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The Importance of Imagination

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Imagination and cognitive development, imagination and emotional well-being, imagination and innovation, imagination and social change.

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Personal and Shared Knowledge Words: 1650
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Imagination Is More Important than Knowledge: Essay Example

Imagination is more important than knowledge: essay introduction, imagination is better than knowledge: essay body, imagination is more important than knowledge: conclusion.

“Imagination is more important than knowledge,” is a famous quote of Albert Einstein. There are only a couple of words in this line, but if we think logically, it encloses the whole world. Imagination is a bequest of life and is indeed far more significant than knowledge. If we have the capability of imagining things, we can craft our world.

Imagination is not significant just for us as individuals but also for the community in general. It can also be interpreted as the fundamental element of theology and can be better articulated through contemplation. There have been great philosophers in the past who imagined the unattainable, and today our societies have certain values that are very relevant.

Simultaneously to be very dominant, imagination is also very risky. It all depends on the direction towards which we orient our imagination. Just like in the case of fire, if it becomes uncontrollable, it spells havocs, but if it is harnessed properly, it contributes to the development and wellbeing of the people. So our imagination should be oriented towards the positive or constructive direction rather than the negative or destructive one.

On the one hand, where positive approach in imagination improves life values, standards and progress, the negative approach is bound to lead the individuals towards fake things and feelings such as panic, intolerance, nervousness, etc. In the negative imagination, people lose their interface with the truth.

All the inventions and developments that have today become inseparable parts of our lives are results of positive imagination only. Some people imagined these things and converted them into reality. Human beings owe the transformation from Stone Age to being civilized to positive imagination. This is what positive imagination can do.

Knowledge is also important because simply by imagining things, one cannot convert them into reality. An intellectual mind is required for such tasks. But without imagination, knowledge would be of no use. We would be stagnant as far as development is concerned.

Like for instance, if Thomas Alva Edison were aware of the light (current) generating system but didn’t have the foresight to make useful things, then today we would not have the so important thing called bulb. Imagination is the foundation of contentment and pleasure in our lives. It provides us with lots of amusement, leisure and above all makes us more lively and humane.

Knowledge can be gained from various textbooks and lectures, but what about innovation? Unless we combine innovation and knowledge, there is no point in studying. Innovation comes from imagination, and imagination cannot be learned at schools or colleges. To put it more strongly, imagination is a revolution – in a good sense – and dominant, whereas knowledge is merely an attained instrument.

It is always good to acquire knowledge, but having the ability to imagine is far more important and inevitable. By acquiring knowledge, we learn things, but my imagination, we learn how to comprehend the things that we have learned. This comprehension further increases our knowledge.

Above all, the knowledge that we acquire is again a result of imagination. We don’t get knowledge out of knowledge but out of imagination that guides us to knowledge. So imagination is a sort of concierge to knowledge. We cannot gain knowledge unless we have imagination. So imagination is more important than knowledge.

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Essay on Imagination

December 15, 2017 by Study Mentor 1 Comment

Human beings are one of the most curious creatures on the planet.  This sense of inquisitiveness roots from the fact that we have an active imagination. A lot of what we have achieved over the course of human existence has its foundation on imagination.

We maybe one of the only creatures on earth who can imagine things. You must have spent hours imagining various things and scenarios in your head. You also must’ve noticed that most of our ideas have stemmed from the idle imagination that happens when we think. But what exactly do we know about imagination?

Table of Contents

A brief premise

Any idea we have, any thought that constructs a scenario, utilizes imagination. As a kid, you must have thought of yourself as a superhero, wearing a cape and jumping up and down the sofa. In this case, you are imagining that you are a superhero, using a prop to help you get more into character. Activities like this fuel our imaginative powers.

Creativity is more defined when we dream. Since we are no longer in control of the peripheral cortex, it’s the brain that drives the imagination.

You can say that your thoughts are in autopilot. In our dreams, we often experience things we haven’t done in real life, but may have thought of doing or wondered how it feels like. Dreams are when you live your imagination this is exactly why when you wake up from a good dream, you have a fleeting feeling to go back to sleep and continue it.

Applications in real life

Everything you see around you, the chair, the blackboard, your clothes, the room you are sitting in and the building where the room is, were all part of someone’s imagination, which they then brought to life.

One of the biggest industries in today’s date, the entertainment industry, runs entirely on the power of imagination. The movies you watch, the ads you see, the cartoons you watch have all culminated from someone’s imagination. Making a movie is an extremely imaginative and creative process.

It all starts from an idea that the director imagines, which he then works on. He either writes the entire story by himself or hires a story writer who he then conveys the idea to. Thus, the story and script of the film gets completed, all out of imagination.

Various steps that follow also require imagination, like set design, costume design, direction, camera angles and movements etc. All these activities are supervised by the director who supervises and makes sure that they stick to his idea.

Another example of us using imagination in daily life is reading books. When we read, we visualize everything. Since there are no pictures, everything depends on our mind, deciding how the characters look, how the surroundings seem, how the air smells etc. The writer or author of the book also leaves various clues and hints to guide our mind into knowing what he or she is thinking.

Our Creativity is exponentially powered and worked when we read a fantasy or science fiction novel. This is because unlike nonfiction or biographies and documentary, which also make us imagine, fantasy books create whole new worlds for us, straining our imagination, compelling us to recreate the world in our own style. Therefore, we are often prompted to read regularly. Books are a great source of information and an excellent exercise for our creative minds.

Without our power of imagination, human beings wouldn’t be where we are today. If Leonardo da Vinci hadn’t imagined a flying vehicle, then the Wright brothers would never have experimented on their plane, if Nikola Tesla hadn’t imagined that we could use electricity to light our homes, we all would still be sitting in darkness.

The world runs on imagination, it fuels our growth. So, it is very important to think about our ideas and most important, visualize them and try to shape them as we see it.

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February 9, 2022 at 6:43 pm

Wow what a defination

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Essay on Imagination And Creativity

Students are often asked to write an essay on Imagination And Creativity in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Imagination And Creativity

Understanding imagination.

Imagination is the mind’s ability to form images and ideas of things that are not present or real. It’s like a movie screen in your head where you can picture anything. For example, you can imagine what it’s like to fly like a bird or live on the moon. Imagination can take you anywhere!

The Power of Creativity

Link between imagination and creativity.

Imagination and creativity are like best friends. Imagination gives you the idea, and creativity helps you make it real. For example, an artist first imagines a picture in their mind, then uses creativity to paint it. Both are needed to create something new.

Importance of Imagination and Creativity

Imagination and creativity are very important. They help us solve problems, make new things, and have fun! They can also help us understand others better. For example, if you can imagine how someone else feels, you can be kinder to them.

250 Words Essay on Imagination And Creativity

Creativity, on the other hand, is using our imagination to make something new. This could be a drawing, a story, or even a new way of doing something. For instance, if a child imagines a new type of car, and then draws it, that’s creativity!

The Link Between Imagination and Creativity

Imagination and creativity are closely linked. You need imagination to think of new ideas. And you need creativity to bring these ideas to life. So, imagination is like the seed of an idea, and creativity is like the water and sunlight that makes it grow.

Why Imagination and Creativity are Important

Imagination and creativity are important because they help us solve problems, invent new things, and make life more interesting. For example, if you imagine a way to make your school bag lighter, and then create a solution, you’ve used both imagination and creativity.

In conclusion, imagination and creativity are powerful tools that help us think of new ideas and bring them to life. They make life more interesting and help us solve problems. So, let’s keep imagining and creating!

500 Words Essay on Imagination And Creativity

Imagination is a powerful tool we all have. It is the ability to form new ideas, images, or concepts in our minds that are not present in our senses. We use our imagination every day, even when we dream. It allows us to explore beyond the boundaries of our physical world. For example, when we read a book, we imagine the characters and the places described in it.

What is Creativity?

Imagination and creativity are closely linked. Imagination is like the fuel, and creativity is the car. Without imagination, creativity would not exist. Imagination provides us with the ideas, and creativity helps us to turn these ideas into reality. For example, a writer first imagines a story in their mind before they create it on paper.

Imagination and creativity are very important in our lives. They help us solve problems, make discoveries, and create new things. They also make life more interesting and enjoyable. For example, when we’re bored, we can use our imagination to create a fun game or story.

Boosting Imagination and Creativity

It’s also important to give ourselves time to relax and daydream. This can help our mind wander and come up with new ideas.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

What Is Imagination & Why Is It Important For Fiction Writing?

In this post, we ask ‘What is imagination?’, look at the difference between imagination and creativity , and discuss why it’s important for fiction writing. There are also exercises for writers to try that are bound to spark your imagination.

Often dismissed as a bit of fancy, imagination is in fact a pervasive function of human experience and helps us make sense of the world.

Child’s Play

This weekend, I visited my cousin. His three-year-old son came bounding into the room. Noah insisted his father didn’t call him by his name. He was now Rocky, the family Rottweiler.

The little boy was transformed. He wanted to lick instead of kiss and eat his biscuits from a bowl on the ground. We all went along with the ruse.

His imaginative play reminded me of my niece, Leila, at a similar age. One day, while handing out imaginary sweets, she burst into tears. When her mother asked what was wrong she cried out, ‘You’ve eaten them all!’

This got me thinking about imagination and how much fun it can be to make things up, to leave reality behind in a conscious way, and enjoy this kind of mental play. It is this ‘fun’ aspect we often forget as writers as we ‘grow up’.

What Is Imagination?

But what exactly is imagination?

Imagination is the part of our minds that makes things up. It is how we form new ideas, images, or concepts of external objects that are not immediately present to the senses.

For example, it’s when you can see and almost feel the beautiful, butterscotch-coloured silk shirt you saw in a boutique’s window a few weeks ago, or taste your favourite dark-chocolate-and-cream mousse when you’re on a strict diet.

Sometimes, our imagination, as my grandmother would say, can also play tricks on us. The scratching sound on the window at midnight is suddenly the compass-style glass-cutter of a well-organised serial killer breaking into your bedroom. When you jerk back the curtains, it’s just an innocuous twig in the wind.

Pervasive Theories

Immanuel Kant , the famous 18th century philosopher, developed a broader theory of imagination, one that beyond the narrow physical sense of the word.

Kant conceived that imagination contributes significantly to the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral aspects of our lives. It synthesises with how we think, reason, and make sense of the world around us.

Much like Kant, Dustin Stokes , a young philosopher at the University of Utah, is interested in philosophical and psychological accounts of our imaginative capacities.

In an essay for a 2104 collection called Philosophy of Creativity, he says that few philosophers have considered the distinction between imagination and creativity. Similarly, few psychologists have directly tested the difference between the two concepts.

Imagination plays an important role in our experiences of art, in the construction of theories, and in everyday life, Stokes writes on his website.

The Ups And Downs Of Imagination

It seems that our brains behave differently when we are in ‘imagine mode’ as humans.

LiveScience , a science news website, reported that reality and imagination flow in different directions in the brain.

Visual information from real events flows up from the brain’s occipital lobe to the parietal lobe; imagined images flow down from the parietal lobe to the occipital lobe.

In fact, the same article reported that employing our imagination involves 11 areas of our brains.

Why Is It Important For Fiction Writing?

Imagination is a writer’s best friend. No artist will argue its rich and unfathomable resources.

Some of us think of it as a deep, nourishing well, others as a giant, magical tree we see at the edges of our dreams before we drift off to sleep – and when we often have our best ideas.

However, imagination is not the exclusive purview of the artist. As humans, it’s our basic capability to be creative. It is a part of human instinct and behaviour and, like creativity, is often dismissed as fanciful – divorced from reason or judgement –from those that don’t understand its importance.

Imagination is powerful and even vital when it is used to help us re-create something of deeper meaning. In other words, when we use it to write a story and craft it to have a specific effect on a reader or audience. Or when we use it to challenge, subvert, or change the things we find our imagination.

A Shared Imaginative Experience

In his ground-breaking book The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution (2009), Dennis Dutton, an American philosopher of art, outlines the 11 characteristics of art – in other words the indicators (or what he calls ‘signals’) for art that are recognised across cultures and the world.

In the book, he says objects of art provide an imaginative experience for both the artist and the audience. He also states that the imaginative characteristic is perhaps the most important one in art’s overall make-up.

All art happens in a make-believe world, he writes. The artistic experience takes place in the theatre of the imagination.

Dutton is correct. The very same serial-killer-turned-out-to-be-a-twig incident is powerful enough to get you to write a horror novel about a fictitious serial killer that kidnaps a young protagonist – a novel that sends vicarious thrills through the spines of thousands of readers across the globe.

Creativity is, of course, another unique cognitive function and one that suffuses all human life, but perhaps one slightly less involuntary as the imagination or our imaginative responses to our environment.

Imagination & Creativity

While imagination allows us to fill in the gaps of our human existence, creativity similarly allows us to connect often ‘opposite’ ideas to create new ideas, concepts, or a tension between the two opposing ideas.

It’s what is often called the magic synthesis, a term coined by Italian author and psychoanalyst Silvano Arieti (author of Creativity: The Magic Synthesis ) in the 1970s.

This synthesis is examined by the Sante Fe Institute in a 2015 paper called ‘How Creativity Works In the Brain’ . It is what happens in the brain when ideas are brought together in a way necessary for creativity to happen.

In other words, the paper explains, the brain must be both divergent and convergent at the same time. It’s a process well understood by artists, who often meld together radically different ideas to create a new connection.

MUST-READ: 5 Steps To Creativity In Writing

Imagination To Creation

Perhaps the crucial difference between the constructs of imagination and creativity , for writers at least, is that our imagination can produce sensations or images that stimulate the creative parts of our brain. Once we have that ‘image’ we can start turning it into a story, while consciously manipulating or re-arranging it to fit the context of our narrative.

Put another way, 0ne can imagine what it would be like to date George Clooney, but it will take our creative skills to write a whole novel about an ordinary person who dates a famous Hollywood actor.

Imagination Exercises

Here are three exercises to help stimulate your imagination and creativity .

For each, find a quiet place where you can sit comfortably, close your eyes, let your imagination run free for at least 30 minutes.

After each exercise, you may want to jot down any unique or inspiring insights.

