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The Current Situation in Pakistan

A USIP Fact Sheet

Monday, January 23, 2023

Publication Type: Fact Sheet

Pakistan continues to face multiple sources of internal and external conflict. Extremism and intolerance of diversity and dissent have grown, fuelled by a narrow vision of Pakistan’s national identity, and are threatening the country’s prospects for social cohesion and stability.   

The inability of state institutions to reliably provide peaceful ways to resolve grievances has encouraged groups to seek violence as an alternative. The country saw peaceful political transitions after the 2013 and 2018 elections. However, as the country prepares for anticipated elections in 2023, it continues to face a fragile economy along with deepening domestic polarization. Meanwhile, devastating flooding across Pakistan in 2022 has caused billions in damage, strained the country’s agriculture and health sectors, and also laid bare Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate disasters and troubling weaknesses in governance and economic stability.

Regionally, Pakistan faces a resurgence of extremist groups along its border with Afghanistan, which has raised tensions with Taliban-led Afghanistan. Despite a declared ceasefire on the Line of Control in Kashmir in 2021, relations with India remain stagnant and vulnerable to crises that pose a threat to regional and international security. The presence and influence of China, as a great power and close ally of Pakistan, has both the potential to ameliorate and exacerbate various internal and external conflicts in the region.

USIP’S Work

The U.S. Institute of Peace has conducted research and analysis and promoted dialogue in Pakistan since the 1990s, with a presence in the country since 2013. The Institute works to help reverse Pakistan’s growing intolerance of diversity and to increase social cohesion. USIP supports local organizations that develop innovative ways to build peace and promote narratives of inclusion using media, arts, technology, dialogues and education.

USIP works with state institutions in their efforts to be more responsive to citizens’ needs, which can reduce the use of violence to resolve grievances. The Institute supports work to improve police-community relations, promote greater access to justice and strengthen inclusive democratic institutions and governance. USIP also conducts and supports research in Pakistan to better understand drivers of peace and conflict and informs international policies and programs that promote peace and tolerance within Pakistan, between Pakistan and its neighbors, and between Pakistan and the United States.

USIP’s Work in Pakistan Includes:

Improving police-community relations for effective law enforcement

The Pakistani police have struggled with a poor relationship with the public, characterized by mistrust and mistreatment, which has hindered effective policing. USIP has partnered with national and provincial police departments to aid in building police-community relationships and strengthening policing in Pakistan through training, capacity building and social media engagement.

Building sustainable mechanisms for dialogue, critical thinking and peace education.

Nearly two-thirds of Pakistan’s population is under the age of 30. Youth with access to higher education carry disproportionate influence in society. However, Pakistan’s siloed education system does not allow interactions across diverse groups or campuses, leading to intolerance, and in some cases, radicalization. To tackle growing intolerance of diversity on university campuses, USIP has partnered with civil society and state institutions to support programs that establish sustainable mechanisms for dialogue, critical thinking and peace education.

Helping Pakistanis rebuild traditions of tolerance to counter extremists’ demands for violence

USIP supports local cultural leaders, civil society organizations, artists and others in reviving local traditions and discourses that encourage acceptance of diversity, promote dialogue and address social change. USIP also supports media production — including theater, documentaries and collections of short stories — which offer counter narratives to extremism and religious fundamentalism.

Support for acceptance and inclusion of religious minorities

Relations between religious communities in Pakistan have deteriorated, with some instances of intercommunal violence or other forms of exclusion. USIP supports the efforts of local peacebuilders, including religious scholars and leaders, to promote interfaith harmony, peaceful coexistence and equitable inclusion of minorities (gender, ethnic and religious) in all spheres of public life.

Supporting inclusive and democratic institutions

To help democratic institutions be more responsive to citizens, USIP supports technical assistance to state institutions and efforts to empower local governments, along with helping relevant civil society actors advocate for greater inclusion of marginalized groups. Gender has been a major theme of this effort and across USIP’s programming in Pakistan. These programs empower women in peacebuilding and democratic processes through research, advocacy and capacity building.

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What is happening in Pakistan’s continuing crisis?

Subscribe to the center for middle east policy newsletter, madiha afzal madiha afzal fellow - foreign policy , center for middle east policy , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , center for asia policy studies.

May 20, 2022

Even by the standards of Pakistan’s perpetually unstable politics, the last ten weeks in the country have been exceptionally turbulent. Pakistan has a new government as of April 11 after Imran Khan was forced out via a vote of no confidence. The weeks leading up to the vote, from the filing of the motion on March 8 to the vote on April 10, were dramatic and full of intrigue. Now, the country is in economic and political crisis. Shahbaz Sharif’s new government has been in a state of decision paralysis and is struggling to find its footing, while the ousted prime minister is leading rallies across the country attacking the government’s legitimacy and calling for fresh elections. At the same time, Pakistan is also in the grip of an acute climate emergency. It’s not only political temperatures that are spiking: an unprecedented heat wave has enveloped Pakistan for weeks.

The fall of Khan’s government

Crucial to the current crisis is understanding how Khan’s government fell. While Khan was Pakistan’s first prime minister to be ousted via a  no-confidence vote, he joined each of his predecessors as prime minister in not lasting five years — the length of parliament’s electoral term — in office. Pakistan’s major opposition parties had been clamoring for Khan’s exit since he came into office — calling him “selected” by the military as opposed to “elected” — and had formed an alliance, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), in the fall of 2020 for that purpose. This spring, the opposition gained traction. On the surface, the opposition blamed governance and economic failures under Khan. But the underlying reason their maneuvers were successful was that Khan had lost the support of Pakistan’s military, which helped him rise to power.

Several factors were responsible for the fracture between Khan and the military, who previously had functioned on a much-touted “same page.” The biggest was an impasse over the transfer of the director general of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in October 2021. Khan refused to sign off on the director general’s transfer, already approved by the military, for weeks. The then-ISI chief was a Khan loyalist, and speculation was that Khan wanted him to be around for the next election (or perhaps even to appoint him the next army chief).

Once Khan lost the military’s support — though the military said it had become neutral — space was allowed to the opposition to make their moves. Two small parties allied with Khan in the ruling coalition switched to the opposition, enough to deprive him of his razor-thin majority in the National Assembly.

Khan hatched a conspiracy theory to blame for his government’s collapse — alleging , without evidence, U.S. “regime change” for following an “independent foreign policy,” and claiming “local abettors” were responsible — claims that Pakistan’s National Security Committee has rebuffed . But Khan and his allies have also alluded to the military being responsible for his exit — sometimes in veiled language and sometimes pointing fingers more directly at the “neutrals,” as they now refer to the military. In so doing, they are testing the limits of political confrontation with the military, receding only when it pushes back on their claims.

An intense polarization

Khan has used his ejection to galvanize his supporters. Day after day, in huge rallies across the country, he calls the new government an “imported government” and the new prime minister a “crime minister.” Khan has used his rallies and interviews to command media attention, and argues that his government’s fall returned to power the corrupt politicians that are responsible for Pakistan’s problems. His supporters, many of them middle class, young, and urban, and furious at what they see as Khan’s unceremonious, orchestrated ousting, repeat his words on social media. With this narrative of grievance, Khan aims to undermine the new government’s legitimacy; his party resigned from parliament and he is calling for fresh elections. He now plans to lead a “freedom march” to Islamabad, likely later this month , to further pressure the government for elections.

By contrast, supporters of the parties that constitute the government see Khan’s exit as having occurred democratically and see his politics as dangerous. Pakistan today has echoes of the post-January 6 moment in the United States, a polarization so deep that each faction sees no validity in the other’s arguments. Khan’s supporters in particular distrust anything the new government or the military says. In recent weeks, politicians from each side have also resorted to using religion to attack the other side, dangerous in a country where the weaponization of religion can spell a death sentence.

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The new government

The new government, led by the PML-N’s Shahbaz Sharif, faces formidable challenges — and not just from Khan. Shahbaz’s brother, three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who was deposed in 2017 on corruption charges and now lives in London, still exercises outsized control over the party, and indeed the government. Shahbaz, a three-time former chief minister of Pakistan’s largest province of Punjab, has throughout his political career played second fiddle to the more charismatic Nawaz. Last week, the prime minister and key members of his cabinet made a sudden trip to London to consult with Nawaz on the direction of the new government. While they were overseas, Pakistan’s economy continued its downward spiral. The rupee continued its precipitous slide relative to the dollar; the stock market also lost value.

The government faces a key decision on whether to continue costly, unsustainable fuel subsidies that Khan’s government installed, and that the International Monetary Fund wants removed as a precondition for renewing Pakistan’s loan program. Removing subsidies would certainly be unpopular, which worries a government with limited time in office before the next election. So far the government has stalled, announcing earlier this week, against its own finance minister’s advice, that it would maintain subsidies (for now).

Shahbaz’s overall hesitancy likely reflects deference to Nawaz and his team, who may have different views, and the fact that he commands an unwieldy coalition of rival parties, who will be competing against each other in the next election. But part of the indecision has to do with the fact that the main goal of the PDM was to oust Khan; they did not actually devise an alternate governance plan or economic strategy before coming into power. That lack of a plan is now showing in the face of Pakistan’s economic crisis.

The next election

A major question contributing to the political uncertainty in Pakistan is the timing of the next election, which must be held by the summer of 2023. Khan has made clear that he wants to ride his present momentum to immediate elections. In the days preceding his downfall, he aimed to deprive the then-opposition of a runway in government by extra-constitutionally dissolving parliament, a decision Pakistan’s Supreme Court (correctly) reversed. The new government, for its part, can use its time in power to turn things in its favor, including resolving outstanding corruption cases.

