argumentative essay on democracy is better than military rule

By the People: Essays on Democracy

Harvard Kennedy School faculty explore aspects of democracy in their own words—from increasing civic participation and decreasing extreme partisanship to strengthening democratic institutions and making them more fair.

Winter 2020

By Archon Fung , Nancy Gibbs , Tarek Masoud , Julia Minson , Cornell William Brooks , Jane Mansbridge , Arthur Brooks , Pippa Norris , Benjamin Schneer

The basic terms of democratic governance are shifting before our eyes, and we don’t know what the future holds. Some fear the rise of hateful populism and the collapse of democratic norms and practices. Others see opportunities for marginalized people and groups to exercise greater voice and influence. At the Kennedy School, we are striving to produce ideas and insights to meet these great uncertainties and to help make democratic governance successful in the future. In the pages that follow, you can read about the varied ways our faculty members think about facets of democracy and democratic institutions and making democracy better in practice.

Explore essays on democracy

Archon fung: we voted, nancy gibbs: truth and trust, tarek masoud: a fragile state, julia minson: just listen, cornell william brooks: democracy behind bars, jane mansbridge: a teachable skill, arthur brooks: healthy competition, pippa norris: kicking the sandcastle, benjamin schneer: drawing a line.

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‘America Is a Republic, Not a Democracy’ Is a Dangerous—And Wrong—Argument

Enabling sustained minority rule at the national level is not a feature of our constitutional design, but a perversion of it.

An illustration of columns, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution

Dependent on a minority of the population to hold national power, Republicans such as Senator Mike Lee of Utah have taken to reminding the public that “we’re not a democracy.” It is quaint that so many Republicans, embracing a president who routinely tramples constitutional norms, have suddenly found their voice in pointing out that, formally, the country is a republic. There is some truth to this insistence. But it is mostly disingenuous. The Constitution was meant to foster a complex form of majority rule, not enable minority rule.

The founding generation was deeply skeptical of what it called “pure” democracy and defended the American experiment as “wholly republican.” To take this as a rejection of democracy misses how the idea of government by the people, including both a democracy and a republic, was understood when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. It misses, too, how we understand the idea of democracy today.

George Packer: Republicans are suddenly afraid of democracy

When founding thinkers such as James Madison spoke of democracy, they were usually referring to direct democracy, what Madison frequently labeled “pure” democracy. Madison made the distinction between a republic and a direct democracy exquisitely clear in “ Federalist No. 14 ”: “In a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.” Both a democracy and a republic were popular forms of government: Each drew its legitimacy from the people and depended on rule by the people. The crucial difference was that a republic relied on representation, while in a “pure” democracy, the people represented themselves.

At the time of the founding, a narrow vision of the people prevailed. Black people were largely excluded from the terms of citizenship, and slavery was a reality, even when frowned upon, that existed alongside an insistence on self-government. What this generation considered either a democracy or a republic is troublesome to us insofar as it largely granted only white men the full rights of citizens, albeit with some exceptions. America could not be considered a truly popular government until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which commanded equal citizenship for Black Americans. Yet this triumph was rooted in the founding generation’s insistence on what we would come to call democracy.

The history of democracy as grasped by the Founders, drawn largely from the ancient world, revealed that overbearing majorities could all too easily lend themselves to mob rule, dominating minorities and trampling individual rights. Democracy was also susceptible to demagogues—men of “factious tempers” and “sinister designs,” as Madison put it in “Federalist No. 10”—who relied on “vicious arts” to betray the interests of the people. Madison nevertheless sought to defend popular government—the rule of the many—rather than retreat to the rule of the few.

American constitutional design can best be understood as an effort to establish a sober form of democracy. It did so by embracing representation, the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the protection of individual rights—all concepts that were unknown in the ancient world where democracy had earned its poor reputation.

In “Federalist No. 10” and “Federalist No. 51,” the seminal papers, Madison argued that a large republic with a diversity of interests capped by the separation of powers and checks and balances would help provide the solution to the ills of popular government. In a large and diverse society, populist passions are likely to dissipate, as no single group can easily dominate. If such intemperate passions come from a minority of the population, the “ republican principle ,” by which Madison meant majority rule , will allow the defeat of “ sinister views by regular vote .” More problematic are passionate groups that come together as a majority. The large republic with a diversity of interests makes this unlikely, particularly when its separation of powers works to filter and tame such passions by incentivizing the development of complex democratic majorities : “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.” Madison had previewed this argument at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 using the term democracy , arguing that a diversity of interests was “the only defense against the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government.”

Jeffrey Rosen: America is living James Madison’s nightmare

Yet while dependent on the people, the Constitution did not embrace simple majoritarian democracy. The states, with unequal populations, got equal representation in the Senate. The Electoral College also gave the states weight as states in selecting the president. But the centrality of states, a concession to political reality, was balanced by the House of Representatives, where the principle of representation by population prevailed, and which would make up the overwhelming number of electoral votes when selecting a president.

But none of this justified minority rule, which was at odds with the “republican principle.” Madison’s design remained one of popular government precisely because it would require the building of political majorities over time. As Madison argued in “ Federalist No. 63, ” “The cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers.”

Alexander Hamilton, one of Madison’s co-authors of The Federalist Papers , echoed this argument. Hamilton made the case for popular government and even called it democracy: “A representative democracy, where the right of election is well secured and regulated & the exercise of the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities, is vested in select persons, chosen really and not nominally by the people, will in my opinion be most likely to be happy, regular and durable.”

The American experiment, as advanced by Hamilton and Madison, sought to redeem the cause of popular government against its checkered history. Given the success of the experiment by the standards of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, we would come to use the term democracy as a stand-in for representative democracy, as distinct from direct democracy.

Consider that President Abraham Lincoln, facing a civil war, which he termed the great test of popular government, used constitutional republic and democracy synonymously, eloquently casting the American experiment as government of the people, by the people, and for the people. And whatever the complexities of American constitutional design, Lincoln insisted , “the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible.” Indeed, Lincoln offered a definition of popular government that can guide our understanding of a democracy—or a republic—today: “A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.”

The greatest shortcoming of the American experiment was its limited vision of the people, which excluded Black people, women, and others from meaningful citizenship, diminishing popular government’s cause. According to Lincoln, extending meaningful citizenship so that “all should have an equal chance” was the basis on which the country could be “saved.” The expansion of we the people was behind the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ratified in the wake of the Civil War. The Fourteenth recognized that all persons born in the U.S. were citizens of the country and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. The Fifteenth secured the vote for Black men. Subsequent amendments, the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth, granted women the right to vote, prohibited poll taxes in national elections, and lowered the voting age to 18. Progress has been slow— and s ometimes halted, as is evident from current efforts to limit voting rights —and the country has struggled to become the democratic republic first set in motion two centuries ago. At the same time, it has also sought to find the right republican constraints on the evolving body of citizens, so that majority rule—but not factious tempers—can prevail.

Adam Serwer: The Supreme Court is helping Republicans rig elections

Perhaps the most significant stumbling block has been the states themselves. In the 1790 census, taken shortly after the Constitution was ratified, America’s largest state, Virginia, was roughly 13 times larger than its smallest state, Delaware. Today, California is roughly 78 times larger than Wyoming. This sort of disparity has deeply shaped the Senate, which gives a minority of the population a disproportionate influence on national policy choices. Similarly, in the Electoral College, small states get a disproportionate say on who becomes president. Each of California’s electoral votes is estimated to represent 700,000-plus people, while one of Wyoming’s speaks for just under 200,000 people.

Subsequent to 1988, the Republican presidential candidate has prevailed in the Electoral College in three out of seven elections, but won the popular vote only once (2004). If President Trump is reelected, it will almost certainly be because he once again prevailed in the Electoral College while losing the popular vote. If this were to occur, he would be the only two-term president to never win a plurality of the popular vote. In 2020, Trump is the first candidate in American history to campaign for the presidency without making any effort to win the popular vote, appealing only to the people who will deliver him an Electoral College win. If the polls are any indication, more Americans may vote for Vice President Biden than have ever voted for a presidential candidate, and he could still lose the presidency. In the past, losing the popular vote while winning the Electoral College was rare. Given current trends, minority rule could become routine. Many Republicans are actively embracing this position with the insistence that we are, after all, a republic, not a democracy.

They have also dispensed with the notion of building democratic majorities to govern, making no effort on health care, immigration, or a crucial second round of economic relief in the face of COVID-19. Instead, revealing contempt for the democratic norms they insisted on when President Barack Obama sought to fill a vacant Supreme Court seat, Republicans in the Senate have brazenly wielded their power to entrench a Republican majority on the Supreme Court by rushing to confirm Justice Amy Coney Barrett. The Senate Judiciary Committee vote to approve Barrett also illuminates the disparity in popular representation: The 12 Republican senators who voted to approve of Barrett’s nomination represented 9 million fewer people than the 10 Democratic senators who chose not to vote. Similarly, the 52 Republican senators who voted to confirm Barrett represented 17 million fewer people than the 48 senators who voted against her. And the Court Barrett is joining, made up of six Republican appointees (half of whom were appointed by a president who lost the popular vote) to three Democratic appointees, has been quite skeptical of voting rights—a severe blow to the “democracy” part of a democratic republic. In 2013’s Shelby County v. Holder , the Court struck down a section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that allowed the federal government to preempt changes in voting regulations from states with a history of racial discrimination.