1. Imaginary Families

Ty to picture one of the following as your alternative family:

A Parisian family during La Belle Epoque in France.
A Martian family on an exchange programme with Earth.
A family of magicians .
An animal family living in a forest.
The Manson Family of psychopaths in the 60s.
A family of fish in a new aquarium.

What was the experience like? Were you surprised by what your imagination offered you?

2. Still-life

Imagine a table in front of you, empty except for a pure white tablecloth. At this moment, you are an artist arranging objects for a still life oil painting.

What will you place on the table? (Fruit, flowers, etc.) How will you arrange these objects? See it all in your mind.
Now add in more of the senses besides the visual. What do you smell ? What do the objects feel like ? What can you hear in the background?
Finally, start imagining who you are as this artist. What does your studio look like? What inspires you? Who is the painting for?

3. Characters Come Alive

In this exercise, think of a character in your favourite book or short story. If you wish, you can re-read some of the story or novel.

What do they look like in your imagination?
What are they wearing as you imagining them?
What are they doing?
Can you ‘hear’ their voices or laughter?
What else comes to mind?

The Last Word

I hope I’ve answered the question ‘What is imagination?’, explained the difference between imagination and creativity, and shown you why it’s important for fiction writing.

Ralph Fletcher, in his book What a Writer Needs (1992), says that as a writer ‘there are two whole universes for you to explore – the one on the inside and the physical one on the outside. Take your choice, inner or outer. Or best – both.’

Top Tip : Find out more about our workbooks and online courses in our shop .

1 thought on “What Is Imagination & Why Is It Important For Fiction Writing?”

Great post, Anthony! I remember my little cousin cooking make-believe food, and my aunt ate it before it was done. My cousin then ordered her to ‘spit it out! That’s yucky!’. My aunt obeyed, and all was well once more. Imagination is an amazing thing. Life would be unbelievably dull without it. 😁

Comments are closed.

education that inspires learners of all ages

The Power of Imagination (I): Myths, Stories, & Thought Experiments

A word of introduction….

During World Creativity & Innovation Week 2018 I had the pleasure of moderating a week-long conversation on imagination with the Google+ Creative Higher Education (#CreativeHE) community . I ended the week with an electronic file overflowing (if such a thing is possible) with intriguing resources and reference on imagination and creativity. Dr. Kevin Byron posted a compelling series of graphics/text about the power of imagination. They resonate strongly with the theory and practice of Imaginative Education. This is the first of a 3-part mini-series entitled The Power of Imagination that shares those posts. I hope you find it informative and inspiring!

Myths & Stories: Speaking in Pictures

One can easily invent a story from imagination. It could range from an embellishment to a personal anecdote that one has heard, to a full blown flight of fancy based on a day-dream. Life-changing dramas apart, such stories form part of a healthy diet in our daily attention exchange with other people, though they are soon superseded by the next mini-incident or imagined idea. There is however another order of stories in circulation that have stood the test of time, sometimes originating many hundreds of years earlier, and that appear around the world in numerous forms having been adapted locally by various cultures. Generally known as traditional tales, these stories often have a social element to them, but they are more than mere inventions of the imagination, because they also carry with them a significance that can resonate deeper within our minds. Such stories created by the wise require one to search them out.

The social element of traditional tales fulfils the various functions illustrated in the slide above. This includes providing an early education, sustaining the mores of a culture or tribe, providing entertainment, and enabling groups of people to bond at times of trouble.

This social dimension in a traditional tale is the means of transport for the deeper meaning that somehow by-passes our analytical, literally interpretive mind. To quote from the writer Idries Shah in his book ‘World Tales’ (1): “Perhaps above all the tale fulfils the function not of escape, but of hope. The suspending of ordinary constraints helps people to reclaim optimism, and to fuel the imagination with energy for the attainment of goals: whether moral or material.”

(1) Idries Shah; World Tales. ISBN 0 7226 6860 0.

The Thought Experiment: The Imaginative Laboratory in your Head

A thought experiment enables one to solve problems conceptually without recourse (initially) to an experiment. This technique was first described by the Greeks with their reliance on deduction from a set of premises to solve mathematical problems. Many great scientists have invented their own thought experiments to test and make sense of abstract concepts, prior to their verification by a real experiment. Examples in physics include Shrodinger’s Cat and Maxwell’s Demon, and other disciplines such as philosophy and law draw on this technique occasionally.

One of Einstein’s thought experiments that helped him to develop the theory of special relativity is illustrated below. Here he was wondering what would happen to his image in a mirror if he was travelling at the speed of light. According to classical Newtonian physics, the light from Einstein’s face would travel at his rocket speed plus the speed of light, and be reflected off the mirror so that Einstein would still see himself. However he had already postulated that nothing could travel faster than light, so in theory his image would disappear, because the light would never reach the mirror. But according to his theory what would happen if he travelled very close to the speed of light? Would his image form very slowly as the light took longer to reach the mirror? This did not make sense, given that the laws of physics are supposed to be invariant. Einstein resolved this dilemma by suggesting that the speed of light always remained constant, and instead it was time and distance (space) that varied with speed.

This idea turned Classical theory upside down, and counter-intuitive as it seemed, it was correct and later verified experimentally. Interestingly, like all good scientific progress the earlier Newtonian physics didn’t turn out to be wrong, but was a specific case of Einstein’s relativity in which the speeds involved are slower than the speed of light. So we live in a Newtonian world, but whenever you use your Sat Nav you enter Einstein’s world because a small timing correction, due to relativistic time dilation, needs to be made due to the high altitude and speed of the orbiting satellites. Einstein developed this famous theory of special relativity in the earlier 1900’s along with four other great ideas that changed the world of physics.

Thought experiments are a great way to teach, and indeed to develop ourselves. All it requires is one to say: “What if…….?” and then take a journey into your imagination, draw on your existing knowledge, but with a flexibility of mind that imagination allows, to enable you to challenge the assumptions you already hold.

Stay tuned: The Power of Imagination (II)–Abstractions, Analogy & Metaphor

About The Author

Dr. Kevin Byron ( [email protected] ) received his Ph.D in Physics from the University of Hull, and pursued a career in commercial research in photonics for some twenty five years. During this time he was an honorary visiting lecturer at the Universities of Glasgow and Salford, and elected to Fellowship of the Institute of Physics. Throughout his time in industry he developed a growing interest in education and the development of transferable skills. The award of a NESTA fellowship in 2002 enabled him to pursue these interests further and following election as an honorary fellow of the HEA in 2006, he took up a post at the University of Leicester as a research skills developer, and then at Queen Mary University of London as an enterprise developer. He has published over 150 academic papers and patents, and contributed to a number of book publications on his earlier research interests, and more recently on innovation and creativity. He has presented his work on creativity, innovation and enterprise at several international conferences in Italy, Canada, the USA, Qatar, South Africa and the UK. More recently he has worked as an independent skills developer for a number of higher education institutions and industries in the UK and Europe.

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Essay on Imagination

Introduction to Imagination

“Dare to Dream, Explore, Create”

Imagination, the seemingly boundless capacity of the human mind to conjure, create, and innovate, is one of our species’ defining characteristics. From the earliest cave illustrations to the latest scientific breakthroughs, imagination has played a pivotal role in shaping our understanding of the world and driving progress in every sphere of human endeavor. Defined as the ability to form cognitive images, ideas, or concepts that are not present to the senses, imagination transcends the constraints of reality, allowing individuals to study the depths of their creativity, problem-solving skills, and personal growth.

This essay will delve into the multifaceted nature of imagination, exploring its role in fostering creativity, problem-solving, and innovation. By examining the cognitive and psychological aspects of imagination, the relationship between imagination and creativity, and the practical applications of imaginative thinking in various fields, we will unravel the intricate tapestry of human imagination and its profound impact on shaping our world. Through this exploration, we will understand the power and potential of imagination as a driving force for progress and personal development in an ever-changing world.

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The Nature of Imagination

Cognitive Process: In imagination, individuals actively generate mental representations that the senses do not directly perceive. It allows individuals to form images, ideas, and concepts in their minds, transcending the limitations of immediate sensory input.
Creative Capacity: Imagination is the wellspring of creativity, providing the raw material for artistic expression, innovative thinking, and original problem-solving. It enables individuals to envision possibilities beyond the constraints of reality, fostering a rich inner world of ideas and inspiration.
Simulation of Experience: Imagination enables individuals to simulate experiences in their minds, allowing them to explore hypothetical scenarios, anticipate future events, and reflect on memories. This mental simulation is a tool for learning, planning, and decision-making.
Flexible and Fluid: Imagination is inherently flexible and fluid, capable of morphing and adapting to different contexts and stimuli. It thrives on curiosity and open-mindedness, welcoming new ideas and perspectives to fuel its creative potential.
Subjective Experience: Imagination is a deeply personal and subjective experience shaped by individual perceptions, memories, and emotions. It reflects the unique worldview of each individual, offering a window into their inner thoughts and desires.
Playful Exploration: Imagination often involves a sense of playfulness and experimentation as individuals engage in imaginative play, storytelling, or daydreaming. This playful exploration allows for exploring fantastical worlds, alternative realities, and unconventional ideas.
Embodied Imagination: Individuals can embody imagination through physical expression, not solely confined to mental abstraction. Through artistic creation, dramatic performance, or kinesthetic movement, imagination finds tangible form in the external world, enriching human expression and communication.
Developmental Milestone: Imagination is crucial in cognitive development, particularly in childhood. It emerges early in life and undergoes significant growth and refinement through exposure to diverse experiences, cultural influences, and educational opportunities.

The Psychological Perspective

Cognitive Processes: Imagination involves a complex interplay of cognitive processes, including perception, memory, reasoning, and creativity. It encompasses the ability to mentally simulate experiences, generate novel ideas, and manipulate mental representations.
Constructive Process: From a psychological standpoint, individuals construct mental images, scenarios, and narratives based on their past experiences, knowledge, and expectations, viewing imagination as a constructive process. This constructive nature allows for integrating new information with existing mental schemas, fostering creativity and problem-solving.
Role in Mental Health: Imagination is crucial to mental health and well-being. It serves as a coping instrument for stress and trauma, allowing individuals to mentally escape from distressing situations or reframe negative experiences through positive imagery and visualization techniques. Additionally, imaginative activities such as art therapy and guided imagery are utilized in therapeutic interventions to promote emotional expression and healing.
Theory of Mind: The development of the theory of mind closely links imagination to the ability to attribute cognitive states to oneself and others. Children understand perspective-taking, empathy, and social interaction through imaginative play and storytelling, laying the foundation for complex social relationships and communication skills.
Creative Problem-Solving: Imagination is instrumental in creative problem-solving, allowing individuals to generate and explore multiple solutions. By mentally simulating different scenarios and outcomes, individuals can evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of various strategies, leading to innovative solutions and adaptive decision-making.
Neurological Basis: Recent advances in neuroscience have shed light on the neurological basis of imagination. Functional imaging studies have determined brain regions involved in imagination, including the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and parietal cortex. These regions are associated with memory, attention, and spatial processing, highlighting the complex neural networks underlying imaginative processes.
Fantasy and Reality: Imagination blurs the boundaries between fantasy and reality, allowing individuals to explore fantastical worlds while maintaining a connection to their real-life experiences and emotions. This ability to navigate between different mental states contributes to cognitive flexibility and adaptive functioning in everyday life.
Developmental Perspective: Imagination undergoes significant developmental changes across the lifespan. In childhood, imaginative play and storytelling are prevalent, serving as vehicles for creativity and social development. As individuals mature, imagination plays a role in creativity, problem-solving, and emotional regulation, albeit in more complex and nuanced ways.

The Role of Imagination in Creativity

Generating Novel Ideas: Imagination allows individuals to break free from conventional thinking patterns and explore alternative possibilities. By mentally simulating different scenarios, combining disparate elements, and envisioning new concepts, imagination fuels the generation of novel ideas that form the basis of creative endeavors.
Visualizing Possibilities: Imagination enables individuals to visualize abstract concepts and translate them into concrete forms. Whether through mental imagery, sketching, or verbal description, imagination provides a means of articulating and refining creative visions, turning intangible ideas into tangible expressions.
Exploring Alternative Perspectives: Imagination facilitates the exploration of multiple perspectives and viewpoints. By stepping into the shoes of others, considering different angles, and challenging preconceived notions, individuals can broaden their creative horizons and uncover new insights that spark innovative thinking.
Combining and Synthesizing: Imagination involves combining and synthesizing diverse elements in novel ways. By drawing connections between seemingly unrelated concepts, integrating disparate influences, and blending different artistic mediums or disciplines, imagination fosters the synthesis of ideas that give rise to innovative creations.
Experimentation and Iteration: Imagination encourages experimentation and iteration in the creative process. Through trial and error, playful exploration, and open-ended inquiry, individuals can refine their ideas, experiment with different approaches, and push the boundaries of creativity to discover new possibilities and refine their artistic vision.
Embracing Ambiguity and Uncertainty: Imagination thrives in ambiguity and uncertainty. By embracing ambiguity as a source of creative tension and uncertainty as a catalyst for exploration, individuals can navigate the creative process with openness, curiosity, and a willingness to welcome the unknown, leading to unexpected discoveries and breakthroughs.
Emotional and Aesthetic Expression: Imagination is a conduit for emotional and aesthetic expression. People can use their imagination to produce powerful artwork, passionate performances, and gripping stories that emotionally connect with audiences by opening up to their deepest thoughts, emotions, and experiences.
Pushing Boundaries and Challenging Conventions: Imagination empowers individuals to push boundaries, challenge conventions, and defy expectations. By envisioning possibilities beyond the status quo, questioning established norms, and daring to think differently, individuals can catalyze transformative change and redefine the boundaries of creativity in their respective fields.

Types of Imagination

1. Creative Imagination

Definition: The ability to generate original ideas, concepts, and solutions.
Characteristics: Involves divergent thinking, exploration of unconventional possibilities, and the creation of novel and unique expressions in art, literature, science, and other fields.

2. Reproductive Imagination

Definition: The capacity to recreate or replicate mental images, ideas, or experiences from memory.
Characteristics: Involves recalling and reproducing elements from past experiences or existing knowledge, often focusing on accuracy and faithful representation.