There is the question of whether Nawaz can or will return to Pakistan before the next election. If he does, that could boost the PML-N’s base, but if he does not face prosecution on his return, that will bolster Khan’s argument that the Sharifs have politically manipulated the corruption cases against them. The PML-N also faces considerable hurdles, including an economic crisis that is partially shaped by exogenous factors, a tussle over power in Punjab, and a president who belongs to and is loyal to Khan’s party. The coalition government this week has said it will not go to early elections; former president Asif Ali Zardari has insisted that elections not be held before parliament can undertake electoral reform.

Whenever the next election is held, it’s far from clear what the outcome will be. What matters in Pakistan’s parliamentary system is which party can get the most “electables” — powerful politicians in local constituencies — on their side. Large urban rallies may attest to Khan’s personal popularity, but will not necessarily define how his party does in parliamentary elections. The other factor, one that has historically determined which party electable politicians align themselves with, is where the powerful military’s support is leaning.

The bottom line

That brings us to the bottom line. The fundamentals of the system in Pakistan, beneath the intense ongoing political tug of war, remain the same. What matters for political success is whether you have the support of Pakistan’s military. Political parties now directly point to the military’s interference in politics, but only when they are in opposition; when they are in government and enjoy that support, they do little to challenge it. This was true of Khan’s party when it was in power, and it is true of Sharif’s government now.

In the end, what Pakistan’s soaring political tension amounts to is an opportunistic struggle for power. It has left the country a political tinderbox. And in all of it, little regard is displayed on either side for the ongoing suffering of ordinary Pakistanis, who continue to pay the price for the country’s long history of political instability.

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Pakistan’s Economic Crisis: What Went Wrong?

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The country is currently running on foreign loans taken on high rates of interest. It will have to repay $80 billion in the coming three years.

Farmers clear out debris in an apple orchard damaged by floods ahead of the harvesting season in Quetta, Balochistan, April 10, 2023.

In March-April, the Pakistan government set up distribution sites across the country to provide s asta aur muft aata (low-cost and free flour) to people to ease their burden amid spiraling prices and the ongoing economic crisis in the country. But instead of doing good, the initiative caused trouble in several places where stampedes broke out, killing and injuring people.

Pakistanis are putting their lives at risk to collect something as basic as a sack of flour. It illustrates how the rising cost of food and other necessities is driving desperation and impacting the masses.

With inflation running at over 30 percent – a 50-year high – putting food on the table for the poorest, who comprise one-third of Pakistan’s population, has become harder than ever before.

When the recent stampedes over food flooded social media, so did the deeper questions: How did the country end up here? What does this economic crisis mean for the majority of the Pakistani people and for Pakistan’s international projects, especially those with China under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which Pakistan considers vital for its future economic growth?

Pakistan’s current GDP, per capita income, and GDP growth are the lowest in its neighborhood ; only war-torn Afghanistan’s economy is weaker.  Likewise, its unemployment and inflation rates are one of the highest in the region. The Human Development Inde x, which measures a country’s achievements through three basic dimensions – health, knowledge, and standards of living – placed Pakistan in the 161st position out of 185 countries in 2022. In other words, Pakistan is among the 25 countries with the lowest human development in the world.

The country’s current situation has multiple causes, including overall poor economic management, corruption, and excessive spending on defense and the armed forces. In a country where half the population is under the age of 22 , investing in the education and technical skills of youth can generate opportunities for a more sustainable economy.

Many also associate the current economic crisis, especially the rise in food staples, with last year’s floods, which caused extensive damage to agricultural land, livestock, thousands of kilometers of road, and other infrastructure. This is partially right, as inflation touched a record high after the floods in August last year. But the war in Ukraine also halted grain supply to a number of countries, including Pakistan, resulting in a sharp increase in prices of foodgrains.

But the situation was not stable even prior to these crises. According to a World Bank report on inflation and development in Pakistan, food-related shortages and transportation challenges caused by the floods and the war in Ukraine that impacted essential grain imports significantly contributed to the inflation, but so did a hike in fuel and oil subsidies. Pakistan heavily relies on imported oil. A constant decline in the value of the country’s currency has resulted in much higher tariffs with every import of oil.

The unceasing decline in the value of Pakistan’s currency over the months has been triggered by the country’s inability to repay its foreign debt . Pakistan is essentially running on foreign loans, an economic model that only leads to borrowing more, which eventually results in bankruptcy. Between February 2023 and June 2026, Pakistan will have to repay around $80 billion in foreign debt.

As of December 2022, Pakistan held $126.3 billion in external debt and liabilities, of which 30 percent is owed to China. As much as the Chinese government has supported Pakistan’s infrastructure development through CPEC, which Pakistan is determined to benefit economically from in the future, for now, the federal government is having to repeatedly turn to the Chinese for refinancing and a rollover of debts .

Although the Chinese government and commercial banks have helped Pakistan by deferring debt repayment or rolling over debts in the past, it is hard to predict if China will continue to do so.

So far, of the numerous projects agreed upon under CPEC, only a few have been completed. Chinese frustration over endless delays in project completion, halting of projects, and security threats to its nationals working in Pakistan has resulted in hesitation to invest in new projects. Yet Pakistan remains one of the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese loans.

Many blame China for the high interest it charges on loans that have burdened many developing countries including Pakistan. Instead of the promised economic growth through CPEC, China’s loans may have worsened Pakistan’s economic crisis. But it is still too early to conclude whether CPEC debts will drain the Pakistani economy or open up opportunities for growth in the future.

For now, transparency over government spending is the need of the hour, along with restructuring the country’s economy from one that overspends on defense institutions and excessively relies on foreign debt with high interest to a model that is sustainable.

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An Economic Crisis in Pakistan Again: What’s Different This Time?

Photo: AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images

Critical Questions by Daniel F. Runde and Ambassador Richard Olson

Published October 31, 2018

Pakistan’s newly-elected government is already dealing with a balance of payments crisis, which has been a consistent theme for the nation’s newly elected officials. Pakistan’s structural problems are homegrown, but what is different this time around is an added component of Chinese debt. Pakistan is the largest Belt and Road (BRI) partner adding another creditor to its already complicated economic situation.

Pakistan’s system is ill-equipped to make changes which would avoid future excessive debt. A bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is probably the safest bet for the country although it is unclear whether the United States will support the program. How Pakistan decides to handle its debt crisis could provide insight into how the U.S., IMF, and China will resolve development issues in the future. Beijing is a relatively new player in the development finance world so much is to be learned from how it deals with Pakistan and how it could possibly maneuver in other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Q1: What is Pakistan’s current financial and economic situation?

A1: Pakistan held its most recent elections in July 2018. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party gained over 100 seats in the parliament, and its founder Imran Khan , a famous cricket team captain, was installed as prime minister. Prime Minister Khan has inherited a balance of payments crisis , the third one in the last 10 years. By the end of June 2018, Pakistan had a current account deficit of $18 billion , nearly a 45 percent increase from an account deficit of $12.4 billion in 2017. Exorbitant imports (including those related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)) and less-than-projected inflows (export revenues and remittances) have led to a current account deficit widening, with foreign currency reserves levels covering less than two months of imports—pushing Pakistan towards a difficult economic situation .

Part of Pakistan’s financial crisis stems from the fact that 2018 was a poor year for emerging markets. Global monetary tightening, increased oil prices, and reduced investor confidence have negatively impacted the country’s already precarious economic situation. But the country’s deep structural problems and weak macroeconomic policies have further exposed the economy to an array of debt vulnerabilities.

Pakistan has had an overvalued exchange rate, low interest rates, and subdued inflation over the last few years. This loose monetary policy has led to high domestic demand, with two-thirds of Pakistan’s economic growth stemming from domestic consumption. An overvalued exchange rate has led to a very high level of imports and low level of exports. Pakistan’s high fiscal deficit was accelerated even further in 2017 and 2018 because elections have historically caused spending to rise (both of the most recent fiscal crises followed elections). Perhaps the greatest financial issues facing Pakistan are its pervasive tax evasion and chronically low level of domestic resource mobilization. Taxes in Pakistan comprise less than 10 percent of GDP , a far cry from the 35 percent of countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Pakistan also suffers from impediments in the energy sector through frequent and widespread power outages that hurt its competitiveness.

In Western media, Chinese investment is often cited as the main driver of Pakistan’s debt crisis. This is somewhat true as China’s BRI makes Pakistan a key partner through the shared CPEC. The CPEC is a $60 billion program of infrastructure, energy and communication projects that aims to improve connectivity in the region. CPEC infrastructure costs have certainly placed a greater debt burden on Pakistan, but the current structural problems are homegrown; the root cause of the energy shortages is now less a matter of power generation, and more of fiscal mismanagement of the power sector .

Q2: What are Pakistan’s options?

A2: Pakistan appears to be in perpetual crisis-mode, and for too long the Pakistani government has been overly reliant on U.S. bilateral assistance. While it may not be the first choice of the Pakistani government, an IMF bailout is the most likely outcome of this financial crisis because it is probably the only path for Pakistan to regain its macroeconomic stability. Any “bailout” from a bilateral donor (meaning China or Pakistan’s Gulf State friends, including Saudi Arabia which has recently provided Pakistan $3 billion for a period of one year as balance-of-payment support) will not get at the root issues that Pakistan faces—its loose macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary policies. Pakistan needs to get its house in order and remedy many of its domestic economic issues. 18 out of Pakistan’s 21 IMF programs over the last 60 years have not been completed despite obtaining over $30 billion in financial support across those programs. Just like today’s current financial crisis, Pakistan’s last two IMF packages (in 2008 and 2013) were also negotiated by incoming governments.

