( )
No matter how unlikely it is that God exists, as long as there is some positive non-zero probability that he does, believing is one’s best bet:
Because of its ingenious employment of infinite utility, the third version has become what most philosophers think of as Pascal’s Wager. The appeal of the third version for theistic apologists is its ready employment as a worst-case device. Suppose there were a compelling argument for atheism. With the third version the theist has an escape: it can still be rational to believe, even if the belief is itself unreasonable, since inculcating theistic belief is an action with an infinite expected utility. This use as a worst-case device is something like a trump card that can be thrown down defeating what had appeared as a stronger hand. Pascal’s third version clearly violates (E).
Now consider James’s Will to Believe argument. As we saw, James’s contention is that any hypothesis that’s part of a genuine option, and that’s intellectually open, may be believed, even in the absence of sufficient evidence. No rule of morality or rationality, James argues, is violated if one accepts a hypothesis that’s genuine and open. If James is correct, then (E) should be replaced with:
E′. For all persons S and propositions p and times t , if believing p fits S ’s evidence at t , then S ought to believe that p at t .
According to (E′) if the evidence is adequate, then the question is settled. If there’s a preponderance of support for p , then one is required to believe p . Where the evidence speaks, one must listen and obey. (E′) differs from (E) in part since it says nothing about those occasions in which the evidence is silent, or is inadequate. If one assigns p a probability of one-half, then there’s not a preponderance of evidence in support of p . (E′) says nothing about believing p in that case. Principle (E), on the other hand, forbids believing p in that case. While a proponent of theistic pragmatic arguments cannot swear allegiance to (E), she can, clearly enough, adhere to (E′). Let’s call (E) Strong Evidentialism, and (E′) Weak Evidentialism. So, an employer of theistic pragmatic arguments can conform to Weak Evidentialism, but not Strong Evidentialism.
Is there a good reason to prefer Weak Evidentialism to Strong (in addition to James’s argument)? A promising argument in support of the moral and rational permissibility of employing pragmatic reasons in belief-formation is erected upon the base of what we might call the Duty Argument (or perhaps more precisely, the Duty Argument scheme):
The Duty Argument employs the box and diamond in the standard fashion as operators for, respectively, conceptual necessity and possibility. The alpha is just a placeholder for actions, or kinds of actions. The locution “(overall) rational” or “(overall) irrational” presupposes that there are various kinds of rationality, including moral rationality, epistemic rationality, and prudential rationality. [ 10 ] The idea that there are various kinds of rationality, or put any way, that one can be under conflicting obligations at a particular time, recognizes that dilemmas are possible. One can be obligated to do various things even when it’s not possible to do all of them. Overall rationality is the all-things-considered perspective. It is what one ultimately should do, having taken into account the various obligations one is under at a particular time. Overall rationality, or all-things-considered rationality (ATC rationality), is, in W.D. Ross’s terms, one’s actual duty in the particular circumstances, even if one has other conflicting prima facie duties. The Duty Argument can be formulated without presupposing that there are various kinds of rationality, by replacing the principle that no one is ever irrational in doing her moral duty , with the principle that moral obligations take precedence whenever a dilemma of obligations occurs . In any case the Duty Argument assumes that if in doing something one is not ATC irrational, then it follows that one is ATC rational in doing it.
The relevance of the Duty Argument is this. The action of forming and sustaining a belief upon pragmatic grounds can replace α. That is, pragmatic belief formation could be one’s moral duty. Consider the following four cases in which pragmatic belief formation is, arguably, morally required:
Devious ETs : Suppose you are abducted by very powerful and advanced extraterrestrials, who demonstrate their intent and power to destroy the Earth. Moreover, these fiendish ETs offer but one chance of salvation for humankind – you acquire and maintain a belief for which you lack adequate evidence. You adroitly point out that you cannot just will such a belief, especially since you know of no good reason to think it true. Devilish in their anticipation and in their technology, the ETs produce a device that can directly produce the requisite belief in willing subjects, a serum, say, or a supply of one-a-day doxastic-producing pills. It is clear that you would do no wrong by swallowing a pill or injecting the serum, and, hence, bringing about and maintaining belief in a proposition for which you lack adequate evidence, done to save humankind. Indeed, it is clear that you are in fact obligated to bring about the requisite belief, even though you lack adequate evidence for it. Pain case : Jones knows that expecting an event to be painful is strongly correlated with an increase in the intensity of felt pain (as opposed to having no expectation, or expecting the event to be relatively painless). Jones is about to have a boil lanced, and believing that she is obligated to minimize pain, she forms the belief that the procedure will be painless. She does so even though she lacks evidence that such procedures are in fact typically painless. Because of her action, the event is in fact less painful than it would otherwise have been. Small child : Suppose you are the parent or custodian of a small child, who has been hurt. You know that studies support the thesis that the felt pain reported by patients is typically higher in cases in which the patient expected the event to be painful than in cases where the patient did not have that expectation. You have no idea about the relative pain associated with a particular medical procedure that the child is about undergo. The child asks you if the procedure will be painful. Desiring to lower the pain the child will feel, you tell the child that the procedure will not hurt, hoping that the child will form a belief not supported by the evidence, but thereby lowering the child’s felt pain. Doctor case : Dr. Jones knows that the prognosis for Smith’s recovery is poor, but if she acts on that knowledge by telling Smith of his poor prognosis, she may well strip Smith of hope. Jones believes that maintaining hope is vital for quality of life. Overall, Jones decides it is better not to inform Smith just how poor the prognosis is and she does not disabuse Smith of her evidentially unsupported belief.
These four cases provide possible scenarios in which pragmatic belief formation, or suborning pragmatic belief formation in others, is morally required.
Although controversial, the Duty Argument, if sound, would provide good reason for thinking that there are occasions in which it is permissible, both rationally and morally, to form beliefs based upon pragmatic reasons even in the absence of adequate evidence. If the Duty Argument is sound, then (E) is false.