3. Fantasy Imagination

Definition: The ability to create imaginary worlds, characters, and scenarios unrelated to reality.
Characteristics: Involves the development of elaborate and fantastical narratives, often seen in literature, storytelling, and imaginative play.

4. Perceptual Imagination

Definition: The ability to mentally manipulate and transform sensory perceptions.
Characteristics: Involves the mental simulation of sensory experiences, such as visually rotating an object in the mind or imagining the taste and texture of a particular food.

5. Aesthetic Imagination

Definition: The capacity to appreciate and create beauty and art.
Characteristics: The ability to perceive and generate aesthetically pleasing ideas, images, and expressions, often seen in visual arts, music, and literature.

6. Scientific Imagination

Definition: The ability to form mental models and hypotheses for scientific inquiry.
Characteristics: Involves using imagination in scientific discovery, hypothesis generation, and the visualization of abstract concepts and processes.

7. Social Imagination

Definition: The ability to understand and interpret social situations and relationships.
Characteristics: Involves empathy, perspective-taking, and the capacity to imagine oneself in the shoes of others, contributing to effective communication and interpersonal skills .

8. Spatial Imagination

Definition: The ability to mentally manipulate and navigate spatial relationships.
Characteristics: Involves skills such as mental rotation, spatial visualization, and the ability to imagine and manipulate three-dimensional objects in one’s mind.

9. Episodic Imagination

Definition: The capacity to mentally replay, anticipate, or construct personal experiences.
Characteristics: Involves recalling or imagining specific events, scenarios, or narratives from one’s life, contributing to autobiographical memory and future planning.

10. Symbolic Imagination

Definition: The ability to understand and manipulate symbols, such as language, numbers, and abstract representations.
Characteristics: Involves using symbols to convey and interpret meaning, facilitating communication, language development, and abstract thinking.

The Art of Imagination

Imagination in Art and Literature

Creative Expression: Imagination serves as the lifeblood of artistic and literary creation, allowing artists and writers to conjure vivid worlds, characters, and narratives that captivate audiences. Through imaginative storytelling, artists and writers explore themes, emotions, and human experiences, inviting viewers and readers to engage with their work emotionally and intellectually.
Symbolism and Metaphor: Imagination is crucial in using symbolism and metaphor in art and literature. Artists and writers employ imaginative devices to convey abstract ideas, emotions, and concepts through concrete images and language, inviting interpretation and imbuing their work with layers of meaning and depth.
Exploration of the Human Condition: Imagination enables artists and writers to explore the complexities of the human condition, delving into the depths of human emotion, psychology, and existential questions. Through imaginative storytelling and visual expression, artists and writers shed light on universal truths, personal experiences, and societal issues, fostering audience empathy and understanding.
Transformation and Transcendence: Imagination empowers artists and writers to transcend the constraints of reality and envision alternative worlds, realities, and possibilities. Through imaginative exploration and experimentation, artists push the boundaries of artistic expression, challenging conventions and reshaping perceptions of reality.

Imagination in Science and Innovation

Hypothesis Formation: Imagination is crucial in hypothesis formation and scientific inquiry. Scientists harness their imaginative capacity to formulate hypotheses, envisioning potential explanations for observed phenomena and guiding their research endeavors.
Conceptualization and Visualization: Imagination facilitates conceptualizing and visualizing abstract scientific concepts and theories. Scientists use imaginative thinking to develop mental models, visualizations, and analogies that aid in understanding and communicating complex scientific ideas.
Creative Problem-Solving: Imagination is instrumental in creative problem-solving and innovation in science and technology . Scientists and inventors draw upon their imaginative faculties to envision novel solutions to scientific challenges, driving progress and breakthroughs in various fields.
Interdisciplinary Connections: Imagination fosters interdisciplinary connections and innovation by bridging gaps between different fields of study. Scientists leverage their imaginative capacity to explore connections between seemingly unrelated disciplines, sparking innovative collaborations and interdisciplinary research initiatives.

Imagination in Education

Fostering Creativity: Imagination is essential for promoting creativity and innovation in education. Educators recognize the importance of nurturing students’ imaginative abilities through creative activities, project-based learning, and inventive storytelling, fostering a classroom culture of innovation and exploration.
Enhancing Learning: Imagination enhances learning by making educational experiences more engaging, memorable, and meaningful. Educators use imaginative teaching methods like visualizations, simulations, and imaginative play to stimulate students’ curiosity, deepen their understanding, and facilitate active learning experiences.
Encouraging Critical Thinking: Imagination encourages critical thinking and problem-solving skills in education. Educators encourage students to use their imaginative faculties to explore alternative perspectives, generate creative solutions, and think critically about complex issues, empowering them to become lifelong learners and innovative thinkers.
Promoting Personal Growth: Imagination promotes personal growth and self-expression in education. Educators provide opportunities for students to express themselves creatively, pursue their interests, and develop their unique talents and strengths, fostering a sense of agency, identity, and purpose in learning.

Strategies for Cultivating Imagination

1. Encourage Curiosity: Foster a sense of interest and wonder by encouraging individuals to ask questions, explore new ideas, and seek out diverse experiences. Curiosity fuels the imagination by prompting individuals to investigate, discover, and engage with the world around them.

2. Provide Stimulating Environments: Create environments that stimulate the senses and spark the imagination. To inspire creative thinking and exploration, surround individuals with various stimuli, such as art, nature, music, literature, and diverse cultural experiences.

3. Promote Open-Mindedness: Cultivate an open-minded attitude that embraces different perspectives, viewpoints, and possibilities. Encourage individuals to suspend judgment, challenge assumptions, and consider alternative ways of thinking, fostering a receptive mindset to imaginative ideas and unconventional solutions.

4. Encourage Play and Experimentation: Embrace playfulness and experimentation as integral parts of the creative process. Provide opportunities for individuals to engage in imaginative play, experimentation, and risk-taking without fear of failure or judgment, allowing them to freely explore new ideas and possibilities.

5. Support Divergent Thinking: Foster divergent thinking by encouraging individuals to generate multiple ideas, solutions, and perspectives. Provide exercises and activities that promote brainstorming, creativity, and divergent thinking techniques, such as mind mapping, association exercises, and creative problem-solving tasks.

6. Provide Time for Reflection and Solitude: Allow someone’s time for reflection, solitude, and introspection, as these moments provide fertile ground for imaginative thinking. Encourage journaling, meditation, or quiet contemplation to stimulate the imagination and cultivate inner creativity.

7. Engage in Creative Activities: Engage in creative activities that encourage imaginative expression and exploration. Encourage participation in artistic endeavors such as drawing, painting, writing, music-making, or theater and activities like storytelling, role-playing, and creative writing exercises that stimulate the imagination.

8. Encourage Multisensory Experiences: Engage the senses in imaginative experiences by incorporating multisensory stimuli into activities and environments. Provide opportunities for individuals to engage with tactile, auditory, visual, and olfactory stimuli, enhancing their sensory perception and enriching imaginative experiences.

9. Embrace Nature: Encourage individuals to connect with nature as a source of inspiration and creativity. Spend time outdoors, explore natural environments, and engage with the natural world through activities such as hiking, gardening, or simply observing the beauty and complexity of the natural world.

10. Provide Freedom and Autonomy: Allow individuals the freedom and autonomy to explore their interests, follow their passions, and pursue their creative impulses. Provide self-directed learning, exploration, and personal expression opportunities, empowering individuals to cultivate their unique imaginative talents and interests.

Imagination in Society and Culture

Cultural Creation and Transmission: Imagination is the driving force behind cultural creation and transmission. Through imaginative storytelling, mythmaking, and artistic expression, cultures create narratives, symbols, and traditions that shape collective identity, values, and beliefs. Imagination fuels the creation of cultural artifacts such as literature, art, music, and folklore, which serve as repositories of cultural heritage and vehicles for cultural transmission across generations.

1. Social Change and Transformation: Imagination fuels social change and transformation by envisioning alternative futures and challenging existing norms and structures. Imaginative thinkers and visionaries inspire social movements, revolutions, and cultural shifts by imagining and advocating for new possibilities, ideals, and ways of living. Imagination fosters empathy, compassion, and solidarity, driving collective efforts to address social injustices and create a more equitable and inclusive society.

2. Innovation and Technological Advancement: Imagination drives innovation and technological advancement by envisioning and creating new technologies, products, and solutions to address human needs and challenges. Imagination fuels scientific inquiry, technological invention, and entrepreneurial creativity, leading to scientific, engineering, medicine, and information technology breakthroughs. Imagination also shapes the cultural impact of technology, influencing how technology is perceived, adopted, and integrated into society.

3. Cultural Diversity and Hybridity: Imagination fosters cultural diversity and hybridity by facilitating cross-cultural exchange, adaptation, and fusion. Imagination allows individuals and communities to creatively reinterpret, remix, and synthesize diverse cultural influences, creating new forms of artistic expression, hybrid identities, and multicultural landscapes. Imagination also plays a role in cultural appropriation and commodification, raising questions about cultural authenticity, ownership, and representation in a globalized world.

4. Collective Memory and Identity: Imagination shapes collective memory and identity by constructing past, present, and future narratives that define cultural identities and worldviews. Imagination creates shared myths, legends, and historical narratives that shape collective memory and identity, shaping how individuals and communities perceive themselves and their place in the world. Imagination also influences the construction of national, ethnic, and cultural identities, reflecting contested narratives of belonging, heritage, and memory.

5. Artistic and Cultural Expression: Imagination is the foundation of creative and cultural expression, driving creativity, innovation, and experimentation in various art forms and cultural practices. Imagination fuels artistic creation in literature, visual arts, music, theater, dance, and film, allowing artists to explore diverse themes, styles, and techniques. Imagination also shapes cultural rituals, traditions, and performances, providing self-expression, communication , and community-building outlets.

6. Utopian and Dystopian Visions: Aspirations, concerns, and fears about the future appear in utopian and dystopian visions of society and culture created by imagination. The imagined realms of harmony, equality, and progress conjured up by utopian imagination inspire social and political reform and better future visions. Dystopian imagination explores dark, dystopian visions of societies plagued by oppression, inequality, and environmental degradation, serving as cautionary tales and critiques of contemporary culture.

The essay has shed light on the intricate workings of imagination, emphasizing its pivotal role in fostering creativity, innovation, and personal growth. From its cognitive foundations to its profound societal impact, imagination serves as a driving force behind human achievement and cultural evolution. As we continue researching the boundless realm of imagination, let us embrace its transformative power to encourage positive change and shape a brighter future.

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Imagination

To imagine is to represent without aiming at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something to be the case.

Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, and has been explored from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. Philosophers of mind have examined imagination’s role in mindreading and in pretense. Philosophical aestheticians have examined imagination’s role in creating and in engaging with different types of artworks. Epistemologists have examined imagination’s role in theoretical thought experiments and in practical decision-making. Philosophers of language have examined imagination’s role in irony and metaphor.

Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions of imagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. For an overview of historical discussions of imagination, see the sections on pre-twentieth century and early twentieth century accounts of entry on mental imagery ; for notable historical accounts of imagination, see corresponding entries on Aristotle , Thomas Hobbes , David Hume , Immanuel Kant , and Gilbert Ryle ; for a more detailed and comprehensive historical survey, see Brann 1991; and for a sophisticated and wide-ranging discussion of imagination in the phenomenological tradition, see Casey 2000.

1.1 Varieties of Imagination

1.2 taxonomies of imagination, 1.3 norms of imagination, 2.1 imagination and belief, 2.2 imagination and desire, 2.3 imagination, imagery, and perception, 2.4 imagination and memory, 2.5 imagination and supposition, 3.1 mindreading, 3.2 pretense, 3.3 psychopathology.

Supplement: Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts

3.5 Creativity

3.6 knowledge, 3.7 figurative language, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the nature of imagination.

A variety of roles have been attributed to imagination across various domains of human understanding and activity ( section 3 ). Not surprisingly, it is doubtful that there is one component of the mind that can satisfy all the various roles attributed to imagination (Kind 2013). Nevertheless, perhaps guided by these roles, philosophers have attempted to clarify the nature of imagination in three ways. First, philosophers have tried to disambiguate different senses of the term “imagination” and, in some cases, point to some core commonalities amongst the different disambiguations ( section 1.1 ). Second, philosophers have given partial taxonomies to distinguish different types of imaginings ( section 1.2 ). Third, philosophers have located norms that govern paradigmatic imaginative episodes ( section 1.3 ).

There is a general consensus among those who work on the topic that the term “ imagination ” is used too broadly to permit simple taxonomy. Indeed, it is common for overviews to begin with an invocation of P.F. Strawson’s remarks in “Imagination and Perception”, where he writes:

The uses, and applications, of the terms “image”, “imagine”, “imagination”, and so forth make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too definite. It would be a matter of more than difficulty to identify and list the family’s members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood. (Strawson 1970: 31)

These taxonomic challenges carry over into attempts at characterization. In the opening chapter of Mimesis as Make-Believe —perhaps the most influential contemporary monograph on imagination—Kendall Walton throws up his hands at the prospect of delineating the notion precisely. After enumerating and distinguishing a number of paradigmatic instances of imagining, he asks:

What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of dimensions along which imaginings can vary; shouldn’t we now spell out what they have in common?—Yes, if we can. But I can’t. (Walton 1990: 19)

Leslie Stevenson (2003: 238) makes arguably the only recent attempt at a somewhat comprehensive inventory of the term’s uses, covering twelve of “the most influential conceptions of imagination” that can be found in recent discussions in “philosophy of mind, aesthetics, ethics, poetry and … religion”.

To describe the varieties of imaginings, philosophers have given partial and overlapping taxonomies.

Some taxonomies are merely descriptive, and they tend to be less controversial. For example, Kendall Walton (1990) distinguishes between spontaneous and deliberate imagining (acts of imagination that occur with or without the one’s conscious direction); between occurrent and nonoccurrent imaginings (acts of imagination that do or do not occupy the one’s explicit attention); and between social and solitary imaginings (episodes of imagining that occur with or without the joint participation of several persons).