Q3: Would the U.S. support a new IMF Pakistan program?

A3: The current U.S. administration and Congress would not be supportive of additional bilateral funding to Pakistan—meaning money coming directly from the United States. Since 2001, Pakistan has been the beneficiary of the U.S. Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which reimburses allies for costs incurred by war on terrorism. The CSF is used to reimburse Pakistan for U.S. military use of its network infrastructure (e.g., ports, railways, roads, airspace) so that the United States can prosecute the war in neighboring Afghanistan, as well as certain Pakistani military counter-terrorism operations. The CSF for Pakistan has been as high as $1.2 billion per year, and, in recent years, $900 million per year. With nearly $1 billion in CSF distributed every year, along with $335 million in humanitarian assistance, it will be difficult to convince Congress to appropriate more funds for a Pakistan bailout yet. However, due to inaction on the part of Pakistan to expel or arrest Taliban insurgents operating from Pakistani territory, the United States has recently cut another $300 million from the CSF, bringing the total to $850 million in U.S. assistance withheld from Pakistan this year. In fact, all security assistance to Pakistan, whether it is international military education and training, foreign military financing, or the CSF, has been suspended for this year according to one State Department official.

An IMF program for Pakistan faces resistance from some members of Congress. A group of 16 senators has already signed a letter to President Trump that outlines their opposition to bailing out Pakistan because the IMF package would, in effect, be bailing out Chinese banks.

The Trump administration has also taken a hardline stance towards assisting Pakistan with its financial crisis. Secretary of State Pompeo stated this past July that he would not support an IMF bailout that went towards paying off Chinese loans. In September, Secretary Pompeo visited Pakistan, and there were indications that the United States would not block an IMF program. If an IMF program is enacted, there is no doubt that it would have stronger conditionality and a greater insistence on full transparency of Pakistan’s debt obligations.

Q4: Would an IMF package be a bailout of the Chinese?

A4: The terms of Pakistan’s loans with China are currently unclear and multiple news outlets have reported that Pakistan has refused to share CPEC information with the IMF. However, it is not unreasonable to presume that the terms in those contracts would be more demanding than terms typically asked by the IMF. Unless the terms between Pakistan and China and its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are disclosed and made clear to the IMF, then it is unwise for the IMF to proceed with a bailout package.

The IMF’s focus is not in projecting power and influence; rather it seeks to help struggling nations get back on their feet. The same cannot be said for China. China appears to be most interested in spreading its influence and gaining valuable assets for its military and expanding economy, while at the same time exporting its surplus capacity for infrastructure building. In its annual report to Congress, the Department of Defense reiterated this concern, “countries participating in BRI [such as Pakistan] could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could leverage to achieve its interests.”

Of Pakistan’s nearly $30 billion trade deficit, 30 percent is directly attributable to China . If China were concerned about the economic crisis in Pakistan, it would make immediate concessions which Pakistan Finance Minister Asad Umar says China is working on . To help with the crisis, China could readjust its trade surplus with Pakistan in different ways. For example, China could buy Pakistani cement and other purchases in the short term to illustrate that they are aware of and swiftly responding to the economic turmoil in Pakistan. Other nations have struggled with debt obligations to China. For instance, in July 2017, Sri Lanka signed over a 99-year lease for Hambantota Port to a Chinese SOE because of Sri Lanka’s inability to pay for BRI costs. Malaysia took a different path and decided to cancel major infrastructure projects with China in August 2018 due to worries that they would increase its debt burden .

Q5: What are the consequences if there is no IMF package?

A5: It is likely that China will provide even more assistance to broaden Pakistan’s dependency. Chinese banks and SOEs have already invested heavily into Pakistan, so much so that state bank loans have not been fully disclosed to the global community. In fact, Pakistan’s Status Report for July 2017 through June 2018 shows that Chinese commercial banks hold 53 percent of Pakistan’s outstanding commercial debt. However, that percentage may be even higher than the report depicts. While China and Pakistan have agreed to make all CPEC projects readily available to the public, the information is scattered and often left blank on essential financial reports (see July-June 2017 document ), and so it is difficult to obtain a full sense of the degree of Pakistan’s indebtedness to China. Again, much of the loan information provided by the Pakistani government, especially concerning China, is not entirely transparent.

If China chooses to follow through and become the “point person” for an assistance package, the pressure will be taken off the IMF. But, if the United States does not support an IMF package, it will forego major geopolitical potential in the region to its main competitor, China.

Pakistan represents a litmus test of all future cases in which the IMF, United States, China, and any emerging market country are all involved. Depending on how Beijing chooses to navigate Pakistan’s financial crisis, China may soon find itself responsible for rectifying the debt burdens of Zambia and many other BRI countries.

Q6: What are U.S. geopolitical “equities” in Pakistan?

A6:  The United States is invested in Pakistan because of its significant geopolitical importance.

• Pakistan is an important component of the balance of power in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons capabilities. Moreover, China, India, and Pakistan have been in dispute over the Kashmir region since 1947. Regional stability is in the interest of the United States.
• Despite its ambiguous stance on militant groups, Pakistan is ostensibly an ally of the United States because of its proximity to Afghanistan. Since the War on Terror began in 2001, Pakistan has been an active partner in the elimination of core al Qaeda within Pakistan and has facilitated aspects of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.
• The United States now seeks a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, perhaps the United States will come to Pakistan with a simple offer: “deliver the Taliban, and we will give you the IMF.”
• Whereas previous administrations may have tried to “play nice” with Pakistan, under the Trump administration, there is a chance that the U.S. government will push the IMF to adopt stricter terms for a Pakistan bailout, citing the Pakistani government’s failures of the last two programs.
• Other than strategic military importance, one of the most important national security challenges to the United States is Pakistan’s demographic trends. Currently, over 64 percent of Pakistanis are under the age of 30—the largest percentage of youth in the country’s history. Over the next 30 years, Pakistan’s population will increase by over 100 million, jumping from 190 million to 300 million by 2050 . The spike in youth population presents an opportunity for the U.S. government and private sector to increase investment in Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy must generate 1 million jobs annually for the next three decades and GDP growth rates must equal 7 percent or more per year to keep up with the population boom. Were Pakistan’s economy to collapse, the world would see the first instance of a failed state with a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons.
• An economically healthy Pakistan could be a large market for U.S. goods and services. If the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is strained as a result of this financial crisis, it will not only harm the United States militarily but will also harm U.S. businesses and Pakistani consumers.

Q7: Should the U.S. support an IMF package to Pakistan?

A7: Given the geostrategic importance of Pakistan for the United States, we should support a package but with stronger conditionality than in 2013 along with full transparency and disclosure of its debt obligations.

Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Richard Olson is a non-resident senior associate at CSIS. He is the former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan; most recently he served as the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Obama administration. Special thanks to CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development program coordinator Owen Murphy and intern Austin Lucas for their contributions to this analysis.

Critical Questions   is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Pakistan’s political crisis, briefly explained

An end to Pakistan’s constitutional crisis. But a political crisis endures.

by Jonathan Guyer

Editor’s note, April 10: Sunday, Imran Khan received a vote of no confidence from the Pakistani parliament, losing his position as prime minister. A vote on a new prime minister is expected as soon as Monday.

One of Pakistan’s twin crises was resolved this week. The other one, not so much.

On Thursday, the country’s supreme court delivered a historic ruling that resolved a constitutional crisis that took shape last week. The court rebuked Prime Minister Imran Khan, a self-fashioned populist leader and former cricket star who is more celebrity than statesman. Khan, the court ruled, had acted unconstitutionally when he dissolved Pakistan’s Parliament last week in order to avoid losing power through a no-confidence vote.

It was a surprising and reassuring decision, experts in the country’s politics said, given the supreme court’s checkered record as a sometime political ally of Khan. On Thursday, the court sided with the rule of law.

But the underlying political crisis that led to the court’s landmark order endures.

Khan outlandishly blamed the opposition parties’ efforts to oust him on a US-driven foreign conspiracy. Now, the Parliament has been restored and will continue with its no-confidence vote against Khan’s premiership Saturday, likely leading to his ouster and extraordinary elections later this year. Khan, for his part, said that he would “ fight ” back.

The broader political crisis, however, can be traced to the 2018 election that brought Khan to power. Traditionally, the military is the most significant institution in Pakistan, and it has often intervened to overthrow elected leaders that got in its way. Khan’s rise is inextricable from military influence over politics , and the incumbent prime minister accused the military of a soft coup for manipulating the election in Khan’s favor.

It was a “very controversial election,” says Asfandyar Mir, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace. “There was a major question over the legitimacy of that electoral exercise and the government that Khan formed could just never escape the shadow of the controversy surrounding that election,” Mir explained.

More recently, the relationship between the military and Khan has worsened, and that gave the political opposition an opening to act against him. Though it’s not known what role the military played in the supreme court’s ruling, experts note that the harshness of the court’s order suggests the military’s buy-in. “This is part of a larger history of instability in Pakistan in which prime ministers are ousted from power, because they lose the support of Pakistan’s military,” Madiha Afzal, foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution, told Vox.