As Adam Serwer recently wrote in these pages , “ Shelby County ushered in a new era of experimentation among Republican politicians in restricting the electorate, often along racial lines.” Republicans are eager to shrink the electorate. Ostensibly seeking to prevent voting fraud, which studies have continually shown is a nonexistent problem, Republicans support efforts to make voting more difficult—especially for minorities, who do not tend to vote Republican. The Republican governor of Texas, in the midst of a pandemic when more people are voting by mail, limited the number of drop-off locations for absentee ballots to one per county. Loving, with a population of 169, has one drop-off location; Harris, with a population of 4.7 million (majority nonwhite), also has one drop-off location. States controlled by Republicans, such as Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, have also closed polling places, making voters in predominantly minority communities stand in line for hours to cast their ballot.

Who counts as a full and equal citizen—as part of we the people —has shrunk in the Republican vision. Arguing against statehood for the District of Columbia, which has 200,000 more people than the state of Wyoming, Senator Tom Cotton from Arkansas said Wyoming is entitled to representation because it is “a well-rounded working-class state.” It is also overwhelmingly white. In contrast, D.C. is 50 percent nonwhite.

High-minded claims that we are not a democracy surreptitiously fuse republic with minority rule rather than popular government. Enabling sustained minority rule at the national level is not a feature of our constitutional design, but a perversion of it. Routine minority rule is neither desirable nor sustainable, and makes it difficult to characterize the country as either a democracy or a republic. We should see this as a constitutional failure demanding constitutional reform.

This story is part of the project “ The Battle for the Constitution ,” in partnership with the National Constitution Center .

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Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions, as well as the moral duties of democratic representatives and citizens. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory, which aim to describe and explain how democracy and democratic institutions function. Normative democracy theory aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions and the actions of citizens and representatives. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must draw on the results of political science, sociology, psychology, and economics in order to give concrete moral guidance.

This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on seven related issues. First, it proposes a definition of democracy. Second, it outlines different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally valuable at all. Third, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority. Fourth, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to demand of citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. Fifth, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation and the moral norms of representation. Sixth, it discusses the relationship between central findings in social choice theory and democracy. Seventh, it discusses the question of who should be included in the group that makes democratic decisions.

This entry focuses on issues in contemporary democratic theory. Although it mentions authors in the history of philosophy where relevant, it does not attempt to give a history of democratic theory. Readers interested in more in-depth discussions of historical figures important to the development of democratic theory are advised to look at the entries listed in the “Historical Figures” section towards the end of this entry.

1. Democracy Defined

2.1.1.1 the production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories, 2.1.1.2 the production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories, 2.1.1.3 character-based arguments, 2.1.1.4 economic justifications of democracy, 2.1.2 instrumental arguments against democracy, 2.1.3 grounds for instrumentalism, 2.2.1 liberty, 2.2.2 democracy as public justification, 2.2.3 equality, 3.1 instrumentalist conceptions of democratic authority, 3.2.1 democracy as collective self-rule, 3.2.2 freedom and democratic authority, 3.2.3 equality and authority, 3.3.1 internal limits to democratic authority, 3.3.2 the problem of persistent minorities, 3.3.3 external limits to democratic authority, 4.1 the problem of democratic participation, 4.2.1 elite theory of democracy, 4.2.2 interest group pluralism, 4.2.3 neo-liberalism.

4.2.4. The self-interest assumption

4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor

4.2.6 sortition, 4.3.1 the duty to vote, 4.3.2 principled disobedience of the law, 4.3.3 accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus, 5.1 what sort of representative system is best, 5.2 the ethics of representation, 6. social choice and democracy, 7. the boundary problem: constituting the demos, 8. historical figures, other internet resources, related entries.

The term “democracy”, as we will use it in this entry, refers very generally to a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second, we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight. It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from which they proceed.

2. The Justification of Democracy

In this section, we examine different views concerning the justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is important to distinguish views concerning the justification of democracy from views concerning the authority of democracy, which we examine in section 3 . Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions. Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch. 7)—it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.

We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision; or intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the method.

2.1 Instrumentalism

2.1.1 instrumental arguments in favor of democracy.

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and (2) improvements in the characters of the participants.

It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy (Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the political system. For example, when African Americans regained the right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013). Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).

A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that

no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen 1999: 152)

The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.

Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to procedure-independent standards. While there are many different explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing.

The most prominent explanation for democracy’s epistemic reliability rests on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), a mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called “law of large numbers”. CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The assumptions are (Condorcet 1785):

each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption );
voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption );
votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption ).

While Condorcet’s original proof was restricted to decisions with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin 2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy’s reliability is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that

[i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)

Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).

The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that, if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct. For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of 10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies (see Black 1963: 159–65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch. XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992; Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).

A second common epistemic justification for democracy—which is often traced to Aristotle ( Politics , Book II, Ch. 11; see Waldron 1995)—argues that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies. More recently, Hélène Landemore (2013) has drawn on the “diversity-trumps-ability” theorem of Scott Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)—which states that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set—to argue that democracy can be expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page and Hong’s original theorem and Landemore’s use of it to justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan 2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).

A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey argues that democracy involves “a consultation and a discussion which uncovers social needs and troubles”. Even if experts know how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927 [2012: 154–155]; see also Marsilius [DP]; Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson 2011).

Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).

Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions.

There are a number of economic justifications of democratic institutions. They proceed from the idea that preferences are given and that institutions are justified in terms of how citizens, given their preferences, would rationally want their society to be organized. The two accounts we mention here are in a broadly contractarian tradition, which seeks to determine what persons would agree to as a framework for collective decision making. Probably the most famous of these efforts and the one that has led to the highly fruitful research program of public choice theory is that of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in their classic work The Calculus of Consent (1963). They argue that something like constitutional democracy could arise from a state of nature in which persons, with their basic natural and property rights protected, would agree to a collective decision procedure. The basic preference structure is self-interest in which persons attempt to maximize the stream of benefits to themselves. Individuals desire a collective decision-making apparatus in order to take care of problems that arise in the state of nature from uncontrolled external costs and public bads, which are costs that arise for everyone because no individual has incentive to limit them. External costs are costs that persons impose others without their consent. Hence, the purpose of the collective decision making is to take care of problems that arise when markets are inefficient because of externalities and public bads. The design of the decision procedure is meant to minimize two kinds of costs: external costs and decision costs. Decision costs are costs that arise from the difficulty of making collective decisions. Such decision making takes time and resources. Here is the basic calculation each person considers when choosing a collective decision procedure. On the one hand, they consider the external costs imposed on them if the decision procedure is not a unanimity procedure. Each person reflects that as the decision procedure approximates unanimity the chance of external costs imposed on them goes to zero. Taking the external costs of the procedure alone into account each prefers unanimity. On the other hand, each person considers the decision costs of a collective procedure. Here, as the decision procedure approaches unanimity the decision costs grow extremely large because of all the haggling such a procedure would generate. The procedure each person would choose under the circumstances would attempt to minimize the combination of these two costs. It would be a procedure that is close to majority rule, though there is no reason to suppose that majority rule itself would be chosen.

One objection is that the assumptions behind the argument are too strong. Buchanan and Tullock argue that this process would lead to unanimous agreement on a collective decision procedure under certain assumptions such as individuals cannot be divided into groups with strongly opposed interests and when individuals are sufficiently uncertain of their fates in the long term that their interests become more or less the same. They are in effect behind a veil of ignorance with regard to the future. These assumptions have been contested as descriptions of any plausible circumstances in which societies find themselves.

Another broadly economic approach can be found in Douglas Rae (1969). Rae argues that individuals with preferences over social states would generally prefer majority rule over the long run because majority rule maximizes the chances of the satisfaction of their preferences. The Rae-Taylor theorem states that if each individual has an equal prior probability of preferring each of the two alternatives, majority rule maximizes each individual’s expected utility (see the Section 2.4 of the entry on social choice theory ). Again the background assumption is that people don’t know how often they fall in the majority or minority and don’t have any special preference for the status quo. Under these circumstances, one gets what one wants more often from a collective decision procedure when it is majoritarian (see also Coleman [1989]).

Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of what David Estlund calls “epistocracy”, a form of oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).

Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the intrinsic value of broad inclusion.

One objection to any form of epistocracy—the demographic objection —holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).

Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.

Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the subjects’ characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch. 3).

Pure instrumentalists argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility—understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction—guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy.

But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process (Arneson 1993 [2002: 96–97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification (Wall 2007).

Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just (Dworkin 2000). In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).

2.2 Non-instrumentalism

Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions. Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value.

One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government (Gould 1988: 45–85; see also Marsilius [DP]). Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff 1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement.

One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese 1995). However, many argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to realize the right to collective self-determination because political communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz 2016).

Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals.

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy has been highly influential in the development of this approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This analysis yields the Democratic Principle:

[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110])

Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.

One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10). Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).

Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996 [2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.

The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005: Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete consensus on the principles that regulate society.

However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only solution (Christiano 2009).

Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973: 30–41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each person’s point of view on matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer 1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).

What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.

An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the principle be realized in a pluralistic society.

Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization of public equality in a political society. Within the framework determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice and the common good that they think are right.

The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).

A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic authority.

A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of relational equality . A concern with relational equality is a concern for

human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler 2010: 225)

Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.

3. The Authority of Democracy

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey democratic decisions when they disagree with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which we discussed in section 2.1.1.2 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of ideological biases.

