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The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know

By Alyssa Ayres , CFR Expert

June 18, 2020 3:20 pm (EST)

China and India’s border dispute turned deadly for the first time in more than four decades. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s response will be critical to de-escalation.

Thousands of Chinese and Indian troops have been in a standoff in the Ladakh region high in the Himalayas since early May. After reaching an agreement to de-escalate on June 6 , the mutual withdrawal of troops from the Galwan Valley went dramatically wrong on June 15, with Indian army officials reporting clashes that resulted in twenty deaths . China’s government and media have not provided casualty figures for Chinese troops, but unconfirmed Indian media reports indicated that more than forty died.

Speaking by phone on June 17, both the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers agreed to avoid actions that might escalate the conflict. The same day, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized in a TV address that “India wants peace. But on provocation, India will give a befitting reply.”

Why are Chinese and Indian troops there in the first place?

Wars and Conflict

Narendra Modi

Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border [PDF] is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962. The border, or Line of Actual Control , is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “ transgressions .” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.

A soldier stands on a pile of rocks in a mountainous region along the China-India border.

The Ladakh region is especially complex, with particularly unusual features. First, there is Aksai Chin , a territory that India has long claimed but China occupies. China began building a road through the area in 1956—linking Tibet to Xinjiang—and has occupied it since 1962. There is also territory that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963. Surveying and mapping the region’s terrain historically proved immensely challenging. A forthcoming history of the Ladakh region points out how colonial-era efforts to survey this area using natural features such as watersheds as focal points did not always align with cartographic needs for precision, and, importantly, ideas of where a country’s territory begins and ends.

Why have tensions escalated now?

There’s no clear reason why tensions have escalated now to their worst in decades—with the first fatalities in forty-five years. And New Delhi and Beijing hold very different views of what happened the night of June 15. India pointed to “premeditated” Chinese action that “reflected an intent to change the facts on the ground in violation of all our agreements to not change the status quo.” China said that “Indian frontline border forces openly broke the consensus reached.”

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Explanations circulating in the Indian and international media cover a broad range: China was unhappy with India’s actions in August 2019 to end Jammu and Kashmir’s traditional autonomy, one result of which was the creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh ; China saw India’s recent road construction work in the area as a change to the status quo and a challenge to its strategic position; China dislikes India drawing closer to the United States and its allies in Asia; China seeks to distract attention from its part in the global pandemic; and the frank appraisal that India’s growing military imbalance with China, and China’s “political will” to deploy its might under President Xi Jinping, is the real difference.

What are the prospects for a peaceful resolution?

China’s moves are hard to gauge, and as many scholars have noted , India’s options are limited. Modi said in his June 17 address that India’s “sovereignty is supreme,” indicating that accepting a territorial shift in China’s favor likely will not be his next step. But looking for conflict at a time of economic downturn and still-rising coronavirus cases is not a good option, either. New Delhi will likely assess other nonmilitary policy options. The blanket calls to boycott Chinese products have gained some mass appeal in India, but the government may take further steps, such as increasing scrutiny on inbound investment from China, similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review process. India recently announced review procedures for foreign investment from “neighboring” countries, and this net could expand further. China is a source of investment [PDF] in some of India’s top start-ups. And press reports have already identified forthcoming restrictions on Chinese equipment in India’s large and growing telecom sector, including a likely ban on Chinese companies’ involvement in building 5G infrastructure.

Despite long-standing border tensions, the two giants have significant multilateral cooperation, including through alternate global institutions created over the past decade. The BRICS bloc, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which India is the second-largest capital contributor; the New Development Bank; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which India recently joined, have all been arenas for cooperation despite the countries’ ongoing security competition. But with escalating security tensions, New Delhi may reexamine its level of interaction in other areas.

Finally, the border clash will likely illustrate for India’s foreign policy planners that its preferred formulation—“ the world is one family ,” derived from a Sanskrit saying—does not apply to all its bilateral relationships, unless the interpretation of “one family” includes family members working against India’s national interests. From this realization, India may begin to make more choices about its partnerships, recognizing that it isn’t possible to maintain equal ties with all indefinitely.

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Emerging global issues: The China-India boundary crisis and its implications

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Tanvi madan tanvi madan senior fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies.

September 9, 2020

31 min read

On September 9, Director of the India Project Tanvi Madan testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “ U.S.-China Relations in 2020: Enduring Problems and Emerging Challenges .” Download or read the full testimony below.

Chairman Cleveland, Vice Chair Bartholomew and Members of the Commission, thank you very much for your invitation to testify on the China-India boundary crisis and its implications. 1

The China-India relationship has had elements of cooperation, competition and potentially conflict. When they met in October 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi sought to stress the cooperative elements in the relationship, which the two countries have tried to increase over the last two decades. However, since the beginning of the year, the novel coronavirus pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the Sino-Indian relationship have dominated—and are likely to persist, if not increase. Recent developments have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to engage and to stabilize their relationship, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spillover into conflict.

Motives, Timing & Assessments

Motives: The motivations for the People’s Liberation Army’s initial moves at the China-India Line of Actual Control (LAC) in May, which Delhi saw as a unilateral attempt to change the status quo, are still a subject of debate. Analysts have put forth various possibilities: a Chinese effort to incrementally salami-slice or nibble its way to additional territory and present India with a fait accompli; a desire to put India in its place; concerns about Indian infrastructure building; Delhi changing the status of Ladakh (separating it from Jammu & Kashmir, and centrally administering it); or as a warning against India further deepening its relations with the U.S. and its allies.