One notable descriptive taxonomy concerns imagining from the inside versus from the outside (Williams 1973; Wollheim 1973; see Ninan 2016 for an overview). To imagine from the outside that one is Napoleon involves imagining a scenario in which one is Napoleon. To imagine from the inside that one is Napoleon involves that plus something else: namely, that one is occupying the perspective of Napoleon. Imagining from the inside is essentially first-personal, imagining from the outside is not. This distinction between two modes of imagining is especially notable for its implications for thought experiments about the metaphysics of personal identity (Nichols 2008; Ninan 2009; Williams 1973).

Some taxonomies aim to be more systematic—to carve imaginings at their joints, so to speak—and they, as one might expect, tend to be more controversial.

Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) distinguishes creative imagination (combining ideas in unexpected and unconventional ways); sensory imagination (perception-like experiences in the absence of appropriate stimuli); and what they call recreative imagination (an ability to experience or think about the world from a perspective different from the one that experience presents). Neil Van Leeuwen (2013, 2014) takes a similar approach to delineate three common uses of “imagination” and cognate terms. First, these terms can be used to refer to constructive imagining , which concerns the process of generating mental representations. Second, these terms can be used to refer to attitude imagining , which concerns the propositional attitude one takes toward mental representations. Third, these terms can be used to refer to imagistic imagining , which concerns the perception-like format of mental representations.

Amy Kind and Peter Kung (2016b) pose the puzzle of imaginative use—on the seeming irreconcilability between the transcendent uses of imagination, which enables one to escape from or look beyond the world as it is, and the instructive uses of imagination, which enables one to learn about the world as it is. Kind and Kung ultimately resolve the puzzle by arguing that the same attitude can be put to these seemingly disparate uses because the two uses differ not in kind, but in degree—specifically, the degree of constraint on imaginings.

Finally, varieties of imagination might be classified in terms of their structure and content. Consider the following three types of imaginings, each illustrated with an example. When one imagines propositionally , one represents to oneself that something is the case. So, for example, Juliet might imagine that Romeo is by her side . To imagine in this sense is to stand in some mental relation to a particular proposition (see the entry on propositional attitude reports ). When one imagines objectually , one represents to oneself a real or make-believe entity or situation (Yablo 1993; see also Martin 2002; Noordhof 2002; O’Shaughnessy 2000). So, for example, Prospero might imagine an acorn or a nymph or the city of Naples or a wedding feast . To imagine in this sense is to stand in some mental relation to a representation of an (imaginary or real) entity or state of affairs. When one imagines X-ing , one simulatively represents to oneself some sort of activity or experience (Walton 1990). So, for example, Ophelia might imagine seeing Hamlet or getting herself to a nunnery . To imagine in this sense is to stand in a first-personal mental relation to some (imaginary or real) behavior or perception.

There are general norms that govern operations of imagination (Gendler 2003).

Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues, or, more generally, to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content. For example, in a widely-discussed experiment conducted by Alan Leslie (1994), children are asked to engage in an imaginary tea party. When an experimenter tips and “spills” one of the (empty) teacups, children consider the non-tipped cup to be “full” (in the context of the pretense) and the tipped cup to be “empty” (both within and outside of the context of the pretense). In fact, both make-believe games and more complicated engagements with the arts are governed by principles of generation , according to which prompts or props prescribe particular imaginings (Walton 1990).

Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the imagined or pretended episode are taken to have effects only within a relevantly circumscribed domain. So, for example, the child engaging in the make-believe tea party does not expect that “spilling” (imaginary) “tea” will result in the table really being wet, nor does a person who imagines winning the lottery expect that when she visits the ATM, her bank account will contain a million dollars. More generally, quarantining is manifest to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the imagined state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world.

Although imaginative episodes are generally governed by mirroring and quarantining, both may be violated in systematic ways.

Mirroring gives way to disparity as a result of the ways in which (the treatment of) imaginary content may differ from (that of) believed content. Imagined content may be incomplete (for example, there may be no fact of the matter (in the pretense) just how much tea has spilled on the table) or incoherent (for example, it might be that the toaster serves (in the pretense) as a logical-truth inverter). And content that is imagined may give rise to discrepant responses , most strikingly in cases of discrepant affect—where, for example, the imminent destruction of all human life is treated as amusing rather than terrifying.

Quarantining gives way to contagion when imagined content ends up playing a direct role in actual attitudes and behavior (see also Gendler 2008a, 2008b). This is common in cases of affective transmission , where an emotional response generated by an imagined situation may constrain subsequent behavior. For example, imagining something fearful (such as a tiger in the kitchen) may give rise to actual hesitation (such as reluctance to enter the room). And it also occurs in cases of cognitive transmission , where imagined content is thereby “primed” and rendered more accessible in ways that go on to shape subsequent perception and experience. For example, imagining some object (such as a sheep) may make one more likely to “perceive” such objects in one’s environment (such as mistaking a rock for a ram).

2. Imagination in Cognitive Architecture

One way to make sense of the nature of imagination is by drawing distinctions, giving taxonomies, and elucidating governing norms ( section 1 ). Another, arguably more prominent, way to make sense of the nature is by figuring out, in a broadly functionalist framework, how it fits in with more well-understood mental entities from folk psychology and scientific psychology (see the entry on functionalism ).

There are two related tasks involved. First, philosophers have used other mental entities to define imagination by contradistinction (but see Wiltsher forthcoming for a critique of this approach). To give an oversimplified example, many philosophers hold that imagining is like believing except that it does not directly motivate actions. Second, philosophers have used other mental entities to understand the inputs and outputs of imagination. To give an oversimplified example, many philosophers hold that imagination does not output to action-generating systems.

Amongst the most widely-discussed mental entities in contemporary discussions of imagination are belief ( section 2.1 ), desire ( section 2.2 ), mental imagery ( section 2.3 ), memory ( section 2.4 ), and supposition ( section 2.5 ). The resolution of these debates ultimately rest on the extent to which the imaginative attitude(s) posited can fulfill the roles ascribed to imagination from various domains of human understanding and activity ( section 3 ).

To believe is to take something to be the case or regard it as true (see the entry on belief ). When one says something like “the liar believes that his pants are on fire”, one attributes to the subject (the liar) an attitude (belief) towards a proposition (his pants are on fire). Likewise, when one says something like “the liar imagines that his pants are on fire”, one attributes to the subject (the liar) an attitude (imagination) towards a proposition (his pants are on fire). The similarities and differences between the belief attribution and the imagination attribution point to similarities and differences between imagining and believing.

Imagining and believing are both cognitive attitudes that are representational. They take on the same kind of content: representations that stand in inferential relationship with one another. On the single code hypothesis , it is the sameness of the representational format that grounds functional similarities between imagining and believing (Nichols & Stich 2000, 2003; Nichols 2004a). As for their differences, there are two main options for distinguishing imagining and believing (Sinhababu 2016).

The first option characterizes their difference in normative terms. While belief aims at truth, imagination does not (Humberstone 1992; Shah & Velleman 2005). If the liar did not regard it as true that his pants are on fire, then it seems that he cannot really believe that his pants are on fire. By contrast, even if the liar did not regard it as true that his pants are on fire, he can still imagine that his pants are on fire. While the norm of truth is constitutive of the attitude of belief, it is not constitutive of the attitude of imagination. In dissent, Neil Sinhababu (2013) argues that the norm of truth is neither sufficient nor necessary for distinguishing imagining and believing.

The second option characterizes their difference in functional terms. One purported functional difference between imagination and belief concerns their characteristic connection to actions. If the liar truly believes that his pants are on fire, he will typically attempt to put out the fire by, say, pouring water on himself. By contrast, if the liar merely imagines that his pants are on fire, he will typically do no such thing. While belief outputs to action-generation system, imagination does not (Nichols & Stich 2000, 2003). David Velleman (2000) and Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) point to particular pretense behaviors to challenge this way of distinguishing imagining and believing. Velleman argues that a belief-desire explanation of children’s pretense behaviors makes children “depressingly unchildlike”. Doggett and Egan argue that during immersive episodes, pretense behaviors can be directly motivated by imagination. In response to these challenges, philosophers typically accept that imagination can have a guidance or stage-setting role in motivating behaviors, but reject that it directly outputs to action-generation system (Van Leeuwen 2009; O’Brien 2005; Funkhouser & Spaulding 2009; Everson 2007; Kind 2011; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002).

Another purported functional difference between imagination and belief concerns their characteristic connection to emotions. If the liar truly believes that his pants are on fire, then he will be genuinely afraid of the fire; but not if he merely imagines so. While belief evokes genuine emotions toward real entities, imagination does not (Walton 1978, 1990, 1997; see also related discussion of the paradox of fictional emotions in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts ). This debate is entangled with the controversy concerning the nature of emotions (see the entry on emotion ). In rejecting this purported functional difference, philosophers also typically reject narrow cognitivism about emotions (Nichols 2004a; Meskin & Weinberg 2003; Weinberg & Meskin 2005, 2006; Kind 2011; Spaulding 2015; Carruthers 2003, 2006).

Currently, the consensus is that there exists some important difference between imagining and believing. Yet, there are two distinct departures from this consensus. On the one hand, some philosophers have pointed to novel psychological phenomena in which it is unclear whether imagination or belief is at work—such as delusions (Egan 2008a) and immersed pretense (Schellenberg 2013)—and argued that the best explanation for these phenomena says that imagination and belief exists on a continuum. In responding to the argument from immersed pretense, Shen-yi Liao and Tyler Doggett (2014) argue that a cognitive architecture that collapses distinctive attitudes on the basis of borderline cases is unlikely to be fruitful in explaining psychological phenomena. On the other hand, some philosophers have pointed to familiar psychological phenomena and argued that the best explanation for these phenomena says that imagination is ultimately reducible to belief. Peter Langland-Hassan (2012, 2014) argues that pretense can be explained with only reference to beliefs—specifically, beliefs about counterfactuals. Derek Matravers (2014) argues that engagements with fictions can be explained without references to imaginings.

To desire is to want something to be the case (see the entry on desire ). Standardly, the conative attitude of desire is contrasted with the cognitive attitude of belief in terms of direction of fit: while belief aims to make one’s mental representations match the way the world is, desire aims to make the way the world is match one’s mental representations. Recall that on the single code hypothesis , there exists a cognitive imaginative attitude that is structurally similar to belief. Is there a conative imaginative attitude—call it desire-like imagination (Currie 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2010; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002), make-desire (Currie 1990; Goldman 2006), or i-desire (Doggett & Egan 2007, 2012)—that is structurally similar to desire?

The debates on the relationship between imagination and desire is, not surprisingly, thoroughly entangled with the debates on the relationship between imagination and belief. One impetus for positing a conative imaginative attitude comes from behavior motivation in imaginative contexts. Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) argue that cognitive and conative imagination jointly output to action-generation system, in the same way that belief and desire jointly do. Another impetus for positing a conative imaginative attitude comes from emotions in imaginative contexts (see related discussions of the paradox of fictional emotions and the paradoxes of tragedy and horror in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts ). Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) and Doggett and Egan (2012) argue the best explanation for people’s emotional responses toward non-existent fictional characters call for positing conative imagination. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Currie (2010), and Doggett and Egan (2007) argue that the best explanation for people’s apparently conflicting emotional responses toward tragedy and horror too call for positing conative imagination.

Given the entanglement between the debates, competing explanations of the same phenomena also function as arguments against conative imagination (Nichols 2004a, 2006b; Meskin & Weinberg 2003; Weinberg & Meskin 2005, 2006; Spaulding 2015; Kind 2011; Carruthers 2003, 2006; Funkhouser & Spaulding 2009; Van Leeuwen 2011). In addition, another argument against conative imagination is that its different impetuses call for conflicting functional properties. Amy Kind (2016b) notes a tension between the argument from behavior motivation and the argument from fictional emotions: conative imagination must be connected to action-generation in order for it to explain pretense behaviors, but it must be disconnected from action-generation in order for it to explain fictional emotions. Similarly, Shaun Nichols (2004b) notes a tension between Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) argument from paradox of fictional emotions and argument from paradoxes of tragedy and horror.

To have a (merely) mental image is to have a perception-like experience triggered by something other than the appropriate external stimulus; so, for example, one might have “a picture in the mind’s eye or … a tune running through one’s head” (Strawson 1970: 31) in the absence of any corresponding visual or auditory object or event (see the entry on mental imagery ). While it is propositional imagination that gets compared to belief and desire, it is sensory or imagistic imagination that get compared to perception (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). Although it is possible to form mental images in any of the sensory modalities, the bulk of discussion in both philosophical and psychological contexts has focused on visual imagery.

Broadly, there is agreement on the similarity between mental imagery and perception in phenomenology, which can be explicated as a similarity in content (Nanay 2016b; see, for example, Kind 2001; Nanay 2015; Noordhof 2002). Potential candidates for distinguishing mental imagery and perception include intensity (Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature ; but see Kind 2017), voluntariness (McGinn 2004; Ichikawa 2009), causal relationship with the relevant object (Noordhof 2002); however, no consensus exists on features that clearly distinguish the two, in part because of ongoing debates about perception (see the entries on contents of perception and epistemological problems of perception ).

What is the relationship between imaginings and mental imagery?

Historically, mental imagery is thought to be an essential component of imaginings. Aristotle’s phantasia , which is sometimes translated as imagination, is a faculty that produces images ( De Anima ; see entry on Aristotle’s conception of imagination ; but see Caston 1996). René Descartes ( Meditations on First Philosophy ) and David Hume ( Treatise of Human Nature ) both thought that to imagine just is to hold a mental image, or an impression of perception, in one’s mind. However, George Berkeley’s puzzle of visualizing the unseen ( Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous ) arguably suggests the existence of a non-imagistic hypothetical attitude.

Against the historical orthodoxy, the contemporary tendency is to recognize that there is at least one species of imagination—propositional imagination—that does not require mental imagery. For example, Kendall Walton simply states, “imagining can occur without imagery” (1990: 13). In turn, against this contemporary tendency, Amy Kind (2001) argues that an image-based account can explain three crucial features of imagination—directedness, active nature, and phenomenological character—better than its imageless counterpart. As a partial reconciliation of the two, Peter Langland-Hassan (2015) develops a pluralist position on which there exists a variety of imaginative attitudes, including ones that can take on hybrid contents that are partly propositional and partly sensorily imagistic. (For a nuanced overview of this debate, see Gregory 2016: 103–106.)