But “even if the court was influenced by the military, it took the right decision,” she says.

Khan’s position weakened domestically

The political and economic situation set the stage for a challenge to Khan.

After running on a campaign that promised less corruption and more economic opportunity for the poor, Khan has failed to deliver. Inflation is climbing , unemployment is soaring , and a billion-dollar program from the International Monetary Fund has not helped stabilize matters. An international investigation into offshore money from last year, known as the Pandora Papers , showed that Khan’s inner circle had moved money abroad to avoid taxes, in contradiction with Khan’s populist rhetoric.

Khan presided over an anti-corruption witch hunt targeting opposition parties. Indeed, the opposition parties, many of them composed of dynastic leadership and families with old money, are corrupt , and their attempt to oust Khan can be seen as a move to evade further scrutiny, Mir said.

Still, that anti-corruption effort brought the government bureaucracy to a halt. And it’s part of Khan’s broader strongman-style approach to governing that has been ineffective .

Since his start in politics, Khan has depended on the courts. Yasser Kureshi, a researcher in constitutional law at the University of Oxford, says Khan has built his political standing on backing the judiciary. “Imran Khan’s political platform has been built around an anti-corruption populism, where he charges the political class for being corrupt, and in the last 15 years the supreme court has been on a spree of jurisprudence targeting the political corruption of Pakistan’s traditional parties,” he explains. “Khan has been the biggest supporter of this jurisprudence as it has validated and legitimized his politics.”

Now, the court appears to have turned against him at a time when the military has also lost faith in Khan. “With Imran Khan, I think that the problem for him is that right now, he has no institutional solutions that he can really turn to,” says Kureshi.

Khan’s relationship with the US has also cooled

Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country with a population of 220 million; it has built the sixth-largest military in the world, and has clout as a leader in the Islamic world. A longtime participant in the US war on terrorism, Pakistan has also been a conflicted partner, criticized for at times abetting the Taliban .

Khan was elected in 2018, and Mir says that, two years in, the military’s relationship to him began to cool. Khan feuded with the army chief over foreign policy issues, and the military saw Khan’s poor governance as a liability. Last year, Khan’s delays in signing off on a new intelligence chief prompted speculation of more divides between the two.

President Joe Biden did not phone Khan in his initial days in office, though he did call the leader of India , Pakistan’s chief rival. “The Biden administration’s cold shoulder to Imran Khan rubbed him the wrong way,” said Afzal. “Pakistan has just fallen off a little bit of the radar in terms of high-level engagement.”

Khan’s public messaging as a strongman has partially been responsible for agitating the relationship with the US — and by extension, his relationship with the Pakistani military, which wants to be closer to the US.

Most recently, that chill was expressed by Khan’s decision to stay neutral in Russia’s war on Ukraine; Khan visited Moscow just in advance of Russia’s invasion.

And, now, he’s turned to accusations of conspiracy: that the opposition’s stand against him is manufactured by the US. The origins of Khan’s incendiary claims appear to be a diplomatic cable that Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington sent home last month after a meeting with senior State Department official Donald Lu. Whatever criticisms Lu may have conveyed about Pakistan’s foreign policy, Khan’s interpretation of the memo has clearly been blown out of proportion. “When it comes to those allegations, there is no truth to them,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said last week.

It’s an open question whether his argument will resonate among a Pakistani populace who is suspicious of the United States. One group it’s likely not resonating with: Pakistan’s powerful military.

Khan is “critical of the United States to a point that makes the military uncomfortable,” said Shamila Chaudhary, an expert at the New America think tank. “The way he’s talking about the United States is preventing the US relationship with Pakistan from being repaired, and it needs to be repaired.”

Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s focus in Asia has been on great-power competition with China and two national security crises (the Afghanistan withdrawal and Russia’s Ukraine invasion). The sloppy withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan furthered the disconnect between Washington and Islamabad, according to Chaudhary, and further upset Pakistan’s government.

Robin Raphel, a former ambassador who served as a senior South Asia official in the State Department from 1993 to 1997, described Biden’s outlook to Pakistan as a “non-approach approach.”

“I’m a diplomat, and, I believe you get more with honey than vinegar,” she said. “It would have been more than worth it for the president to take five minutes to call Imran Khan.”

The US did send its top State Department official for human rights, Uzra Zeya, to the Organization of Islamic Countries summit in Pakistan last month. Zeya also met with the country’s foreign minister and senior officials, as the two countries celebrated the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

But there hasn’t been more than that in terms of a positive message for the US-Pakistan relationship in light of the recent political and constitutional crises in the country. Price’s recent comments on the situation were brief: “We support Pakistan’s constitutional process and the rule of law.”

What happens next

Once the Parliament completes its no-confidence vote, which may happen as soon as today, it will dissolve the government. The country’s electoral commission will then oversee a caretaker government that will likely be headed by the leader of the opposition, Shehbaz Sharif . (Sharif is the brother of Nawaz Sharif , a former prime minister himself, who is currently living in exile in the UK as he faces accusations of corruption.) And, in that forthcoming vote, Khan will most probably lose .

But even the specifics of those elections are contentious. Khan had asked the electoral commission to set a date within the next 90 days; opposition politicians told NPR that reforms are needed before the next vote, otherwise they say the military will “rig” the next elections.

Long-term, things are even less clear. Among civil society leaders in Pakistan, there is agreement that the supreme court’s ruling is good for constitutionalism. But it may also be a vehicle for further expansion of the judiciary’s ability to intervene in politics.

Kureshi, an expert on the courts of Pakistan and how they have increasingly become the arbiter of politics in the country, says the bigger takeaways won’t be fully understood until the court releases the full text of its ruling in the next month or so. That detailed order may set other legal precedents and even cast the opposition in a bad light.

After the immediate euphoria of keeping Khan’s audacious unconstitutional maneuver in check, that judgment may say a lot about how the court sees itself, especially its supervisory role over the parliament and prime minister.

“The elected institutions are deeply constrained by the tutelage of overly empowered unelected institutions, whether it is the military, historically, or the judiciary more recently,” said Kureshi. “Judgments like this give them an opportunity to further affirm and expand that role.”

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Essay On Current Affairs Of Pakistan 2020 (200 & 500 Words)

Essay on current affairs of pakistan 2020 (200 words).

Pakistan faced challenges and witnessed events in 2020 that significantly impacted its political, social, and economic landscape. One of the most significant events was the outbreak of COVID-19, which affected the country in various ways.

The government took various steps to contain the spread of the virus, including imposing lockdowns and other measures to restrict people’s movement. The country also faced economic challenges due to the pandemic, with many businesses shutting down and the economy contracting.

Another significant event in 2020 was the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. The Indian government revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, which led to protests and unrest in the region. Pakistan strongly condemned the move and continued to advocate for the rights of the Kashmiri people.

The year also saw political turmoil in Pakistan, with the opposition parties staging protests and rallies against the government’s policies. The government faced criticism for handling the economy and its efforts to curb corruption.

Overall, 2020 was challenging for Pakistan, facing various economic, political, and social issues. However, the government’s efforts to tackle these challenges and its commitment to promoting peace and stability in the region give hope for a brighter future.

Essay On Current Affairs Of Pakistan 2020 (500 words)

Pakistan, a country located in South Asia, faced numerous challenges in 2020. Pakistan had a tumultuous year, from the COVID-19 pandemic to the economic crisis and political instability. In this essay, we will discuss the current affairs of Pakistan in 2020.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted Pakistan’s healthcare system, economy, and society. As of 2021, there have been over 900,000 confirmed cases and over 20,000 deaths in Pakistan due to COVID-19. The government implemented lockdowns and other measures to control the spread of the virus. However, these measures also adversely affected the economy and the poor population, who could not earn their livelihoods due to the lockdowns.

Pakistan’s economy has been struggling recently, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only worsened the situation. The country faced a current account deficit of $3 billion in the fiscal year 2019-20, and the GDP growth rate remained at -0.4%. The government took steps to address the economic crisis, such as seeking financial assistance from international organizations and implementing economic reforms. However, these measures have yet to yield significant results.

Pakistan also experienced political instability in 2020. The opposition parties formed a coalition called the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Imran Khan. The PDM held rallies nationwide, and the government responded with arrests and crackdowns on opposition leaders. The situation escalated, with the opposition announcing a long march towards Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, to pressure the government. However, the march was later postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Another significant event in Pakistan’s current affairs in 2020 was the Lahore High Court’s decision to overturn the death sentence of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British national convicted of the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. The international community, including the United States, criticized the decision and sparked outrage in Pakistan. The government has appealed the decision, and the case remains ongoing.

Pakistan also faced challenges in its relations with neighboring countries in 2020. The country had tense relations with India over the Kashmir dispute, with both sides engaging in ceasefire violations and cross-border firing. Pakistan also had strained relations with Afghanistan over allegations of Taliban support and cross-border terrorism.

In conclusion, Pakistan faced numerous challenges in 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, economic crisis, political instability, and strained relations with neighboring countries. The government took steps to address these issues, but their effectiveness remains to be seen. Pakistan must continue working towards a stable and prosperous future, both for its citizens and its relations with the international community.

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Sana Mursleen is a student studying English Literature at Lahore Garrison University (LGU). With her love for writing and humor, she writes essays for Top Study World. Sana is an avid reader and has a passion for history, politics, and social issues.