One further worry about the Jury Theorem’s epistemic conceptions of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).

Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.

3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority

Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person’s interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority.

Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.

There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general will. On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good. On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good. As we discussed in section 3.1 , Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized democratic procedure.

Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all.

One worry with this account is that those who oppose democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a significant threat to individuals’ freedom as independence. Another worry, which Stilz’s view arguably inherits from Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz’s view might thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” (Simmons 2001).

Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one’s fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy, democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted. Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision making process.

Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see section 2.2.3 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another. According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.

Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008; 2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology, Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism (see section 5.1 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production.

3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy

What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.

External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh against—and may sometimes outweigh the principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience. Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).

Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.

Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.

More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.

The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public equality.

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).

Some views may assert that there are only external limits to democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is how one treats one’s fellow citizens as equals but one may also have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.

4. The Demands of Democratic Participation

In this section, we examine the demands of participation in large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core challenge.

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex society. There are three distinct problems here:

Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule ( The Republic , Book VI)
Others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
Since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one’s votes to advance one’s aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation

Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.

Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter 1942 [1950: 269]).

On Schumpeter’s view, however, citizens do have a role to play in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums out.

So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population at large, on how to run the society.

A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about citizens’ political agency and competence argues that a well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of “defensible epistocracy” (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in legislative assemblies (the “pivotality effect”) and officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for the general welfare (the “accountability effect”). Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its commitments.

One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is very powerful.

In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69)

In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.

This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a whole.

A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society) than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the interest group.)

Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.

But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent.

Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens can choose.

4.2.4 The self-interest assumption

A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility functions.

Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion with those who have distinct morally informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge 1990).

Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a complex and differentiated “deliberative system”, a

wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012)

Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be characterized by a division of democratic labor , with different parts of the system making different contributions to the overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano 1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.

To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with equality?

One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the individuals use “cognitive shortcuts” to save on time in acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221–229). Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).

People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy. People receive “free” information (which they do not deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a difference to the stream of free information individuals receive. Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities of information among citizens.

It has been argued that some of the core problems of electoral representative democracy can be solved by embracing the appointment of political officials by random selection, or sortition . Athenian democracy involved direct democracy for the making of laws and sortition for the choice of officials. Sortition is arguably consistent with the definition of democracy offered in section 1 because, in virtue of the fact that citizens have an equal chance of being selected, sortition is characterized by equality at a crucial stage of the decision-making process. Alex Guerrero (2014) argues that sortition can avoid the related problems of political ignorance, lack of representative accountability, and capture of the political process by elites. The problems are solved because the appointment of public officials does not depend on the input of ordinary citizens who are likely to be ignorant about political matters, nor does it leave space for the wealthy and powerful to influence official decision-making through funding electoral campaigns. One objection is that sortition ignores citizens’ interests in being part of the process of collective self-governance and rather than merely having an equal chance to be part of this process (Lafont 2019). Another objection is that the process of sortition does not allow for choosing representatives and political parties that have put together a conception of how all the interests in society are to fit together in a just and reasonable whole.

4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens

What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus.

It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale democracies, the chance that any particular citizen’s vote will decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though they’re almost certain not to make the difference to who gets elected? Why shouldn’t they seek to promote the good or justice in other ways?

Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit 1984: 73–75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have a good reason to vote.

One worry with Parfit’s view is that it faces a version of what Jason Brennan calls “the particularity problem” (Brennan 2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.

Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the reason to vote that Guerrero identifies.

Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices (Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices—they make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).

One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.

One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to vote in the importance of doing one’s fair share of the demands of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one’s fair share of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote, citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.

Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls 1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007, 2012).

Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues that the same considerations that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001; Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive (Markovits 2005).

It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law. On the other hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons 2007: ch 4).

Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only civil disobedience can be justified in this way. However, some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative presumption over uncivil disobedience. The core idea that insofar as the values that ground a pro tanto duty to obey the law—for example, justice or democratic equality—are sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).

Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public justification.

A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect, and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock 2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).

Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see section 2.2.2 ) often argue that democratic citizens and officials have individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for a “duty of civility” that requires citizens and officials to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires citizens to appeal to a reasonable “political” conception of justice that can be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between different comprehensive doctrines. While different theorists motivate duties of public justification in different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive political authority to respect citizens’ freedom and equality.

5. Democratic Representation

Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral questions concerning representation. First, what sort of representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are representatives bound?

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society (Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.

In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.

Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose democratic control over their representatives’ actions.

Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi’s discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion of these issues.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is thought by some to provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow 1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good instrumental reasons for having democracy.

The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function. Unlimited domain : The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. Non dictatorship : the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. Transitivity and completeness : The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. Independence of irrelevant alternatives : the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. Pareto condition : if all the members prefer an alternative x over y , then x must be ranked above y in the social preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.

A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative. For example, suppose we have three persons A , B and C and three alternatives x , y and z . A prefers x over y , y over z ; B prefers y over z and z over x ; C prefers x over z and z over y . In this case, x is the Condorcet winner since it beats y , and it beats z . The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons A , B and C , and three alternatives, x , y and z . In the case in which A prefers x over y and y over z , while B prefers y over z and z over x , and C prefers z over x and x over y , the Condorcet rule will yield a social preference of x over y , y over z and z over x . One can see here that the Condorcet rule satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference. One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.

Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely (Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties that enable them to avoid cycles.

The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all, coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean Ingham’s account of political equality. He includes intensity of preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles.

If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the right to participation? Ought children have the right to participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the people in the world ought to be included in the collective decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state. But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society A can pollute another society B . Why shouldn’t the members of B have a say in the decisions regarding the polluting activities in A ? And there can be many other effects that activities in A can have on B .

Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be determined through a principle of national self-determination. We identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups and cultures co-mingle on the very same land.

Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).

A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This principle is plausible enough, but it doesn’t get at enough cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.

A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).

But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem.

First, “having a say” is not clear. Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm. As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian politics.

Second, it is not clear what “being affected” means. One, does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good? Two, are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the money to them (Goodin 2007).

The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams 1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies, presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take on any particular character if this is the case.

A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their legitimate interests in life.

But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to advance one’s interests in a decentralized process like a market or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective decision-making.

Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the international system. They have developed more effective practices of accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have created unified societies with highly interdependent populations. Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to some degree to other individuals and states through the process of negotiation and international law making. The origin of these boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant. To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan 1991).

Plato’s ethics and politics in The Republic
Aristotle’s political theory
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Jean Jacques Rousseau
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Debate: Why Democracies Survive

Jason brownlee.

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Experts worry that de facto single-person regimes in previous multiparty states (Russia, Turkey, Venezuela) and norm-defiance in existing democracies (Brazil, Hungary, the United States) signal a coming authoritarian age. Without examining the broader record, however, it is hard to know whether such tremors presage a global convulsion. A century’s worth of evidence (1920–2019) shows that contemporary democracies are sturdier than they look. Above all, high levels of economic development continue to sustain multipartism; OECD democracies have faced less risk than often intimated. Further, competition among political parties, regardless of national affluence, contains a momentum that even the most willful demagogues have had trouble stopping. These economic and institutional bulwarks help explain why democratic backsliding, which seems so portentous, has preceded democratic survival more often than breakdown. Even as executive aggrandizement and rancorous partisanship roil the world’s most venerable democracies, they are unlikely to produce new autocracies absent permissive material conditions.

E xactly a hundred years ago, in October 1922, Benito Mussolini began twisting Italy’s democracy into an icon of authoritarianism. The March on Rome that he and his Fascist Party staged that month convinced the king of Italy—fearing civil war—to hand the government to Mussolini, sending reverberations beyond Southern Europe. An early one was felt just a year later, when Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party tried to seize control of Bavaria and start a “German revolution” against the Weimar Republic. Their bid failed, but the resulting trial made Hitler a national figure in German politics.

Over the next two decades, what Samuel P. Huntington would later call the “first reverse wave” of authoritarianism would see nearly two-thirds of the world’s democracies placed under the bootheels of dictators and occupying armies. 1 The price of liberating at least some of these countries was a cataclysmic six-year conflict that killed more than seventy-million people, most of them civilians, and ended with the use of atomic weapons. For later generations, the titanic horror of the Second World War cast a grim light on the era leading up to it, when Mussolini, Hitler, and their followers had risen to power. The first reverse wave loomed as a dire testament to the ability of willful leaders to threaten freedom and peace.

About the Authors

Jason Brownlee is professor of government at the University of Texas, Austin, and the author of Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (2007).

View all work by Jason Brownlee

Kenny Miao is a doctoral candidate in government at the University of Texas, Austin.

View all work by Kenny Miao

The specter of democratic collapse now haunts a new century. The 2010s began with 116 electoral democracies in the world, according to Freedom House, and ended with 115, a modest net decline that belied significant disruptions in a dozen earlier multiparty systems. Alarming numbers of elected leaders were using coercion to stay in power. A prime example was Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who exploited a clumsy July 2016 coup attempt to launch a sweeping “crackdown on the political opposition, academia, media and civil society.” 2 Within two years, he would transform the once-ceremonial Turkish presidency into a potent executive office tailor-made for his brand of strongman rule. Other events of 2016 including the British vote to leave the European Union and the U.S. presidential election stunned professionals who made a living explaining world events.