The Duty Argument presupposes that there are various kinds of rationality. Many Evidentialists, as well as many opponents of Evidentialism, also assume that there are various kinds of rationality. What if however there is only one kind or standard of rationality? What impact would that have on the debate? Susanna Rinard argues that it is best to reject the idea that there are various kinds or standards of rationality, and replace that idea with an equal treatment idea that all states – whether doxastic or not – face a single standard of rationality (Rinard 2017). Equal treatment of states – states like carrying an umbrella, or walking the dog, or voting for this candidate over that, or forming a belief in God – provides greater theoretical simplicity than does the idea that there are various standards or kinds of rationality. Equal Treatment also better explains the methodological attraction of simplicity in science than does the idea that there are various kinds of rationality, Rinard argues. If the equal treatment of all states idea is correct, then doxastic states would face the same standard of rationality as states of action. The Equal Treatment idea provides an additional objection to Evidentialism insofar as Evidentialism implies that beliefs are subject to one standard, while other states are subject to another standard.
Whether it is via Rinard’s Equal Treatment argument, or the Duty Argument, there is, arguably, good reason to reject Evidentialism.
The idea that persons can voluntarily and directly choose what to believe is called “Doxastic Voluntarism”. According to Doxastic Voluntarism, believing is a direct act of the will, with many of the propositions we believe under our immediate control. A basic action is an action that a person intentionally does, without doing any other action. Jones’ moving of her finger is a basic action, since she need not perform any other action to accomplish it. Her handing the book from Smith to Brown is not basic, since she must intentionally do several things to accomplish it. According to Doxastic Voluntarism, some of our belief acquisitions are basic actions. We can will, directly and voluntarily, what to believe and the beliefs thereby acquired are freely obtained and are not forced upon us. In short, one can believe at will. The proponent of Doxastic Voluntarism need not hold that every proposition is a candidate for direct acquisition, as long as she holds that there are some propositions belief in which is under our direct control.
It is widely thought that Doxastic Voluntarism is implausible. Opponents of Doxastic Voluntarism can present a simple experiment against it: survey various propositions that you do not currently believe, and see if any lend themselves, directly and immediately, by a basic act of the will, to belief. Certainly there are some beliefs that one can easily cause oneself to have. Consider the proposition that I am now holding a pencil. I can cause myself to believe that by simply picking up a pencil. Or more generally, any proposition about my own basic actions I can easily enough believe by performing the action. But my coming to believe is by means of some other basic action. Since I lack direct control over what I believe, and there’s no reason to think that my lacking in this regard is singular, Doxastic Voluntarism is implausible. Does the implausibility of Doxastic Voluntarism show that pragmatic belief-formation is also implausible?
Not at all: think of Pascal’s advice to act as if one already believes (by going to masses and by imitating the faithful) as a way of inculcating belief. Pragmatic belief-formation neither entails nor presupposes Doxastic Voluntarism. As long as there is indirect control, or roundabout control, over the acquisition and maintenance of beliefs, pragmatic belief-formation is possible. What constitutes indirect control over the acquisition of beliefs? Consider actions such as entertaining a proposition, or ignoring a proposition, or critically inquiring into the plausibility of this idea or that, or accepting a proposition. Each of these involves a propositional attitude, the adoption of which is under our direct control. Indirect control occurs since accepting a proposition, say, or acting as if a proposition were true, very often results in believing that proposition. Insofar as there is a causal connection between the propositional attitudes we adopt, and the beliefs that are thereby generated, we can be said to have exercised indirect, or roundabout, control over belief-formation.
One objection to the foregoing is that pragmatic arguments are, by and large, pointless because beliefs are, by their very nature, psychological states that aim for truth. That is, whenever one believes a proposition, one is disposed to feel that that proposition is probably the case. A person ordinarily cannot believe a proposition that she takes to have a probability of less than one-half or whose probability is uncertain since such propositional attitudes do not aim for truth. The upshot of this objection is that strong evidentialism is unavoidable.
If it is true, as this objection holds, that believing a proposition ordinarily involves being disposed to feel that the proposition is the case then it does appear at first blush that pragmatic belief-formation, as such, is ineffectual. But all that follows from this fact, if such it be, is that some sort of belief-inducing technology will be necessary in order to facilitate the acquisition of a proposition that is pragmatically supported. Now it is true that the most readily available belief-inducing technologies – selectively using the evidence for instance – all involve a degree of self-deception, since one ordinarily cannot attend only to the favorable evidence in support of a particular proposition while neglecting the adverse evidence arrayed against it and, being conscious of all this, expect that one will acquire that belief. The fact that self-deception is a vital feature of the readily available belief-formation technologies leads to another objection.
This second objection is that willfully engaging in self-deception renders pragmatic belief-formation morally problematic and rationally suspect, since willfully engaging in self-deception is the deliberate worsening of one’s epistemic situation. It is morally and rationally problematic to engage in pragmatic belief-formation, insofar as belief-formation involves self-deception.
This second objection is powerful if sound, but we must be careful here. First, while self-deception may be a serious problem with regard to inculcating a belief which one takes to be false, it does not seem to be a serious threat involving the inculcation of a belief which one thinks has as much evidence in its favor as against it, nor does it seem to be a threat when one takes the probability of the proposition to be indeterminate, since one could form the belief knowing full well the evidential situation. Even if it is true that believing that p is being disposed to feel that p is the case , it does not follow that believing that p involves being disposed to feel that p is the case based on the evidence at hand . Second, this is an objection not to pragmatic belief-formation per se , but an objection to pragmatic belief-formation that involves self-deception. Although it may be true that the employment of self-deceptive belief-inducing technologies is morally and rationally problematic, this objection says nothing about those belief-inducing technologies that do not involve self-deception. If there are belief-inducing technologies which are free of self-deception and which could generate a belief on the basis of a pragmatic reason, then this objection fails. [ 11 ]
Is there a belief-inducing technology available that does not involve self-deception? There is. Notice first there are two sorts of belief-inducing technologies distinguishable: “low-tech” technologies and “high-tech” ones. Low-tech technologies consist of propositional attitudes only, while high-tech ones employ nonpropositional techniques along with various propositional attitudes. The nonpropositional techniques could include actions like acting as if a certain proposition were true, and morally questionable ones like hypnosis, or indoctrination, or subliminal suggestion. Consider a technology consisting of two components, the first of which is the acceptance of a proposition, while the second is a behavioral regimen of acting on that acceptance. Accepting a proposition, unlike believing, is an action that is characterized, in part, by one’s assenting to the proposition, whether one believes it or not. One accepts a proposition, when she assents to its truth and employs it as a premise in her deliberations. One can accept a proposition that one does not believe. Indeed, we do this much of the time. For example, think of the gambler’s fallacy. One might be disposed to believe that the next toss of the fair coin must come up Tails, since it has been Heads on the previous seven tosses. Nevertheless, one ought not to accept that the next toss of a fair coin must come up Tails, or that the probability that it will is greater than one-half. Acceptance, we should remember, unlike believing, is an action that is under our direct control.
