% by 2022. The trade between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries is mainly concentrated in Southeast Asia, focusing on West Asia and South Asia (Qin 2022 ). From an overall perspective, in 2022, China’s trade with ASEAN accounted for 50.3% of the trade of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. And the trade imbalance between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries is becoming more and more serious (Wang and Liu 2022 ).

Since 2007, the World Bank has published the “Logistics Performance Index Report” every two years to measure the level of logistics in countries worldwide with the LPI (Hausman et al. 2013 ). The progress of the logistics industry drives the development of manufacturing, finance, and other industries, promotes the coordinated development of upstream and downstream enterprises, and promotes the formation of a complete industrial chain and supply chain (Göçer et al. 2022 ). The logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has become an important factor in promoting import and export between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries (Pan et al. 2022 ). With the continuous advancement of the 'economic integration' process, logistics connects the needs of trade between countries, is an essential guarantee for the smooth operation of the supply chain (Yang 2023 ), and plays a vital role in the country’s economic development (Yingfei et al. 2022 ). Therefore, the research on the relationship between international logistics performance and the development of import and export trade has certain practical significance.

Due to the incalculable impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the world economy, this paper selects 2011–2022 as the time interval for research to avoid the effect on the accuracy of empirical results. Combined with data availability, taking 61 countries along the Belt and Road Initiative as an example, this paper profoundly analyzes the relationship between international logistics performance and national import and export trade. It systematically analyzes the impact of different indicators of international logistics performance on international trade import and export and more accurately controls the adjustment direction of resource allocation to provide some reference value for the implementation of the “Belt and Road” initiative of China and provide some reference for the balance of national logistics system and trade relations.

Compared with previous studies, the innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects: Firstly, the interaction mechanism between international logistics performance and import and export trade is analyzed. This paper analyzes the interaction mechanism between international logistics performance and import and export trade through previous data collection. Secondly, the fixed effect model is used to test the impact of the improvement of the logistics performance level of the countries along the “Belt and Road” on the trade volume, and to explore the impact of international logistics performance on the import and export of countries of different sizes and the differences. Thirdly, the relationship between international logistics performance and import and export trade is tested by using the methods of 'eliminating outlier samples', 'reducing sample interval', 'shrinking tail processing' and 'lagging one period of explained variables', and the conclusions are summarized, and specific and feasible development suggestions are put forward.

The research contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: Firstly, it further enriches the research on international logistics performance and import and export trade. The research of related fields is mainly related to the relationship between logistics performance and export. This paper takes import and export as the research object, which has a specific reference value for the overall development of the country and the region. Secondly, this paper not only explores the relationship between international logistics performance and import and export trade but also divides different countries according to their scale and explores the various impacts on countries of different scales, which provides a specific reference for the direction of national logistics and trade investment. Thirdly, this paper discusses the relationship between international logistics performance and the development of import and export trade, and puts forward specific suggestions to promote the improvement of international logistics performance and trade volume, which helps provide some reference value for the development of related fields.

The section 2 reviews the literature on logistics performance and international trade, and provides some theoretical support for the article. Section 3 explains the construction of the gravity model data sources, the variables, and the division of the national scale. In section 4, descriptive statistics, LPI comprehensive index regression, and LPI sub-index regression are used, and systematic analysis is carried out according to the results of empirical data. Section 5 conducts a robustness test. Section 6 summarizes the conclusions and puts forward specific suggestions based on the empirical analysis.

Literature review

Logistics performance is the key to supporting trade growth and the main factor determining a country’s economic growth (Cui et al. 2022 ). Bhukiya and Patel ( 2023 ) and Huong et al. ( 2024 ) believed that logistics performance promotes international trade. Barakat et al. ( 2023 ) demonstrated that the improvement of logistics performance helps to increase national trade openness and reduce trade costs. Jayathilaka et al. ( 2022 ) analyzed the impact of gross domestic product (GDP) and LPI on international trade based on 142 countries, and verified the positive role of LPI in promoting international trade, which is more significant in Asia, Europe and Oceania. Çelebi ( 2019 ) believes that logistics performance will promote the development of trade, and the efficiency of logistics system is an important factor affecting bilateral trade. Based on the sample data of 10 countries along the China-Europe Express from 2015 to 2019, Zhong and Zhou ( 2022 ) demonstrated that the improvement of international logistics performance has promoted the increase of import and export trade in Guangdong Province. Liu ( 2022 ) selected the data of 12 provinces and regions in western China from 2015 to 2020 to explore the impact of cross-border logistics performance on the competitiveness of cross-border agricultural products trade, and found that the development of cross-border logistics is conducive to improving the development of cross-border agricultural products trade in western China. The above research shows that: in the context of economic integration, the development of international logistics performance has promoted the improvement of the international trade environment and improved the convenience of international trade. There is a positive correlation between international logistics performance and international trade.

Import and export trade has a certain feedback effect on the development of logistics industry (Yang 2010 ). Guo ( 2018 ) used the panel data of 31 provinces in China from 1997 to 2016 to empirically test the role of import and export trade in promoting the development of the logistics industry, and the impact of exports on the development of the logistics industry is significantly greater than the role of imports. At the same time, due to differences in geographical location and resource endowments, only imports in the central and eastern regions of China promote the development of the logistics industry, and the western region is not significant. Zhan et al. ( 2019 ) found that the scale effect, export efficiency effect and export structure effect of export trade in the core area of the “Belt and Road” have promoted the development of the logistics industry. Wang and Wang ( 2021 ) found that the trade in the core area of “Belt and Road” can promote the growth and agglomeration of the logistics industry, and the export scale effect is the main factor to promote the growth of the logistics industry. The expansion of international trade scale, the improvement of trade efficiency and the improvement of trade structure have also promoted the improvement of international logistics performance. Based on the co-integration model of time series data from 1989 to 2012, Wang ( 2015 ) found that there is a co-integration relationship between logistics development and energy consumption, foreign trade and urbanization level, and this co-integration relationship has a long stability. Yang et al. ( 2019 ) found that the logistics development between China and ASEAN countries is the reason that affects the development of each other’s trade through the Granger causality test. Guo et al. ( 2018 ) studied the development of China’s logistics industry and foreign trade in the past 40 years of reform and opening up, and found that there is a long-term and stable coordinated development relationship between the two. In order to promote the sustainable development of the two, it can be achieved by optimizing the business environment, promoting the support of the coordinated development of modern logistics and foreign trade, improving the quality of logistics infrastructure and customs operation efficiency, and accelerating the informatization and standardization of logistics industry.