Finally, the relationship between mental imagery and perception has potential implications for the connection between imagination and action. The orthodoxy on propositional belief-like imagination holds that imagination does not directly output to action-generation system; rather, the connection between the two is mediated by belief and desire. In contrast, the enactivist program in the philosophy of perception holds that perception can directly output to action-generation system (see, for example, Nanay 2013). Working from the starting point that imagistic imagination is similar to perception in its inclusion of mental imagery, some philosophers have argued for a similar direct connection between imagistic imagination and action-generation system (Langland-Hassan 2015; Nanay 2016a; Van Leeuwen 2011, 2016b). That is, there exist imagery-oriented actions that are analogous to perception-oriented actions. For example, Neil Van Leeuwen (2011) argues that an account of imagination that is imagistically-rich can better explain pretense behaviors than its propositional-imagination-only rivals. Furthermore, Robert Eamon Briscoe (2008, 2018) argues that representations that blend inputs from perception and mental imagery, which he calls “make-perceive”, guide many everyday actions. For example, a sculptor might use a blend of the visual perception of a stone and the mental imagery of different parts of the stone being subtracted to guide their physical manipulation of the stone.

To remember , roughly, is to represent something that is no longer the case. On the standard taxonomy, there are three types of memory. Nondeclarative memory involves mental content that is not consciously accessible, such as one’s memory of how to ride a bike. Semantic declarative memory involves mental content that are propositional and not first-personal, such as one’s memory that Taipei is the capital of Taiwan. Episodic declarative memory involves mental content about one’s own past, such as one’s memory of the birth of one’s child. (See the entry on memory for a detailed discussion of this taxonomy, and especially the criterion of episodicity.) In situating imagination in cognitive architecture, philosophers have typically focused on similarities and differences between imagination and episodic declarative memory.

There are obvious similarities between imagination and memory: both typically involve imagery, both typically concern what is not presently the case, and both frequently involve perspectival representations. Thomas Hobbes ( Leviathan : 2.3) claims that “imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse consideration has diverse names”. In making this bold statement, Hobbes represents an extreme version of continuism, a view on which imagination and memory refer to the same psychological mechanisms.

The orthodoxy on imagination and memory in the history of philosophy, however, is discontinuism, a view on which there are significant differences between imagination and memory, even if there are overlaps in their psychological mechanisms. Some philosophers find the distinction in internalist factors, such as the phenomenological difference between imagining and remembering. Most famously, David Hume sought to distinguish the two in terms of vivacity —“the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination” ( Treatise of Human Nature : 1.3; but see Kind 2017). Others who have adopted a phenomenological criterion include René Descartes, Bertrand Russell, and William James (De Brigard 2017). Other philosophers find the distinction in externalist factors, such as the causal connection that exists between memories and the past that is absent with imagination. Aristotle uses the causal connection criterion to distinguish between imagination and memory ( De Anima 451a2; 451a8–12; see De Brigard 2017). Indeed, nowadays the idea that a causal connection is essential to remembering is accepted as “philosophical common sense” (see the entry on memory ; but see also De Brigard 2014 on memory traces). As such, it is unsurprising that discontinuism remains the orthodoxy. As J. O. Urmson (1967: 83) boldly claims, “One of these universally admitted distinctions is that between memory and imagination”.

In recent years, two sets of findings from cognitive science has given philosophers reasons to push back against discontinuism.

The first set of findings concern distortions and confabulations. The traditional conception of memory is that it functions as an archive: past experiences are encapsulated and stored in the archive, and remembering is just passively retrieving the encapsulated mental content from the archive (Robins 2016). Behavioral psychology has found numerous effects that challenge the empirical adequacy of the archival conception of memory. Perhaps the most well-known is the misinformation effect, which occurs when a subject incorporates inaccurate information into their memory of an event—even inaccurate information that they received after the event (Loftus 1979 [1996]).

The second set of findings concern the psychological underpinnings of “mental time travel”, or the similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future, which is also known as mental time travel (see Schacter et al. 2012 for a review). Using fMRI, neuroscientists have found a striking overlap in the brain activities for remembering the past and imagining the future, which suggest that the two psychological processes utilize the same neural network (see, for example, Addis et al. 2007; Buckner & Carroll 2007; Gilbert & Wilson 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997, 2007). The neuroscientific research is preceded by and corroborated by works from developmental psychology (Atance & O’Neill 2011) and on neurodivergent individuals: for example, the severely amnesic patient KC exhibits deficits with remembering the past and imagining the future (Tulving 1985), and also exhibits deficits with the generation of non-personal fictional narratives (Rosenbaum et al. 2009). Note that, despite the evocative contrast between “remembering the past” and “imagining the future”, it is questionable whether temporality is the central contrast. Indeed, some philosophers and psychologists contend that temporality is orthogonal to the comparison between imagination and memory (De Brigard & Gessell 2016; Schacter et al. 2012).

These two set of findings have given rise to an alternative conception that sees memory as essentially constructive, in which remembering is actively generating mental content that more or less represent the past. The constructive conception of memory is in a better position to explain why memories can contain distortions and confabulations (but see Robins 2016 for complications), and why remembering makes use of the same neural networks as imagining.

In turn, this constructive turn in the psychology and philosophy of memory has revived philosophers’ interest in continuism concerning imagination and memory. Kourken Michaelian (2016) explicitly rejects the causal connection criterion and defends a theory on which remembering, like imagining, centrally involves simulation. Karen Shanton and Alvin Goldman (2010) characterizes remembering as mindreading one’s past self. Felipe De Brigard (2014) characterizes remembering as a special instance of hypothetical thinking. Robert Hopkins (2018) characterizes remembering as a kind of imagining that is controlled by the past. However, the philosophical interpretation of empirical research remain contested; in dissent, Dorothea Debus (2014, 2016) considers the same sets of findings but ultimately concludes that remembering and imagining remain distinct mental kinds.

To suppose is to form a hypothetical mental representation. There exists a highly contentious debate on whether supposition is continuous with imagination, which is also a hypothetical attitude, or whether there are enough differences to make them discontinuous. There are two main options for distinguishing imagination and supposition, by phenomenology and by function.

The phenomenological distinction standardly turns on the notion of vivacity: whereas imaginings are vivid, suppositions are not. Indeed, one often finds in this literature the contrast between “merely supposing” and “vividly imagining”. Although vivacity has been frequently invoked in discussions of imagination, Amy Kind (2017) draws on empirical and theoretical considerations to argue that it is ultimately philosophically untenable. If that is correct, then the attempt to demarcate imagination and supposition by their vivacity is untenable too. More rarely, other phenomenological differences are invoked; for example, Brian Weatherson (2004) contends that “supposing can be coarse in a way that imagining cannot”.


	Variable	Atypical
	Typical	Typical
	Typical	Typical
	Typical	Atypical
	Typical	Variable
	Variable	Atypical
	Typical	Typical
	Typical	Atypical

Table 1. Architectural similarities and differences between imagination and supposition (Weinberg & Meskin 2006).

There have been diverse functional distinctions attributed to the discontinuity between imagination and supposition, but none has gained universal acceptance. Richard Moran (1994) contends that imagination tends to give rise to a wide range of further mental states, including affective responses, whereas supposition does not (see also Arcangeli 2014, 2017). Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000a) contends that while attempting to imagine something like that female infanticide is morally right seems to generate imaginative resistance, supposing it does not (see the discussion on imaginative resistance in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts ). Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) contend that supposition involves only cognitive imagination, but imagination involves both cognitive and conative imagination. Alvin Goldman contends that suppositional imagination involves supposing that particular content obtains (for example, supposing that I am elated) but enactment imagination involves “enacting, or trying to enact, elation itself.” (2006: 47–48, italics omitted). Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) contend that imagination tends to motivate pretense actions, but supposition tends not to. On Jonathan Weinberg and Aaron Meskin (2006)’s synthesis, while there are a few functional similarities, there are many more functional differences between imagination and supposition (Table 1).

There remain ongoing debates about specific alleged functional distinctions, and about whether the functional distinctions are numerous or fundamental enough to warrant discontinuism or not. Indeed, it remains contentious which philosophers count as continuists and which philosophers count as discontinuists (for a few sample taxonomies, see Arcangeli 2017; Balcerak Jackson 2016; Kind 2013).

3. Roles of Imagination

Much of the contemporary discussion of imagination has centered around particular roles that imagination is purported to play in various domains of human understanding and activity. Amongst the most widely-discussed are the role of imagination in understanding other minds ( section 3.1 ), in performing and recognizing pretense ( section 3.2 ), in characterizing psychopathology ( section 3.3 ), in engaging with the arts ( section 3.4 ), in thinking creatively ( section 3.5 ), in acquiring knowledge about possibilities ( section 3.6 ), and in interpreting figurative language ( section 3.7 ).

The variety of roles ascribed to imagination, in turn, provides a guide for discussions on the nature of imagination ( section 1 ) and its place in cognitive architecture ( section 2 ).

Mindreading is the activity of attributing mental states to oneself and to others, and of predicting and explaining behavior on the basis of those attributions. Discussions of mindreading in the 1990s were often framed as debates between “theory theory”—which holds that the attribution of mental states to others is guided by the application of some (tacit) folk psychological theory—and “simulation theory”—which holds that the attribution of mental states is guided by a process of replicating or emulating the target’s (apparent) mental states, perhaps through mechanisms involving the imagination. (Influential collections of papers on this debate include Carruthers & Smith (eds.) 1996; Davies & Stone (eds.) 1995a, 1995b.) In recent years, proponents of both sides have increasingly converged on common ground, allowing that both theory and simulation play some role in the attribution of mental states to others (see Carruthers 2003; Goldman 2006; Nichols & Stich 2003). Many such hybrid accounts include a role for imagination.

On theory theory views, mindreading involves the application of some (tacit) folk psychological theory that allows the subject to make predictions and offer explanations of the target’s beliefs and behaviors. On pure versions of such accounts, imagination plays no special role in the attribution of mental states to others. (For an overview of theory theory, see entry on folk psychology as a theory ).

On simulation theory views, mindreading involves simulating the target’s mental states so as to exploit similarities between the subject’s and target’s processing capacities. It is this simulation that allows the subject to make predictions and offer explanations of the target’s beliefs and behaviors. (For early papers, see Goldman 1989; Gordon 1986; Heal 1986; for recent dissent, see, for example, Carruthers 2009; Gallagher 2007; Saxe 2005, 2009; for an overview of simulation theory, see entry on folk psychology as mental simulation ).

Traditional versions of simulation theory typically describe simulation using expressions such as “imaginatively putting oneself in the other’s place”. How this metaphor is understood depends on the specific account. (A collection of papers exploring various versions of simulation theory can be found in Dokic & Proust (eds.) 2002.) On many accounts, the projection is assumed to involve the subject’s imaginatively running mental processes “off-line” that are directly analogous to those being run “on-line” by the target (for example Goldman 1989). Whereas the “on-line” mental processes are genuine, the “off-line” mental processes are merely imagined. For example, a target that is deciding whether to eat sushi for lunch is running their decision-making processes “on-line”; and a subject that is simulating the target’s decision-making is running the analogous processes “off-line”—in part, by imagining the relevant mental states of the target. Recent empirical work in psychology has explored the accuracy of such projections (Markman, Klein, & Suhr (eds.) 2009, section V; Saxe 2005, 2006, 2009.)

Though classic simulationist accounts have tended to assume that the simulation process is at least in-principle accessible to consciousness, a number of recent simulation-style accounts appeal to neuroscientific evidence suggesting that at least some simulative processes take place completely unconsciously. On such accounts of mindreading, no special role is played by conscious imagination (see Goldman 2009; Saxe 2009.)

Many contemporary views of mindreading are hybrid theory views according to which both theorizing and simulation play a role in the understanding of others’ mental states. Alvin Goldman (2006), for example, argues that while mindreading is primarily the product of simulation, theorizing plays a role in certain cases as well. Many recent discussions have endorsed hybrid views of this sort, with more or less weight given to each of the components in particular cases (see Carruthers 2003; Nichols & Stich 2003.)

A number of philosophers have suggested that the mechanisms underlying subjects’ capacity to engage in mindreading are those that enable engagement in pretense behavior (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Goldman 2006; Nichols & Stich 2003; for an overview of recent discussions, see Carruthers 2009.) According to such accounts, engaging in pretense involves imaginatively taking up perspectives other than one’s own, and the ability to do so skillfully may rely on—and contribute to—one’s ability to understand those alternate perspectives (see the entry on empathy ). Partly in light of these considerations, the relative lack of spontaneous pretense in children with autistic spectrum disorders is taken as evidence for a link between the skills of pretense and empathy.

Pretending is an activity that occurs during diverse circumstances, such as when children make-believe, when criminals deceive, and when thespians act (Langland-Hassan 2014). Although “imagination” and “pretense” have been used interchangeably (Ryle 1949), in this section we will use “imagination” to refer to one’s state of mind, and “pretense” to refer to the one’s actions in the world.

Different theories of pretense disagree fundamentally about what it is to pretend (see Liao & Gendler 2011 for an overview). Consequently, they also disagree about the mental states that enable one to pretend. Metarepresentational theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires the innate mental-state concept pretend (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985; Friedman 2013; Friedman & Leslie 2007; Leslie 1987, 1994). To pretend is to represent one’s own representations under the concept pretend. Behaviorist theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires a process of behaving-as-if (Harris 1994, 2000; Harris & Kavanaugh 1993; Jarrold et al. 1994; Lillard & Flavell 1992; Nichols & Stich 2003; Perner 1991; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano 2004; Stich & Tarzia 2015). Different behaviorist theories explicate behaving-as-if in different ways, but all aim to provide an account of pretense without recourse to the innate mental-state concept pretend.