If one accepts a proposition, then one can also act upon the proposition. Acting upon a proposition is behaving as though it were true. The two-step regimen of accepting a proposition and then acting upon it is a common way of generating belief in that proposition. And, importantly, there is no hint of self-deception tainting the process.
One might object that employing a belief-inducing technology at all, whether low or high tech, is enough to entangle one in issues implicating the rationality of the belief induced (see, for instance, Garber, 2009). A friend of the pragmatic, however, might argue that that this objection presupposes Strong Evidentialism, and arguments found in William James, the Duty argument, the Equal Treatment argument, have already provided a dispositive ruling on that issue.
While not as common as theistic arguments, there have been atheistic pragmatic arguments offered from time to time. These arguments often arise within the context of a purported naturalistic explanation of the occurrence of religious belief and practice. Perhaps the earliest proponent of an atheistic pragmatic argument was David Hume (1711–1776). In chapter X of his 1757 The Natural History of Religion , Hume wrote:
Where the deity is presented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief... is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement …
The idea of Hume’s argument here and elsewhere in his writings (see for instance Dialogue XII of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , and appendix IV of the second Enquiry) is that theism, or at least theism of the popular sort—that conjoined with “superstitious terrors,” degrades individual morality, thereby devaluing human existence. Theistic belief, Hume contended, inculcates the “monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable…” But not only does theistic belief harm individual morality, according to Hume, it also harms public morality. In chapter IX, Hume suggested that theism (again he qualifies by writing of the “corruptions of theism”) leads to intolerance and persecution.
Another atheistic pragmatic argument is that of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who in The Future of an Illusion (1927) contends that religious belief perpetuates psychological immaturity among individuals, and cultural immaturity on the social level. To make sense of Freud’s argument requires knowing that he employed the term “illusion” in an idiosyncratic way. An illusion in the Freudian sense is a belief that is caused by and in turn satisfies a deep psychological need or longing. Illusions are not held rationally. Illusions stick even in the absence of any supporting evidence. Indeed, according to Freud, they stick even in the face of strong contra-evidence. An illusion could be true, but often they are not. Delusions are false illusions. Religious belief Freud thought was an illusion. While it may have been a beneficial illusion at an earlier time, it no longer is. The religious illusion now, Freud asserted, inhibits scientific progress, and causes psychological neuroses, among its other pernicious effects.
Another atheistic pragmatic argument is Richard Dawkin’s contention that religious belief is a “virus of the mind” (Dawkins 1993). One is religious, according to Dawkins, because one has been infected by a faith meme. A meme is Dawkins’s imaginative construct, which he describes as a bit of information, manifested in behavior, and which can be copied from one person to another. Like genes, memes are self-replicating vehicles, jumping from mind to mind. One catches a meme by exposure to another who is infected. Dawkins claims that the faith meme has the following traits:
M1. The faith meme seems to the person as true, or right, or virtuous, though this conviction in fact owes nothing to evidence or reason. M2. The faith meme makes a virtue out of believing in spite of there being no evidence. M3. The faith meme encourages intolerant behavior towards those who possess rival faiths. M4. The faith meme arises not because of evidence but because of epidemiology; typically, if one has a faith, it is the same as one’s parents and as one’s grandparents.
Dawkins’s meme idea, and his dismissal of faith as a virus of the mind, is both a purported naturalistic explanation of religious belief and a pragmatic dismissal of it as a harmful phenomenon.
A contemporary atheistic pragmatic argument is that the existence of God would make the world far worse in some respects than would be the case if God did not exist, even if it did not make the world worse overall (Kahane 2011). As Kahane notes, if God were to exist, then a full understanding of reality by humans, may in-principle be unachievable. Additionally, if God were to exist, moral autonomy may be limited, since humans, as creatures, might be subordinate to God’s demands, including demands for worship, obedience, and allegiance. Finally, if God were to exist, complete privacy may be lost, as an omnsicient being could, presumably, know one’s thoughts and attitudes.
Kahane’s intricate argument is counter to the conventional view that God’s existence is something that all should hope for, since this world would, arguably, be the best or among the best of all possible worlds if God were to exist. Even so, Kahane argues that one could rationally prefer that God not exist. The argument invovles a distinction between evaluations from an impersonal viewpoint, and from a personal viewpoint. It is the latter, which proves the most promising for the argument as Kahane contends that the existence of God could undermine the meaning generating life-projects of some. If his argument is sound, Kahane has provided a kind of athiestic pragmatic argument that one could prefer that God not exist, even if God’s existence would render the world better overall than it otherwise would be.
Much of Kahane’s argument consists of comparisons between possible worlds in which God exists (“Godly worlds”), and those in which God does not exist (“Godless worlds”). The modal reliability of these comparisons is far from obvious, since God is standardly seen as a necessarily existing being. For a critical examination of Kahane’s arguments, see Kraay 2013.
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God, arguments for the existence of: moral arguments | James, William | Mill, John Stuart | Pascal’s wager
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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time
Author: Jamie B. Turner Category: Philosophy of Religion , Epistemology Word Count: 1000
Suppose that one evening, you look to see whether your neighbors are home, notice that their car isn’t in the driveway and the lights are off, and so conclude that they’re out. It’s just because of such reasoning or argument that your belief is reasonable. [1]
While we believe many things on the basis of arguments, we also believe many more things without argument or reasoning, e.g., believing there’s a cup on our desk, that we ate cereal for breakfast, that we’re in pain, and that we hear a bird chirping. These are beliefs we form immediately, without any explicit reasoning, when we see, remember, feel, or hear these things. And these sorts of beliefs are reasonable for us to hold.
It’s often thought that religious beliefs—such as belief in God—require supporting arguments to be reasonable. [2] Some philosophers have argued, however, that arguments are not needed for belief in God to be reasonable. [3] This essay examines their case.