There are some differences in the impact of international logistics performance on countries with different income levels, different trade facilitation levels, and different population sizes (Fan and Yu 2015 ). See et al. ( 2024 ) found that countries with higher income levels have better logistics performance. Çelebi ( 2019 ) believes that income level is an important factor in the impact of logistics performance on trade volume. Trade facilitation will have different effects according to per capita income level, and low-income economies with higher logistics level will gain more benefits than high-income economies. Compared with the increase of logistics level in low-income countries, the increase of trade volume will be promoted, and the import volume of middle and high-income countries will benefit more from the improvement of logistics performance. Kumari and Bharti ( 2021 ) studied the impact of country size on trade and logistics performance based on population size, and found that the degree of LPI to improve related trade growth is the highest in medium-sized countries, followed by small-scale countries. Among the sub-indicators of LPI, cargo tracking ability and timeliness have the greatest impact on the trade of small-scale countries, and the convenience and timeliness of arranging international freight transportation have the greatest impact on medium-sized countries.

In summary, with the deepening of the globalization of the supply chain and industrial chain, import and export trade are moving towards lower cost and higher efficiency. International logistics performance and import and export trade promote each other and jointly drive national economic development. The impact of international performance on the trade of different countries has certain differences. However, there are still few studies on the impact of logistics performance on the trade of countries of different sizes. Therefore, this paper divides the “Belt and Road” initiative countries according to population size, further explores the impact of international logistics performance on import and export trade, and provides a reference for the development of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries and the trade between nations.

Data selection and model construction

In order to improve the trade level of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, this paper studies the impact of international logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries on China’s import and export trade, constructs an extended gravity model, and introduces the LPI into the model. At the same time, according to the population size, the countries along the “Belt and Road” are divided into three categories: large, medium and small, to explore the impact of international logistics performance on the import and export of countries of different sizes and the differences.

Data processing and variable setting

This study takes 2011–2022 as the time interval of the study. The data mainly come from the World Bank WDI database. In view of the fact that the data published by the World Bank has been updated to 2022, but there are missing data in individual years, such as LPI, since the World Bank releases the logistics performance index every two years, in order to ensure the continuity of the data, the missing data of this part is filled by linear prediction using stata15 software. In order to avoid the impact of unit differences between indicators on the experimental results, the gross national product of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, China’s imports and exports to the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, the distance from the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, China’s gross national product, the comprehensive index of international logistics performance, the score of cargo tracking ability, the score of logistics serviceability, the score of international freight transportation that is easy to arrange competitive prices, the score of customs clearance process efficiency, the score of the expected time of goods to reach the consignee frequency and the score of transportation-related infrastructure quality are standardized by stata15. Variables are set as follows:

Explained variable: China’s trade volume with the “Belt and Road” initiative countries (billions of dollars).

Explanatory variable: international logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. Sub-indicators: goods tracking ability score, logistics serviceability score, easy-to-arrange price competitive international freight score, customs clearance process efficiency score, goods expected time to reach the consignee frequency score, and transportation-related infrastructure quality score.

Control variables: distance from the “Belt and Road” initiative countries (kilometers), gross national product of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries (billions of dollars), gross national product of China (billions of dollars), the ratio of total imports and exports of goods and services to GDP of the sample countries, whether it is adjacent to China, and whether it has joined the WTO.

Data sources and processing instructions

According to the model setting and variable definition, the variable name, economic implications, variable value, data source and expected impact on trade volume of international logistics performance and its sub-indicators and control variables on trade volume is shown in Table 1 . If the expected impact on trade volume is positive, it is expressed as '+', and vice versa.

Since the fixed effect model is used for regression analysis while controlling the year and time, all variables should change with time. This paper uses the product of the distance between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries and the Brent crude oil price of the year to represent the distance, so that the distance can change with time, which enhances the feasibility of the model. There are 65 countries and regions along the “Belt and Road” marked by the 'China Belt and Road Network'. However, due to the lack of data in Brunei, Timor-Leste, Palestine and other countries, combined with the availability of data, this study selects the “Belt and Road” initiative countries: 40 countries in Asia, 20 countries in Europe and one country in Africa, a total of 61 countries from 2011 to 2022 sample data for empirical research.

According to the average population data of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries from 2011 to 2022, the countries with the top 25% of the population are classified as large-scale countries, the latter 25% are classified as small-scale countries, and 25–75% are classified as medium-scale countries. The specific division results are shown in Table 2 .

Model construction

The gravitational model is derived from the law of universal gravitation proposed by the British physicist Newton. It was originally used to explain the interaction between objects and was later cited in the field of international trade. It is used to measure the relationship between the trade volume between the two countries and their economic scale (Zhong and Zhou 2022 ). The formula can be expressed as:

Formula (1) is transformed into logarithmic form and the random error term can be expressed as:

The above equation \({{TRADE}}_{{ij}}\) represents the trade volume between country i and country j, \({X}_{i}\) and \({X}_{j}\) represent the economic aggregate of country i and country j respectively, \({{DIS}}_{{ij}}\) represents the geographical distance between the two economies of country i and country j, \({\beta }_{0}\) represents the parameters to be estimated in the model, and ε represents the random error term of the model.

In the gravity model setting in the field of international trade, the trade volume between the two countries is negatively correlated with the distance between the two countries, and positively correlated with the total economic volume of the two countries. On the basis of the basic gravity model, combined with the existing research, the international logistics performance index released by the World Bank is introduced into the gravity model, and the control variables are added to expand the model. The control variables include: DIS, GDPJ, GDPC, OPEN, BORDER and WTO, in which OPEN is an endogenous variable, BORDER and WTO are dummy variables.