Others have noted that the PLA action at the LAC did not occur in isolation and have pointed to a broader pattern of Chinese assertiveness over the last few months. Along with moving forward with the National Security Law in Hong Kong, Beijing has also seemed to target imports of barley, beef and wine from Australia. Canberra has also revealed major cyber-attacks on various organizations, with some officials confirming China as the culprit. 2 Japan, in turn, has flagged daily Chinese coast guard activity near the Senkaku Islands and “suspicious aircrafts heading to Japan’s airspace” more frequently as subjects of concern. 3 Taipei has complained about increased Chinese military activity in its vicinity. 4 Hanoi, on its part, has objected to Chinese vessels ramming—and in one case sinking—Vietnamese fishing boats in the South China Sea (SCS). 5 There were also reports of maritime harassment against other SCS claimants (Malaysia, Philippines). 6 In addition, Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels operating off the Natuna islands resulted in a stand-off with Indonesia. 7 And Beijing charged two Canadians for spying—and linked their 18-month detention to the Canadian detention of the chief financial officer of Huawei. 8 Meanwhile, a number of European countries and the United Kingdom have been subjected to coercive rhetoric from China’s “wolf warrior” diplomats. 9

There is a debate about whether this Chinese assertiveness on a number of fronts, including against India, is stemming from (a) Xi Jinping acting out of insecurity, given domestic concern and international criticism of his regime’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, and wanting to demonstrate resolve or strength, 10 or (b) Beijing’s desire to take advantage of other countries, including the United States, being on the backfoot or distracted due to the coronavirus. 11

On the Chinese actions against India, former Indian national security advisor and ambassador to China Shivshankar Menon has suggested the first is at play, noting that “China has a pattern of risk-taking behavior at times of domestic crisis.” 12

As far as the Indian government is concerned, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar has said, “frankly, we are at a loss to know why” Beijing has taken this approach. 13

One thing that does seem clear, given the scale of the initial PLA deployment and activity, is that these movements were neither accidental nor the result of a local commander’s initiative. What is still not clear is what led to the the clash of June 15 that resulted in the first fatalities on the China-Indian boundary in 45 years.

Timing : The timing of the PLA’s actions was not surprising. The weather and terrain in the area mean that there is a window for such activity from around May to September each year. 14 This is also the period during which the two sides undertake military exercises on their respective sides of the LAC. This year, India postponed its exercise due to the pandemic. However, after a short delay, China did conduct its annual spring military exercise. Indeed, the PLA is reported to have undertaken its initial moves to change the status quo at the LAC by redeploying its troops involved in this exercise. On the other hand, the Indian postponement meant that its military did not have a presence in matching strength on its side of the LAC, which the PLA could have seen as an opportunity to act before India had a chance to move troops from other locations .

Evaluating outcomes : It is difficult to assess how Beijing might be evaluating the success of its actions without a better sense of its motivations. If, for instance, its goals were to acquire territory and consolidate its claims, presenting India with a fait accompli and changing the LAC, it might deem the moves a success (though this is still an ongoing situation and the final disposition is as yet unclear). If Beijing’s objectives were to stop or dissuade Indian infrastructure building on its side of the LAC, reverse Indian moves in Ladakh, or deter Delhi from a closer relationship with the US and other partners, then the Chinese moves have been ineffective, if not counterproductive. Furthermore, they have fueled concerns in a number of countries of an assertive, if not aggressive China that is willing to risk escalation and challenge the rules-based order. Finally, if Chinese policymakers’ idea was to make tactical gains while keeping the broader China-India relationship intact, recent developments should have put paid to that expectation.

Impact on Indian Perceptions & the Sino-Indian Relationship

China has publicly sought a return to business as usual in the relationship. Wang Yi and other officials have called for the border issues to be placed in “a proper place in bilateral ties.” 15 However, while Beijing is seeking a restoration of the status quo ante in the relationship, Delhi has made clear that what it wants is a restoration of the status quo ante at the boundary (i.e. the PLA to return to its positions as of late April). Government officials have stressed that the boundary issue and the broader relationship cannot be separated, asserting that the “maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas is sine qua non for progress in [the] rest of [the] bilateral relationship.” 16

Even as their militaries remain deployed in large numbers at frontline positions, the two countries’ military and diplomatic officials are engaged in dialogue. However, former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran asserted in July that “tensions may subside, but the relationship will never be the same again.” 17 The suggestion is that Delhi might return to engaging Beijing in the future, but even the nature, extent and expectations of that engagement will change.

For now, tensions have not subsided and the longer the boundary crisis continues, the greater its impact will be on the broader Sino-Indian relationship.