Commentary from the Energy Security Program

Pakistan's energy crisis from conundrum to catastrophe.

An acute ongoing energy crisis poses serious threats to Pakistan’s feeble economy and national security environment. Michael Kugelman (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) examines the origins of the country’s energy problems, prevailing hurdles to reform, and potential impact of the upcoming general elections.

Pakistan’s acute energy crisis is posing a serious predicament for its feeble economy and volatile national security environment. The country’s energy problems are deep and complex, being rooted more in shortages of governance and political will than of pure supply. This stems from (1) the absence of a comprehensive and integrated energy strategy, resulting in interagency turf wars and a lack of coordination, (2) insufficient revenue to support energy generation and infrastructure, owing to low liquidity in Pakistan’s struggling economy and high rates of tax default, and (3) the leadership’s unwillingness to implement politically unpopular changes to address the situation.

Resolving Pakistan’s energy crisis will thus require political will, additional funding, and new power-generation sources. As the country lacks significant internal sources of revenue, opportunities exist for international donors to finance its energy recovery. The United States already provides a considerable amount of energy assistance to Pakistan, with Congress having released nearly $300 million in new energy aid last summer alone. However, indigenous energy solutions should not simply be discarded, and the Pakistani government should explore the Thar coalfields and alternative energy sources, among other options.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• Pakistan should consolidate its many energy-related institutions into a single ministry. This will bring some urgently needed order and efficiency to its dysfunctional energy sector.

A short-term fix that could bring immediate relief is to request a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, because the IMF would probably impose politically delicate conditions, Islamabad is unlikely to make such a request until after this spring’s elections.

Tax reform is imperative and should be designed to provide Islamabad with more revenue to address the energy crisis.

Pakistan can initially better diversify its energy mix by importing clean coal, which is often cheaper than imported oil and gas.

Pakistan will not be able to implement the reforms needed to resolve its energy crisis unless Pakistanis elect leaders this spring who genuinely desire to serve the interests of their country.

Pakistan’s Energy Crisis: From Conundrum to Catastrophe?

Pakistan is mired in an acute energy crisis—one with immense implications for both the nation’s floundering economy and its volatile security situation. According to some estimates, energy shortages have cost the country up to 4% of GDP over the past few years. They have also forced the closure of hundreds of factories (including more than five hundred alone in the industrial hub city of Faisalabad), paralyzing production and exacerbating unemployment. Additionally, they imperil much-needed investments in development and infrastructure. Meanwhile, the nation has been convulsed by energy riots. Protestors, angered by unscheduled outages, have often resorted to violence. They have blocked roads and attacked the homes and offices of members of both the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, the chief opposition party. Significantly, in February 2013 Pakistan’s minister for water and power warned that the energy crisis has become a national security issue. For all these reasons, energy poses one of Pakistan’s most critical challenges.

Resolving this crisis will require far more than power-generation expansion and other supply-side quick fixes, the de facto policy of the country’s political leadership. Pakistan’s energy problems are deep and complex, and are rooted more in shortages of governance and political will than of pure supply. If the nation is to overcome this crisis, it will need to begin with whole-scale institutional energy sector reform—a politically unwelcome, yet utterly essential, prerequisite for energy relief. Necessary reforms can then follow. The success of such efforts, however, will hinge on the existence of leaders willing to prioritize long-term national development and well-being over short-term political considerations.

Origins and Nature of the Current Crisis

The origins of Pakistan’s energy crisis can be traced back to the 1990s. A major energy crisis was actually averted in the 1970s, when the government launched the massive Mangla and Tarbela dams, leading to a short-lived period of robust hydro-driven energy generation that ably responded to demand. However, after a period of strong economic growth in the 1980s, energy demand soared, and supply and infrastructure could not keep up. The government sought to ramp up generation but was unable to satisfy demand. As Pakistan’s population has risen, and as urbanization has spawned the rise of new industries and other corporate energy customers, the situation has continued to worsen to the present day. Electricity shortfalls reached a peak of 8,500 megawatts (MW) in June 2012—more than 40% of national demand.

With this in mind, it is important to emphasize that Pakistan’s current energy quandary is rooted in paucities that go well beyond those of power supply. In fact, Pakistan is blessed with ample indigenous energy resources; it is especially rich in natural gas, hydroelectricity, and coal. However, in the case of the two most utilized sources of energy—oil and gas—consumption levels are so high that these domestic resources are being rapidly depleted. Pakistan’s national oil and gas company, Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), predicts indigenous oil reserves will be exhausted by 2025, and that Pakistan will run out of domestic sources of natural gas by 2030. Meanwhile, hydroelectricity supply is imperiled by climate change, with less rainfall reducing river flows.

At the same time, governance shortfalls (and not just of the corruption variety) are a key challenge for the power sector. Pakistan’s energy policies come under the purview of several government ministries and agencies, but coordination is lacking, clear lines of authority are absent, and interagency turf wars are legion. The sector also suffers from gross inefficiencies (including 30% transmission and distribution losses), and electricity theft is rife; Pakistanis can regularly be seen hooking onto power lines.

Yet one of the most critical deficiencies plaguing the energy sector is money. With Pakistan’s economy struggling, liquidity is dangerously low. In effect, energy consumers, private producers, the national transmission agency, distribution companies, and even the government itself cannot pay their power bills. Of note, according to figures provided by Pakistan’s water and power ministry, “influential defaulters” owe about $1 billion in overdue energy bills. As a result, the energy sector is deprived of desperately needed revenue to pay for generation, transmission, and distribution, as well as operating and administrative costs. This gap between revenue and expenses—often referred to as “circular debt”—has approached a whopping $4.5 billion and is worsened by the fact that, thanks to generous government-funded subsidies, energy end-costs for consumers are always lower than the actual cost of production. Consequently, the country cannot afford to provide a regular supply of power.

A Lack of Strategy and Political Will

A subset of the energy financing problem is an inability or unwillingness to muster the necessary political will to address the money shortage. More broadly, Pakistan has never developed a comprehensive, integrated energy strategy, and Islamabad’s haphazard policies have failed to address the crisis’s deep roots. The problem lies not with civil servants, bureaucrats, and technical experts who focus on developing energy policies (many of them reasonable and actionable), but rather with the non-expert, high-level political appointees spread across the energy sector and beyond who are charged with implementing them.

Pakistan announced a national energy plan in 2010, though it was dominated by much-mocked—and likely ignored—conservation measures, such as bans on all-night wedding parties and neon billboards, along with the required early closures of street markets. (A more realistic demand-management strategy, announced last year by the Asian Development Bank, calls for the distribution of twenty million low-energy light bulbs.) Other well-intentioned initiatives have likewise not produced results. Pakistan has established the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), charged with ensuring fair energy competition and consumer protection, but political interference undermines its autonomy and effectiveness. Tariff decisions must be approved by Islamabad, and NEPRA’s four members are all selected by the government. Furthermore, government officials have been known to outright ignore the body’s decisions.

Recent recommendations put forth by Pakistan’s Planning Commission, however, offer some hope. In 2011, the commission released what it described as a “new framework” for economic growth, which calls for more focus on the private sector, cities, and youth. If implemented, the impact would be immense, as the plan would represent a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s development philosophy.

In the context of energy, the document proposes some of the most far-reaching and comprehensive policy measures ever introduced in Pakistan—from full-scale sectoral deregulation to governance reform and the phasing out of many subsidies. Unfortunately, there are several problems. One is that while the Planning Commission is part of the government, it lacks implementation power, and no government entity has stepped up to embrace the commission’s ideas and take on the mantle of implementation. (In fact, government agencies often spar with the Planning Commission.) Another dilemma is that the Planning Commission insists that such measures are only implementable after the country has established an integrated energy policy, which has still not happened. Moreover, Islamabad likely has little desire to authorize the Planning Commission’s measures anyway, given that some of them (such as phasing out subsidies) are fraught with political risk—especially with national elections scheduled for spring 2013. On the subsidy question, in particular, while many experts accurately note that Islamabad’s policies distort pricing, these measures are unlikely to change for political (and not systemic) reasons. This is because subsidies provide temporary relief to an impoverished mass population that often harbors antigovernment sentiment. It also bears mentioning that reducing subsidies could have an unintended effect: increasing the number of Pakistanis who do not pay their taxes (given that if the poor are asked to pay more for energy, they may not have enough money to pay their taxes).

Yet herein lies a major dilemma, because Pakistan’s government would significantly increase its revenue—and hence its ability to pay its energy bills—if more of the country paid its taxes. Former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton has claimed that only 2 million of Pakistan’s population of 180 million pay income taxes, while Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue estimates that 700,000 wealthy Pakistanis are not paying their returns. The latter figure, in particular, suggests that revenue gains from increasing the number of citizens paying taxes could be tremendous. However, the government refuses to pressure its most affluent citizens, because many of them are politically connected or politicians themselves. And admittedly, there is no guarantee that Islamabad would actually use this added tax revenue to cover its energy debt; it could well spend the revenue on the repayment of other debts, administrative costs, or even defense.

Scenarios for the Future

Given that Pakistan lacks the revenue to finance an energy recovery, future opportunities abound for international donors, including the United States. Washington, in fact, already provides a considerable amount of energy assistance to Pakistan. The Obama administration identifies energy as a priority area in its civilian assistance program to the country, and Congress released nearly $300 million in new energy aid last summer alone. The U.S. private sector also contributes to Pakistan’s energy sector, including in overtly political ways. Last summer, ConocoPhillips mediated talks between Pakistan and Qatar on a potential natural gas deal in an effort to discourage Islamabad from pursuing a pipeline project with Iran that is opposed by Washington.