The extended gravity model can be expressed as follows:

Each sub-index of LPI as an alternative index of LPI into the extended gravity model can be expressed as:

Empirical analyses

Analysis of statistical index results.

The descriptive statistical results are shown in Table 3 . According to the results in the table, there are great differences in the data results of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. First of all, there is a big difference in China’s import and export to the “Belt and Road” initiative countries: China’s import and export to Bhutan, Maldives, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and other countries remained low from 2011 to 2022, with an average annual import and export value of no more than $300 million. Trade with Singapore, India, Russia and other countries have remained at more than USD 50 billion since 2011. Secondly, the population size of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries is significantly different: the population of Maldives, Bhutan, Montenegro and other countries is less than one million between 2011 and 2022, while India’s population remains above one billion. Third, the scores of various indicators related to logistics in countries along the route are not the same: from the perspective of the comprehensive index of logistics performance, Singapore and other countries have maintained a score of more than 4, and the comprehensive ranking is among the top ten in the world, while Mongolia, Myanmar, Laos, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and other countries have a low logistics level ranking of 100. From the perspective of each sub-index, the differences between countries are obvious, and the development status of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries is uneven.

LPI comprehensive index regression

On the basis of descriptive statistics, this paper further uses Stata15.0 software to conduct regression analysis on the panel data of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries from 2011 to 2022. Since the data cross section (N) > time series (T), it is a short panel and does not require a unit root test. Through collinearity diagnosis, it was found that the VIF values of each index were less than 10, indicating that there was no multicollinearity in the data. The results of the Hausman test are shown in Table 4 , and the P value is 0.0017, which is less than 0.1. Therefore, the results are significant. The original hypothesis that the panel data model is a random effect model is rejected, and the fixed effect model is supported. The fixed effect model is used to analyze the data from 2011 to 2022 by controlling the country and time at the same time. The regression results are shown in Table 5 .

According to the regression results, the impact of international logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries on China’s import and export trade is as follows:

According to the regression results in Table 5 , the impact of LPI on China’s import and export trade is significantly positive under the condition of 10%, indicating that the higher the LPI of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, the more conducive to the trade between China and the country.

In the regression results of endogenous variables, the coefficient of DIS is −0.116, which is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the distance between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has a significant negative impact on China’s trade volume. The farther the distance is, the more unfavorable it is for China’s import and export to the Belt and Road Initiative countries. In China’s international trade, distance cost is still an important influencing factor. The economic volume coefficient of the countries along the route is 0.803, indicating that the economic volume of the countries along the route has a certain impact on China’s imports and exports to the country. The higher the GDP is, the higher the economic development level of the country is, and the higher the corresponding consumption level is, thus driving China’s import and export to the country. China’s economic volume coefficient is 0.1, which is significantly positive at the 1% level. Therefore, the improvement of China’s economic volume will significantly promote the growth of international trade volume. In addition, the degree of opening to the outside world has a significant role in promoting international trade, with a coefficient of 0.223, indicating that the higher the degree of opening to the outside world of countries along the route will be conducive to China’s import and export to the country.

Through the results of dummy variable data, it can be seen that the BORDER and WTO coefficients are-0.048 and 0.011, respectively, and the BORDER is significant at the level of 10%, indicating that the national border is not conducive to improving China’s import and export of goods. Because the climate environment of the bordering countries is close to China, the differences in resources and production factors may not be obvious enough, so that BORDER is negatively correlated with TRADE. The WTO performance is not significant, indicating that whether to join the WTO organization cannot be used as the strongest factor affecting trade between countries. To a certain extent, the differences in the types of goods traded between China and countries of different sizes will affect the volume of trade between countries. For example, some countries have parallel production with China, which leads to a decrease in trade between China and the country.

The comparison of the results in Table 5 shows that the impact of international logistics performance on China’s import and export to large-scale countries is significantly positive at the 1% level. In addition, the impact of international logistics performance on small and medium-sized countries is negative and insignificant at the 10% level, respectively. To a certain extent, it is due to the small total national demand of small and medium-sized countries. The improvement of international logistics performance has also led to the improvement of the national internal logistics system and promoted the better utilization of national internal resources. Therefore, continuing to invest resources to enhance the international logistics performance level of small and medium-sized countries is not conducive to the growth of import and export trade volume, which is more obvious in small-scale countries, and reasonable allocation of resources is particularly important.

LPI sub-index regression

In order to study the impact of LPI’s specific sub-indicators on China’s import and export to the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, this paper replaces LPI with six sub-indicators TRACE, SERVICE, SHIPMENTS, CLEARANCE, TIME, INFRASTRUCTURE for regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 6 .

From the regression results, it can be seen that TRACE, SHIPMENTS, CLEARANCE and TIME are not significant at the 10% level, indicating that logistics cargo tracking ability, international freight price competitiveness, customs clearance efficiency and logistics timeliness have little impact on China’s import and export to the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. The impact of SERVICE on import and export trade is positive, which is significant at the level of 10%, and INFRASTRUCTURE is positive at the level of 1%. That is, the logistics service capacity and logistics infrastructure quality of the Belt and Road Initiative countries have a greater impact on China’s import and export trade. Logistics service capacity includes inventory capacity, operation capacity and logistics reliability of the logistics system. The progress of logistics inventory capacity and operation capacity will be conducive to the supply of resources and business development of international trade enterprises (Wang 2023 ). The improvement of logistics reliability will increase consumers ‘ online purchase intention to a certain extent and promote the positive development of international trade (Yuan and Zhang 2023 ). The quality of logistics infrastructure is an important guarantee for efficient transportation of goods (Yuan et al. 2023 ). Therefore, China’s trade import and export have a certain dependence on the level of international logistics performance. The improvement of the relevant sub-indicators of the logistics performance index has a certain role in promoting China’s import and export trade.

Through the regression analysis of comprehensive indicators, it can be seen that the impact of international logistics performance on large-scale countries is the most significant. In order to deeply explore the impact of sub-indicators of international logistics performance on large-scale countries, this paper introduces the sub-indicators of international logistics performance indicators into large-scale countries, and replaces LPI for regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 7 .