Commentators and scholars soon placed Brexit, Donald J. Trump’s victory, and authoritarian leaders such as Erdoğan in a broader narrative of democratic decline. 3 Two months after Trump was inaugurated as U.S. president, the title story in the Atlantic was “How to Build an Autocracy.” The cover depicted Trump addressing a throng that stretched beyond the horizon. The 14 May 2018 issue of Time magazine carried a lead story titled “Rise of the Strongman,” with a cover showing Russian president Vladimir Putin looming above images of Erdoğan, Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán, and Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. A few months later, in October, the Atlantic asked readers “Is Democracy Dying?” Last December the magazine declared “The Bad Guys Are Winning,” with the illustration showing a black-suited Putin strutting, Reservoir Dogs –style, with Erdoğan as well as presidents Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, and Xi Jinping of China.

Talk of an antidemocratic Zeitgeist echoed in the halls of academe. Some scholars saw a “wave of autocratization” threatening to engulf the world’s most venerable polities. 4 “If Trump wins this election in November,” said one political scientist in mid-2020, “democracy is gone.” 5 Even after Trump lost, however, the menace to democracy did not disappear, as the former president and swaths of his base embraced the fiction that the election had been stolen and a usurper sat in the Oval Office. 6

At the centennial of Mussolini’s putsch, it would be risible to ignore troubling parallels between the interwar epoch and our current era. Then and now, opportunists with no lasting fealty to democracy have weaponized elections to concentrate power in their own hands. Then and now, demagogues have stirred millions through naked appeals to prejudice and nativism. Then and now, office-seekers have celebrated the violence of the mob and the state to silence critics. No matter how much observers may disagree about the extent of these similarities, that the ugliest episodes of the 1920s and 1930s echo at all in the early twenty-first century is a cause for dismay and reflection.

Even as experts and laypersons reckon with these challenges, it is vital to note that historical analogies can mislead. 7 Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany are notorious because they were terribly exceptional. Countless egotists have aspired to emulate the Duce and the Führer, but few have come close. The fates of Italy’s liberal Parliament and the Weimar Republic warn against complacency, but at the same time, the value of their examples for decisionmakers who must navigate today’s waters should not be overestimated.

The present essay takes seriously what was previously inconceivable: the prospect that, across the global North and South, a slew of democracies will fall in the twenty-first century. We step back from recent examples to consider an expanse of historical and contemporary evidence—including an analysis of democratic breakdown and survival between 1920 and 2019. We conclude that, while democracies today are certainly under stress, the prognosis is generally positive. Affluent democracies (in which national wealth derives from industry rather than unproductive rents such as may be charged for oil or mineral extraction) remain very likely to endure as democracies. Notwithstanding a small set of outliers such as Turkey, electoral democracy in wealthy states looks set to survive. This inference fits a storied research tradition regarding the link between socioeconomic modernization and the stability of democratic rule. 8

A closer look at which democracies “backslid” in the early twenty-first century, and which cases broke down suggests that norm erosion, institutional gridlock, and other woes—while certainly troubling—are not portents of dictatorship. Democracy watchers should therefore keep their eyes on the socioeconomic conditions that have tamed the wild ambitions of would-be autocrats—or allowed their schemes to flourish.

Not With a Bang, but a Whimper

The 2000s and 2010s did not deliver a reverse wave of democratization, but the mode and setting of democratic breakdowns drew attention. 9 Most recent democratic breakdowns traced back to politicians who had been elected to run the executive branch rather than to uniformed coup plotters. The mechanism of breakdown was death by a thousand cuts. Erdoğan also tightened his hold in a country where relative material prosperity was supposed to stymie authoritarianism.

From the 1950s through the 1980s, when democracies fell, odds were that generals or colonels were responsible. While traditional military coups continue to threaten civilian rule (as in the cases of Egypt 2013, Thailand 2014, Burma 2021, and Burkina Faso 2022), civilian-led takeovers have eclipsed them. 10 Examples of other nonmilitary figures who have embedded themselves in power include Daniel Ortega, who is now in his fourth consecutive term as Nicaragua’s president, and Sheikh Hasina, who is enjoying her third successive term as the prime minister of Bangladesh.

While they have been behind many democratic breakdowns, civilian politicians have mostly eschewed overt autogolpes . The original “self-coup” artist was Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, who in the early 1850s turned the French Second Republic into the French Second Empire, promoting himself from France’s president to its emperor in the process. The German Enabling Act of 23 March 1933, Ferdinand Marcos’s 1972 declaration of martial law in the Philippines, and Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 seizure of legislative and judicial power in Peru are other notable cases. One day citizens are enjoying multipartism and civil liberties; the next morning they awake under dictatorship. The autocratic premiers and presidents of the twenty-first century have generally steered clear of anything that jolting. Preferring to showcase continuity, they hold regular elections, keep legislatures open (even if manipulated and curbed), and permit at least some rival parties to operate.

Because the new authoritarianism arises in stages behind a republican frontispiece, the emergence of rule by a single party or person can be gradual enough to have a “dangerously deceptive” quality. 11 The incumbent plays coy while spending years gradually shrinking the space for political competition. Observers both foreign and domestic may not reach consensus about what is happening until it is too late. 12 Democratic decline is not unidirectional, but the downward slope of backsliding can be both slippery and steep. One study found that more than two-thirds of democracies that backslid eventually underwent full breakdown. 13 Spotting such patterns in the past is far easier than tracking them in real time. Ortega bucked term limits to win reelection in 2011, with 62 percent of the vote, in a controversial but hotly contested race. 14 He then garnered implausibly high supermajorities in later polls. Erdoğan pulled off a slow-motion executive takeover in a country where economic development was supposed to have advanced too far to let democracy be unraveled in this way.

As of this writing in September 2022, democracies above the historical “Argentina 1975” threshold continue to appear safe from military coups. (The May 2014 coup in Thailand came close to defying the trend.) 19 Meanwhile, the stability that affluence was supposed to bestow did not extend to blocking takeovers by civilian chief executives. 20 Even bracketed as an “outlier,” the case of Turkey, and an incident of breakdown in the small nation of the Maldives, still mean that there can be no deterministic relationship between development and democratic survival. At the same time, however, a potent example—or even a handful of such instances—does not constitute a trend. From 2000 through 2019, democratic breakdowns still clustered in the bottom quarter of the PPP GDPpc range (73 percent of them happened below $6,602, which is less than half the Argentina 1975 threshold). In the absence of a more methodical examination, it is difficult to know whether Turkey is an outlier or a bellwether.

Midrange studies underline the importance of not overgeneralizing from high-profile cases and potentially misreading the threat to democracy. Kurt Weyland found that among thirty “populist” leaders in the Americas and Europe, only six had “suffocated democracy.” 21 When Robert Kaufman and Stephan Haggard studied the problem, they even set aside wealthy democracies, acknowledging that “outright reversions [to authoritarianism] are still virtually non-existent in developed countries.” 22

Conversely, as illiberal politics spreads—but few democracies succumb—multiparty governments may prove more likely to recover from backsliding than plunge into autocracy. Just four years after the Atlantic mused about Trump building an undemocratic regime and Time placed Duterte in the company of dictators, both men were out of office. Both figures still commanded influence in national politics. Trump denied his defeat and raised expectations for a fierce run at the White House in 2024. Duterte’s daughter Sara was elected vice-president of the Philippines in 2022, while another prominent scion—Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.—won the presidency with nearly 60 percent of the vote. Nonetheless, neither Trump nor Duterte had exceeded his mandate, and the respective elections that replaced them evinced robust multipartism.

It is not hard to imagine prosaic outcomes for other elected executives who have flouted democratic norms: Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński, India’s Narendra Modi, and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. 23 These individuals may harbor fantasies of emulating Erdoğan, but such fearsome schemes remain circumscribed by the very political systems they seek to corrupt.

The Empirics of Democratic Breakdown

Is Erdoğan’s Turkey a black swan or a canary in a coal mine? Comparative study may help us to find out. Only then can we reliably assess the risks posed by elected leaders who may harbor ambitions similar to Erdoğan’s, but who find themselves in different contexts. Our full dataset (5,563 country-years and 235 spells from 1920 through 2019) allows us to test the degree to which economic development protected democracy during times of creeping authoritarianism. Our key findings come from our linear-probability model. (This type of model is among the most widely used in the social sciences; for our main regression table, see the online appendix at https://bit.ly/3R25isA . ) As we ran the model, certain patterns emerged repeatedly. Reported results are not idiosyncratic; they denote enduring trends. We tested a range of competing hypotheses, and we used multiple measures of democracy to make sure that no findings depended on judgments made by a single coder or team.

The topline result is that patterns of democracy in the early twenty-first century show as much continuity as change—and they offer as much evidence for optimism as cause for concern. First, productive wealth (nonrent GDPpc) stands as a strong predictor of democratic breakdown and survival. For the average electoral democracy of the early twenty-first century, the compounded predicted probability of surviving (avoiding breakdown) for a generation (twenty years) rises as GDPpc goes up. At a GDPpc level of $1,000 per year, democracy has a slightly better than one-in-three chance of surviving. That probability improves to 60 percent at $5,000 GDPpc, reaches 75 percent when it is $10,000 a year, and enters the realm of virtual certainty (97 percent) at $20,000.