Given the extent of Pakistan’s energy woes, and especially its circular debt—which, at its highest point of nearly $4.5 billion, far exceeded the value of Washington’s $1.5 billion in total annual civil assistance—it is folly to expect U.S. energy aid to make a major dent in the crisis. Conversely, if U.S. civilian assistance to Pakistan were to be cut, the reduction of energy-intensive aid would be a significant loss for the country. This assistance includes a USAID infrastructure project, expected to be completed by this year, which adds nearly 1,000 MW to the national power grid—a fifth of Pakistan’s energy shortfall.

This is not to say that indigenous solutions should simply be discarded. Consider the vast Thar coalfields in Sindh Province, where 200 billion tons of reserves have lay dormant since their discovery more than twenty years ago (Thar constitutes the world’s sixth-largest coal deposit). Last year, Islamabad designated Thar as a special economic zone, hoping to lure investors with tax breaks and other incentives. Some, however, believe that the government must be more aggressive. Thar has been a common theme on the campaign trail for this year’s elections, with opposition parties hailing Thar as an elixir for Pakistan’s energy supply crunch and underscoring the urgency of tapping into its riches.

However, what both the government and political opposition fail to articulate is how Pakistan will overcome the formidable challenge of developing the technological and labor capacity to exploit this potential bonanza. Another problem is purely political. Ever since the Thar coal was discovered, the central government has been locked in a disagreement with the Sindh provincial government about how to divvy up the spoils. Islamabad has proposed an 80/20 split, while Sindh has insisted that it retain full control of the coalfields. This 22-year-old disagreement has effectively put on hold the exploitation of Thar’s resource treasures and crystallizes how Pakistan’s energy woes are as much (if not more) a governance and political issue as one of supply and demand.

Encouragingly, Pakistan is also starting to explore other alternative energy sources. Officials have said several small-scale wind projects are under construction. The government has also announced that by 2030 it plans to have a minimum of 5.0% of total commercial energy supply provided by wind, solar, and biowaste, and that 2.5% of Pakistan’s overall energy generation will come from renewables. Islamabad claims that by 2030 about 5,500 MW of Pakistan’s projected 160,000-MW daily energy requirement will come from alternative and renewable sources. These are admittedly ambitious goals, given the miniscule role renewables play in the current energy mix.

Ultimately, it is the issue of implementation that prolongs Pakistan’s energy crisis, making many experts pessimistic that the crisis can be resolved anytime soon. There is no shortage of research, conferences, and proposals offering policy solutions. However, these measures are not executed, because there is no political will to do so. This has long been the case at both federal and provincial levels, as well as with different political parties. While the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party has been the political face of the energy crisis since 2008, the previous government (led by Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam, or PML-Q) largely restricted its energy policies to supply-generation measures—the same politically safe bets made today. Then, as now, few efforts were made to strengthen energy governance or reform the energy pricing system. Tellingly, even in the rare cases when the government enacts politically risky measures to strengthen the energy sector and overall economy, it often reverses course. In 2011, for example, Islamabad repealed an increase in fuel prices—instituted to raise desperately needed revenue—after a key coalition partner had withdrawn from the government to protest this price hike.

The Clock Is Ticking

With no end in sight, the implications of Pakistan’s energy crisis are stark and go well beyond threats to the country’s economic well-being and stability. Pakistan is currently in the midst of two major societal shifts that could worsen the effects of its energy problems in the years ahead. One is urbanization. While today the majority of Pakistan’s population is rural, estimates suggest that at least 50% could be concentrated in urban areas by the 2020s. Demand for electricity is particularly high in cities, because urban-area industries and homes tend to be more dependent than those in the hinterland on grid-connected energy sources. With droves of Pakistanis entering cities and becoming dependent on grids, pressures on supply will deepen exponentially.

Pakistan’s other notable societal shift that could worsen the energy crisis is the devolution of governance from the federal level to the provincial and local levels. Thanks to the 18th constitutional amendment, which President Asif Ali Zardari signed in 2010, federal ministerial responsibilities and resources are being passed down to local authorities and agencies. This means that many new energy-related functions and duties are being foisted upon provincial and district governments, which suffer from even more capacity constraints, inefficiencies, and financial troubles than their federal counterpart. Local governments will likely inherit the ineffective policies of the federal government as well. Given the central government’s inability to address the country’s energy crisis, there is even less reason to expect that short-handed local-level authorities are up to the task.

How long can Pakistan ride out this storm? Today, many Pakistanis are getting by through their own resourcefulness, as they do on so many occasions when their government fails to provide basic services. This winter, some residents have coped with the nation’s worst gas shortage on record by fashioning homemade pumps from old refrigerators and sucking gas out of distribution systems. Others have done their cooking only when gas stations are closed—the only time they receive any pressure.

Time is running out, however. Pakistan faces rapidly dwindling foreign reserves and a plunging currency that late last year fell to a record low, and double-digit inflation is projected to hit this year. There is the very real fear that Pakistan could soon find itself unable to afford to address its energy crisis—meaning that even stopgap, short-term measures to expand power generation could be eliminated. Such a scenario would presumably increase the frequency and violence of public protests and threaten the state’s ability to maintain order. The consequences could be catastrophic for the country’s economy and stability.

Recommendations and Conclusions

There are some short-term steps that Pakistan can and should take. One is to formally request a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bring both immediate relief to the economy and badly needed liquidity to finance solutions to the energy crisis. However, given that the IMF would probably impose politically delicate conditions—including the phasing out of some energy subsidies—Islamabad is unlikely to make such a request until after this year’s election. Even if the next government follows through, another loan would simply be another short-term fix.

Above all, Pakistan must bring some urgently needed order and efficiency to its chaotic and dysfunctional energy sector. A better coordinated and integrated energy sector can best be attained through the consolidation of the country’s many energy-related institutions into a single ministry. A tighter institutional set-up would allow Pakistan’s energy sector to enjoy better coordination of planning, decision-making, and above all implementation. This would in turn enable it to do away with the reactive, haphazard, and ad-hoc policy environment that has characterized the energy sector for years. Although such a transformation will certainly be difficult to achieve, the seeds have already been planted. Back in the early 1980s, Pakistan experimented with establishing a more coordinated system, but those efforts petered out due to capacity constraints. Today, some influential players in the energy scene—including policymakers—have indicated their support for revisiting the idea. After a new institutional arrangement is in place, Pakistan could move on to policy reform. This should include new pricing measures that remove not all, but many, energy subsidies. Tax reform is another imperative—and should be designed to provide Islamabad with more revenue not just to address the energy crisis but also to assist poor Pakistanis harmed by the phase-out of subsidies.

Pakistan should also make improvements on the energy-demand side—such as by aiming to reduce by half the 30% in losses arising from distribution and transmission (a goal that will entail crackdowns on energy theft). Both federal and provincial authorities should be more vigilant about keeping up with necessary maintenance and repairs at all generation, distribution, and transmission facilities in order to minimize leakage and other losses. Any efforts to improve energy governance will need to occur in tandem with measures to curb wasteful water consumption. Decades of water-intensive agricultural practices—including widespread and subsidized flood irrigation—have helped deplete surface water tables and prompted farmers to expend excessive electricity on tubewells to extract groundwater.

Finally, Pakistan should better diversify its energy mix. This can be done initially by importing clean coal, which is often cheaper than imported oil and gas. With time, if the political spats over Thar’s reserves can be worked out, then the nation would ideally begin to focus on developing indigenous supplies—though a variety of challenges, such as transporting the coal across the nation and overcoming possible resistance to environmental costs, would remain. Pakistan is already making an effort to diversify by pursuing separate pipeline projects with Iran and with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and India. However, a variety of factors (international sanctions–based with the former, and security-oriented with the latter) suggest that these projects are far from being consummated. In the meantime, Pakistan should take advantage of its enhanced commercial relationship with India to import energy from that country. Already, the two nations have concluded a deal to export electricity to Pakistan, and they have created a joint working group on petroleum to explore further possibilities for energy trade. Hypothetically, Pakistan-India energy trade could be expanded to feature more region-wide energy commerce, with organizations such as the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) providing an institutional platform. However, the fractious political relations between South Asia’s states make this prospect unlikely in the near term.

Ultimately, there is just one obstacle to the implementation of these measures, and that is leadership. For years, Pakistani officials have had promising policies at their disposal; yet they have been unwilling or unable to move forward. This spring, if Pakistanis elect leaders with a genuine desire to serve the interests of their country, then the end of its long energy struggles could conceivably be in sight. Yet if the election produces another governing dispensation concerned only about its own interests and political survival, then Pakistan’s energy conundrum could well become an energy catastrophe.

[1] Annabel Symington, “Pakistan Opposition Take Aim at Energy Crisis Ahead of Elections,” Christian Science Monitor , February 1, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2013/0201/Pakistan-opposition-take-aim-at-energy-crisis-ahead-of-elections ; and “Pakistan’s Energy Shortage: Lights Out,” Economist , October 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21531495 .

[2] “Electricity Shortfall in the Country Reaches 8,500 MW,” Dawn, June 17, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/06/17/residents-protest-prolonged-loadshedding-in-lahore ; and “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis: Power Politics,” Economist, Banyan Asia, web log, May 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/pakistan’s-energy-crisis .