From the regression results in Table 7 , it can be seen that TRACE and TIME have no significant impact on China’s import and export to large-scale countries. SHIPMENTS is significant at the 5% level. SERVICE, CLEARANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE are significant at the 1% level, and the coefficients are 0.254,0.532,0.485 and 0.449, respectively. The international freight price competitiveness, logistics service capacity, customs clearance efficiency and logistics-related infrastructure level of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries have a significant positive effect on China’s trade import and export.

Robustness test

In order to avoid the influence of extreme values on the empirical results of the selected samples, this paper removes individual outliers and conducts robustness test analysis. Among the 61 sample countries along the “Belt and Road”, China’s annual average import and export volume to Bhutan, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova from 2011 to 2022 is less than USD 100 million, which has a large gap with the average value of China’s import and export volume to the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. Therefore, in order to avoid the impact of such extreme data on the experimental results, this paper eliminates the sample data of four countries, including Bhutan, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova, and performs multiple regression analysis on the remaining sample data. The regression results are shown in Table 8 .

Combined with the regression results, it can be seen that the LPI coefficient passed the significance test under the condition of 5%, excluding the influence of sample selection bias on the empirical results of this paper. That is, the international logistics performance of the Belt and Road Initiative countries has a significant role in promoting the growth of trade volume between China and the country.

Since 2020, the new coronavirus epidemic has traumatized the economies of various countries to a certain extent and has had a certain impact on the country’s import and export trade. In order to avoid the interference of such factors on the regression results, the sample time interval is shortened to 2011–2020, and the regression is carried out again. The results are shown in Table 9 , and the estimated coefficient of LPI is significantly positive at the level of 10%, which proves that under the condition of weakening the interference of economic turbulence factors, the improvement of logistics performance level of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has a significant role in promoting China’s trade import and export, and the conclusions of this paper are still robust.

The data are tailed in the range of 5–95%. The second column in Table 10 shows that the international logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has a positive impact on China’s import and export trade, which is significant at the level of 5%, the coefficient is small, and the main research conclusions have not changed.

Since there may be a certain time difference in the effect of international logistics performance level on import and export trade volume, this paper lags the explained variable TRADE by one period to explore the lag effect of LPI on TRADE, which helps to alleviate the possible two-way causality. The results in Table 11 show that the impact of LPI on TRADE lags one period is consistent with the benchmark results, so the benchmark regression is robust.

Conclusions

By adding the international logistics performance index to the trade gravity model, this paper analyzes the impact of the logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries on China’s import and export trade. At the same time, the countries along the 'Belt and Road' are divided into three scales: large, medium and small, to explore the differences in the impact of logistics performance on the import and export of China and these three scale countries. According to the empirical analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn:

First, the improvement of the logistics performance level of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has a certain role in promoting the increase of trade volume between China and the country. The international logistics performance index of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has the most significant impact on China’s import and export to large-scale countries. The impact of LPI on China’s import and export trade is significantly positive under the condition of 10%. Therefore, the improvement of the logistics performance index of the 'Belt and Road' initiative countries is conducive to the increase of trade volume between China and the country. The impact of international logistics performance on China’s import and export to large-scale countries is significantly positive at the 1% level, small-scale countries are significantly negative at the 10% level, and medium-scale countries are not significant.

Second, the sub-indicators of the international logistics performance index of the countries along the “Belt and Road” have different degrees of influence on the import and export volume. Among them, logistics service capacity has a significant impact at the level of 10%, and the quality of logistics infrastructure is significant at the level of 1%, and the coefficient is positive. Therefore, the improvement of logistics service capacity and logistics infrastructure quality will help promote the growth of import and export volume. However, TRACE, SHIPMENTS, CLEARANCE and TIME have no significant impact on import and export volume. Therefore, logistics cargo tracking capability, international freight price competitiveness, customs clearance efficiency and logistics timeliness have little impact on China’s import and export to the Belt and Road Initiative countries.

Third, among the sub-indicators of international logistics performance of large-scale countries along the 'Belt and Road', international freight price competitiveness, logistics service capacity, customs clearance efficiency and logistics-related infrastructure level have a significant role in promoting import and export trade, and the impact of cargo tracking capacity and logistics timeliness is not significant. SERVICE, CLEARANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE are significant at the 1% level, with coefficients of 0.532,0.485 and 0.449, respectively, so the impact of logistics service capacity is the greatest.

Practical implications

Based on the relevant conclusions of this paper, it is concluded that the improvement of the international logistics performance of the 'Belt and Road' initiative countries is conducive to promoting the development of China’s international trade, and the factors that have a greater impact on the growth of import and export trade in the sub-indicators of international logistics performance are clarified, which provides a certain basis for the implementation of the 'Belt and Road' initiative. In addition, combined with the research conclusions, targeted suggestions are put forward to provide certain reference values for the improvement of national logistics and trade levels and the implementation direction of the “Belt and Road” initiative.

First, improve logistics performance and reduce trade costs. The regression results show that the international logistics performance of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries has a significant and positive impact on China’s import and export, indicating that the level of logistics performance will promote the economic and trade exchanges between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. The implementation of China’s 'Belt and Road' initiative is of great significance to the deepening of international cooperation. However, due to the large differences in the level of logistics performance among the “Belt and Road” initiative countries, this difference will restrict the development of intra-regional trade to a certain extent, and then weaken the benefits of the “Belt and Road” initiative. Therefore, it is particularly important to give full play to the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund to ensure the financial support for the process of improving the logistics performance level of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. In addition, make full use of advanced digital economy and technology to promote more efficient and lower-cost trade between the “Belt and Road” initiative countries.

Second, strengthen infrastructure facilities and reduce trade barriers between countries along the route. Whether from the LPI comprehensive index regression or the regression results of each sub-index, the coefficient of distance is negative, indicating that the geographical distance between China and the “Belt and Road” initiative countries will have a negative impact on China’s import and export, that is, distance is still an important factor affecting trade costs. However, there are still some problems and obstacles in the logistics facilities of various countries. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the capital investment and investment in various facilities related to logistics, improve the sub-indicators of logistics performance, and improve logistics competitiveness and reduce trade costs by improving infrastructure quality and logistics service capabilities.