The tests also showed how the perils of the time between the two world wars compare with the current era. The data underscored just how fraught were the 1920s and 1930s. The overall risk of breakdown (whether by army coup or civilian takeover) during the interwar period was a statistically significant 2 percent higher per year, which translates, over a twenty-year span, into a 50 percent greater chance of a democracy ending at some point during that two-decade interval. All later eras, including the opening decades of the present century, have been more conducive to democratic survival. Such a claim may sound puzzling, given the rise in executive takeovers, but the data offer an explanation.

Democratic breakdown did not become more likely in the 2000s and 2010s, but its modality morphed. The annual likelihood of a military coup dropped nearly 1 percent (0.9 percent), a slight but statistically significant change. Meanwhile executive takeovers became 0.6 percent more probable. For the most part, these countervailing patterns washed each other out. Yet the greater peril that elected incumbents posed to democracies did not quite match the increased security those same governments enjoyed from coups. On balance, an electoral democracy has annually been 0.4 percent safer, on average, since 2000.

In summary, our analysis found substantial evidence of political continuities between the recent era and the postwar twentieth century. Development continued to be a powerful predictor of a country’s ability to sustain democracy. Conversely, to the extent that new hazards for democracy have emerged, their net impact on democratic survival has been nil. To understand how democracy could have remained relatively sturdy while democratic backsliding proliferated, we complemented our quantitative analysis with qualitative attention to the latest cases.

Democratic backsliding is still an emerging concept in the social sciences. In her seminal contribution on the subject, Nancy Bermeo defined backsliding as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” 24 Subsequent researchers have been more successful at describing what backsliding looks like than they have been at establishing its relationship to regime changes, or even at agreeing on how to measure it.

Working with the same group of cases that we used in our long-range tests of democratic survival, we sought a measure of backsliding that would track incremental declines in the quality of democracy. To provide a continuous measure, we turned to data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. The V-Dem data have been cited to back up some of the most prominent claims about democratic fragility. 25 By employing a V-Dem measure, we aimed to ensure that our analysis would not overlook instances of backsliding that a narrower method might miss. 26 We then examined how the population of “backsliders” overlapped with cases of democratic survival and breakdown. 27

Forty-seven electoral democracies (and fifty democratic spells) experienced breakdown or at least one period of backsliding under our measure (see the Table , which omits another 75 democratic countries that did not undergo breakdown or substantial backsliding during the two decades). By this count, countries with periods of backsliding slightly exceeded occurrences of democratic breakdown (30 to 28). What is remarkable, however, is how little the two phenomena coincided. In twenty cases (more than half of which were instances of executive takeover), democratic breakdown was not presaged by a backsliding period. By comparison, seven of the eight cases of the second column were executive takeovers, connoting the electoral road to single-person rule.

The last column solves the mystery of how multiple presidents and premiers can curtail local opposition but still not produce a global threat to democracy. As captivating it has been, the tale of backsliding preceding breakdown has been much less common than the story of backsliding—and recovery—within electoral democracies. Twenty-two countries had one or more democratic spells with backsliding but did not break down. This set of states accounts for more than two-thirds of the backsliders from 2000 through 2019. However portentous executive overreach and rancorous partisanship may have seemed at the time, they did not augur regime change.

Sources of Democratic Survival

Like most history buffs, students of democratic breakdown have been drawn to the most consequential figures and events. Confident conclusions also require studying the proverbial “dogs that did not bark,” the cases where the feared outcome failed to happen. For democracy this means considering periods of continuity, the “quiet times” which make no headlines but which are integral to any sound estimate of how often and under what conditions democracies end.

The preceding analysis supports three inferences: 1) Having national wealth that does not depend on oil rents strongly predicts democratic survival; 2) multipartism contains built-in defenses against authoritarianism; and 3) backsliding tends to roil electoral democracy without curtailing it. In sum, the main conditions that imperiled democracy after 1945 continue to pose the biggest risks, while the historic sources of democratic survival continue to offer the strongest safeguards.

The legacy of Lipset. The idea that higher national incomes sustain democratic governments remains one of the few lawlike regularities that comparativists have discovered in the political world. We uncovered hefty amounts of evidence supporting the insights of Lipset and his successors: For citizens of electoral democracies during the century after 1920, there was no more reliable guarantor of their political system than material prosperity.

These results indicate a robust probabilistic relationship between wealth and democratic survival. Electoral democracy has been nearly impregnable—although not invincible—in countries with GDPpc above the Argentina 1975 level. By comparison, the dynamics of lower-income states are less novel. In countries with less (non-oil) per capita wealth than Argentina had in 1975, democracy has been and still is highly susceptible to both coups and executive takeovers.

Hence, what sometimes appears to be a topsy-turvy dynamic on the surface displays profound continuities that accord with prior theory. The data strongly support the stabilizing effect that national wealth has on electoral democracy, even in the face of downturns in Moscow, Managua, and Dhaka. Meanwhile, the outlier, Erdoğan, has grabbed the spotlight but has proved a tough act to follow. In order to understand why, it is valuable to also consider the political dynamics that stop one party or person from monopolizing power.

The momentum of multipartism. For traditional coup-proofing, new democracies may have no better option than appeasing the military until civilian sovereignty becomes taken for granted. In the countries of postcolonial Africa, Asia, and Latin America, that process sometimes took generations, especially for fiscally constrained states that struggled to deliver essential goods while also placating the generals. When it comes to blocking executives from seizing total control, however, the situation is less bleak. Even the youngest electoral democracies have a potent defense mechanism: their own political pluralism, rooted in social constituencies and embodied by parties and candidates. This innate resistance to civilian autocracy is so fundamental that it often hides in plain sight.

The same context of multiparty competition that vested the chief executive with authority then becomes a built-in impediment to the incumbent’s ability to hold power indefinitely. Even a minimal procedural democracy will have leaders whose path to office was a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. (If no such struggle took place, then the regime is something other than a democracy.) A chief executive intent on installing authoritarianism must be not only willing but able to stop future electoral competition and stay in power even after a plurality of voters has soured on the executive’s rule.

Consolidating a single-party state can be a tall order in civilian-dominated political systems where large-scale state repression is off the table and voting remains the principal mechanism of assigning political power. In effect, the incumbent executive needs to build a coalition of elite and mass supporters large and potent enough to defeat the broad resistance that indefinite single-party rule is sure to provoke. The resisters will include not only rival parties, but also former backers of the incumbents who may once have cheered but who now balk at a full-on plunge into the authoritarian unknown.

The protean nature of “competitive authoritarianism” is a testament to the inertial power of multipartism. Christopher Carothers noted in 2018 that competitive authoritarianism tends to be a passing political situation—it moves toward pluralism or else autocracy—rather than a stable regime type. 28 Elections can be hotly contested even on a skewed playing field, and incumbents will struggle to stop the ballot from mandating the ebb and flow of power to and from the various parties. At the time of Carothers’s essay, more than half the original thirty-five competitive authoritarian regimes had moved out of that category, into electoral democracy, while less than a fifth (including Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Nicaragua, and Russia) established de facto single-party rule under an individual dictator.

In sum, when civilian politicians keep the army in its barracks—eschewing mass armed repression and preventing outright coups—these politicians will likely have no choice but to keep tussling in elections and partisan politics, without one figure or faction ever achieving permanent predominance. The potential for multipartism to provide a self-sustaining equilibrium carries a related implication for concerns about democratic backsliding.

Backsliding without breakdown. It is prudent to take note of attacks on democratic rules and norms, even when the overall political system is not immediately endangered. Yet close attention to scattered cases of backsliding may suggest causal or predictive relationships that broader evidence does not support. A train of abuses may precede a democratic breakdown in a way that cannot be written off as pure coincidence, but the question of how much backsliding contributes to breakdown remains unanswered until one considers backsliding’s relationship to democratic survival as well.

The data revealed that the road from backsliding to breakdown may be less traveled than previously assumed. Whereas speculation about a democratic crisis has centered on illiberal elites and their loyal zealots, the statistics point to the continuing power of structural conditions to hem in those actors and uphold democracy. Today’s would-be electoral autocrats choose their strategies for cementing power, but they do not choose the circumstances in which they pursue those strategies. When antecedent conditions include a competitive struggle for the people’s vote, bolstered by a robust economy, incumbents will find themselves hard-pressed to turn incremental gains into indefinite mandates.

We would not assert that backsliding and breakdown are orthogonal, but the predictive relationship is so weak that students of democracy should exercise caution before treating signs of democratic deterioration as portents of dictatorship. As the Table indicated, backsliding has been a problem within electoral democracies, but it is not associated with regime breakdown. If the patterns we observed hold over the coming decades, it may become commonplace to see backsliding and forward progress in equal measure as governments oscillate along the spectrum of electoral democracy. If commentators want to opine about the lifespan of a democracy, they would do well to speak of backsliding as a generally nonfatal ailment, from which electoral democracies often recover. And they will find a country’s material status to be the clearest guide to its long-term prognosis.

An Agenda for Action

If recent observers have underrated economic development’s power to block dictatorship, it would be a mistake to hew to approaches that boosted democracy in the past but may not help much anymore. Since the end of the Cold War, the challenge facing multipartism has changed.

The predominant reaction to the political tumult of the 2010s has been to issue general warnings about power-hungry firebrands endangering democracies the world over. Vigilance is fine; it does not require alarmism. When discussions of a democratic crisis slip into lurid historical analogies and unempirical speculation, they cloud matters rather than clarify them.

A dozen established electoral democracies were interrupted in the 2010s, but close attention to the ways in which democracy broke down and the larger contexts of events shows that our planet is not in the midst of an interwar-style reverse wave of democratization, much less the rise of an “authoritarian international.”