[3] Saleem Shaikh and Sughra Tunio, “Pakistan to Boost Renewable Energy to Meet Power Shortfall,” AlertNet, July 6, 2011, http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/pakistan-to-boost-renewable-energy-to-meet-power-shortfall .

[4] Jon Boone, “Pakistan Power Cut Riots Spread as Politician’s House Stormed,” Guardian, June 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/19/pakistan-power-cut-riots .

[5] “For Pakistan, Everyday is a Blackout with No End in Sight,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), August 8, 2012, available at http://dawn.com/2012/08/08/for-pakistan-everyday-is-a-blackout-with-no-end-in-sight .

[6] Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “Clinton Criticizes Low Rate of Tax Collection in Pakistan,” Bloomberg, October 21, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-21/clinton-criticizes-low-rate-of-tax-collection-in-pakistan.html ; and Mehreen Khan, “Energy Subsidies Dilemma Expose Failings of Pakistan State,” Financial Times , Energy Source, web log, August 5, 2011, http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2011/08/05/energy-subsidies-dilemma-expose-failings-of-pakistan-state .

[7] “”No End in Sight for Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” AFP, August 8, 2012, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/419175/no-end-in-sight-for-pakistans-energy-crisis ; and “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers: What the United States Spends in Pakistan,” Center for Global Development, Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/pakistan/numbers .

[8] Shaikh and Tunio, “Pakistan to Boost Renewable Energy.”

[9] Shahid Javed Burki, “Historical Trends in Pakistan’s Demographics and Population Policy,” in Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges, ed. Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 67.

[10] “IMF Warns of Deteriorating Pakistan Economy,” AFP, October 5, 2012, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/447222/imf-warns-of-deteriorating-pakistan-economy .

Michael Kugelman is the Senior Program Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

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Pakistan’s Current Affairs

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Published: Apr 11, 2019

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Challenges Facing Pakistan in 2023

• February 3, 2023 |

Mary Hunter ,

• Image Credit: Unsplash

A challenging year lies ahead for Pakistan as it negotiates the aftermath of the unprecedented floods, economic turmoil, the desire among the youth to leave and the ongoing struggle against terrorism. The reader should not conclude that because this article only tackles challenges, the author has not noted recent positives and opportunities for Pakistan. To the contrary, 2022 saw Pakistan lead the international community in matters of climate justice, helping to secure the historic loss and damage deal. Depending on how much progress is made by COP28 this year, this could mark a fundamental shift in climate negotiations that works to support further countries vulnerable to climate change, like Pakistan itself.

Pakistan is also stepping out of a global year for popular culture and the arts, which will motivate the creation of further artistic outlets and help to bridge Pakistans film and music industries with others around the world. Academic events like ThinkFest held in Lahore and the Pakistan Conference hosted by Harvard University last year, marking 75 years of independence, testified to a burgeoning intellectual culture, an interest among the youth in tackling contemporary challenges and a strong international interest in Pakistan Studies. Pakistan will have to balance these positives and opportunities with very challenging circumstances, not all of the origins of which were avoidable.

Pakistan will have to balance these positives and opportunities with very challenging circumstances, not all of the origins of which were avoidable.

The Aftermath of the Floods

It has been well-documented that the floods in Pakistan last year, caused by increased monsoon rainfall, have affected over 33 million people. The ongoing consequences of much of Pakistan going underwater have made dire conditions a daily reality for many, especially children. UNICEF, whose health interventions have reached nearly 1.5 million people to date, has warned that up to 4 million children are still living near contaminated and stagnant flood waters: Frail and hungry children are fighting a losing battle against severe acute malnutrition, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, typhoid, acute respiratory infections, and painful skin conditions. (sic)

Besides health concerns, UNICEF has found that 2 million additional children have been locked out of learning, on top of the estimated 22.8 million children aged 5-16 not in school after the destruction of nearly 27,000 schools. Thus, the floods have exacerbated poor health and educational outcomes for the next generation of Pakistanis, who will also have to contend with more serious and frequent extreme weather events unless the world gets serious about reducing global temperatures. Given Pakistans acute vulnerability to climate change, it will have to increasingly treat the phenomenon as a non-traditional threat and prepare accordingly in its national security estimations.

Economic Turmoil

While the human impact of floods must be the most central concern for Pakistan and the international community, the economic impact is unprecedented. The World Bank has estimated that total damages exceed 14.9 billion USD and total economic losses amount to around 15.2 billion USD, while rehabilitation and reconstruction will cost close to 16.3 billion USD. The organisation also projected that Pakistan lost around 2.2 per cent of Fiscal Year 2022 GDP as a direct result of the floods.

To make matters worse, there are concerns that Pakistan may default on its loans to the IMF. Miftah Ismail, the former finance minister, has warned that Pakistans expenses are much higher than its income and that the country could default if it fails to approach the IMF. The IMF defines defaulting in simple terms as a broken promise, or a breach of contract, such as through missed payments or data misreporting. The consequences of Pakistan defaulting on its loans include an inability to import fuels to generate electricity, resulting in blackouts, as well as increased unemployment. Pakistanis already have to cope with inflated food prices and competition for subsidised products.

The Desire Among the Youth to Leave

Pakistanis rightly emphasise how the countrys youthful population is a great source of potential, but the young are among the most likely to express a desire to leave Pakistan. This desire, as reflected in a survey published in November 2022 by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, has translated into reality for a considerable number. Official documens allegedly show that 765,000 people left Pakistan in 2022, nearly triple the number in 2021. Given that 92,000 of these people were classed as highly educated, this flurry of departures has been presented as a continuation of the countrys brain drain. The government of Pakistan thus faces the challenge of incentivising its talented youth to remain in Pakistan and encourage those who have left to return. Based on anecdotal evidence, some Pakistanis who have left the country for higher education feel that there are not the same opportunities at home, leaving their only options to be jobs for which they are overqualified.

Ongoing Struggle Against Terrorism

Three police officers sadly lost their lives in the first terror attack in Pakistan of 2023, when heavily armed terrorists attacked a police station in Peshawar on the 14 January. This comes after the conclusion of an indefinite ceasefire between the government of Pakistan and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the 23 rd of November, that was agreed upon in June. Following an absence of attacks in the capital of Islamabad for eight years, the first suicide bombing occurred at the end of December inside a taxi, leaving the driver, bomber and a police officer dead.

Outside of the capital, the inhabitants of Swat demonstrated in October against increased killings in one of the largest protests the valley has seen to voice not only the rejection of political violence but also to demand protection as a constitutional right. While the progress and sacrifices made by the Pakistani military and police forces in addressing terrorism should be noted, attacks will continue until more successful peace talks are held with the TTP. This is by no means a simple task, given the mutually opposing demands of the TTP and the government of Pakistan, especially in terms of the TTPs rejection of the constitution of Pakistan as un-Islamic.

Dealing with any of these challenges in isolation would be difficult, but their simultaneous existence will require the government of Pakistan to rehabilitate and reconstruct those communities devastated by the floods while also seeking long-term security, economic, and educational solutions that also give hope and opportunities to the youth of Pakistan. The more the youth become central to policy-making, both as stakeholders and as visionaries, the more sustainable and forward-looking Pakistan will become.

Mary Hunter

Mary Hunter completed her PhD at the University of St Andrews, researching the Islamization of Pakistan. She is also a freelance writer on issues relating to Islamophobia, Pakistan and its diaspora in the UK.

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Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan Cause and Effect Essay

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Introduction

Current population problems in pakistan, causes of population problems, solutions to the population problems in pakistan, future population problems in pakistan, strategies to avoid future population problems, works cited.

Economic analysts and their political counterparts are yet to concur on the truth of the allegations by the Population Association of Pakistan that effective population control measures have been put in place to reduce the population problems in Pakistan.

Despite the slight decline in the total fertility of Pakistan since the start of this decade, the country still remains one of the most fertile countries in the whole world. Some demographers have associated this decline with the increasing use of methods of contraception in limiting fertility but there still exists a considerable controversy regarding the effectiveness and contribution of contraception in the relatively lower fertility rates seen in Pakistan as this decade ends.

Despite the aforementioned decline in the fertility rate of Pakistan, the country still experiences insurmountable population related-problems and stakeholders have been struggling to find an amicable solution to the problem. The future of Pakistan population therefore depends on the measures that the government and other stakeholders will take to curb the problem. Otherwise, the predictions of future population in Pakistan based on trends in the past and the present are shocking.

If nothing much is done from now on, Pakistan is expected to be one of the three most populated countries in the whole world. This paper investigates the population problem in Pakistan by suggesting the possible reasons for the current population trends, the effects they have on the country, possible solutions to the prevailing population problems and future predictions of population in Pakistan and its implications.

Pakistan’s total population was more than 180 million in the year 2009 with a total fertility rate of 4.0 in the same year (Sathar 7). This can be considered to be exponential population growth if compared to the 1947 figure for total population of 33 million. Currently, more than three million children are born each year adding more people to the already unsustainable population.

Pakistan is currently the second largest contributor to global population after India. The country is estimated to currently have a population of more than 170, 000 and the current population growth rate is believed to be currently standing at a figure above 1.5% (Sathar 8). In addition to the large population that Pakistan has, it is characterized with the fastest rate of urbanization with more than 35% of its total population living in urban areas (Sathar 3).