Third, improve the logistics performance of large-scale countries and promote the overall development of countries along the “Belt and Road”. Comparing the regression results of the three models of large, medium and small, the LPI passed the significance test of China’s import and export to large-scale countries at the 1% level. International logistics performance has the most significant impact on China’s import and export to large-scale countries along the “Belt and Road”, and the impact of logistics service capacity, customs clearance efficiency and logistics-related infrastructure level in each sub-index is the most significant. That is to say, the improvement of logistics performance of large-scale countries along the route will promote China’s import and export trade to a greater extent. Therefore, in order to promote the high-quality development of the “Belt and Road”, the government can increase investment in infrastructure construction in large-scale countries, promote the development of their import and export trade, and enhance the overall development of the “Belt and Road”.

Limitation and future research

In the research, the “Belt and Road” initiative countries are used as research samples. The sample interval is not broad enough, and the data source has certain limitations. Future research can consider many countries in the world with trade. Secondly, according to the number of populations, this paper divides different countries into three categories: large-scale countries, medium-scale countries and small-scale countries, and explores the different effects of international logistics performance on import and export trade in different countries. In the future, it can be further studied according to other aspects such as national income level, national geographical location and national economic development level. Finally, the fixed effect model is adopted in this paper. The research method is relatively simple, and the selection of control variables and sub-indicators is limited. Future research can try different research methods, add different control variables and sub-indicators to improve the technicality and comprehensiveness of the research. Although there are some limitations in this study, this study has certain positive significance for enriching the literature in the field of international logistics performance and international trade development, and enriches the current knowledge.

Data availability

The data used in the paper were compiled by the authors according to the World Bank Database and Prospective Database. Requests to access these publicly available datasets should be directed to https://d.qianzhan.com/xdata/list/xCxpy5y5xr.html , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.TRAC.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.INFR.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.ITRN.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.LOGS.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.CUST.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/LP.LPI.TIME.XQ , https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS .

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Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Science and Technology Innovation Project of Chongqing Education Commission “Chengdu Chongging Double City Economic Circle Construction”, Grant Number KJCX2020039.

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Wang, W., Wu, Q., Su, J. et al. The impact of international logistics performance on import and export trade: an empirical case of the “Belt and Road” initiative countries. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 11 , 1028 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03541-0

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October 6, 2021

The Biden Administration’s U.S.-China Trade Strategy: A Primer

Executive Summary

• On October 4, 2021, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai revealed the Biden Administration’s highly anticipated strategic plan on U.S.-China trade policy, which set an overall goal of “building resilience and competitiveness” for American workers and the economy overall.
• The plan lays out four steps to achieve this goal but offers little detail on how the administration plans to implement the steps.
• The lack of specifics suggests that much of the administration’s trade strategy has yet to be decided and depends on the outcome of future discussions between the United States and China; the specifics it does offer imply that the Biden Administration will continue many of the Trump Administration’s protectionist policies toward China.

Introduction

On October 4, 2021, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced the Biden Administration’s long-awaited strategic plan on reformulating U.S.-China trade policy. The plan’s objective is to formulate a U.S.-China trade policy that builds “resilience and competitiveness — including with our allies and partners — on diversifying markets, and limiting the impact of Beijing’s harmful practices.”

The plan outlines, in order, four steps the Biden Administration will take in the coming months: [1]

• Revisit the “Phase One” trade deal originally negotiated under the Trump Administration and “emphasize” that China holds up its end to the agreement;
• Reinstate a “targeted” Section 301 tariffs exclusion process;
• Continue high level discussions with China to address more and broader trade concerns; and
• Work more closely with allies to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Although the plan outlines the steps, it provides little detail on how USTR and the Biden Administration will implement them. This lack of specificity suggests much of the Biden Administration’s China trade strategy has yet to be decided and depends on the outcomes of steps 1 and 3. The specifics the plan does offer imply the Biden Administration will continue much of the Trump Administration’s protectionist trade policy toward China.

Revisit Phase One

The Biden Administration’s first step in its initial China trade strategy is to revisit the “ Phase One ” trade agreement and “emphasize” that China upholds its provisions in the agreement. In 2018, the Trump Administration levied Section 301 tariffs on $360 billion worth of imports from China under the justification of punishing China for its forced technology transfer and intellectual property (IP) theft. These tariffs have since become known as the “China Tariffs.” Subsequently, the United States and China agreed to a Phase One trade deal, in which China agreed to reduce non-tariff barriers against U.S. exports and reform some of its unfair practices (such as IP theft) in exchange for the Trump Administration reducing a portion of its China Tariffs. The deal also outlined that China purchase $200 billion of additional goods and services (over 2017 levels) from the United States through the end of 2021. The plan does not spell out what the Biden Administration will do if the Phase One agreement discussions fail; it simply notes the need for an “emphasis” on upholding the agreement.

Ambassador Tai stated Phase One is flawed because it focuses almost exclusively on China’s IP theft, while failing to address China’s industrial subsidies and state-directed approach. She also noted, however, that Phase One is beneficial for certain sectors of the U.S. economy, such as agriculture, because it increases market access. It would therefore make sense to pursue a Phase Two deal which builds on the provisions in Phase One that help the U.S. economy, while shifting the priorities toward addressing China’s unfair subsidies. Ambassador Tai ruled out pursuing a Phase Two deal, however.

Reopen “Targeted” Section 301 Tariff Exclusions

The administration’s second step is to reopen a “targeted” exclusions process on the Section 301 China Tariffs. Through this process, U.S. companies can ask USTR to exclude or exempt them from paying certain China Tariffs. USTR evaluates exclusion requests on a case-by-case basis using several criteria, including import availability outside of China and the economic harm of the tariffs. This is the main way U.S. companies seek relief from tariffs. From 2018 to 2020, however, USTR denied 46,000 requests (87 percent) out of 53,000 submitted. [2] The Government Accountability Office also found USTR failed to document its internal process in granting tariff exclusions and was neither consistent nor transparent in the process. [3] The plan does not provide details on how the exclusions process will be different, only that the process will be reopened and possibly extended.