Knowing the specifics of where and how democracy is endangered is crucial. The most likely countries to experience breakdown are low-income and often relatively young democracies in the global South. These countries have not featured prominently in popular coverage, perhaps because they lack geopolitical heft or because their instability seems less novel. But aiming attention and resources at places where breakdown is not likely will not help the many millions of people who live in places where it is. A discussion of the practical means for preventing democratic breakdown is beyond our present scope, but there are some general lessons to keep in mind.

Economic development is the big factor. As a predictor of democratic survival, it eclipses all other variables. The magic number is a GDPpc (apart from oil rents) of 16,374 constant PPP 2017 international dollars per year. Above that level, the odds of democratic survival become favorable, and no other variable can compete. Were South Korea as poor as Brazil, for example, then the chance of South Korean democracy surviving for the next twenty years would drop by 25 percent on that token alone. Conversely, if Zambia were as affluent as Brazil, the likelihood of Zambian electoral democracy lasting for at least a generation would go from barely better than a coin flip (52 percent) to a solid prospect that nearly any wagering person would take (87 percent).

The road to development can be bitterly long, unfortunately. If GDPpc grew at 3 percent per year (the mean growth rate from 2000 through 2019), it would take the median case of democratic breakdown (Bangladesh in 2013, the year before breakdown) 53.6 years to exceed the level of 1975 Argentina. This is a daunting time horizon, but at least the data show that national material gains—slowly made though they may be—do yield the surest guarantee that, once a people have achieved their republic, they can keep it.

While political economy’s tectonic plates grind away in the background, policymakers and practical political scientists will focus on the nearer term. They have long sought ways to strengthen democratic institutions and norms, and nothing in our analysis argues for abandoning that search. We do reason, however, that a country’s macroeconomic profile communicates important information for interpreting its internal politics.

When it comes to holding accountable state officials who flout the law, suppress public debate, or plunder the treasury, development level should not figure. But where a country stands in terms of material affluence—and the baseline risk of democratic breakdown—does signify how seriously such malfeasance jeopardizes an entire political system. In economically advanced multiparty states, the abuse of power by elected leaders and their subordinates has not historically posed the level of existential threat that equivalent behaviors have brought to developing democratic states. These robust patterns indicate that speculation about antidemocratic regime change in many countries may be misplaced even—and perhaps especially—when concerns about discrete political failures are justified.

As it happens, there are even strong signs of long-term coherence, despite recurring challenges, in medium- and low-income democracies. Take Ecuador, a country that experienced a coup in 1997 and another in 2000. 29 It would be facile to call Ecuador’s democracy dictator-proof. In the first half of 2013, left-wing populist and thrice-elected president Rafael Correa appeared to be taking Ecuador “down an increasingly authoritarian path.” 30 As his personal control over national institutions grew, Correa “looked like a sure bet to become president-for-life.” 31 Yet prior politics suggested—and later events confirmed—that Correa would struggle at erecting a one-person autocracy. By 2017, the political and economic winds had turned against Correa; he had been forced to scupper his reelection plans and back an ostensible surrogate, Lenín Moreno. Moreno won the presidency in a runoff, then reversed much of Correa’s intended legacy and served only a single term. He did not run in the 2021 election, and in May of that year peacefully passed power to the democratically elected opposition candidate. 32

Symptoms of backsliding may be just that, signs that the machinery of government and the mores of society are falling behind expectations and historic standards. These signs are not negligible problems that will vanish if left alone, but neither do they point to a collapse of multiparty politics. In Ecuador, the Philippines, and other periodically volatile regimes, some form of multiparty civilian-driven pluralism has generally cohered even when the times have seemed to favor despotism. This is because when aspiring autocrats try to concentrate power, the very systems of political competition that they threaten also impede them. In light of this, the best response to backsliding will not be high-level forecasts of democracy descending into autocracy, but more granular work that seeks to tune up the gears of the state and cultivate a greater openness to differences among citizens.

A Gallery of Isolated Rogues

Surprising events have left observers of politics grasping for answers. Recent literature on the weakening and collapse of democracy focuses on important cases where authoritarianism took hold (Nicaragua, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela) or illiberal leaders who challenged sacrosanct democratic norms and rules in their respective countries (Brazil, Hungary, India, the United States). These countries are few in number but heavy in implication. They have attracted close academic and media attention under the suspicion that they point to a global trend. Still, it has been difficult to gauge the utility of historical comparisons or the scope of today’s antidemocratic threats. Without complacency, students of democracy must be on guard as well against an evidence-resistant “tyrannophobia” that treats every bumptious and overweening executive as the next Mussolini. 33

Our inquiry into democratic breakdown over a hundred-year span allows us to consider the most alarming recent setbacks for democracy, the calamitous fascist wave of the 1920s and 1930s, and numerous other events that have attracted less attention. Statistical tests on more than two-hundred democratic spells show that recent problems of executive takeover and democratic breakdown are unlikely to amount to anything like the authoritarian cascade that followed the First World War. Fortunately, in most of the world where conditions for democratic stability (especially productive national wealth) appeared strong twenty or thirty years ago, they continue to bode well. Conversely, where these conditions have been scarce, countries have not miraculously solidified their democratic institutions in the historical equivalent of a fortnight. Both types of democratic breakdown can be expected to continue to bedevil states as impoverished as Haiti, Nepal, and Niger.

At the other end of the economic-development continuum, high (non-oil) GDPpc remains the single most consistent predictor of survival in electoral democracies. The case of Turkey notwithstanding, high levels of development continue to provide one of the strongest defenses against autocracy. In wealthy countries not dependent on oil rents, even the most power-hungry leaders are likely to hit obstacles if they try to smother dissent.

More often than not, mass electoral contests have proved a bulwark against would-be tyrants. Multipartism forces civilian politicians to vie for and share power, without the armed forces picking winners. Even when that system suffers from ills such as polarization and majoritarianism, it stands apart from the small number of erstwhile democracies that are now led by executives who have managed to install themselves for life.

Worrying about civil-liberties violations and electoral malfeasance remains reasonable: Alternation in power does not prevent incumbents and oppositionists from flouting norms and institutions, sometimes with force. Elected leaders are likely to continue challenging the soft guardrails of norms and the hard limits of the law. They will not pursue such schemes in self-selected circumstances. In this respect, their fate lies as much in their stars as in themselves.

WHY DEMOCRACY SURVIVES: A DEBATE Jason Brownlee and Kenny Miao, “ Why Democracy Survives ” RESPONSES Yascha Mounk, “ The Danger Is Real ” Nancy Bermeo, “ Questioning Backsliding ” Tom Ginsburg, “ The Value of ‘Tyrannophobia ’” Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “ Follow the Leader ” REBUTTAL Jason Brownlee and Kenny Miao, “ A Quiet Consensus ”

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991), 14–15.

2. Zafer Yılmaz and Bryan S. Turner. “Turkey’s Deepening Authoritarianism and the Fall of Electoral Democracy,” British Journal of Middle East Studies 46 (December 2019): 691.

3. Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy,” UCLA Law Review 65 (February 2018): 78–169; Adam Przeworski, Crises of Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Larry Diamond, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency (New York: Penguin, 2019); Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan, 2018); Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2018); Ozan O. Varol, “Stealth Authoritarianism,” Iowa Law Review 100 (May 2015): 1673–1742; Emily Holland and Hadas Aron, “We Don’t Know How Democracies Die,” London School of Economics Phelan U.S. Centre blog, 8 February 2018; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Ahmad Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26 (January 2015): 45–58; Chris Maisano, “Democracy’s Morbid Symptoms,” Catalyst: A Journal of Theory and Strategy 3 (Summer 2019): 181–207; Daniel Treisman, “Is Democracy Really in Danger? The Picture Is Not as Dire as You Think,” Washington Post, 19 June 2018.

4. Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?” Democratization 26 (October 2019):1095–1113.

5. Christopher Ingraham, “The United States Is Backsliding into Autocracy Under Trump, Scholars Warn,” Washington Post, 18 September 2020.

6. Barton Gellman, “Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun,” Atlantic, 6 December 2021.

7. Dylan Matthews, “Is Trump a Fascist? 8 Experts Weigh In,” Vox, 23 October 2020.

8. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 69–105; Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

9. In the 1920s and 1930s, nearly two-thirds of the world’s existing democracies collapsed; between 1960 and 1975, over a third of electoral democracies broke down. Huntington, Third Wave, 14–21.

10. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die ; Milan W. Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 15 (January 2020): 3–31.

11. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 5.

12. Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” Journal of Democracy 27 (January 2016): 5–19.

13. Vanessa Alexandra Boese et al., “Deterring Dictatorship: Explaining Democratic Resilience Since 1900,” V-Dem Working Paper 101 (May 2020): 12.

14. “The November 2011 Elections in Nicaragua: A Study Mission Report,” Carter Center, www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/americas/nicaragua_2011_report_post.pdf

15. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” 75.

16. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 (January 1997): 165.

17. In constant 2010 U.S. dollars, the GDPpc of Turkey in 2016 was 23 percent larger than that of Argentina in 1975. All economic data come from the Gapminder project, which compiles information from multiple sources, including the World Bank, the Maddison Project, and Penn World Tables, www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd001 .