Impact on perceptions: Together with the coronavirus pandemic and its health and economic consequences, the boundary crisis has already had an effect on Indian perceptions. The Indian ambassador to China has noted the considerable damage to India’s trust in China. Moreover, the recent developments have reinforced and even accelerated existing Indian concerns about China (some of which have existed since the mid-to-late 1950s). 18

In the foreign and security policy establishment, there are widespread calls for a reassessment of India’s China policy. The boundary crisis—and particularly the fatal clash in June—has resulted in a remarkable convergence among the Indian government’s former China hands on the ideas of a watershed moment, of significant damage to Sino-Indian ties, of a more adversarial relationship in the future, and of the need for India to build its strength and its partnerships further to tackle China. This contrasts with the messaging coming from Chinese officials who have stated that “the orientation of China and India as partners, friendly cooperation and common development remain unchanged.” 19

Indian public sentiment on China, already turning sour due to the pandemic, also deteriorated further because of the killing of Indian soldiers in June. Among other things, this has resulted in calls to boycott Chinese products, partners and sponsors. 20

More significantly, the boundary crisis has hardened official views of China in India. The Indian home minister has linked China both to the boundary and health crises affecting the country. The Indian external affairs minister told his China counterpart after the June 15 clash, “this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.” 21

Furthermore, the Indian government has called the Chinese “actions and behavior” a “clear violation of the bilateral agreements and protocols concluded between the two countries” over a two-decade period from 1993. 22 And the external affairs has added a reminder that, despite a boundary dispute that dates backs decades, “It was because of these agreements and the adherence to them that the bilateral relationship moved forward in other, different spheres, including the economic one.” 23

The boundary crisis indeed seems to have weakened the hands of those in Indian policymaking circles that argued for more engagement with China or for the idea that economic ties would help alleviate political strains.

Policy consequences : Thus, beyond rhetoric, there have already been policy consequences. These have resulted from the intensification of Indian concerns about (a) economic overdependence on and exposure to China, (b) inroads that Chinese companies—particularly those with close links with the state—have made into certain Indian economic sectors that are sensitive, and (c) avenues of Chinese influence in the country. This has led to a slew of measures that will restrict or scrutinize Chinese activities in the economic, technology, telecommunications, public diplomacy and education sectors.

Even before the boundary crisis, the Indian government had announced restrictions on foreign direct investment from countries that share a land boundary with India—a move clearly directed against China. Furthermore, it reportedly urged the Securities and Exchange Board of India to increase its scrutiny of foreign portfolio investment from China and Hong Kong. 24

Since the Chinese actions at the boundary, the Indian government has taken further action. Some have interpreted Prime Minister Modi’s emphasis on atmanirbharta (self-reliance) over the last few months as primarily designed to reduce India’s economic dependence on China. Road Transport, Highways and MSME minister Nitin Gadkari has indeed said, “imports from China will be discouraged and the country will take large strides towards self-reliance.” He also indicated that, within his portfolio, Chinese companies could be excluded from future road construction projects. 25

The government has amended public procurement rules “to enable imposition of restrictions on bidders from countries which share a land border with India” on defence and national security grounds. 26 And its online procurement platform now requires vendors to identify the country of origin of products. 27

There have also been reports of other steps, signals and scrutiny. An Indian state government has put on hold some agreements with Chinese companies, and indicated that the central government has told them “not to sign any further agreements with Chinese companies.” 28 Delhi is reportedly considering further measures to curb and scrutinize imports, including to prevent Chinese goods from being routed through third countries. 29 There are have also been reports that Indian state-owned oil companies will no longer use Chinese tankers to ship crude oil or petroleum products. 30 On a more positive note, the Indian government is providing incentives for Indian and foreign companies to manufacture in India, and to reduce dependence on Chinese imports in particular sectors like solar power, electronics and pharmaceuticals.

Sino-Indian technology sector ties have also been affected. The amendments to Indian investment rules will adversely affect Chinese technology companies interested or operating in India. Moreover, in three tranches, India has banned a number of Chinese apps on the grounds that they are “prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.” These include TikTok, almost a third of whose total downloads come from India, as well as AliPay. 31

There has also been an impact on the telecommunications sector. State-owned firms BSNL and MTNL canceled a tender issued in March to upgrade their 4G networks. The revised tender is expected to exclude Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE from bidding to provide equipment. 32 There are also reports that the Indian government is ready to use investment restrictions to exclude these companies from India’s 5G trials. This is a shift from the Indian approach earlier in the year when the government had announced that it would permit all vendors, including Huawei, to participate in the trials. 33

In addition, after a phase of encouraging travel and exchanges from China, the Indian government seems set to adjust course in this sphere. Delhi is reportedly considering requiring prior security clearance for visas for Chinese business, civil society and academic professionals. Indian institutions’ and universities’ agreements with Chinese organizations, particularly Hanban, are also being reviewed and likely to be discouraged. 34

Responses and the Road Ahead

Current responses: The response to these policy changes in India have been mixed. There have been questions about India’s ability to reduce dependence on China, and the costs that will entail—particularly as India deals with the economic fallout of the pandemic. There are also concerns about supply disruptions, especially since Prime Minister Modi has been emphasizing the importance of India playing a greater role in global value chains. Others have questioned the government’s motives, suggesting these moves stem from a protectionist impulse and are reminiscent of pre-liberalization import substitution policies. 35 And there has been anxiety in some quarters of the technology sector because China has been a major source of investment for Indian start-ups—by one estimate, two-thirds with a billion-plus-dollar value have at least one Chinese investor. Some of these investments have reportedly been put on hold. 36

Former Indian officials have acknowledged that these restrictions will hurt India, but have argued that it is still worthwhile to take these steps to reduce Indian exposure to and overdependence on China—and noted that it might be easier to take these steps when Indians are already feeling economic pain as a result of the pandemic fallout. Gautam Bambawale, a former Indian ambassador to China, also expected these steps to lead to a deterioration of Sino-India ties, but said “so be it.” 37 Others have argued that alternative sources of capital and imports exist and should be explored. Indian government officials, on their part, have indicated that they neither expect overnight overcomes nor total decoupling, but stressed the importance of starting the process.