There is speculation that USTR will conduct a new Section 301 investigation with a focus on China’s industrial practices and how they have hurt U.S. business. [4] A new Section 301 investigation would allow the Biden Administration to adjust the current China Tariffs, keeping those it likes and removing those it does not. The new investigation could also simply result in more tariffs. Many were hoping the Biden Administration would completely rescind the China Tariffs. The reopening of the exclusions process and a new Section 301 investigation instead suggests the Biden Administration will continue the biggest and most damaging trade action of the Trump Administration. The White House and Ambassador Tai have not provided additional details when pressed on this issue.

Continue High Level Discussions with China

The administration’s third step is to continue high-level trade discussions with China that go beyond the Phase One deal and cover broader trade concerns. These future discussions will therefore depend on the outcome of the discussion over the Phase One deal. And it is in this step that the administration will make more concrete decisions based on China’s response. Ambassador Tai noted she would emphasize to Beijing that the United States will use all tools available to pursue its trade interests while at the same time stating, “our objective is not to inflame trade tensions with China.”

Work More Closely with Allies

The administration’s fourth step is to work more closely with allies to counter China’s unfair trade practices. Ambassador Tai pointed to the agreement between the United States and European Union to suspend tariffs that resulted from a dispute between Boeing and Airbus as an example of such cooperation. This example is flawed, however, because if the United States and European Union were serious about putting the issue to rest, they would have rescinded the tariffs rather than simply suspending them. Beyond emphasizing the importance of this step, the ambassador provided little detail.

One of the most effective ways the United States can work with its allies is to leverage current trade deals and pursue new ones. Trade deals allow large economies such as the United States to shape regional trade in its favor, while also providing a platform to consolidate and integrate trade practices. This is especially true in the Indo-Pacific region, which has one of the world’s fastest-growing and increasingly influential economies. There are currently two major Indo-Pacific trade agreements in effect, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) . China has officially applied to join CPTPP, while it is one of the original signatories to RCEP. The United States, on the other hand, is not a part of either. Ambassador Tai suggested the Biden Administration has little intent in joining CPTPP, deeming it outdated. She did not discuss pursuing another trade deal or joining RCEP.

The U.S.-China trade relationship is the most important in the world, as it has significant economic implications across the globe. Following a nine-month wait, the Biden Administration finally released its strategic plan on U.S.-China trade relations, but the vague plan provided little new information to the American businesses that are severely impacted by the U.S.-China trade war.

This vagueness of the plan implies that the Biden Administration’s strategy will not be clear until after future trade discussions between the United States and China. In the meantime, many of the protectionist trade policies started under the Trump Administration will continue under President Biden.

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/10/04/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-the-administrations-trade-approach-to-china/

[2] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-506

[4] https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2021/09/13/white-house-trial-balloons-new-china-tariffs-797563

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More pain than gain: How the US-China trade war hurt America

Subscribe to the china bulletin, ryan hass and ryan hass interim chen-fu and cecilia yen koo chair in taiwan studies, the michael h. armacost chair, fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , john l. thornton china center abraham denmark abraham denmark director, asia program and senior fellow, kissinger institute on china and the united states - woodrow wilson international center for scholars.

August 7, 2020

• 12 min read

The ultimate results of the phase one trade deal between China and the United States — and the trade war that preceded it — have significantly hurt the American economy without solving the underlying economic concerns that the trade war was meant to resolve, writes Ryan Hass and Abraham Denmark. The consequences that have followed in the wake of the economic clash have served to exacerbate bilateral relations. This piece originally appeared in SupChina .

As a candidate in 2016, Donald Trump built his argument for the presidency around his claimed acumen as a  dealmaker . As the 2020 election draws nearer, President Trump and his surrogates are doubling down on that assertion, including by calling attention to what  he has deemed  “the biggest deal ever seen”: the  “phase one” trade deal  with China. The agreement reportedly includes a Chinese commitment to purchase an additional $200 billion in American goods above 2017 levels by the end of 2021.

Six months after the deal was inked, the costs and benefits of this agreement are coming into clearer focus. Despite Trump’s  claim  that “trade wars are good, and easy to win,” the ultimate results of the phase one trade deal between China and the United States — and the trade war that preceded it — have significantly hurt the American economy without solving the underlying economic concerns that the trade war was meant to resolve. The effects of the trade war go beyond economics, though. Trump’s prioritization on the trade deal and de-prioritization of all other dimensions of the relationship produced a more permissive environment for China to advance its interests abroad and oppress its own people at home, secure in the knowledge that American responses would be muted by a president who was reluctant to risk losing the deal.

Origins of the trade war

During the 2016 presidential campaign, a consistent refrain from then-candidate Trump was to point to U.S. trade with China, and the agreements that enabled it, as a primary cause of the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs and intellectual property. He  said China was responsible  for “the greatest theft in the history of the world” and lambasted the U.S. trade deficit with China, which  in 2016 stood at around $346 billion . He declared, “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country.” Building on the image of Donald Trump as the ultimate dealmaker, his campaign released a strategy to  reform the U.S.-China trade relationship , in which it pledged to “cut a better deal with China that helps American businesses and workers compete.” Trump laid out a four-part plan to secure a better deal with China: declare China a currency manipulator; confront China on intellectual property and forced technology transfer concerns; end China’s use of export subsidies and lax labor and environmental standards; and lower America’s corporate tax rate to make U.S. manufacturing more competitive.

Upon entering office, Trump sought to engage Beijing directly to address structural concerns about China’s economic policies. Just three months into his administration, he  met with Chinese leader Xí Jìnpíng 习近平  at Mar-a-Largo, where they agreed to establish a 100-Day Action Plan to resolve trade differences. The next month, China  agreed  to open its economy (slightly) to U.S. firms and services in exchange for greater Chinese access on bilateral trade and U.S. recognition of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Yet follow-on negotiations fizzled as Washington pushed Beijing for more concessions and Beijing rebuffed American pressure. The 100 days concluded in July 2017 with no agreement, no press conference, and no joint statement out of the first meeting of the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (which was declared dead by the Trump administration four months later).