18. This analysis includes democratic spells of at least three continuous years. Periods of democracy and incidents of breakdown come from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED), version 5.3. See Svend-Erik Skaaning, John Gerring, and Henrikas Bartusevičius, “A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 48 (October 2015): 1491–1525. The LIED sorts democratic breakdowns into four categories: gradual regressions induced by incumbents, coups, foreign occupations, and self-coups (incumbents close parliament and take full control). We coded incumbent-led self-coup and gradual regression as “executive takeover” and coup and foreign occupation as “executive removal.” The general pattern did not substantially change under slightly different codings from a range of leading democracy datasets.

19. The Maldives skirts the line between executive takeover and executive removal. In February 2012, opposition forces irregularly deposed President Mohamed Nasheed amid a power struggle that had already ruptured the country’s short-lived electoral democracy. See Fathima Musthaq, “Shifting Tides in South Asia: Tumult in the Maldives,” Journal of Democracy 25 (April 2014): 166.

20. Milan W. Svolik, “Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation,” British Journal of Political Science 45 (October 2015): 725–27.

21. Kurt Weyland, “Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States,” Perspectives on Politics 18 (June 2020): 397–98.

22. Robert R. Kaufman and Stephan Haggard, “Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?” Perspectives on Politics 17 (June 2019): 417.

23. Orbán has left no doubt that he sees Russia and Turkey as lodestars, but only one major research team has labeled Hungary an “electoral autocracy.”See “Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tushnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014,” Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014; V-Dem Institute, “Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021,” 22–23.

24. Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” 5.

25. Kaufman and Haggard, “Democratic Decline in the United States”; Vanessa Alexandra Boesse et al., “How Democracies Prevail: Democratic Resilience as a Two-Stage Process,” Democratization 28 (July 2021): 885–907; Max Fisher, “Is the World Really Falling Apart, or Does It Just Feel That Way?” New York Times, 12 July 2022.

26. Moreover, V-Dem’s “electoral democracy index” (v2x_polyarchy) offers a continuous variable (ranging from 0 to 1) that takes in electoral fairness, freedoms of the press and association, and other basics that establish regime type. See Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook v11.1,” V-Dem Project, 43.

27. Looking at all countries from 2000 through 2019, we identified “backsliding periods” by looking for a substantial (0.1) net decline in the v2x_polyarchy score over some portion of that period—a method based on Kaufman and Haggard, “Democratic Decline in the United States,” 418. This analysis covered countries with democratic spells of at least three continuous years. Use of a lower threshold (0.08) yielded one additional case of a breakdown preceded by a backsliding period (Zambia 2016), and four additional cases of survival preceded by backsliding periods (Argentina, the Czech Republic, Mexico, and Papua New Guinea).

28. Christopher Carothers, “The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 29 (October 2018): 129–35.

29. Dieter Nohlen and Simon Pachano, “Ecuador,” in Dieter Nohlen, ed., Elections in the Americas A Data Handbook: Volume II South America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 368.

30. Carlos de la Torre, “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: Technocratic Populism in Ecuador,” Journal of Democracy 24 (July 2013): 35.

31. Carlos de la Torre, “Latin America’s Shifting Politics: Ecuador After Correa,” Journal of Democracy 29 (October 2018): 80.

32. John Polga-Hecimovichand Francisco Sánchez, “Latin America Erupts: Ecuador’s Return to the Past,” Journal of Democracy 32 (July 2021): 5–18.

33. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

34. Fisher, “Is the World Really Falling Apart?”

Image Credit: Gguy/Shutterstock.com

What Makes Democracies Endure?

Adam Przeworski
Michael Alvarez
José Antonio Cheibub
Fernando Limongi

Read the full essay here .

Volume 12, Issue 1

The 2000 Freedom House Survey: Gains Offset Losses

Arch Puddington

Promising advances in the status of freedom in the world during the past year have been matched by significant disappointments.

Volume 6, Issue 3

The Western Allies 50 Years Later

The Editors’ introduction to “The Western Allies 50 Years Later.”

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

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How countries around the world view democracy, military rule and other political systems

A 38-nation Pew Research Center survey conducted this spring found reasons for optimism as well as concern about the future of democracy around the world. In every nation polled, more than half said representative democracy is a very or somewhat good way to run their country. But the survey also found openness, to varying degrees, to some nondemocratic forms of government.

Use our interactive feature below to compare views of political systems in each nation surveyed. It’s followed by six findings the Center found especially striking.

Explore global opinions on political systems by country

Here are six key findings:

About nine-in-ten Swedes (92%) say representative democracy is a good way of governing their country, the highest share of any country in the survey. A majority of Swedes (57%) also say direct democracy – in which citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major issues – is a good way to govern. People in Sweden are among the most likely of any in the survey to say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country: About eight-in-ten Swedes (79%) hold this view, the same share as in India and Tanzania.

Germans are overwhelmingly opposed to rule by the military or by a strong leader. More than nine-in-ten are opposed to military rule (95%) or rule by a strong leader who can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts (93%). Even among those on the ideological right and those with less education – two groups who tend to voice more support for military or autocratic rule in other countries – there is little backing for these two forms of government in Germany. Just 13% of Germans on the ideological right say a political system with an unchecked leader is a good way to govern, and just 4% of those with less education see military rule as a good form of government.

People in Vietnam are the most likely to support military rule among the countries surveyed. Seven-in-ten Vietnamese say rule by the military would be a good way to govern. But a larger majority (87%) of Vietnamese people express support for representative democracy, while another big majority (73%) supports direct democracy and 67% back a system in which experts, not elected officials, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Of the five different forms of governance tested by the survey, only one – rule by a strong leader without judicial or parliamentary interference – draws more opposition (47%) than support (42%) in Vietnam.

Support for a strong leader who is unchecked by the judiciary or parliament is highest in India. While 55% of people in India view rule by a strong leader as a good way to govern, this form of governance remains less popular than direct democracy (viewed favorably by 76% of respondents), representative democracy (75%) and rule by experts (65%).

Just 6% of people in Mexico are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country, the smallest share of any country surveyed. That compares with a median of 46% among all countries surveyed. Roughly nine-in-ten Mexicans (93%) say they are not satisfied with the way their democracy is working.

Despite their pessimism about democracy in practice, majorities of Mexicans still view direct democracy and representative democracy as good ways to govern (62% and 58%, respectively). About half (53%) say the same about rule by experts, while most Mexicans (67%) have a negative view of rule by a strong leader. When it comes to military rule, more Mexicans oppose than support the idea (52% versus 42%).

Trust in the national government is highest in Tanzania. About nine-in-ten people in Tanzania (89%) trust their government to do what is right for their country, including 48% who say they have “a lot” of trust. Globally, a median of just 14% express “a lot” of trust in their national government to do what is right. And in 10 countries – Chile, Spain, Peru, France, Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, South Korea, Greece and Italy – 5% or less of respondents express this level of confidence in their national government.

Authoritarianism
International Political Values
Politics & Policy
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Trust, Facts & Democracy

John Gramlich is an associate director at Pew Research Center .

Support for democracy is strong in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Who likes authoritarianism, and how do they want to change their government, many across the globe are dissatisfied with how democracy is working, globally, broad support for representative and direct democracy, study on twins suggests our political beliefs may be hard-wired, most popular.

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Advantages of democracy over military rule in Nigeria

Eventually, people will always talk about the advantages of democracy over military rule in Nigeria. Those who had an opportunity to compare two rules will vote for democracy and will always appreciate peaceful and stable democracy. We will remind you in this article one more time why the whole country has to work hard to overcome the challenges of Democracy in Nigeria.

What is democracy

Today democracy is considered the best form of government in the world. In a democratic state, people are believed to have power in there hands, and people decide how to rule the country.

The characteristics of democracy are:

People are the highest form of political power; they have a right to choose and to be chosen.
Mass media and citizens have a right to express themselves; people can even organize meetings.
The law protects the rights of the citizens.
The rule of law prevails.
The separation of powers into executive, legislature and judicial branches.
Pure democracy does not exist.

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READ ALSO: What are main features of democracy?

You must be surprised by the last line, but this is indeed the problem of democracy, it does not exist. There are always exceptions that do not permit people to rule the country entirely. At the same time, these restrictions do not let the democracy to become the anarchy. Anyway, to see all advantages of the regime that is supposed to be called “democracy,” we will compare it with the other governing experienced by the Nigerians – military rule.

What is military rule

Military rule - is political regime when the power is concentrated in the hands of the military as an organization. It is believed to be one of the types of the authoritarian regime because at the time of military rule human rights are noticeably limited.

The main features of military rule are:

The concentration of power in the hands of the military ruler.
A significant limitation or complete absence of democratic rights and freedoms.
Willful violation of constitutional proclamation of rights and freedoms in the pretext of restoring and maintaining order in the country.
The military government can resort to weapons for resolving any conflict. People lose any right to express their opinion and have to suffer under the pressure of armed people.

Causes, positive and negative effects of military rule in Nigeria

However, military rule has positive sights:

The rulers have no other choice but maintain and sponsor some projects, the civilian government forgets about in peaceful times.
The military rule includes severe discipline, that factually “destroys” corruption and bureaucracy.

READ ALSO: History of Democracy Day in Nigeria

What are the advantages of democracy over military rule in relation to human rights

We are going to speak about democracy and the army rule in the context of Nigeria because this country experienced both regimes.

Military rule in Nigeria started for the first time in 1966 – a several years after obtaining the independence. The matter was that Nigeria was in an infantile state, and it was necessary to adjust the governing so that all citizens were satisfied.