The Chinese response has been a mix of persuasion, objections, warnings, and suggestions of legal action or retaliation. In isolation, one or two Indian steps might not have mattered to the Chinese government—India, for instance, is far more dependent on Chinese imports than the other way around. But collectively, they can have an impact. Moreover, in particular sectors like telecommunications and technology, these Indian restrictions have implications for Chinese companies’ valuations and their access to a significant and growing market. Beijing also seems worried about the global impact and perceptions of the Indian moves, and has raised questions about the link between Indian actions and those of others like the U.S. and Australia. 38

Thus, the Chinese government has objected to a number of the steps India has taken to restrict Chinese activities. The Chinese ambassador to India Sun Weidong has spoken to civil society and media audiences calling for relations to get back on track. But he has also warned against the “forced decoupling of the Chinese and Indian economies,” noting that “it will only lead to a ‘lose-lose’ outcome.” The ambassador has further suggested that Indian restrictions “violate market laws and WTO rules.” Furthermore, he has reminded Indians of how dependent they are on imports of certain products from China, and warned that even non-Chinese multinational companies operating in India will be adversely affected. 39 Chinese state-linked media outlets have gone further, suggesting that Beijing could retaliate. That, however, would likely only prove the Indian government’s point and could lead to further Indian restrictions, including, on exports to China of pharmaceuticals, for instance.

Other potential sources of leverage: Nonetheless, China does have points of leverage include its ability to pressure India further on the boundary. It can also complicate India’s internal security situation (particularly in India’s northeast as it did in the past), and Delhi’s regional options given Beijing’s expanding ties with India’s territorial and maritime neighbors. Furthermore, China can use its relationship with Pakistan as a tool to pressure—or reassure—India. Beijing can also be helpful or harmful to Indian interests in key international bodies, especially the U.N. Security Council. Finally, while China’s ability to use economic coercion with India is relatively limited because of their still limited—and lop-sided—investment relationship, there are areas Beijing could target. For instance, India’s pharmaceutical sector, which is fairly dependent on imports of active pharmaceutical ingredients or India’s automotive sector that needs components from China.

India, in turn, also has other sources of leverage beyond its market, which China and its companies have wanted to access. Another is the presence of Tibetan leaders and refugees in India. A third is Delhi’s ability to complicate Beijing’s interests—and exploit its vulnerabilities—in the Indian Ocean. A fourth could be doing more with Taiwan. Finally, India’s partnerships—especially, but not only, with the United States. After all, China might not worry much about India in and of itself given the gap in the two countries’ relative capabilities, but the US-India partnership does give it pause. Delhi can also work with these partners to complicate Chinese interests in the region and in international institutions. In the next few years, it will be chair of the World Health Organisation Executive Board, a member of the UN Security Council, as well as host of the G-20.

India and its Partners: The boundary crisis will likely result in India doubling down on these partnerships with like-minded countries. They help India (1) enhance its own capabilities, (2) balance and deter China, and (3) ensure a rules-based and multipolar order prevails in the region.

There have already been signs that India is moving forward with deepening ties with partners like the US, Australia and Japan. Bilaterally, Delhi has been in close touch with Washington during the crisis and seen the US as helpful both as a source of diplomatic support, military equipment and intelligence. The two countries will be holding their 2+2 defense and diplomacy ministerial dialogue shortly, and are expected to sign another foundational agreement that will facilitate interoperability and intelligence sharing. Delhi is also expected to sign a military logistics agreement with Japan in the near future. It has recently also signed one with Canberra. Furthermore, it has upgraded its 2+2 with Australia to the ministerial level, and signed an agreement with that country to cooperate on cyber affairs and critical technology.

Beyond the bilateral dynamics, concerns about dependence on China have also led India, along with Australia and Japan, to announce their intention to launch a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. A recent meeting of their economic ministers noted that they would welcome other like-minded partners. 40

Delhi has also showed continued willingness to work with Australia, Japan and the U.S. via the Quad, with a ministerial meeting expected later this fall. Indian officials have also indicated that they are ready to include Australia in MALABAR, the annual India-Japan-U.S. maritime exercise. Moreover, in recent months, it has participated in a deputy secretary of state-level grouping with the other Quad countries and New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to discuss and tackle coronavirus-related concerns.

Indeed, India can be expected to participate in other such issue- or interest-based coalitions as well. For instance, the D10 (G7+Australia, India, South Korea, proposed by Britain to deal with concerns related to reliance on China for 5G and other technologies) or the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. Delhi has also taken the lead in forming other such initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance and the Global Coalition for Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure (China is not a member of any one of these).