President Trump launched the trade war to pressure Beijing to implement significant changes to aspects of its economic system that facilitate unfair Chinese trade practices, including forced technology transfer, limited market access, intellectual property theft, and subsidies to state-owned enterprises. Trump argued that unilateral tariffs would shrink the U.S. trade deficit with China and cause companies to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States. Between July 2018 and August 2019, the United States announced plans to impose  tariffs on more than $550 billion of Chinese products, and China retaliated with tariffs on more than $185 billion of U.S. goods.

Economic costs of the trade war

The trade war caused economic pain on both sides and led to diversion of trade flows away from both China and the United States. As  described  by Heather Long at the Washington Post, “U.S. economic growth slowed, business investment froze, and companies didn’t hire as many people. Across the nation, a lot of farmers went bankrupt, and the manufacturing and freight transportation sectors have hit lows not seen since the last recession. Trump’s actions amounted to one of the largest tax increases in years.”

A  September 2019 study by Moody’s Analytics  found that the trade war had already cost the U.S. economy nearly 300,000 jobs and an estimated 0.3% of real GDP.  Other studies  put the cost to U.S. GDP at about 0.7%. A  2019 report from Bloomberg Economics  estimated that the trade war would cost the U.S. economy $316 billion by the end of 2020, while more recent  research from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Columbia University  found that U.S. companies lost at least $1.7 trillion in the price of their stocks as a result of U.S. tariffs imposed on imports from China.

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Numerous  studies  have found that U.S. companies primarily paid for U.S. tariffs, with the cost  estimated  at nearly $46 billion. The tariffs  forced American companies  to accept lower profit margins, cut wages and jobs for U.S. workers, defer potential wage hikes or expansions, and raise prices for American consumers or companies. A spokesperson for the American Farm Bureau  stated  that “farmers have lost the vast majority of what was once a $24 billion market in China” as a result of Chinese retaliatory actions.

Meanwhile, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China continued to grow,  reaching a record $419.2 billion in 2018. By 2019, the trade deficit had shrunk to $345 billion, roughly the same level as 2016, largely as a result of reduced trade flows. It should be noted that, while the U.S. deficit with China decreased, its overall trade deficit did not. Trump’s unilateral tariffs on China diverted trade flows from China, causing the U.S. trade deficit with Europe, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to increase as a result.

China also felt economic pain as a result of the trade war, though apparently not enough to capitulate to the Trump administration’s core demands for major structural reform. Indeed, as the trade war dragged on, Beijing  lowered  its tariffs for its other trading partners as it reduced its  reliance on U.S. markets. The final deal that both sides announced on January 15, 2020, largely resembled the offer Beijing had put on the table from the start — increased goods purchases plus commitments on improved intellectual property protection, currency, and forced technology transfer.

Missing from the deal was any forward movement on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and China’s uses of industrial policy to advantage its own firms over foreign competitors. Progress on market access also proved underwhelming outside of the financial sector. These and other challenges were put off for a phase two negotiation, which  Trump recently said  is not under consideration.

A more permissive environment for Chinese aggression and suppression  

Throughout this period, President Trump made efforts to develop a smooth and positive relationship with China — and especially with Xi Jinping — and explained his efforts as serving the purpose of advancing trade negotiations. Trump lauded Xi’s strength and leadership publicly while shying away from points of sharp bilateral friction in private engagements. Instead, Trump reportedly used his private exchanges with Xi to urge him to act on his personal priorities, most of which related to the trade negotiations, and, for a time, North Korea.

In June 2019, Trump reportedly  promised Xi Jinping in a private phone call  that the United States would  refrain from criticizing China over Hong Kong  while trade negotiations were ongoing. The following month,  Trump said he believed that Xi Jinping had acted “very responsibly” with the protests in Hong Kong , adding, “We’re working on trade deals right now. We’ll see what happens.” He expressed similar sentiments publicly in November when  he shied away from criticizing Xi about Hong Kong and linked the issue to trade negotiations , saying, “We have to stand with Hong Kong, but I’m also standing with President Xi.” He further said that Xi is “a friend of mine, he’s an incredible guy,” and described the Hong Kong protests as a “complicating factor” in trade talks. On January 10, 2020, when Laura Ingraham on Fox News asked Trump about “the human rights issue in China” and referenced “a million people in reeducation camps, internment camps,”  he replied , “Well, I’m riding a fine line, because we’re making…great trade deals.”

John Bolton, then national security adviser, claims that the reasons behind President Trump’s prioritization of a trade deal above other considerations with China were made clear in a private meeting with Xi Jinping at the June 2019 G-20 summit in Japan.  According to Bolton , Trump told Xi to go ahead with building camps to detain 1 million or more Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, saying it was exactly the right thing to do, and asked Xi Jinping to help him win the upcoming presidential election by increasing purchases of soybeans and wheat. Trump later challenged Bolton’s characterization of events,  tweeting  that Bolton’s book “is a compilation of lies and made up stories”; Trump  specifically denied  Bolton’s claims about Xinjiang. Yet at a campaign rally in Manchester, New Hampshire, on February 10, 2020, Trump  declared , “Last month, we signed a groundbreaking trade agreement with China that will defeat so many of our opponents.”

Although other members of the Trump administration, including Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have been outspoken in their criticism of China’s repression at home and aggression abroad, their statements have not been seen in Beijing as a substitute for presidential opprobrium. During this period, the Trump administration did take a wide range of actions against China, including tightening export controls, enhancing investment screening, challenging Chinese technology companies, and blunting the Belt and Road Initiative. In Beijing’s top-down Leninist system, though, the signals that other leaders send to Xi Jinping, and Xi’s responses to those messages, carry significant weight. Neither the United States nor any other country gets to have two foreign policies with China. There only is one. Beijing’s antennae are tuned to the signals that other leaders send.

To be clear, the Chinese leadership owns full responsibility for its recklessly nationalistic actions along its periphery and its brutal suppression at home. Beijing’s decisions to move in its current direction were made simpler, though, by its confidence in Trump’s tight focus on trade and his interest in not allowing other issues to obstruct completion of a deal or derail the deal’s implementation.