It’s commonly thought that being reasonable or rational is a matter of evidence: a belief is rational for someone only if they have sufficient evidence that supports their belief. Evidence, however, takes different forms. One form is arguments; another form is experiences and how things appear or seem to a person, such as our sensory perceptions.
Evidence isn’t limited to arguments: if we had to offer an argument for everything we believe, including the premises of that argument, and the premises of those arguments, and so on forever, then we arguably wouldn’t be rational in holding any beliefs since we don’t and can’t do that. [4] But we are rational in accepting many of our beliefs, so we don’t need an argument for everything we believe. [5]
Many theists , people who believe there’s a God, believe because of an argument: they consider the origins of the cosmos, ponder its orderliness, and infer that God best explains its existence. [6] Arguing for God’s existence from these features of the natural world might make belief in God rational.
A different type of reason for belief, however, is based upon, e.g., encountering the beauty of the starry night sky or the joy of holding a newborn child: the person is simply overwhelmed by what they take to be God’s presence. This believer doesn’t argue or reason towards believing God exists: they simply find themselves believing because of these or similar experiences.
Some contemporary philosophers have defended the view that belief in God can be rational for theists who believe because of their immediate experiences, not arguments. [7] The most notable defender of this view is philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932–). [8] He argues that belief in God can be “properly basic,” by which he means it is “basic”—it isn’t inferred from any other belief, and held “properly”—it’s rational. [9]
In Plantinga’s view, belief in God can have the same sort of intellectual status as our other more ordinary beliefs about the world such as what we perceive or remember. [10] Since evidence includes experiences—it’s not just arguments—then since beliefs in cups or chirping birds can be rational by way of such evidence, the same could extend to belief in God. [11] Thus, if someone has an experience that they take to be of God, then this experience counts as evidence and in favor of one’s belief in God being rational, in the same way as it does for our more ordinary beliefs. So, arguably, belief in God can be “properly basic.”
There are many objections raised against the case that belief in God can be properly basic. [12] One of the most common is that it seems to imply that almost any belief could be properly basic.
Imagine someone who takes themselves to have experiences of tooth fairies, goblins, or the Great Pumpkin at Halloween. If experiences can render belief in God properly basic, it seems that the experience of these bizarre entities could make belief in them properly basic also. But, the objector claims, belief in these bizarre entities is irrational and so can’t be properly basic; they conclude that experiences alone cannot make a belief properly basic, including belief in God.
In response, one might agree that belief in, say, the Great Pumpkin could potentially be rational without arguments, but argue that most people have good reasons to doubt that such a being exists: e.g., if there really were a Great Pumpkin, we’d expect many others to spot it or for science to reveal to us that such an entity exists; that hasn’t happened, so probably there’s no Great Pumpkin.
So, those who think that belief in God can be properly basic might argue that there are good reasons to doubt the existence of bizarre entities like the Great Pumpkin, but these doubts are not present for belief in God. This response involves proposing it’s not experiences alone that make beliefs properly basic but experiences combined with there being no adequate reason to doubt beliefs formed on their basis .
Critics respond that there are at least some reasons to doubt that there’s a God: e.g., that the presence of so much evil in the world renders God unlikely, or that if God really exists, then we’d expect evidence of God to be more obvious—perhaps we’d even expect more people to have what they take to be experiences of God!—among other objections. [13]
Perhaps some theists haven’t seriously considered these reasons, though, and so they won’t give such theists good reason to doubt. For those theists who have considered them well enough, if they have a good response to them, then they won’t be good reasons for these theists to doubt either; but if they lack good responses, then these doubts might prevent their belief in God from being rational. [14]
In sum, perhaps belief in God could be “properly basic.” However, whether belief in God is in fact properly basic for a person depends on whether they have strong reasons to doubt, and how well they respond to those reasons.
[1] An argument is a set of reasons or propositions (i.e., premises) which provides reason or support to accept another proposition (i.e., a conclusion). For more on the notion of “argument” and ordinary case examples see Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe? by Thomas Metcalf.
[2] Although this essay focuses on how specifically belief in God may or may not require arguments for such a belief to be reasonable, this is not the only kind of religious belief that might be appropriate for this form of consideration. For instance, some have considered whether specifically belief in aspects of God’s nature might be reasonably believed without argument (i.e., whether God is triune or wholly one) or whether a purported special revelation from God (e.g., the Bible, Qur’an, or Bhagavad Gita) may be reasonably believed without argument. See Plantinga (2000), Baldwin and McNabb (2018), Turner (2021), and Gupta (2022) regarding these latter kinds of religious belief and whether arguments are necessary in these cases for reasonable religious belief. Defenders of the view that religious beliefs can be reasonable without arguments have primarily focused on three kinds of religious belief: belief in God’s existence, belief in His specific nature, and belief in His special revelation.
[3] Consider the following argument against belief in God:
Those who think that belief in God is reasonable have often responded to the sort of argument outlined above, by rejecting premise (2). They agree that arguments are needed for belief in God to be reasonable but attempt to show such a belief is reasonable by offering arguments in support of it. But those who uphold the sort of view we’re considering in this essay reject premise (1), and so, for them, whether premise (2) is true or not is less important. For if premise (1) is false, it implies that belief in God can be reasonable without arguments.
[4] Few contemporary philosophers defend the idea that inferences may in fact go back infinitely far. Indeed, according to a PhilPeople survey of academic philosophers only around 1% of philosophers today accept something like this view: see PhilPapers (n.d.). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the view is not quite the same as the idea that arguments need to go back infinitely far.
[5] The idea that we do not need an argument for everything we believe—principally because this implies an infinite regress of offering arguments to support our belief—is the basis of perhaps the central argument for “foundationalism.” This is, roughly, the view that there are at least some beliefs we hold that are reasonable without argument: these are beliefs that provide the “foundation” for our other reasonable beliefs. See “I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge by Charles Miceli, and Poston (2014) for an introduction to this view.
It is important to note, however, that some philosophers deny that there are foundational or what’s later described in this essay as “basic” beliefs: they propose that our beliefs are part of a web or system of beliefs and that the extent to which they’re reasonable depends on how well they cohere together and provide mutual support. This view is known as “coherentism.” See Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf for an introduction to this view.