At the same time, India is continuing to participate in plurilaterals that involve another partner— Russia—as well as China: the Russia-India-China trilateral, the BRICS grouping, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the scope and degree of these interactions are more limited, though on a bilateral basis, Delhi continues to see Moscow as a key partner, particularly in the defense equipment and technology space.

The boundary crisis remains serious and requires careful watching. The US is probably considering different scenarios. Members of Congress can encourage the administration to also consider what Delhi might ask of it in each case, whether or not the US is willing to be responsive, and, if it is, prepare for those contingencies. In previous crises, Washington has also played a role vis-à-vis Beijing. However, in the current situation, it is not clear how effective or welcome that might be.

Second, moments like the current one can be clarifying for India, including in terms of which of its partners is reliable. If the US wants to be responsive or to show support to India, it should convey this willingness, while taking care not to escalate the situation. Such responsiveness and support will facilitate a closer Indian alignment with the US in the future. However, Washington should not try to push India into decisions or choices, or let Delhi think it is taking advantage of the boundary crisis—that would be unhelpful, if not counterproductive.

Third, over the last few months, a number of members of Congress have criticized Chinese assertiveness vis-à-vis India, sought a peaceful resolution of the dispute, as well as expressed support for the US-India relationship. It is important that this has come from both sides of the aisle—particularly in an election year, the signal a bipartisan approach sends to Delhi and Beijing is crucial. It will also help maintain public support for the US relationship in India.

Fourth, Congress in the past has played a crucial role in enabling or facilitating the US-India partnership, including deeper diplomatic, defense and intelligence cooperation. This role will continue to be important in maintaining the momentum in the relationship.

Fifth, how India deals with the boundary crisis, as well as the choices and tradeoffs it makes, will affect the US. It will offer opportunities, but potentially also challenges. For instance, Delhi’s desire to reduce its economic dependence on China could benefit American companies. But if this leads to broader Indian protectionism, that could adversely affect American economic interests.

Finally, for partners like India, their willingness to cooperate with the US in the region and globally will depend not just on Chinese missteps but on the US willingness and ability to respond. A robust US response to challenges to the rules-based order could help deter certain Chinese behavior; it will also make Washington a more attractive partner, increasing countries’ willingness to work with the US and to burden share. Steps that members of Congress can take or encourage the administration to take to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as ensure the maintenance of a rules-based order will be helpful in this regard.

Sino-Indian War

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Sino-Indian War , (October 20–November 20, 1962), conflict between India and China , centred primarily on the disputed Aksai Chin region along those countries’ borders.

The partition of India (1947), which took place just as the Cold War began transforming the landscape of international relations worldwide, left a set of border disputes in the Indian subcontinent where India, Pakistan , and China converged. The regime in Beijing , after suppressing the buffer state of Tibet in 1950, began disputing the border with India at several points between the tiny Himalayan states of Nepal , Bhutan , and Sikkim .

D-Day. American soldiers fire rifles, throw grenades and wade ashore on Omaha Beach next to a German bunker during D Day landing. 1 of 5 Allied beachheads est. in Normandy, France. The Normandy Invasion of World War II launched June 6, 1944.

Aksai Chin in particular had been a long-ignored corner of the subcontinent because of its remoteness and isolation. However, this changed when the Chinese tried to connect Tibet with Xinjiang by building a military road through the region. India objected to the Chinese presence in the sector, which it claimed as part of the Ladakh region under Indian administration.

After a number of border skirmishes between 1959 and 1962, which began initially as a by-product of the uprising in Tibet, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China forcefully attacked across the disputed boundaries on October 20, 1962. Indian forces were soundly defeated, 7,000 men having been killed or captured, and the lowlands of Assam lay open to the invaders.

The Chinese leadership chose the height of the Cuban missile crisis as their moment of attack, apparently expecting a more drawn-out crisis in Cuba that would have distracted superpowers from intervening in India. But the swift resolution in Cuba in favour of the United States permitted Washington to respond to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ’s request for help. With a U.S. aircraft carrier en route, China announced a unilateral ceasefire on November 20 and soon afterward withdrew from most of the invaded area. It retained control of about 14,700 square miles (38,000 square km) of territory in Aksai Chin, and the area remained a point of contention between the two countries.

Face-off at 14,000ft China and India have been to war over their Himalayan border before. Is it about to happen again?

By Ben Westcott , CNN

C hina and India are the closest they’ve been to armed conflict in half a century, over a mountainous strip of land on their disputed border high in the Himalayas.

On June 15, at least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a violent brawl between the two sides in the disputed region of Aksai Chin-Ladakh. Soldiers fought with fists, stones, and nail-studded bamboo poles, according to a source in the Indian military.

It is unclear if any Chinese soldiers died, but both governments have moved fast to find a diplomatic solution to the worst outbreak of border violence in decades.

In 1962, India and China went to war over this remote, inhospitable stretch of land. Thousands died, though there are conflicting figures on the final toll.

Since then, the two countries have had a long history of non-lethal scuffles over the position of the border.

The problem is that neither side agrees where it is, how far it stretches, nor who owns the surrounding territory.

What is being disputed?

There are three main areas of contention along India and China’s disputed border, broadly known as the Line of Actual Control.

That name dates back to 1959 when former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed that troops on both sides withdraw behind a “line up to which each side exercises actual control.”

The western section, where the most recent clash took place, divides India’s Ladakh region and the Chinese-administered Aksai Chin in the heavily-contested Kashmir region.