Philosophical and psychological theories have sought to explain both the performance of pretense and the recognition of pretense, especially concerning evidence from developmental psychology (see Lillard 2001 for an early overview). On the performance side, children on a standard developmental trajectory exhibit early indicators of pretend play around 15 months; engage in explicit prop-oriented play by 24 months; and engage in sophisticated joint pretend play with props by 36 months (Harris 2000; Perner, Baker, & Hutton 1994; Piaget 1945 [1951]). On the recognition side, children on a standard developmental trajectory distinguish pretense and reality via instinctual behavioral cues around 15–18 months; and start to do so via conventional behavioral cues from 36 months on (Friedman et al. 2010; Lillard & Witherington 2004; Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie 2007; Richert and Lillard 2004).

Not surprisingly, the debate between theories of pretense often rest on interpretations of such empirical evidence. For example, Ori Friedman and Alan Leslie (2007) argue that behavioral theories cannot account for the fact that children as young as 15 months old can recognize pretend play and its normativity (Baillargeon, Scott, & He 2010). Specifically, they argue that behavioral theories do not offer straightforward explanations of this early development of pretense recognition, and incorrectly predicts that children systematically mistake other acts of behaving-as-if—such as those that stem from false beliefs—for pretense activities. In response, Stephen Stich and Joshua Tarzia (2015) has acknowledged these problems for earlier behaviorist theories, and developed a new behaviorist theory that purportedly explains the totality of empirical evidence better than metarepresentational rivals. Importantly, Stich and Tarzia argue that their account can better explain Angeline Lillard (1993)’s empirical finding that young children need not attribute a mental concept such as pretend to someone else in order to understand them as pretending.

The debate concerning theories of pretense has implications for the role of imagination in pretense. Behaviorist theories tend to take imagination as essential to explaining pretense performance; metarepresentational theories do not. (However, arguably the innate mental-state concept pretend posited by metarepresentational theories serve similar functions. See Nichols and Stich’s (2000) discussion of the decoupler mechanism, which explicitly draws from Leslie 1987. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) give a broadly behaviorist theory of pretense that does not require imagination.) Specifically, on most behaviorist theories, imagination is essential for guiding elaborations of pretense episodes, especially via behaviors (Picciuto & Carruthers 2016; Stich & Tarzia 2015).

Most recently, Peter Langland-Hassan (2012, 2014) has developed a theory that aims to explain pretense behavior and pretense recognition without appeal to either metarepresentation or imagination. Langland-Hassan argues that pretense behaviors can be adequately explained by beliefs, desires, and intentions—including beliefs in counterfactuals; and that the difference between pretense and sincerity more generally can be adequately characterized in terms of a person’s beliefs, intentions, and desires. While Langland-Hassan does not deny that pretense is in some sense an imaginative activity, he argues that we do not need to posit a sui generis component of the mind to account for it.

Autism and delusions have been—with much controversy—characterized as disorders of imagination. That is, the atypical patterns of cognition and behavior associated with each psychopathology have been argued to result from atypical functions of imagination.

Autism can be characterized in terms of a trio of atypicalities often referred to as “Wing’s triad”: problems in typical social competence, communication, and imagination (Happé 1994; Wing & Gould 1979). The imaginative aspect of autism interacts with other prominent roles of imagination, namely mindreading, pretense, and engagement with the arts (Carruthers 2009). Children with autism do not engage in spontaneous pretend play in the ways that typically-developing children do, engaging instead in repetitive and sometimes obsessional activities; and adults with autism often show little interest in fiction (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano 2005; Happé 1994; Rogers, Cook, & Meryl 2005; Wing & Gould 1979). The degree to which an imaginative deficit is implicated in autism remains a matter of considerable debate. Most radically, Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) have argued that, with respect to Wing’s triad, problems in typical social competence and communication are rooted in an inability to engage in imaginative activities.

Delusions can be characterized as belief-like mental representations that manifest an unusual degree of disconnectedness from reality (Bortolotti & Miyazono 2015). Particularly striking examples would include Capgras and Cotard delusions. In the former, the sufferer takes her friends and family to have been replaced by imposters; in the latter, the sufferer takes himself to be dead. More mundane examples might include ordinary cases of self-deception.

One approach to delusions characterize them as beliefs that are dysfunctional in their content or formation. (For a representative collection of papers that present and criticize this perspective, see Coltheart & Davies (eds.) 2000). However, another approach to delusions characterize them as dysfunctions of imaginings. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 170–175) argue that delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by the subject as the result of an inability to keep track of the sources of one’s thoughts. That is, a delusion is an imagined representation that is misidentified by the subject as a belief. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007) argues that in cases of delusions and self-deceptions, imaginings come to play a role in one’s cognitive architecture similar to that typically played by beliefs. Andy Egan (2008a) likewise argues that the mental states involved in delusions are both belief-like (in their connection to behaviors and inferences) and imagination-like (in their circumscription); however, he argues that these functional similarities suggest the need to posit an in-between attitude called “bimagination”.

3.4 Engagement with the Arts

There is an entrenched historical connection between imagination and the arts. David Hume and Immanuel Kant both invoke imagination centrally in their exploration of aesthetic phenomena (albeit in radically different ways; see entries on Hume’s aesthetics and Kant’s aesthetics ). R.G. Collingwood (1938) defines art as the imaginative expression of feeling (Wiltsher 2018; see entry on Collingwood’s aesthetics ). Roger Scruton (1974) develops a Wittgensteinian account of imagination and accords it a central role in aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment.

In contemporary philosophy, the most prominent theory of imagination’s role in engagement with the arts is presented in Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990). (Although Walton uses “fictions” as a technical term to refer to artworks, his conception of the arts is broad enough to include both high-brow and low-brow; popular and obscure; a variety of specific arts such as poetry and videogames; and—as Stacie Friend (2008) clarifies—both fictive and non-fictive works.) Walton’s core insight is that engagement with the arts is fundamentally similar to children’s games of make-believe. When one engages with an artwork, one uses it as a prop in a make-believe game. As props, artworks generate prescriptions for imaginings. These prescriptions also determine the representational contents of artworks (that is, “fictionality”, or what is true in a fictional world). When one correctly engages with an artwork, then, one imagines the representational contents as prescribed.

Out of all the arts, it is the engagement with narratives that philosophers have explored most closely in conjunction with imagination (see Stock 2013 for an overview). Gregory Currie (1990) offers an influential account of imagination and fiction, and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (1996) discuss literature specifically. Indeed, this research program—despite many criticisms of Walton’s specific theory—remains lively today (see, for example, papers in Nichols (ed.) 2006b). For example, Kathleen Stock (2017) argues that a specific kind of propositional imagination is essential for engagement with fictions. In dissent, Derek Matravers (2014) argues that, contra Walton, imagination is not essential for engagement with fictions.

Philosophers have also done much to articulate the connection between imagination and engagement with music (see the entry on philosophy of music ; see also Trivedi 2011). Some philosophers focus on commonalities between engagement with narratives and engagement with music. For example, even though Walton (1990, 1994a, 1999) acknowledges that fictional worlds of music are much more indeterminate than fictional worlds of narratives, he maintains that the same kind of imagining used in experiencing narratives is also used in experiencing various elements of music, such as imagining continuity between movements and imagining feeling musical tension. Similarly, Andrew Kania (2015) argues that experiencing musical space and movement is imaginative like our experience of fictional narratives. Other philosophers draw parallels between engagement with music and other imaginative activities, namely as understanding other minds ( section 3.1 ) and interpreting metaphor ( section 3.7 ). As an example of the former, Jerrold Levinson (1996) argues that the best explanation of musical expressiveness requires listeners to experience music imaginatively—specifically, imagining a persona expressing emotions through the music. As an example of the latter, Scruton (1997) argues that musical experience is informed by spatial concepts applied metaphorically, and so imaginative perception is necessary for musical understanding (but see Budd 2003 for a criticism; see also De Clercq 2007 and Kania 2015). Stephen Davies (2005, 2011) and Peter Kivy (2002) notably criticize the imaginative accounts of engagement with music on empirical and theoretical grounds.

Other imaginative accounts of engagement with the arts can be found in entries on philosophy of film and philosophy of dance . Indeed, imagination’s aesthetic significance extends beyond the arts; philosophical aestheticians have recognized the role of imagination in appreciating nature (Brady 1998) and in appreciating mundane objects, events, and activities (see the entry on aesthetics of the everyday ).

Philosophers have sought to clarify the role of imagination in engagement with the arts by focusing on a number of puzzles and paradoxes in the vicinity. The puzzle of imaginative resistance explores apparent limitations on what can be imagined during engagements with the arts and, relatedly, what can be made fictional in artworks. The paradox of emotional response to fictions (widely known as “paradox of fiction”) examines psychological and normative similarities between affective responses prompted by imaginings versus affective responses by reality-directed attitudes. The paradox of tragedy and the paradox of horror examine psychological and normative differences between affective responses prompted by imaginings versus affective responses by reality-directed attitudes. Finally, the puzzle of moral persuasion is concerned with real-world outputs of imaginative engagements with artworks; specifically, whether and how artworks can morally educate or corrupt. For more detail on each of these artistic phenomena, see the Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts .

The idea that imagination plays a central role in creative processes can be traced back to Immanuel Kant ( Critique of Pure Reason ), who takes artistic geniuses as paradigmatic examples of creativity. On Kant’s account, when imagination aims at the aesthetic, it is allowed to engage in free play beyond the understanding available to oneself. The unconstrained imagination can thereby take raw materials and produce outputs that transcend concepts that one possesses.

While the precise characterization of creativity remains controversial (see Gaut & Kieran (eds.) 2018; Paul & Kaufman (eds.) 2014), contemporary philosophers typically conceive of it more broadly than Kant did. In addition to creative processes in the aesthetic realm, they also consider creative processes in, for example, “science, craft, business, technology, organizational life and everyday activities” (Gaut 2010: 1034; see also Stokes 2011). As an example, Michael Polanyi (1966) gives imagination a central role in the creative endeavor of scientific discovery, by refining and narrowing the solution space to open-ended scientific problems (see Stokes 2016: 252–256). And, in addition to creative processes of geniuses, contemporary philosophers also consider creative processes of ordinary people.

With this broadened scope, contemporary philosophers have followed Kant’s lead in exploring the role of imagination in creativity (see Stokes 2016 for an overview). Berys Gaut (2003) and Dustin Stokes (2014) argue that two characteristic features of imagination—its lack of aim at truth and its dissociation from action—make it especially suitable for creative processes. Peter Carruthers (2002) argues that the same cognitive resources, including imagination, underlie children’s pretend play and adults’ creative thinking. Specifically, Carruthers hypothesizes that children’s play evolutionarily developed as precursors to and practices for adults’ creative thinking.

There are two points of disagreement regarding the role of imagination in creative processes. First, philosophers disagree about the nature and the strength of the connection between imagination and creativity. Kant takes imagination to be constitutive of creativity: what makes a creative process creative is the involvement of imagination aiming at the aesthetic (see also A. Hills & Bird forthcoming). Gaut and Stokes, by contrast, thinks there is only an imperfect causal connection between imagination and creativity: while imagination is useful for creative processes, there are creative processes that do not involve imagination and there are imaginings that are uncreative (see also Beaney 2005). Second, philosophers disagree about the type of imagination involved in creative processes. By hypothesizing a common evolutionary cause, Carruthers suggests that the same imaginative capacity is involved in pretense and in creativity. By contrast, perhaps echoing Kant’s distinction of productive versus reproductive imagination, Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) sharply distinguish recreative imagination, which is involved in pretense and mindreading, from creative imagination.

Imagination plays a role in the acquisition of knowledge. Many philosophical arguments call on imagination when they appeal to metaphysical modal knowledge (see the entry on epistemology of modality ; the papers collected in Gendler & Hawthorne (eds.) 2002; and Kung 2016 and Strohminger & Yli-Vakkuri 2017 for overviews). The kind of thought experiments that are regularly used in scientific theorizing is also plausibly premised on imaginative capacities (see the entry on thought experiments ). As already discussed, people use imagination to understand the perspectives of others ( section 3.1 ). Moreover, people often make decisions via thinking about counterfactuals, or what would happen if things had been different from how they in fact are (see the entries on causation and counterfactual conditionals ). However, the phenomenon of transformative experience has recently called into question which kind of imaginary scenarios are truly epistemically accessible. (For a representative collection of papers that explore different epistemic roles of imagination, see Kind & Kung (eds.) 2016a.)

Broadly speaking, thought experiments use imaginary scenarios to elicit responses that (ideally) grant people knowledge of possibilities. A special, but prominent, type of thought experiment in philosophy concerns the link between imagination, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility. René Descartes famously offered a modal argument in the Sixth Meditation , reasoning from the fact that he could clearly and distinctly conceive of his mind and body as distinct to the real distinctness between them. The current prevalence of similar modal arguments can be verified by entries on zombies and dualism . These modal arguments all rely, in some way, on the idea that what one can imagine functions as a fallible and defeasible guide to what is really possible in the broadest sense.

Pessimists, notably Peter Van Inwagen (1998: 70), doubt that imagination can give us an accurate understanding of scenarios that are “remote from the practical business of everyday life”, such as those called upon in philosophical modal arguments. Optimists typically take it as a given that there is some connection between imagination and metaphysical modal knowledge, but focus on understanding where the connection is imperfect, such as when one (apparently) imagines the impossible. To just give a few examples, Saul Kripke (1972 [1980]), Stephen Yablo (1993), David Chalmers (2002), Dominic Gregory (2004), Timothy Williamson (2007, 2016), Peter Kung (2010), and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2018) have each developed a distinctive approach to this task. For example, Kripke adopts a redescription approach to modeling (some) modal errors: in some cases where one is apparently imagining the impossible, one is in fact imagining a possible scenario but misconstruing it as an impossible one. On this diagnosis, in such cases, the error resides not with imaginative capacities, but with the capacity to describe one’s own imaginings.

Other thought experiments are scoped more narrowly; for example, scientific thought experiments are intended to allow people to explore nomic possibilities. Galileo ( On Motion ) famously offered a thought experiment that disproved Aristotle’s theory of motion, which predicts that heavier objects fall more quickly. In this thought experiment, Galileo asked people to imagine the falling of a composite of a light and heavy object versus the falling of the heavy object alone. When one runs the thought experiment—that is, when one elaborates on the starting point of this imaginary scenario—one notices an incoherence in Aristotle’s theory: on the one hand, it should predict that the composite would fall more slowly because the light object would slow down the heavy object; on the other hand, it should also predict that the composite would fall more quickly because the composite is heavier than the heavy object alone. While it is incontrovertible that imagination is central to thought experiments, debates remain on whether imagination can be invoked in the context of justification (Gendler 2000b; Williamson 2016) or only in the context of discovery (Norton 1991, 1996; Spaulding 2016).