[6] For instance, some believers base their religious beliefs on versions of the cosmological or design arguments: see Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God and Design Arguments for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf. There are many other arguments for theism: many are introduced in the Philosophy of Religion category of essays.
[7] As mentioned above in note 2, some philosophers think that arguments are needed for belief in God to be reasonable and others who think that such arguments are not needed for belief in God to be reasonable. In the philosophical literature, those who uphold the former view are often referred to as upholding “theistic evidentialism.” Whereas those who uphold the latter view are often referred to as upholding “reformed epistemology.” This latter view was coined by Alvin Plantinga due to the influence of Reformed theologians, particularly John Calvin (1509-1564), on this approach to religious epistemology. See Dougherty and Tweedt (2015) on the difference and overlap between these perspectives. For the paradigmatic cases of reformed epistemology see Alston (1991) and Plantinga (2000); for theistic evidentialism see Swinburne (2004). A different type of potential justification for religious beliefs appeals to mystical experiences , which are understood to be a different type of experience than the experiences that advocates of the “proper basicality” of religious beliefs typically appeal to; see Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs? by Matthew Sanderson.
[8] Alvin Plantinga famously began articulating this idea in his book God and Other Minds (1967). Plantinga later developed the view in his article “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” (1981) and then further still in his chapter “Reason and Belief in God” (1983). This set of works is often referred to as the “earlier Plantinga” with respect to reformed epistemology. The work on reformed epistemology of the “later Plantinga” is fleshed out in his Warranted Christian Belief (2000). This book comprises the final element of his “warrant trilogy”, with the two previous works in the trilogy Warrant: The Current Debate (1993) and Warrant and Proper Function (1993) being on epistemology or the theory of knowledge, but not applied to religious beliefs. Plantinga applied the insights of these two books on epistemology to religious epistemology in Warranted Christian Belief (2000).
[9] More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God can be “warranted” to a degree sufficient for one to know that God exists. His argument is grounded in the idea that “warrant” (i.e., that property enough of which turns a true belief into knowledge: “warrant” is a proposed improvement on the idea that “epistemic justification” is necessary for knowledge: see The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge by Andrew Chapman and Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long) just so long as one’s belief is the product of truth-aimed properly functioning faculties in congenial environments for those faculties. Plantinga proposes that if God exists then God would have probably made knowledge of Himself available to us by giving us an ability of faculty to know Him which, in following John Calvin, he calls a sensus divinitatis (i.e., “sense of divinity”). If that faculty works properly in the right circumstances, he argues belief in God can be warranted without argument to a degree sufficient for knowledge. Plantinga goes on to extend his argument for specifically Christian theistic belief, which includes belief in God as triune and the Bible as God’s revelation: see Plantinga (2000).
More recently, Turner (2021) has argued the same for Islamic theism, primarily based on the concept of fiṭra as developed by the Muslim medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), which partially resembles the idea of a sensus divinitatis . Baldwin and McNabb (2018) have also considered the extent to which this might be possible across a variety of religious traditions.
[10] This discussion here differs from Plantinga’s original way of making his point. He originally claimed that belief in God could be rational “without evidence.” But by “without evidence” he meant “without argument.” Since experiences and how things seem to be a person can be evidence, it was misleading for him to put his view this way: e.g., when someone believes there’s a God based on an experience of the night sky, that experience is their evidence. In his later work, however, Plantinga acknowledges that experiences and seemings are evidence: see Plantinga (1993), especially chapter 10.
[11] The theory of rationality appealed to in this essay is closer to what’s called a “phenomenal conservative” approach to reformed epistemology than the traditional Plantingian approach developed in his (2000). According to phenomenal conservatism, a person is justified in believing that p , if it seems to them that p and they have no sufficient defeater for (or reason to doubt) the belief that p , see Huemer (2007).
It is important to understand here what is meant by a “seeming” and what we mean by a “defeater.” A “seeming” is a mental state or experience in which a certain proposition “appears” to a subject to be true e.g., it appears ( seems ) to me <that there is a tree> before me. A “defeater” for a given belief is a form of “counterevidence.” It can either be “rebutting,” i.e., something that gives us reason for thinking that a belief is false, or “undercutting,” i.e., something that undermines or takes away our reason for taking the belief to be true.
The point being developed here is roughly the thought that belief in God could be justified or rational along the lines of phenomenal conservatism’s theory of justification, absent any sufficient defeater. See Sudduth (2008) on the notion of “defeaters.” For more on the phenomenal conservative approach to reformed epistemology see Tucker (2011), and Gage Paul and McAllister (2020).
[12] Some of the most important objections to the idea that belief in God can be properly basic are: (1) the Great Pumpkin objection, (2) the religious diversity objection, and (3) the disanalogy objection. (1) is the sort of objection under consideration in this essay. For more detail on this objection see Scott (2014).
Regarding (2), this is the objection that theists of different types each claim to experience God but they differ in their beliefs about the God being experienced. For instance, Christian theists claim to have had an experience of Christ as God, Hindu theists an experience of Brahman, and Muslim theists an experience of Allah. The objection is that theists who claim to have had an experience of God as Christ, Brahman, or Allah, and are aware of such disagreement cannot reasonably trust their tradition-specific experiences of God without recourse to an argument. This means that their beliefs in God cannot be properly basic because they must be based on an argument that gives the relevant theist good reason for taking their own experience as trustworthy.
Concerning (3), this objection contends that there are important disanalogies between ordinary perceptual beliefs and belief in God, such that the former can be properly basic but not the latter.
See Bolos and Scott (2015) for a discussion of these three objections. Also see Moon (2016) for an overview of recent work on these and other objections.
[13] For introductions to these arguments given to believe there is not, or probably is not, a God, see The Problem of Evil by Thomas Metcalf and Divine Hiddenness by David Bayless. A case against trusting religious beliefs formed and held on the basis of religious experiences can be developed from observations about the diversity of religious experiences: many people do not have religious experiences and, when people have religious experiences, their experiences vary widely and so there are good reasons to doubt beliefs formed from religious experiences: see The Epistemology of Disagreement by Jonathan Matheson for the basis of this type of argument.