The central section runs along the northern borders of the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and southern Tibet.

The eastern section runs between southern Tibet and far eastern India, following the McMahon Line, named after the British colonial administrator who proposed it in 1914. It was in this region that the last major standoff between India and China took place in 2017.

Liverpoolfc.com

Where is the current standoff?

In the Himalayas, India's borders with its neighboring countries are ill-defined, which has led to decades of conflict.

The Kashmir region (shaded) is one of the most heavily disputed areas in the world, split into territory claimed by India, Pakistan and China.

China holds the area of Aksai Chin, which it says is part of Xinjiang. India believes it is part of Ladakh.

India and China's territory is divided by the Line of Actual Control, a border which neither side can agree on. No one can say how long it is or what territory it covers exactly.

The June 15 confrontation took place at Galwan Valley, along the rough border between the Indian-controlled area of Ladakh and the Chinese-administered Aksai Chin.

The border between Ladakh and Aksai Chin is a result of the 1962 war between India and China, roughly marking where the two armies finished fighting more than half a century ago.

Although the LAC appears as a clear line on a map, no one knows exactly where it falls. That’s due to due to a combination of historic disagreements, clashing territorial claims and poorly-defined maps.

It means that on the ground, Chinese and Indian soldiers regularly come into conflict with each other, claiming certain parts of the territory as their own.

1962 India China border war

The confusion over the LAC in Aksai Chin dates back to at least 1947 when India and Pakistan went to war, resulting in the partition of the region.

After that conflict, the border between the countries was far from settled. India, China and Pakistan all claimed parts of the northern region of Kashmir.

In subsequent years, tensions between China and India grew. New Delhi was infuriated when Chinese troops built a road through Aksai Chin in 1957, while Beijing was displeased at the Dalai Lama’s flight to India after the Tibetan uprising in 1959.

In 1962, the two countries went to war over Aksai Chin. But the Chinese forces were better supplied and, as many came from the plateaus of Tibet, were more acclimatized to the high altitude of the Himalayan battlefields, according to an essay published on the war in 2003.

China pushed back Indian troops and took possession of the region. At least 2,000 troops were killed, with twice as many Indian fatalities as Chinese.

Before the war, Chinese leader Mao Zedong said the 1962 conflict would keep the border between the two countries stable for 10 years, but it barely lasted five.

Tensions flared again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and Cho La, in the Indian state of Sikkim . That time, India pushed the Chinese back. Reports at the time said that 150 Indians and more than 300 Chinese were killed in the ensuing conflict.

Relations between the two countries have improved since — the last fatal encounter before this year was in 1975 — but with neither side agreeing on a border and New Delhi continuing to claim Aksai Chin, the mountainous area remains volatile.

India and China agreed in 1993 to ensure that the border was peacefully maintained but no serious efforts have been made to define it. And soldiers have often clashed in non-military ways i.e. in brawls and using makeshift weapons.

Disputed region

Border tensions aren't limited to Aksai Chin and the Kashmir region.

The last major standoff between China and India took place in Doklam in 2017 , in the eastern section of the LAC, at their border with Bhutan in the Himalayas.

Bhutan accused Chinese troops of building a road inside its territory, a claim its ally India supported.

Troops massed on both sides of the border and China staged live fire drills to intimidate its neighbor.

Eventually talks calmed the situation and soldiers were withdrawn.

The border situation is further inflamed by fractious geopolitical relationships in the region.

In particular, China’s close relationship with Pakistan complicates Beijing’s relations with India, Islamabad’s longtime rival in South Asia.

Experts say decades may have passed but the two sides are no closer to mutually defining their borders.

“I think an agreement will take time and need concerted negotiation that should not be sporadic but sustained,” said former Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao.

Publicly, China and India are downplaying border tensions and say they are holding emergency meetings to try to defuse the situation.

“I believe that the next few weeks are going to be reasonably tense” Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Indian counterpart in a phone call Wednesday that both sides should “properly address the border situation through existing channels” so that they can “jointly preserve peace and tranquility in the border area.”

But it could turn in an instant.

“I believe that the next few weeks are going to be reasonably tense,” said retired Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain, who previously commanded Indian forces based in Jammu and Kashmir.

“There is no certainty that this is the last of the engagements of this campaigning season between the Indian and Chinese armies.”

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How China and India Came to Lethal Blows

Beijing saw a threat in New Delhi’s steady improvement of borderland infrastructure and renewed Indian claims on disputed territory.

By Ajai Shukla

Mr. Shukla is a strategic affairs analyst and former Indian Army officer.

NEW DELHI — Tensions between Indian and Chinese troops have simmered since early May in the remote, high Karakoram mountains that separate India’s northern Ladakh region from the alkaline desert of Aksai Chin, which is claimed by India but controlled by China and abuts its Xinjiang province.

It is a forbidding landscape of cold deserts, snow-capped peaks, sparse vegetation and freezing temperature about 14,000 feet above sea level. On Monday evening, in a brutal hand-to-hand battle, Chinese soldiers killed at least 20 Indian soldiers with wooden staves and nail-studded clubs, in the severest escalation of the dispute on the Sino-Indian frontier in decades.