The role of imagination in counterfactual reasoning—and, in particular, the question of what tends to be held constant when one contemplates counterfactual scenarios—has been explored in detail in recent philosophical and psychological works (Byrne 2005; Williamson 2005, 2007, 2016). Williamson suggests that

When we work out what would have happened if such-and-such had been the case, we frequently cannot do it without imagining such-and-such to be the case and letting things run. (2005: 19)

It is imagination that lets one move from counterfactuals’ antecedents to their consequents. Williamson (2016) argues that our imaginings have evolved to be suitably constrained, such that such counterfactual reasoning can confer knowledge. Indeed, he argues that if one were to be skeptical about gaining knowledge from such a hypothetical reasoning process, then one would be forced to be (implausibly) skeptical about much of ordinary reasoning about actuality. Developing an idea anticipated by Williamson (2007), Margot Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (forthcoming) argue that the same imaginative mechanisms that capable of producing metaphysical modal knowledge are also capable of producing knowledge of other restricted modalities, such as nomic and practical modality. In parallel, Amy Kind (2016c, 2018) argues that imaginings can confer knowledge when they are guided by reality-sensitive constraints, in a manner akin to computer simulations.

Thinking about counterfactuals is just one way that imagination can factor into mundane decision-making. Neil Van Leeuwen (2011, 2016a, 2016b) and Bence Nanay (2016a) have recently started to elaborate on the connection between imagination and actions via decision-making. Although neither authors focus on the epistemic status of imagination, their accounts of decision-making seem to suggest that imagination is used to gain practical knowledge about the probability and value of actions’ possible outcomes.

At the same time, the recently prominent discussion of transformative experiences calls into question the extent to which imagination can be epistemically useful for making life-altering decisions. L.A. Paul (2014, 2015, 2018; see also Jackson 1982, 1986; D. Lewis 1988) argues that some types of knowledge—especially de se knowledge concerning one’s values—are inaccessible by imaginings; only actual experiences can confer these types of knowledge. For example, one cannot really know whether one wants to become a parent without experiencing being a parent because parenthood itself can transform one’s values. If one cannot reasonably imagine oneself with radically different values, then plausibly one cannot appropriately imagine the values associated with the outcomes of one’s actions. As such, despite their epistemic worth in ordinary contexts, imaginings might not help in making life-altering decisions.

Finally, imagination might play a role in interpreting figurative language. The exact role ascribed to imagination varies greatly from theory to theory. In part, this variation arose from a longstanding debate in philosophy of language concerning the divide between literal and figurative language: while some imaginative theories of figurative language (such as Walton 1990) accept a strong divide, others (such as Lepore & Stone 2015) reject it. Although this controversy cannot be avoided entirely, it is worth reiterating that the present aim is only to highlight the possible role(s) that imagination might play in the psychology of irony, metaphor, and nearby linguistic phenomena.

Despite immense differences between them, numerous theories of irony have converged on the idea that interpreting irony involves imagination. Kendall Walton (1990) treats ironic and metaphoric speech as props in momentary games of make-believe. On Walton’s theory, imagination is central to understanding and interpreting such figurative speech. Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig (1984) and Gregory Currie (2006) connect irony to pretense, but without further linking all cases of pretense to imaginative capacities. Elisabeth Camp (2012) similarly endorses a role for pretense in the interpretation of irony and the related case of sarcasm. Finally, this idea that interpreting irony involves imagination is corroborated by psychological research: irony recognition is difficult for neurodivergent individuals who lack imaginative capacities (Happé 1991)—specifically, in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome, who have deficits with meta-representation—and in individuals with schizophrenia, who have deficits with theory-of-mind (Langdon et al. 2002).

Again, despite immense differences between them, numerous theories of metaphor have also converged on the idea that interpreting metaphor involves imagination (see the entry on metaphor ). The first family of theories focus on imagination’s role in pretense. As mentioned earlier, Walton (1990) takes metaphors to be props in momentary games of make-believe. Walton (1993, 2000) and David Hills (1997) further develop this idea. (Importantly, Walton (1993) notes that interpretation of a metaphor may not involve actual imaginings, but only the recognition of the type of imaginings prescribed.) Andy Egan (2008b) extends the idea to account for idioms. These theories remain controversial: in particular, Camp (2009) and Catherine Wearing (2011) have offered forceful criticisms. The second family of theories focus on imagination’s role in providing novel perspectives. While Camp (2009) criticizes the first family of theories, she also acknowledges a role for imagination. On her account, pretense and metaphor typically involve distinct types of imaginings: pretense-imaginings allow one to access counterfactual content, but metaphor-imaginings allow one to re-interpret actual content from a novel perspective. Indeed Camp (2007) argues that the kind of imagination involved in interpreting metaphors is also used to interpret similes and juxtapositions. The third family of theories focus on imagination’s role in providing mental images. Paul Ricoeur (1978), Richard Moran (1989), and Robyn Carston (2010) all propose theories on which mental imagery plays an important role in processing metaphors. Outside of philosophy of language, James Grant (2011) argues that metaphors are prevalent in art criticism because they prompt readers’ imaginings.

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Wiltsher, Nick, 2018, “Feeling, Emotion, and Imagination: In Defence of Collingwood’s Expression Theory of Art”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy , 26(4): 759–781. doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1379001
–––, forthcoming, “Imagination: A Lens, Not a Mirror”, Philosophers’ Imprint .
Wing, Lorna and Judith Gould, 1979, “Severe Impairments of Social Interaction and Associated Abnormalities in Children: Epidemeology and Classification”, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders , 9(1): 11–29. doi:10.1007/BF01531288
Wollheim, Richard, 1973, “Imagination and Identification”, in On Art and the Mind , London: Allen Land, pp. 54–83.
Yablo, Stephen, 1993, “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 53(1): 1–42. doi:10.2307/2108052
Yablo, Stephen, 2002, “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2002: 441–492.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

The Junkyard , a scholarly blog on imagination
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Imagery and Imagination
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Imagination
PhilPapers collection of papers on Imagination

Acknowledgments

No one can have an encyclopedic knowledge on a topic as vast as imagination. The previous iteration of the entry could not have existed without the help of Paul Bloom, David Chalmers, Gregory Currie, Tyler Doggett, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Shaun Nichols, Zoltán Gendler Szabó, Jonathan Weinberg, Ed Zalta, an anonymous referee, and—most of all—Aaron Norby. This iteration of the entry could not exist without the help of Tyler Doggett, Elisabeth Camp, Felipe De Brigard, Anna Ichino, Andrew Kania, Amy Kind, Peter Langland-Hassan, Aaron Meskin, Kengo Miyazono, Eric Peterson, Mark Phelan, Dustin Stokes, Margot Strohminger, Mike Stuart, Neil Van Leeuwen, Jonathan Weinberg, Nick Wiltsher, and two anonymous referees.

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Imagination refers to the ability to create, modify, or represent mental images and ideas. Essays on imagination could delve into the cognitive, psychological, and social dimensions of imagination, the role of imagination in creativity, problem-solving, and innovation, or the distinction between imagination and other mental processes like perception and memory. They might also explore the cultivation of imagination in education and personal development, the representation of imagination in literature and art, or the philosophical and ethical inquiries surrounding imagination. A substantial compilation of free essay instances related to Imagination you can find in Papersowl database. You can use our samples for inspiration to write your own essay, research paper, or just to explore a new topic for yourself.

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What Is Sociological Imagination: Definition & Examples

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The term sociological imagination describes the type of insight offered by sociology; connecting the problems of individuals to that of broader society.
C. Wright Mills, the originator of the term, contended that both sociologists and non-academics can develop a deep understanding of how the events of their own lives (their biography) relate to the history of their society. He outlined a list of methods through which both groups could do so.
Mills believed that American society suffered from the fundamental problems of alienation, moral insensibility, threats to democracy, threats to human freedom, and conflict between bureaucratic rationality and human reason, and that the development of the sociological imagination could counter these.

What is Sociological Imagination?

Sociological imagination, an idea that first emerged in C. Wright Mills’ book of the same name, is the ability to connect one’s personal challenges to larger social issues.

The sociological imagination is the ability to link the experience of individuals to the social processes and structures of the wider world.

It is this ability to examine the ways that individuals construct the social world and how the social world and how the social world impinges on the lives of individuals, which is the heart of the sociological enterprise.

This ability can be thought of as a framework for understanding social reality, and describes how sociology is relevant not just to sociologists, but to those seeking to understand and build empathy for the conditions of daily life.

When the sociological imagination is underdeveloped or absent in large groups of individuals for any number of reasons, Mills believed that fundamental social issues resulted.

Sociological Imagination Theory

C. Wright Mills established the concept of sociological imagination in the 20th century.

Mills believed that: “Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both” the daily lives of society’s members and the history of a society and its issues.

He referred to the problems that occur in everyday life, or biography, as troubles and the problems that occur in society, or history, as issues.

Mills ultimately created a framework intended to help individuals realize the relationship between personal experiences and greater society (Elwell, 2002).

Before Mill, sociologists tended to focus on understanding how sociological systems worked, rather than exploring individual issues. Mills, however, pointed out that these sociologists, functionalists chief among them, ignored the role of the individual within these systems.

In essence, Mills claimed in his book, The Sociological Imagination , that research had come to be guided more by the requirements of administrative concerns than by intellectual ones.

He critiqued sociology for focusing on accumulating facts that only served to facilitate the administrative decisions of, for example, governments.

Mills believed that, to truly fulfill the promise of social science, sociologists and laypeople alike had to focus on substantial, society-wide problems, and relate those problems to the structural and historical features of the society and culture that they navigated (Elwell, 2002).

Mills’ Guidelines for Social Scientists

In the appendix of The Sociological Imagination, Mills set forth several guidelines that would lead to “intellectual craftsmanship.” These are, paraphrased (Mills, 2000; Ellwell, 2002):

Scholars should not split work from life, because both work and life are in unity.

Scholars should keep a file, or a collection, of their own personal, professional, and intellectual experiences.

Scholars should engage in a continual review of their thoughts and experiences.

Scholars may find a truly bad sociological book to be as intellectually stimulating and conducive to thinking as a good one.

Scholars must have an attitude of playfulness toward phrases, words, and ideas, as well as a fierce drive to make sense of the world.

The sociological imagination is stimulated when someone assumes a willingness to view the world from the perspective of others.

Sociological investigators should not be afraid, in the preliminary and speculative stages of their research, to think in terms of imaginative extremes, and,

Scholars should not hesitate to express ideas in language that is as simple and direct as possible. Ideas are affected by how they are expressed. When sociological perspectives are expressed in deadening language, they create a deadened sociological imagination.

Mills’ Original Social Problems

Mills identified five main social problems in American society: alienation , moral insensibility, threats to democracy, threats to human freedom, and the conflict between bureaucratic rationality and human reason (Elwell, 2015).

1. Threats to Democracy and Freedom

The end result of these problems of alienation, political indifference, and the economic and political concentration of power, according to Mills, is a serious threat to democracy and freedom.

He believed that, as bureaucratic organizations became large and more centralized, more and more power would be placed into the hands of a small elite (Elwell, 2006).

2. Alienation

Mills believed that alienation is deeply rooted in how work itself works in society; however, unlike Marx, C. Wright Mills does not attribute alienation solely to the means of production, but to the modern division of labor .

Mills observed that, on the whole, jobs are broken up into simple, functional tasks with strict standards. Machines or unskilled workers take over the most tedious tasks (Elwell, 2002).

As the office was automated, Mills argued, authority and job autonomy became the attributes of only those highest in the work hierarchy. Most workers are discouraged from using their own judgment, and their decision-making forces them to comply with the strict rules handed down by others.

In this loss of autonomy, the average worker becomes alienated from their intellectual capacities and work becomes an enforced chore (Elwell, 2015).

3. Moral Insensibility

The second major problem that C. Wright Mills identified in modern American society was that of moral insensibility. He pointed out that, as people had lost faith in their leaders in government, religion, and the workplace, they became apathetic.

He considered this apathy a “spiritual condition” that underlined many problems — namely, moral insensibility. As a result of moral insensibility, people within society accept atrocities, such as genocide, committed by their leaders.

Mills considered the source of cruelty to be moral insensibility and, ultimately, the underdevelopment of the sociological imagination (Elwell, 2002).

4. Personal Troubles

Personal troubles are the issues that people experience within their own character, and in their immediate relationships with others. Mills believed that people function in their personal lives as actors and actresses who make choices about friends, family, groups, work, school, and other issues within their control.

As a result, people have some issue on the outcomes of events on a personal level. For example, an individual employee who spends most of his work time browsing social media or online shopping may lose their job. This is a personal problem.

However, hundreds of thousands of employees being laid-off en masse constitutes a larger social issue (Mills, 2000).

5. Social and Public Issues

Social and public issues, meanwhile, are beyond one”s personal control. These issues pertain to the organization and processes of society, rather than individuals. For example, universities may, as a whole, overcharge students for their education.

This may be the result of decades of competition and investment into each school”s administration and facilities, as well as the narrowing opportunities for those without a college degree.

In this situation, it becomes impossible for large segments of the population to get a tertiary education without accruing large and often debilitating amounts of debt (Mills, 2000).

The sociological imagination allows sociologists to distinguish between the personal and sociological aspects of problems in the lives of everyone.

Most personal problems are not exclusively personal issues; instead, they are influenced and affected by a variety of social norms, habits, and expectations. Indeed, there is often confusion as to what differentiates personal problems and social issues (Hironimus-Wendt & Wallace, 2009).

For example, a heroin addiction may be blamed on the reckless and impulsive choices of an addict. However, this approach fails to account for the societal factors and history that led to high rates of heroin addiction, such as the over-prescribing of opiate painkillers by doctors and the dysregulation of pharmaceutical companies in the United States.