[14] As such, it may well be the case that arguments are needed for some believers in God to dispel objections raised against their belief in God. However, this needn’t be the case for every kind of believer. For instance, the average believer in God among ordinary folk might not be very well aware of the objections to belief in God or may lack the proper tools needed to respond to them. For these believers, it’s plausible to think that they’re acting reasonably in trusting others in their community who can and perhaps have responded to these objections. See Sennett (1993) and Ruloff (2003) concerning this distinction between ordinary and reflective believers, and the epistemic duties that may apply to one but not the other.
Alston, W. (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience . New York: Cornell University Press.
Baldwin, E. and McNabb, T. (2018). Plantingian Religious Epistemology and World Religions: Problems and Perspectives . London: Lexington Books.
Bolos, A. and Scott, K. (2015). Reformed Epistemology. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Dougherty, T. and Tweedt, C. (2015). “Religious Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 10(8):547-559.
Gage Paul, L. and McAllister, B. (2020). “Phenomenal Conservatism.” In J. DePoe and T. McNabb (eds.), Debating Christian Religious Epistemology (London: Bloomsbury), pp. 61-81.
Gupta, A. “Are There De Jure Objections to Mādhvic belief?,” Religious Studies 58(4):732-744.
Huemer, M. (2007). “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1):30-55.
Moon, A. (2016). “Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 11(12):879-891.
PhilPapers. (N.d.). Survey Results: Justification: Reliabilism, Nonreliabilist Foundationalism, Infinitism, or Coherentism? Philpeople.org .
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function . New York: Oxford University Press.
Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief . New York: Oxford University Press.
Poston, T. (2014). Foundationalism. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Ruloff, C.P. (2003). “Evidentialism, Warrant, and The Division of Epistemic Labor,” Philosophia 31(1-2):185-203.
Scott, K. (2014). “Return of The Great Pumpkin,” Religious Studies 50(3):297-308.
Sennet, James. (1993). “Reformed Epistemology and Epistemic Duty.” In E.S. Radcliffe and C.J. White (eds.), Faith and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief (Chicago, Open Court Publishing), pp. 196-207.
Sudduth, M. (2008). Defeaters in Epistemology. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Swinburne, R. (2004). The Existence of God . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tucker, C. (2011). “Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology.” In K.J. Clark and R. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 52-74.
Turner, J.B. (2021). “An Islamic Account of Reformed Epistemology,” Philosophy East and West 71(3):767-792.
Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf
Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long
Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller
Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” by Spencer Case
The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge by Andrew Chapman
Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs? by Matthew Sanderson
The Epistemology of Disagreement by Jonathan Matheson
Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf
Design Arguments for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf
Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God by Liz Jackson
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Jamie B. Turner is a doctoral researcher at the Centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Birmingham. His main philosophical interests are in religious epistemology and Islamic analytic philosophy of religion. bham.academia.edu/JamieBTurner
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Most Americans say it’s not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, according to a spring 2022 Pew Research Center survey. About two-thirds of Americans say this, while about a third say belief in God is an essential component of morality (65% vs. 34%).
This analysis focuses on views of religion and morality in 17 advanced economies in North America, Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.
For non-U.S. data, this report draws on nationally representative surveys of 18,782 adults from Feb. 14 to June 3, 2022. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Hungary, Poland and Israel. In Australia, we used a probability-based online panel.
In the United States, we surveyed 3,581 U.S. adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology .
Data for Japan and South Korea are not included in this analysis due to differences in the way the question was worded. Translations in these countries emphasized following a religion rather than a belief in God. This analysis also did not separately examine the views of U.S. Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and other smaller religious groups due to sample size limitations.
Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and the survey methodology .
However, responses to this question differ dramatically depending on whether Americans see religion as important in their lives. Roughly nine-in-ten who say religion is not too or not at all important to them believe it is possible to be moral without believing in God, compared with only about half of Americans to whom religion is very or somewhat important (92% vs. 51%). Catholics are also more likely than Protestants to hold this view (63% vs. 49%), though views vary across Protestant groups.
There are also divisions along political lines: Democrats and those who lean Democratic are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to say it is not necessary to believe in God to be moral (71% vs. 59%). Liberal Democrats are particularly likely to say this (84%), whereas only about half of conservative Republicans (53%) say the same.
In addition, Americans under 50 are somewhat more likely than older adults to say that believing in God is not necessary to have good values (71% vs. 59%). Those with a college degree or higher are also more likely to believe this than those with a high school education or less (76% vs. 58%).
Views of the link between religion and morality differ along similar lines in 16 other countries surveyed. Across those countries, a median of about two-in-three adults say that people can be moral without believing in God, just slightly higher than the share in the United States.
In European and North American countries, at least six-in-ten respondents believe that it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral. That includes nine-in-ten Swedes, the highest share of any country surveyed.
In contrast, Israelis are nearly evenly split over whether belief in God is necessary to be moral: 47% say such a belief is necessary, while 50% say it is not.
On the other end of the scale, roughly one-in-five Malaysians believe that people can be moral without believing in God. In every other country surveyed, at least half of people hold this view.
As in the U.S., differences exist in other countries by religion and demographic factors. For example, people who identify as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular” are much more likely than the religiously affiliated to separate belief in God from morality.
Still, even among people who are religiously affiliated, most do not think it is necessary to believe in God to have good values. In most countries surveyed, half or more of people who say they belong to a religion also say it is not necessary to believe in God to be moral, including 86% of religiously affiliated Swedes and 75% of religiously affiliated Australians.
Large differences also sometimes appear within countries and religions, as is the case in Israel. Nearly eight-in-ten Israeli Muslims say morality is tied to a belief in God, while a majority of Israeli Jews say it is not. However, views vary widely among Israeli Jews: Nearly nine-in-ten who are Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) and Dati (“religious”) – both generally considered Orthodox – say you need to believe in God to have good values (86%). But half of Jews who are Masorti (“traditional”) and only 7% of Hiloni (“secular,” the largest group ) agree.
Differences in responses by political affiliation, age and education level also align with results in the U.S. In nearly every country where political ideology is measured, people who place themselves on the political left are more likely than those on the political right to say that belief in God is not necessary to have good values. Sweden is the only country where roughly the same shares on the left and right agree that you can have good values without believing in God.
In addition, younger adults in about half of the countries surveyed are significantly more likely than older respondents to say that a belief in God is not connected with morality. In Greece, for example, more than four-in-five adults under 30 separate a belief in God from morality, compared with about half of adults ages 50 and older (84% vs. 51%). Significant age differences also exist in Poland, Italy, Singapore, Hungary, the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom.