British colonial authorities bequeathed India a border with China that was neither delineated on a map nor demarcated on the ground. After China invaded Tibet in 1950 and the two Asian giants sought to formalize their frontier, the territorial dispute emerged. The Sino-Indian border dispute involves about 13, 500 square miles in Ladakh and Aksai Chin and about 35,000 square miles in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls South Tibet.

In 1962, the border dispute flared into a war. China won conclusively but retreated after a cease-fire to what were broadly its prewar positions. That de facto border, which is called the Line of Actual Control, is patrolled by both armies. Occasional unarmed clashes have taken place over the years despite five agreements aimed at reducing the risk of combat.

China has built a network of roads and tracks on its side of the Line of Actual Control, but the Chinese military has consistently objected to India’s far slower but steady improvement of borderland infrastructure.

One of the key Indian projects is the construction of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road in Ladakh, cutting through treacherous mountain ridges as high as 16,000 feet. The road runs almost parallel to the disputed border with Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin and reaches Daulat Beg Oldi, an Indian military base and landing ground for the Indian Air Force, about 12 miles from Karakoram Pass, which separates Ladakh from Xinjiang.

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Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War

On the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian Border War, Strategic Asia author Arun Sahgal (Institute of National Security Studies) discusses the lessons learned from the conflict and explains how the dispute still shapes relations between the two rising powers 50 years later.

On October 20, 1962, Chinese forces launched offensives into the disputed border regions flanking the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Line of Actual Control, igniting what became known as the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Although the conflict ended nearly 50 years ago, the border war still has a significant impact on the geopolitical strategies of both India and China.

In this Q&A, Strategic Asia author Arun Sahgal (Institute of National Security Studies) discusses the lessons learned from the conflict and explains how the dispute still shapes relations between the two rising powers 50 years later.

This October marks the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian Border War. What were the causes of the conflict, and what lessons did India learn?

The genesis of the 1962 war can be traced to two broad factors: British India’s frontier legacy and developments in Tibet. The borders between India and Tibet were largely undefined and not demarcated. China’s forcible occupation of Tibet in 1950–51 exacerbated regional tensions and deprived India of a buffer. Although India accepted this new reality, reflected in the signing of the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement for peaceful coexistence, the Lhasa rebellion and flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 were the proverbial tipping point, leading to the souring of relations and beginning of border tensions.

These developments came at a time when China found itself geopolitically vulnerable for a number of reasons, including the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of all of its experts and advisers from China in 1960, perceived threats from Taiwan in 1961–62, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and tensions on the Sino-Soviet border. Other factors were the failure of the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in millions of deaths, and Mao’s compromised political position.

During this period Prime Minister Nehru launched his ill-fated “forward policy” to secure India’s borders with China. Indian intelligence believed that China could not sustain a major drive across the “great Himalayan land barrier,” reducing the incentive for India to make any territorial concessions.

From the conflict, India first and foremost realized that it had completely misread China’s strategic perspective and the geopolitical scenario. The Indian political and intelligence hierarchy had underestimated Chinese threat perceptions and failed to pick up the hardening Chinese stance and preparations for war.

This was largely a result of the lack of institutionalized decision-making at the national level. Well-established and well-respected agencies providing politico-military linkages did not exist. Unfortunately, despite the 1999 Kargil incident and subsequent committees on defense reforms, there is little improvement today.

A second lesson concerns the preemptive use of force. Indian political thinking had been largely shaped by the Cold War world order and the belief that wars were not possible for fear of wider global nuclear conflagration. The Chinese leadership had no such illusions.

Lastly, India learned important lessons from its intelligence shortcomings in terms of the capability to assess the mindset, perceptions, intentions, and medium- and long-term plans of the Chinese leadership.

How has the border conflict shaped current Indian and Chinese policies, especially regarding the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Line of Actual Control?

TAR remains central to China’s security strategy, which looks on this minority-dominated region as a buffer between the Han heartland and China’s turbulent periphery. Beijing’s Western development strategy in the Tibet Autonomous Region determines how China handles its security and economic relations with South Asia. Beijing is keen to project Tibet as a major trade hub between China and South Asia. However, the recent series of self-immolation by dozens of Tibetan monks and youth has heightened tensions within the region, resulting in a steep rise in armed Chinese paramilitary presence. In addition, links between Tibet and Tibetan emigre in India after 1959 continue to be a source of tension in relations between China and India.

Despite 15 rounds of bilateral negotiations between special representatives, no solution to the dispute surrounding the Line of Actual Control is in sight. India and China have taken tangible steps to maintain peace and tranquility and put in place mechanisms to avoid untoward incidents. Nonetheless, in addition to mutually agreed disputes acknowledged by both sides, border intrusions are on the rise with new pockets of discord characterized as “emerging disputed areas.” The Indian perception is that conflict over the Line of Actual Control is being raked up by China as leverage for future negotiations.

In your chapter in Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge , you lay out in detail what policies India must enact to “ensure that asymmetry with China remains manageable.” What challenges will India face in implementing these policies?

India faces a security scenario involving threats from two closely allied nuclear neighbors. Dealing with threats from two fronts not only is a major military challenge for India but entails huge economic costs accentuated by a poor indigenous military industrial base and suboptimal defense management infrastructure.