There were several coup d’états against the existing government of the grounds of ethnicity, discontentment and many other reasons. It is quite clear that military rule was not the best period in the life of Nigerian people. But citizens of the current time must be able to compare these two forms of ruling to avoid choosing the wrong ways in the future.

Top primary values and principles of constitutional democracy

First of all, it is necessary to highlight the advantages of democracy over military rule in Nigeria concerning human rights.

1. The right to vote

The military rule usually begins with the armed seizure of the governing power.

2. The right to express one’s point of view

Military rule press is characterized by propaganda. All mass media (including radio, television, Internet) work for the government only. People can not organize demonstrations and meetings because they will be punished. During the military rule, many people were tortured because of their opposition to the government. Democracy predisposes the freedom of speech and pluralism of opinions. Meetings organized by people will be taken into account, and people will be listened to because the government depends on people.

3. The right to live

In the period of the military rule in Nigeria, many people were killed and tortured. They were not protected by the law or police. In the democratic conditions, all citizens are supposed to be protected by the law, and all people are supposed to be equal in the court.

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READ ALSO: History of democracy in Nigeria from 1960

Advantages of democracy over military rule in general

Other advantages of democracy over military rule in Nigeria include:

Democracy is the best way to implement the social and political system in a society with constantly changing living conditions without revolutionary explosions and upheavals.
Democracy is stable. People appreciate peace that is why the regime that presupposes no peace provokes mass dissatisfaction. The problem of Nigerian military rule consists in its durability. It took thirty-three years for the state to become democratic! That is why it is still so difficult to recover from the consequences of revolutions, blood spilling, and instability.
Democracy promotes the idea of national identity, of national pride, while military rule destroys it. Many people tend to leave the country with military rule.
Government is stable in a democratic state. Unlike the military rule, you will never wake up and hear the name of a new ruler of the country. Democracy brings stability. At least, in the democratic state, you will go to bed thinking that tomorrow will be a different day!

Advantages and disadvantages of democracy

As it can be seen, military rule is evil, like any other authoritarian rule. This is not just someone’s subjective point of view. Summing up the advantages of democratic rule over military rule is human life which is the most precious thing in the world and any rule that threats or neglects it is considered wrong, dangerous, and must be demolished. Fortunately, it happened in Nigeria, and under no conditions should it (military rule) be repeated.

READ ALSO: Advantages and disadvantages of democracy

Source: Legit.ng

Adrianna Simwa (Lifestyle writer) Adrianna Simwa is a content writer at Legit.ng where she has worked since mid-2022. She has written for many periodicals on a variety of subjects, including news, celebrities, and lifestyle, for more than three years. She has worked for The Hoth, The Standard Group and Triple P Media. Adrianna graduated from Nairobi University with a Bachelor of Fine Arts (BFA) in 2020. In 2023, Simwa finished the AFP course on Digital Investigation Techniques. You can reach her through her email: [email protected]

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4 Plato against Democracy: A Defense

Published: July 2018
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This essay examines the Republic ’s most important argument against democracy, and claims that it remains, even amidst the dominance of democratic theory, a powerful critique not only of Athenian democracy but also of representative democracy. Plato’s basic idea is that a regime is inherently defective if it gives people a right to participate in political office whether or not they have demonstrated any qualifications for doing so. I examine several ways in which modern and contemporary democratic theorists respond to Plato’s critique, and argue that they are problematic. Perhaps Plato was right, then: democracy is not the best possible political system.

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Democracy Arguments For and Against Essay

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Introduction

Arguments for democracy, arguments against democracy, works cited.

Contrary to other ideas in political science such as justice and liberty, democracy is a term that can be easily explained. It mainly relates to the government by the majority. Although characterizing democracy is not difficult, the latest political theory is often left this out. No strong argument is provided by political theorists regarding the reason for representative democracy.

On the other hand, if any is given, it lacks strength. One would anticipate that great literature can be created from the reasons for the promotion and institution of democracy. On the contrary, popular literature does not delve so much into why democracy is desirable, but instead, get to explain the reasons for the improvement of the current democracy. This essay examines what different philosophers have had to argue both for and against democracy.

One of the arguments is that democracy is important because it can be embraced and made deliberative. This implies that deliberation of a dialogical nature is vital to the democratic society. When democracy is made deliberate in a given society, instead of people’s mere adaptation to circumstance, their preferences are not only informed but also made clear.

Democracy also helps to remove points of difference among people without necessarily making them agree. At times, democracy requires that people be compelled to embrace a general perspective. As such, both their imagination and empathy are stretched. In the same vein of the deliberateness of democracy, selfish concerns can be separated from public-oriented considerations thus encouraging public reasoning for participants who are free and equal (Sosa & Villanueva 287-288).

Research also indicates that making democratic to be more deliberative is likely to result to other benefits such as legitimizing all decisions that are arrived at, encouraging the powerless to voice their concerns in decision making, promoting transparency among group members and enhancing outcomes that are just.

Another argument that favors the importance of democracy in deliberation is one that aims at making deliberation democratic and not vice versa. This implies that whenever there is democratic deliberation, then the probability of reaching the truth based on reliability increases with the presence of a democratic decision-making regime.

Moreover, democracy enhances the proper allocation of resources to appropriate uses. This argument is supported by the fact dictatorial leaders are not fully accountable to citizens and do not have motivations to put the total output into maximum use. Instead, they focus on their selfish ends.

Consequently, democracy ensures that property rights are protected hence allowing investors to have a long term perspective. Besides, allowing free flow of information ensures that the quality of economic decisions made is high (Dahl 448).

In attempting to argue against democracy, Gordon takes on several philosophers who have argued in favor of democracy. He does this by revealing how such arguments fail to hold water when based on democracy because, in his perspective, the proponents of democracy do not express the desirability of democracy as it were. A good example of writers who have omitted this fact is Bernard Barber.

He dismisses other philosophers on this matter arguing that a just political order can only be reached at through a discussion and not by avoiding it. Questions of distributive justice can properly be dealt with by individuals rather than by philosophers alone since it would be undemocratic to do the reverse. However, Barber does not clearly explain why people should value democracy.

His concern is that individuals thinking on their own can reach wiser decisions than a group of individuals discussing the same issue. He’s satisfied with the fact that Rousseau concurs with the issue. If he were to be correct about this empirical matter, then it would be sound to conclude that if democratic governance would guide a society, then it would be prudent to arrive at decisions in such a society through discussions.

Although this point is still devoid of the desirability of democracy, it centers on the importance of democracy in discussing policy publicly. Deliberating on issues publicly is not a compulsory ingredient for democracy. For instance, during the nineteenth century, there was no democracy in the British government although public issues could be discussed broadly (Gordon para.5).

Plato presents a couple of arguments against democracy. First, Plato describes democracies as societies that are anarchic. He believes that societies that are democratic are marked with anarchy. For example, his attack describes governments that are democratic for being libertarian in such a manner every citizen can carry out their life issues in a way that appeals to them.

In this way, he asserts that people mistake anarchy for freedom. Plato criticizes democratic societies again by asserting that since they are characterized with anarchy, they are devoid of unity. They are not united on two fronts. First, due to the lack of political structure and are not politically organized. Second, democratic societies do not have a leadership structure since everyone can speak on political issues.

Second, Plato argues that democratic societies are likely to adhere to what their citizens want hence lacking any concern for the good of all. If anarchy is what features in democracies, then every individual has the freedom to choose what will ultimately benefit him or her. These choices may clash and encourage people to value their own needs rather those of others as well.

This is a clear pursuit of personal desires which may encourage loss of the common good. Since citizens have no idea of what ruling is, it happens that they pursue their passions and not the reason because reason cannot be applied in such pursuits. Any leaders that are elected through democracy are therefore servants who are out to satisfy the individual desires and appetites of the citizens.

Plato further argues that citizens who are guided by democracy are likened to individuals who grope in darkness since they do not have what it takes to execute governance (Kofmel 20). Moreover, Plato lists two more difficulties. First, numerous individuals falsely believe that they have adequate political proficiency that can qualify them to take part in political issues.

Citizens are not bothered by the fact that on account of their political standing, they are entitled to an equal political voice with each other. Second, when people get involved in a philosophical investigation with each other, they are more concerned with winning arguments instead of the following truth.

Therefore, even though citizens may be endowed with enough political expertise, it may be concluded that they will not be able to manage it effectively (Kofmel 21). The best remedy to this problem is to limit popular involvement in politics and allowing those who have sufficient political know-how in matters of governance to take the lead in the political decision-making process. Such are the people who can guide the citizens into achieving their common good.

Democracy is a term that is perceived differently by different people. Arguments put forth in favor of it are that it encourages fair allocation of resources, sound decision making especially by the powerless and allows for transparency and justice through deliberation.

Arguments against democracy are that it is not the best option for decision making, it encourages anarchy and hence lack of unity and that democracy encourages people who do not have sufficient political expertise to be involved in decision making. This results in a lack of common good.

Dahl, Robert. The Democracy Sourcebook. NY: MIT Press, 2003. June 19, 2011.

Gordon, David. What’s the Argument for Democracy? LeRockwell.com, 1992. June 19, 2011.

Kofmel, Erich. Anti-Democratic Thought. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2008. June 19, 2011.

Sosa, Ernest & Villanueva, Enrique. Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, Volume 1. Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. June 19, 2011.

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Democracy Arguments For and Against Essay

Introduction

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