People with at least a college degree are also more likely to say a belief in God is not necessary to have good values. The differences by education are largest in Spain and Germany.
Overall, the answers to this question have been relatively consistent over time across the countries surveyed.
The countries polled in our most recent global survey are all advanced economies, but previous Pew Research Center surveys have investigated the link between belief in God and morality in emerging and developing economies. At the start of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, Pew Research Center suspended fieldwork in countries where surveys are conducted in person, many of which are emerging or developing economies. It is slowly returning to these countries as conditions improve, but not in time for this survey to include those countries.
A 2019 survey of 34 countries, including 10 emerging and developing economies, found that countries with lower gross domestic products (GDPs) had higher shares of people who say a belief in God is essential for morality (r = -0.86). For example, in Kenya, which had the lowest GDP per capita, 95% of people saw believing in God as a necessary aspect of morality. By contrast, in Sweden, which had one of the highest GDPs per capita of the countries surveyed in 2019, only 9% of people expressed this view. More than eight-in-ten also held this view in Brazil, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines – all countries with emerging or developing economies as of 2019.
Like the 2022 survey, the 2019 survey found that older people and those with less education are more likely to see a connection between belief in God and living a moral life.
Note: Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and the survey methodology and full dataset .
Janell Fetterolf is a senior researcher focusing on global attitudes at Pew Research Center .
Sarah Austin is a former research assistant focusing on global attitudes research at Pew Research Center .
Around 4 in 10 americans have become more spiritual over time; fewer have become more religious, spirituality among americans, chinese communist party promotes atheism, but many members still partake in religious customs, unlike other u.s. religious groups, most atheists and agnostics oppose the death penalty, most popular.
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Students are often asked to write an essay on Why Do You Believe In God in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.
Let’s take a look…
Personal experience.
I believe in God because of personal experiences that have shown me His presence in my life. I have seen God answer prayers, provide for me in times of need, and give me strength and guidance when I have been weak and lost. These experiences have shown me that God is real and that He cares for me.
The moral law.
The existence of the moral law also points to the existence of God. The moral law is a set of universal truths that are binding on all people, regardless of their culture or background. These truths include things like justice, fairness, and compassion. The existence of the moral law suggests that there is a higher power who has created these truths and who holds us accountable for following them.
Why do i believe in god, personal experiences.
I believe in God because of my personal experiences. I have experienced His presence and love in my life in many ways. For example, I have felt His peace during difficult times, and I have seen His guidance in my decisions.
I believe in God because of the design of the human body. The human body is an incredibly complex and intricate system, and it is perfectly adapted to its environment. I believe that this is evidence of a intelligent designer, and that this designer is God.
I believe in God because of my personal experiences, the beauty and complexity of nature, and the design of the human body. I believe that God is real, and that He is a loving and caring God.
My belief in god.
I believe in God because it gives me comfort and hope. In times of trouble, I can turn to God for strength and guidance. I believe that God is always with me, watching over me and protecting me. This belief gives me a sense of peace and well-being.
I also believe in God because of the beauty of nature. When I look at a sunset, a flower, or a mountain, I am filled with awe and wonder. I believe that these things are evidence of God’s creativity and artistry.
I am also amazed by the complexity of the universe. The laws of physics and chemistry are so finely tuned that they allow for the existence of life. I believe that this is evidence of God’s intelligence and design.
I believe in God for many reasons. I believe that God gives me comfort and hope, that the beauty of nature is evidence of God’s creativity, that the complexity of the universe is evidence of God’s intelligence, and that the human spirit is evidence of God’s love. I believe that God is real and that he loves me. This belief gives me meaning and purpose in life.
That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.
Happy studying!
Lifeway Research
Enlightening today’s church with relevant research and insights
Insights | Discipleship & Evangelism | Faith & Culture | Aug 6, 2024
While 71% of Americans believe God was active in human origins, 24% assert we evolved with no divine involvement.
By Aaron Earls
Most U.S. adults believe human beings came about because of divine intervention, but there’s disagreement over what that involvement looked like.
A Gallup survey finds 37% of Americans believe God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so. Additionally, 34% say human beings developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life but God guided this process.
While 71% see God as having an active part, 24% contend human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life but God had no part in this process. Another 5% either say they aren’t sure or volunteer another answer.
The numbers have not changed significantly since 2019, but the percentage who believe in God’s direct creation of humans fell to its lowest point in the four-decade history of the survey. The previous low was 38% in 2017. Also, those who say God had no role in human origins reached its highest percentage since the survey began in 1982, up two percentage points from 22% in 2019.
The percentages of the two options that believe God was involved in human origins haven’t changed drastically in the past four decades, but they are both trending downward. Creationism reached a high of 47% in both 1993 and 1999, while theistic evolution topped at 40% in 1999. Meanwhile, the percentage of those who reject God’s involvement has grown steadily since 2000.
Several factors, including church attendance, religious identification, political ideology, and formal education, influence how likely a person is to hold one of the three positions.
Among those who attend religious services weekly or more, 61% believe God created human beings basically in their present form, 30% adopt theistic evolution, and 3% say God wasn’t involved. Half of Americans who attend nearly weekly or monthly (50%) accept creationism, 42% hold to God being involved in evolution, and 4% reject God’s involvement. For those who attend less often, 24% embrace creationism, 32% theistic evolution, and 39% evolution without God.
Politically, most conservatives (55%) hold to creationism. Moderates are evenly split between God directly creating (35%) and God using evolution (36%). A plurality of liberals (44%) hold to evolution without God’s involvement.
Half of Protestants (51%) believe in creationism. Almost half of Catholics (46%) embrace theistic evolution. Most religiously unaffiliated (58%) say God was not involved in the development of human life.
Among those without a college degree, 43% accept God directly creating humans, 31% believe God guided evolution, and 20% reject God’s involvement. For college graduates, 26% believe in creationism, 39% accept theistic evolution, and 30% say human evolution happened without God.
Young adults, those 18-34, are slightly more likely to accept evolution without God’s involvement compared to older Americans—31% v. 22% of those 35-54 and 20% of those 55 and older. Every age group, however, is statistically just as likely to embrace either creationism (ranging from 35%-38%) or theistic evolution (32%-36%).