The above mentioned population problems coupled with problems brought about by urbanization have made Pakistan to be among the countries that are most affected by population growth. This is because, large population and rapid population growth has brought problems in virtually all realms of life in this country. Examples of such problems include poverty, unemployment, political instability, illiteracy, terrorism and religious extremism etc.

Poverty is believed to have increased by 10% in the past decade hitting a total of 40% of total population (Sathar 3). This means that 40% of Pakistan residents live below the poverty line (Sathar 3). It is also estimated that virtually a half of the population in Pakistan is illiterate. This implies that in the future, poverty and child labor are expected to increase since education is the only tool that can be used to predict a better future for these people.

Additionally, those in the elite class have only acquired minimal education and they are unable to bring innovative ideas to the country. The country is thus painfully slow in its adoption of new technologies and ideas. This has led to economic degeneration and the country is, seemingly, unable to come up with measures to counteract the effects that large population size has had on its economy. The country as also suffered significant corruption and political instability due to its system of using establishments in organizations.

The country has also experienced an establishment of criminal and terrorist networks that have made it fail to qualify for investments and tourism. This is mainly due to the religious fanatics that make the most of Pakistan population. This is very unfortunate for Pakistan especially considering the fact that other countries like China are getting billions of dollars in form of foreign investment while other small countries like Philippines have a substantial amount of tourism activity and foreign investments.

Given the repercussions that these problems have had on the population of Pakistan, there is need to look into the causes of population growth and the cause of such problems in order to form effective policies that will help to end these problems. The discussion below investigates the root cause of the problems that Pakistan if facing and suggests a number of solutions that can be implemented to reduce the effects these problems have had on the people of Pakistan.

The main reason why Pakistan is facing the above mentioned problems is due to the inability of the government and the population of Pakistan to effectively reduce their population growth rate.

Therefore, the main causes of the problem are the causes of inefficiency in combating population growth. The stated inability of the government and the Pakistan population to reduce their rate of population growth is due to their lack of effectiveness in implementing family planning programmes which were started in this country in the 1950’s (Hagen 1).

The stated planning programmes failed in Pakistan because of a weakness in the administrative structure these programmes were subjected to. It can be deduced from the failure of these programmes that the government did not adequately educate the public about the crucial importance of family planning and the grave repercussions of ignorance of the same.

The government therefore needs to engage itself in public awareness campaigns aimed at educating the public about the importance of small families. The government also needs to be vigilant to identify populist politicians and deal with them accordingly before they derail efforts to educate the public and eventually reduce the population growth rates.

Despite the fact that Pakistan started fighting its population growth in the 1950’s with the implementation of population control programmes, nothing much has been achieved since then.

In comparison with other countries like Bangladesh and Iran, where family planning programmes like the use of contraceptives had a dramatic effect, Pakistan has not been serious with their family planning programmes. This is because Iran started its family programme in the 1980’s while Bangladesh started their in the 1970’s and both countries realized exponential declines their fertility rates unlike Pakistan (Hagen 1).

The people of Pakistan also have a role to play in the fight against population growth. They should listen to the government and ensure that they follow the instructions they are given in order to reduce their fertility rates. This is because one of the main reasons why family planning has been ineffective in this country is the fact that the citizens of this country cling to the religious and cultural values such that they forget to mind about their welfare.

For instance, it is a religious belief in Pakistan that engaging in family planning practices is going against the will of God (Hagen 1). The ineffectiveness of family planning programmes caused by these beliefs has been the reason why population in Pakistan is always growing and bringing the myriad of problems stated in the discussion above.

In order to effectively combat the population problem in Pakistan, there is need for a coherent approach aimed at removing the socio-cultural and religious stigma attached to the fight against population growth. This will help to prepare the people in Pakistan for a change to their normal life in order to achieve a productive change in the growth rate of their population.

There is also the need for implementation of a service delivery plan bound to achieve effective results throughout the entire country. The service delivery plan should be structured such that every Pakistan citizen who needs to plan his/her family will be able to access the necessary services. This is because it will be pointless to run advertisements on the television if there are no effective networks of workers on the ground to provide effective information and if there are no outreach activities (Sathar 4).

Up to today, the main reason for the failure of family planning programmes is the lack of political commitment to the issue and the lack of continuity of efforts after political transitions. If the prevailing lack of commitment to this important issue remains, change will always be evasive and Pakistan will continue to suffer the problems it currently suffers.

The government can also launch a programme to mitigate the effects that high population growth rates have had on the country by diverting some resources to alleviation of poverty, investing in agricultural activities to feed its citizens by increasing food security and coming up with policies to avoid formation of poor urban areas that increase poverty and crime.

To achieve this objective, the government needs to be objective since it has limited resources. For instance, to increase food security, the government may invest negligible resources in environmental conservation campaigns that will automatically lead to more agricultural activities. On the other hand, the government could alleviate poverty by subsidizing activities that lead to provision of food and educating the public on viable methods of investment.

If the prevailing population growth rate in Pakistan, 2.1 percent per year, persists, Pakistan is expected to have a population of between 220 million and 250 million between the years 2020 and 2025 (Hagen 1). This will inevitably be coupled with indicators of poor human development which include low rates of economic growth, high rates of infant mortality and an amazing decline in the levels of literacy in the country.

All these poor human development indicators will be partly or fully brought by the uncontrolled population growth. It is thus deducible that a the predicted population will be very effective in undermining poverty alleviation efforts and the efforts being taken in the country to improve the standard under which the country’s population live by provision of basic necessities like water, electricity and the like.

During the same five-year period, the total fertility rate, the infant mortality rate, the crude death rate and the crude birth rate are expected to reduce to figures close to 2.7, 42.2, 5.6, and 21.4 respectively (Sathar 7). The population growth rate is also expected to reduce to 1.52 while the life expectancy of the population will be close to 72 years (Sathar 9).

The discussion above implies that there will be no pronounced effect of the drop in the population growth rate since the life expectancy has increased and the negligible increase in population growth rate will be neutralized by the aging population to keep population problems virtually constant.

This stresses the highly needed commitment to contraceptive methods and other population control methods in order to reduce the population growth rate substantially. It is only when a major reduction in the rate of population growth will be realized that we can be hopeful that population problems in Pakistan will reduce in the future.

Due to the above stated concern, the government of Pakistan has come up with population reduction policies aimed at gradually reducing the population growth rate. The government priority among its policies is the attainment of ensuring that, ten years from now, it will reach the replacement fertility level.

The above paragraph describes the intention of the government of Pakistan to reach a replacement fertility level in the year 2020 (Hagen 1). This is just a statement of what the government desires to do and without proper planning and commitment to the programmes concerned, the gravely desired decrease in the population of Pakistan will forever remain evasive.

The government of Pakistan therefore needs to integrate awareness programs with proper service delivery programs in a bid to be assured of improving the population situation in their country substantially.

The awareness programs should be aimed at ensuring that every Pakistan citizen understands that smaller families are better than larger families and helping every Pakistan citizen break cultural and social chains tying them to high fertility. The programme should be implemented to touch every part of the country and it should run for as long as the government will be assured that a family planning program will achieve substantial results.

The government should thus dedicate the minimal resources it has in this program and ensure the effectiveness of a family planning programme (Sathar 3). On the other hand, the family planning programme should be such that there is an efficient network of service delivery centers throughout the country to ensure that every part of the country participates in the efforts to reduce the population of the country.

There is also the need for the Pakistan government and public to begin realizing the importance of literacy to the alleviation of population related problem. It can, in fact, be argued that high fertility problems and problems encountered in implementing family planning programmes are due to the high level of illiteracy in the country.

If the government and its people prioritize improvement of education institutions, there can be a guarantee that the population problem and some of its resultant effects will reduce in the future. It is therefore of essence that, as it implements other solutions, the government considers revolutionizing the education system of the country since this will have positive effects on the problems the country is currently facing.

The Pakistan government and population have encountered insurmountable problems related to their high population growth rates since the fifties. Currently, forty per cent of the people in Pakistan are below the poverty line and illiteracy and low standards of living have engulfed the country’s population for decades.

The Pakistan government and population can no longer be ignorant of the fact that the situation can be improved sacrificing their religious and cultural beliefs to have small families. For instance, if the Pakistan people abandon their belief that family planning amounts to going against the will of God, better results can be seen from family planning efforts and this will substantially reduce the population growth rate.

The government and the population need to realize that small families are needed in order to realize personal and national health. The government therefore needs to develop strategic programmes aimed at creating extensive public awareness that will make the population in Pakistan realize the importance of family planning.

This should be followed by family planning programmes which will definitely have an impact on the population growth rate since the Pakistan population will have gained an understanding of the grave importance of low birth rates. Otherwise, the existing problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, etc will worsen and with time the country will fall under the weight of its sheer population size.

Hagen, Catherine. “ Pakistan Population .” Web.

Sathar, Zeba. “Fertility in Pakistan: Past, Present and Future.” 2001. Web.

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IvyPanda. (2019, February 7). Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan. https://ivypanda.com/essays/current-and-future-population-problems-in-pakistan/

"Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan." IvyPanda , 7 Feb. 2019, ivypanda.com/essays/current-and-future-population-problems-in-pakistan/.

IvyPanda . (2019) 'Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan'. 7 February.

IvyPanda . 2019. "Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan." February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/current-and-future-population-problems-in-pakistan/.

1. IvyPanda . "Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan." February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/current-and-future-population-problems-in-pakistan/.

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IvyPanda . "Current and Future Population Problems in Pakistan." February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/current-and-future-population-problems-in-pakistan/.

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