Even in the weeks following the signing of the phase one trade deal, President Trump remained focused on reassuring Xi of his support. For weeks, Trump  repeatedly praised Xi’s response to the rapid spread of COVID-19  in China. Trump’s tone would not change until the virus took its toll on the United States.

Was the trade war worth it?

The two sides declared a truce in the trade war at an ornate signing ceremony at the White House involving President Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liú Hè 刘鹤, the 11th ranked member in the Chinese leadership. Although the full text of the agreement has not been made public, reports say the agreement commits China to purchasing an extra $200 billion in American products over two years above 2017 levels. The  text  of the agreement that has been made public shows China committing to protect American intellectual property, halt coercive technology transfers, and refrain from using currency devaluation as a trade weapon. It also included an enforcement mechanism that would allow for the imposition of import tariffs if disputes are not resolved.

In the six months since the deal was signed, the prospects of China meeting its purchasing targets have  dimmed considerably . According to  Bloomberg calculations  based on Chinese Customs Administration data, China in the first half of 2020 had purchased only 23% of the total purchase target for the year. While part of this is attributable to trade flow disruptions caused by COVID-19, much of the gap owes to the impracticality of the agreement from the start. In the phase one deal, as  described  by Brad W. Setser and Dylan Yalbir at the Council on Foreign Relations, China committed to purchasing roughly $60 billion more in U.S. goods than it had in 2017 — roughly $180 billion in U.S. goods this year. Yet U.S. goods exports to China currently are  significantly   below  what they were in 2017.

In other words, Beijing essentially paid for the deal with a promise of a windfall in purchases of American goods. It appears that President Trump accepted an IOU as a declaration of victory.

Time will tell if the innovations in the agreement on enforcement will succeed where others have failed, and much will depend on China’s willingness to translate agreements into law and, crucially, enforce them. Yet the key question for the United States — especially today, as the U.S. economy is in its worst state since the Great Depression as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic — is if the economic costs it paid for those enforcement agreements were worth the billions of dollars lost in value, the hundreds of thousands of jobs lost, the stagnation of U.S. manufacturing, and the devastating effects of the trade war on American farmers.

Ultimately, the phase one agreement disappointed because it, along with the trade war, severely damaged the U.S. economy while failing to make significant progress in fundamentally resolving the structural imbalances of the U.S.-China trade relationship.

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• Published 7 July 2020
• Political Science
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Ecological source identification and ecological security pattern construction from the perspective of ecosystem service supply and demand: A case study of Baiyangdian Basin in China

• Published: 19 August 2024

Cite this article

• Xing Gao 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
• Zhongyuan Guo   ORCID: orcid.org/0009-0001-9651-2021 1 ,
• Mengmeng Zhang 1 ,
• Xinyu Liang 1 ,
• Meiran Zhao   ORCID: orcid.org/0009-0001-7050-0233 1 &
• Ling Qin   ORCID: orcid.org/0009-0005-6386-0512 5  

Achieving a balance between the supply and demand of ecosystem services is crucial for ensuring ecological security and promoting the healthy development of regional ecosystems. This study focuses on 35 county-level administrative regions within China's Baiyangdian Basin. The supply and demand of four ecosystem services, namely water supply, carbon sequestration, food production, and entertainment services, were quantitatively evaluated. Ecological Sources are identified from the perspective of supply and demand, with the basic Resistance Surface corrected using VIIRS/DNB nightlight data and Circuit Theory applied to identify Ecological Corridors and Key Points. A regional Ecological Security Pattern was established. The results reveal the presence of 163 Ecological Sources in this area, which cover a total area of approximately 6,479.24 km 2 . These sources were predominantly found in the Taihang Mountains in the northwest, as well as in the central and eastern river basins of the area. A total of 76 main and 112 potential Ecological Corridors were extracted, totaling 3,241.63 km. Additionally, 124 Ecological Key Points were extracted, including 74 key Pinch Points, 30 general Pinch Points, and 20 Obstacle Points. These ecological elements are interconnected to form a basic structure of the Ecological Security Pattern. The study identifies a spatial pattern of "Three zones—One belt—Multiple corridor and point" and provides targeted policy suggestions based on these findings. The research contributes valuable insights for ecosystem management and the development of land space ecological restoration policies in both the Xiong'an New Area and the Baiyangdian Basin.

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Data Availability

The datasets used or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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Acknowledgements

Sincere gratitude to the editor and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comment. Responsibility for the content of the manuscript remains solely with the author.

This project is supported by National: Natural Science Foundation of China: Realization Mechanisms, Influencing Factors and Optimization of Urban Ecosystem Service Delivery: A Case Study of Beijing and its Surrounding Areas (42371279); The National Natural Science Foundation of China: Research on Safety Resilience Evaluation of Critical Infrastructure Systems in Urban Cities and Optimization of Operation (72374063); Hebei Province Graduate Student Innovation Ability Training Funding Project: Study on the Multi-scale Spatial Convergence of Urban Land Green Use Efficiency in China(CXZZSS2024091).

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School of Public Administration, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang, 050061, China

Xing Gao, Zhongyuan Guo, Mengmeng Zhang, Xinyu Liang & Meiran Zhao

Center for Urban Sustainability and Innovation Development, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang, 050061, China

Hebei Collaborative Innovation Center for Urban-Rural Integrated Development, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang, 050061, China

Hebei Province Economics and Social Development Geographic Information Big Data Platform, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang, 050061, China

School of Land Science and Space Planning, Hebei GEO University, Shijiazhuang, 050031, China

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X.G., L.Q. contributed to the conception of the study; M.Z., M.R.Z. performed the experiment and data processing; Z.G., X.L. contributed significantly to analysis and manuscript preparation; M.Z., Z.G. performed the data analyses and wrote the manuscript. X.G. and Z.G. have contributed equally to this work.

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Gao, X., Guo, Z., Zhang, M. et al. Ecological source identification and ecological security pattern construction from the perspective of ecosystem service supply and demand: A case study of Baiyangdian Basin in China. Environ Dev Sustain (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-024-05302-0

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