In a 2015 Lifeway Research study , 79% of Americans, including 43% of nonreligious adults, said the fact that humans exist means someone created us. Additionally, 72% of Americans, including 46% of nonreligious adults, said the universe’s organization points to a creator who designed it.
Creation, including humanity, can present apologetic and evangelistic opportunities for observant Christians to listen to those around them and be ready to start a conversation.
For permission to republish this article, contact Marissa Postell Sullivan .
@WardrobeDoor
Aaron is the senior writer at Lifeway Research.
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In this essay, we will consider what the Bible says in answer to these questions, before sampling the answers of some influential Christian thinkers. ... Since the Enlightenment, it has often been held that belief in God is rationally justified only if it can be supported by philosophical proofs or scientific evidences. While Romans 1:18-21 ...
When we ask ourselves 'Why do we believe in God?' our faith provides the first response," offered St. John Paul II during a 1985 General Audience. "We believe in God because God has made himself known to us as the supreme Being, the great 'Existent.'".
Should you believe there's a God? To answer this, we might examine arguments for theism—like first-cause and design arguments—and arguments for atheism—like arguments from evil. These arguments offer evidence for and against God's existence. Pascal's wager, originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), takes a more pragmatic approach.
Belief in god: Why people believe, and why they don't. Current Directions in Psychological Science. Advance online publication. DOI: 10.1177/0963721418754491. More references ...
One might think that belief in God is relevantly like belief in a leprechaun or sea monster, and thus that the theist also bears an additional burden of proof. ... 1986, "Religion and the Queerness of Morality," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Robert Audi and William J ...
3. The belief in God is a belief that effects a change for the better in a person's life. 4. If one tries to decide whether or not to believe in God based on the evidence available, one will never get the chance to evaluate the pragmatic evidence for the beneficial consequences of believing in God (from 2 and 3). 5.
6. Pragmatic Arguments and Meaning in Life. A popular pragmatic argument in support of theistic belief is built upon a saying erroneously attributed to Pascal that humans have a god-shaped hole in their hearts that can be filled only by committing to God. Any finite filler will prove futile, pernicious or hollow.
The Bible begins with the simple words: "In the beginning God …. " These four words are the cornerstone of all existence and of all human history. God is not just "a power.". He is the source of all things. He is the beginning and the end. Without God, there could have been no beginning and no continuing. God indeed was the creating ...
Premise 1: Everything that has a beginning comes to exist by virtue of an external cause. Premise 2: The universe has a beginning. Conclusion: The universe has an external cause. One weakness of this argument is that it only proves God if "God" is defined rather minimally.
Reality is so structured that goodness brings goodness and sin brings sin. I believe in God because blind chaos could not have designed things this way, to be innately moral. Only an intelligent Goodness could have built reality this way. My next reason for believing in God is the existence of soul, intelligence, love, altruism, and art.
The question of the existence of God is one that has intrigued and inspired humanity for centuries. For me, the belief in God is a deeply personal journey that has been shaped by my experiences, reflections, and the profound impact it has had on my life. In this essay, I delve into the reasons why I believe in God, drawing on my personal journey to explore how faith has been a guiding light ...
Belief in a god or gods is a central feature in the lives of billions of people and a topic of perennial interest within. psychology. However, research over the past half decade has achieved a new ...
Still, in many countries on the European continent, relatively few people say it is necessary to believe in God to be moral, including just 9% in Sweden, 14% in the Czech Republic and 15% in France. Less than half in both Canada and the U.S. say belief in God is necessary to be moral (26% and 44%, respectively).
Existence of God, in religion, the proposition that there is a supreme being that is the creator or sustainer or ruler of the universe and all things in it, including human beings. In many religions God is also conceived as perfect, all-powerful and all-knowing, and the source and ultimate ground of morality.
The two major schools of thought are: belief in the existence of God and the belief that the universe just happened. Within these two schools, again, justifications differ. This work argues in favour of the existence of God, borrowing a lot from the arguments of St Anselm. Get a custom essay on The Belief in God. 185 writers online.
A new Pew Research Center survey of more than 4,700 U.S. adults finds that one-third of Americans say they do not believe in the God of the Bible, but that they do believe there is some other higher power or spiritual force in the universe. A slim majority of Americans (56%) say they believe in God "as described in the Bible.".
However, according to Moser, it might seem that there is no evidence that this belief was inspired by God (265). The problem with the latter maxim is that it is self-contradictory - proofs in its favor have not yet been presented (Goldman 360). Therefore, it may be proper to deny it. In addition, belief in revelation is by its nature much ...
First published Mon Aug 16, 2004; substantive revision Thu Mar 15, 2018. Pragmatic arguments have often been employed in support of theistic belief. Theistic pragmatic arguments are not arguments for the proposition that God exists; they are arguments that believing that God exists is rational. The most famous theistic pragmatic argument is .
Here's My Answer. — The Think Institute. "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.". This is Genesis 1:1, the first verse of the Bible. And it states that God's existence is the most fundamental fact in the universe. I want to share with you why I believe belief in God is not only intellectually valid, but that it is ...
Although this essay focuses on how specifically belief in God may or may not require arguments for such a belief to be reasonable, this is not the only kind of religious belief that might be appropriate for this form of consideration. For instance, some have considered whether specifically belief in aspects of God's nature might be reasonably ...
Belief In God Essays. Moral Dimensions of Belief in God. Vaughn's work critically examines Pascal's Wager and the morality of believing in God for practical benefits. Vaughn discusses Pascal's pragmatic God-rationality. Pascal's Wager states that Christians will experience eternal bliss if God exists and minimal loss otherwise.
By Janell Fetterolf and Sarah Austin. Most Americans say it's not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, according to a spring 2022 Pew Research Center survey. About two-thirds of Americans say this, while about a third say belief in God is an essential component of morality (65% vs. 34%).
500 Words Essay on Why Do You Believe In God My Belief in God. I believe in God because it gives me comfort and hope. In times of trouble, I can turn to God for strength and guidance. I believe that God is always with me, watching over me and protecting me. This belief gives me a sense of peace and well-being.
37% of Americans believe God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so, according to Gallup. Share on X. While 71% see God as having an active part, 24% contend human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life but God had no part in this process.