Sociological imagination is useful for both sociologists and those encountering problems in their everyday lives. When people lack in sociological imagination, they become vulnerable to apathy: considering the beliefs, actions, and traditions around them to be natural and unavoidable.

This can cause moral insensitivity and ultimately the commitment of cruel and unjust acts by those guided not by their own consciousness, but the commands of an external body (Hironimus-Wendt & Wallace, 2009).

Fast Fashion

Say that someone is buying themselves a new shirt. Usually, the person buying the shirt would be concerned about their need for new clothing and factors such as the price, fabric, color, and cut of the shirt.

At a deeper level, the personal problem of buying a shirt may provoke someone to ask themselves what they are buying the shirt for, where they would wear it, and why they would participate in an activity where they would wear the shirt over instead of some other activity.

People answer these questions on a personal level through considering a number of different factors. For example, someone may think about how much they make, and how much they can budget for clothing, the stores available in the community, and the styles popular in one”s area (Joy et al., 2012).

On a larger level, however, the questions and answers to the question of what shirt to buy — or even if to buy a shirt at all — would differ if someone were provided a different context and circumstances.

For example, if someone had come into a sudden sum of wealth, they may choose to buy an expensive designer shirt or quit the job that required them to buy the shirt altogether. If someone had lived in a community with many consignment shops, they may be less likely to buy a new shirt and more likely to buy one that was pre-owned.

If there were a cultural dictate that required people to, say, cover their shoulders or breasts — or the opposite, someone may buy a more or less revealing shirt.

On an even higher level, buying a shirt also represents an opportunity to connect the consumption habits of individuals and groups to larger issues.

The lack of proximity of communities to used-clothing stores on a massive scale may encourage excessive consumption, leading to environmental waste in pollution. The competition between retailers to provide the cheapest and most fashionable shirts possible results in, as many have explored, the exploitation of garment workers in exporting countries and large amounts of co2 output due to shipping.

Although an individual can be blamed or not blamed for buying a shirt made more or less sustainably or ethically, a discussion of why an individual bought a certain shirt cannot be complete without a consideration of the larger factors that influence their buying patterns (Joy et al., 2012).

The “Global Economic Crisis”

Dinerstein, Schwartz, and Taylor (2014) used the 2008 economic crisis as a case study of the concept of sociological imagination, and how sociology and other social sciences had failed to adequately understand the crisis.

The 2008 global economic crisis led to millions of people around the world losing their jobs. On the smallest level, individuals were unable to sustain their lifestyles.

Someone who was laid off due to the economic downturn may have become unable to make their mortgage or car payments, leading to a bank foreclosing their house or repossessing their car.

This person may also be unable to afford groceries, need to turn to a food bank, or have credit card debt to feed themselves and their families. As a result, this person may damage their credit score, restricting them from, say, taking out a home ownership loan in the future.

The sociological imagination also examines issues like the great recession at a level beyond these personal problems. For example, a sociologist may look at how the crisis resulted from the accessibility of and increasing pressure to buy large and normally unaffordable homes in the United States.

Some sociologists, Dinerstein, Schwartz, and Taylor among them, even looked at the economic crisis as unveiling the social issue of how academics do sociology. For example, Dinerstein, Schwatz, and Taylor point out that the lived experience of the global economic crisis operated under gendered and racialized dynamics.

Many female immigrant domestic laborers, for example, lost their jobs in Europe and North America as a result of the crisis.

While the things that sociologists had been studying about these populations up until that point — migration and return — are significant, the crisis brought a renewed focus in sociology into investigating how the negative effects of neoliberal globalization and the multiple crises already impacting residents of the global South compound during recessions (Spitzer & Piper, 2014).

Bhambra, G. (2007). Rethinking modernity: Postcolonialism and the sociological imagination . Springer.

Dinerstein, A. C., Schwartz, G., & Taylor, G. (2014). Sociological imagination as social critique: Interrogating the ‘global economic crisis’. Sociology, 48 (5), 859-868.

Elwell, F. W. (2002). The Sociology of C. Wright Mills .

Elwell, F. W. (2015). Macrosociology: four modern theorists . Routledge.

Hironimus-Wendt, R. J., & Wallace, L. E. (2009). The sociological imagination and social responsibility. Teaching Sociology, 37 (1), 76-88.

Joy, A., Sherry Jr, J. F., Venkatesh, A., Wang, J., & Chan, R. (2012). Fast fashion, sustainability, and the ethical appeal of luxury brands. Fashion theory, 16 (3), 273-295.

Mills, C. W. (2000). The sociological imagination . Oxford University Press.

Spitzer, D. L., & Piper, N. (2014). Retrenched and returned: Filipino migrant workers during times of crisis. Sociology, 48 (5), 1007-1023.

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What is Environmental Imagination?

Poems, stories, and essays are not written in a vacuum; they arise from the imaginations of writers who are imprinted and influenced by specifics of place and landscape–by history, geography, geology, biology, and ecology, among others. And the texts that writers create are also situated in and imprinted by particular bio-regions and multiple environments, often subtle and complex.

Where would William Faulkner have been without Yoknapatawpha County, or Wallace Stegner have been without the American West, the Big Rock Candy Mountain? Where would Janisse Ray be without the rural southern Georgia bio-region of her childhood, or Annie Proulx be without the austere landscapes of Newfoundland and Wyoming from which to draw stories?

Through creative writing workshops, study in literature courses, cross-disciplinary environmental coursework in disciplines other than English, self-designed fieldwork experiences, and intensive thesis work with a major professor, writers in the MFA Program in Creative Writing and Environment will learn to develop and cultivate an eco-centric aesthetic in their writing. The result is writing that is rich in specifics, subject matter, and imaginative content.

To begin considering how we, as writers, might come to a greater awareness of the environmental underpinnings and ecological considerations of the texts we create, we can begin with Lawrence Buell’s succinct phrase, “the environmental imagination.” In his ground-breaking work, The Environmental Imagination , Buell outlines what he believes to be the four earmarks of an environmental text:

The nonhuman environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a presence that begins to suggest that human history is implicated in natural history;
The human interest is not understood to be the only legitimate interest;
Human accountability to the environment is part of the text’s ethical orientation; and
Some sense of the environment as a process rather than as a constant or a given is at least implicit in the text.

Environmental journals and magazines

Canary Online
Ecotone: Reimagining Place
Flyway: Journal of Writing and Environment
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ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment
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Terrain.org: A Journal of the Built & Natural Environments

Announcing the Visiting Writers Series, Fall 2024

DATE: August 16, 2024

Immediate Release

Contact: Ryan Mihaly, @email

413-545-8724

UMass MFA for Poets & Writers Presents Fall ‘24 Visiting Writers Series

Celebrating 61 years of free public readings

Amherst, MA – The UMass MFA for Poets and Writers is pleased to announce the Fall ‘24 Visiting Writers Series. This year’s series features Hanif Abdurraqib, Rae Armantrout, Tongo Eisen-Martin, and Yuri Herrera with translator Lisa Dillman . Readings are free, open to the public and will be held in the Old Chapel’s Great Hall. All events begin at 6PM.

Celebrating its sixty-first year, the nationally renowned Visiting Writers Series at UMass Amherst presents emerging and established writers of poetry, fiction and nonfiction. The series is sponsored by the MFA for Poets and Writers and the Juniper Initiative for Literary Arts and Action, and is made possible with support from the Massachusetts Cultural Council, the University of Massachusetts Arts Council, the Massachusetts Review, and the English Department. In addition, funding for the December 6 reading featuring Yuri Herrera and Lisa Dillman is underwritten, in part, by the Chancellor’s Community, Democracy, and Dialogue working group.

Tongo Eisen-Martin | September 19, 2024, 6pm

Tongo Eisen-Martin is the Poet Laureate of San Francisco, California. He is the author of Heaven Is All Goodbyes (City Lights Books, 2017), which was shortlisted for the Griffin International Poetry Prize, received the California Book Award for Poetry, an American Book Award, and a PEN Oakland Book Award. He is also the author of someone's dead already (Bootstrap Press, 2015). Blood on the Fog , his newest collection of poems, was published as volume 62 in the City Lights Pocket Poets Series in September 2021.

In their citation, the judges for the Griffin Prize wrote that Eisen-Martin’s work “moves between trenchant political critique and dreamlike association, demonstrating how, in the right hands, one mode might energize the other—keeping alternative orders of meaning alive in the face of radical injustice ... His poems are places where discourses and vernaculars collide and recombine into new configurations capable of expressing outrage and sorrow and love.”

Eisen-Martin is also an educator and organizer whose work centers on issues of mass incarceration, extrajudicial killings of Black people, and human rights. He has taught at detention centers around the country and at the Institute for Research in African-American Studies at Columbia University. He lives in San Francisco.

Hanif Abdurraqib | October 24, 2024, 6pm

Hanif Abdurraqib is a poet, essayist, and cultural critic from Columbus, Ohio. His poetry has been published in Muzzle , Vinyl , PEN American , and other journals. His essays and music criticism have been published in The FADER , Pitchfork , The New Yorker , and The New York Times . His first full length poetry collection, The Crown Ain't Worth Much , was released in June 2016 from Button Poetry. It was named a finalist for the Eric Hoffer Book Prize, and was nominated for a Hurston-Wright Legacy Award. With Big Lucks, he released a limited edition chapbook, Vintage Sadness , in summer 2017 (you cannot get it anymore and he is very sorry.) His first collection of essays, They Can't Kill Us Until They Kill Us , was released in winter 2017 by Two Dollar Radio and was named a book of the year by Buzzfeed, Esquire, NPR, Oprah Magazine, Paste, CBC, The Los Angeles Review, Pitchfork , and The Chicago Tribune , among others. He released Go Ahead In The Rain: Notes To A Tribe Called Quest with University of Texas press in February 2019. The book became a New York Times Bestseller, was a finalist for the Kirkus Prize, and was long-listed for the National Book Award. His second collection of poems, A Fortune For Your Disaster , was released in 2019 by Tin House, and won the 2020 Lenore Marshall Prize. In 2021, he released the book A Little Devil In America with Random House, which was a finalist for the National Book Award, the National Book Critics Circle Award, and the The PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award for the Art of the Essay. The book won the 2022 Andrew Carnegie Medal for Excellence in Nonfiction and the Gordon Burn Prize. His newest book is There's Always This Year: On Basketball and Ascension with Random House. Hanif is a graduate of Beechcroft High School.

Rae Armantrout | November 14, 2024, 6pm

Rae Armantrout has fifteen previous books including Versed, which received a Pulitzer Prize, a National Book Award, and a National Book Critics Circle Award; Finalists ; Conjure ; Wobble (finalist for a National Book Award); Partly: New and Selected Poems ; Itself ; Just Saying ; and Money Shot . Armantrout is Professor Emerita of Writing at the University of California at San Diego. She has been published in many anthologies, including, The Oxford Book of American Poetry , and Scribner's Best American Poetry , and in such magazines as, Harpers, The New Yorker, American Poetry Review, Boston Review, Scientific American, Chicago Review, and the Los Angeles Times Book Review.

Yuri Herrera & Lisa Dillman | December 5, 2024

Born in Actopan, Mexico, Yuri Herrera is the author of three novels, including Signs Preceding the End of the World , as well as the collection Ten Planets , which was a finalist for the Ursula K. Le Guin Prize. His first novel Trabajos del reino (in English: Kingdom Cons ) won the Premio Binacional de Novela Joven 2003 and received the “Otras voces, otros ámbitos” prize for the best novel published in Spain in 2008. His second novel, Señales que precederán al fin del mundo ( Signs Preceding the End of the World ) was a finalist of the Rómulo Gallegos Prize. His third novel is La transmigración de los cuerpos ( Transmigration of Bodies ). All of these novels have been translated into English by Lisa Dillman for British publisher And Other Stories. In 2016, he and Dillman shared the Best Translated Book Award for Signs Preceding the End of the World. Herrera teaches at Tulane University in New Orleans.

Lisa Dillman has translated a number of Spanish and Latin American writers. Some of her recent translations include Rain Over Madrid , Such Small Hands and The Right Intention by Andrés Barba and Yuri Herrera’s novels. She won the 2016 Best Translated Book Award for Herrera’s Signs Preceding the End of the World . She teaches in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia.

The Visiting Writers Series is an annual event by the UMass MFA for Poets and Writers bringing literary artists from around the world to western Massachusetts with free and public programming. The voice of the writer brings ideas and rhythms of language to life, inspiring listeners through intellectual engagement, imagination, and possibility. By showcasing a variety of aesthetics, perspectives, genres, forms, and performance styles the series provides audience members with unique opportunities to experience contemporary literary art.

Author/translator photos are available here: VWS Photos 2024

For more information: Ryan Mihaly, @email

E445 South College 150 Hicks Way Amherst, MA 01003 (413) 545-5456

Supported by

Here Are the Olympic Moments We Won’t Forget

It doesn’t take a medal to make a lasting memory.

Share full article

Simone Biles and Sunisa Lee running onto a gymnastics floor carrying an American flag as their teammates, Jordan Chiles, Hezly Rivera and Jade Carey, stand in the background.

By The New York Times

Success and failure. Exhilaration and agony. Gold, silver and bronze.

The Olympics will always turn on who won and who lost, how high and how fast and how far. But they linger in our minds long after they end for moments that might have little to do with the actual competitions.

Jordan Chiles and Simone Biles came up with the plan. They had both wanted to be on the top step of the medal stand after the final event of the women’s gymnastics competition, the floor exercise. But Biles, the favorite, had made a few mistakes, and Chiles had made a few more, so they instead became bookends to the true headliner: Rebeca Andrade of Brazil. And so a plan was hatched.

After Chiles accepted her bronze medal ( temporarily, it turned out ) and Biles her silver, Andrade was introduced as the Olympic champion. As she approached the podium — completing the first all-Black podium in Olympic gymnastics history — Biles and Chiles turned to Andrade, dropped to one knee and bowed. Afterward, they called her a queen. — JULIET MACUR

More Cowbell

After Bobby Finke won the 1,500-meter freestyle in world-record time — preserving American men’s 120-year streak of winning at least one individual swimming gold at the Olympic Games — the NBC cameras panned to a particularly excited fan. She screamed. She pumped her fists. She clanged her cowbell.

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