Whereas India has adopted a policy of political management for these challenges, there is growing understanding within the national security establishment that the country must develop credible dissuasive capabilities against China and punitive capabilities against Pakistan, while also not allowing asymmetry with China to become unmanageable.

The Indian security establishment has begun to address the above challenges through infrastructural development, forsaking the earlier scorched earth policy in the Tibet Autonomous Region and focusing capacity enhancement in all three domains, details of which I outline in my Strategic Asia chapter. These policies are backed by efforts to enhance both continental awareness (in the Tibet Autonomous Region and along India’s periphery) and maritime domain awareness.

However, efforts at capability development are dependent on direct imports and transfers of military technology, given India’s relatively underdeveloped defense industrial base. The perils of a poor indigenous defense industrial infrastructure are increasingly realized by Indian strategists. As a consequence, a number of steps have been taken to address this issue. The Indian National Security Council recently convened a committee to review post-Kargil defense reforms and a separate defense modernization committee to suggest improvements in the overall defense industrial base to include procurement procedures, norms of transfer of technology, and foreign direct investments in the defense sector.

Your Strategic Asia chapter also examines the impact of Chinese military modernization on India’s strategic posture. What are the implications of PLA modernization for the border dispute? How can India counter growing Chinese influence without provoking another conflict or destabilizing the region?

Until 2025, India will experience a window of strategic vulnerability in regard to its ability to develop joint and integrated warfighting platforms and systems. During this window, India can leverage its relationship with both the United States and the European Union not only for weapons acquisitions but also for filling the fast-expanding technological gap.

A second way in which India can counter Chinese influence is to re-examine its conventional attritional warfare strategy. India should develop its own anti-access and area-denial strategy in response to the PLA presence in its maritime and continental sphere of influence. This should include space-based ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities to detect Chinese intrusions, as well as credible interdiction capabilities.

In addition, India needs to work out concomitant external balancing strategies. The options for India are as follows: develop a close political and strategic relationship with the United States to help build comprehensive national power, assume the role of a swing state to balance relations with China and the United States, or accommodate China to buy time to build India’s own dissuasive power. The Indian leadership will need to walk a fine line, however, to build an economic and military relationship with the United States that serves the common aim of maintaining strategic stability in Asia, while at the same time ensuring good cooperative relations with China.

You state in your Strategic Asia chapter that India needs to “foster maritime cooperation among the Asian littorals” in order to secure the Indian Ocean region. What has India done to develop closer relationships with its maritime neighbors? How has China reacted to these efforts?

The pace of India-China naval exchanges and bilateral cooperation has also been enhanced. Recently, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to undertake joint operations against pirates and share technical know-how on mining seabed resources. In a major initiative toward bilateral cooperation, four frontline Indian naval ships visited Shanghai in June 2012, the first time in six years. The highlight of the visit was the announcement of the Indo-Chinese maritime dialogue.

Indian deployments in the South China Sea—in particular, marine surveys in areas that China claims as its EEZ (extended economic zone)—remain a major point of friction between the two countries. India is still concerned about Chinese attempts to create naval facilities in the Indian Ocean region, fearing that the facilities will later turn to bases. Indian fears are exacerbated by growing Chinese naval capabilities, as well as by Chinese maritime strategies such as far-sea defense that require deployments across and into the Indian Ocean. Chinese attempts to develop carrier-based task forces, nuclear attack submarines, and amphibious capabilities further concern India.

What can China and India do to avoid a military buildup along their border similar to what took place in the 1950s and early 1960s?

Although both sides have taken a number of steps to normalize border relations through confidence-building measures such as the agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility and mechanisms for crisis management, these have not resolved the underlying boundary dispute. There remain several hurdles to the successful resolution of this issue. China has expanded its claims to Arunachal Pradesh while reducing the length of the boundary it considers under dispute. Chinese measurements discount the entire sector of the border buttressing Jammu and Kashmir, thus reducing the length of the disputed border from 4056 km to 1978 km.

To buttress non-recognition along the Line of Actual Control, China has been carrying out territorial intrusions. 228 such cases were reported in 2010, 213 cases in 2011, and 64 through April 2012. Chinese sources claim that India has conducted similar transgressions. The Indian security establishment believes these to be Chinese “pinpricks to keep India on the tenterhooks.”

Finally, Beijing has sought to strike a deal with Bhutan—essentially a territorial exchange—that would result in China securing the area surrounding the Siliguri Corridor, deemed a “chicken’s neck” with regard to India’s lines of communication to the northeast.

Arun Sahgal is the Joint Director of Net Assessment, Technology, and Simulation at the Institute of National Security Studies in New Delhi.

Naomi McMillen is an intern at NBR.

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India-China War of 1962: How it started and what happened later

On the anniversary of the end of sino-indian war of 1962, here are some facts on how the war started and what all happened in the war..

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On the anniversary of the end of Sino-Indian War, let us take you through a timeline regarding how the war began and all that took place during its course:

With the independence of the Republic of India and the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the year 1949, one of the policies for the Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China
When China announced that it would be occupying Tibet, India sent a letter of protest proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue. China was even more active in deploying troops on the Aksai Chin border than any other Indian republic was
India was so concerned about its relations with China that it did not even attend a conference for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan because China was not invited. India even strove to become China's representative in matters related to world since China had been isolated from many issues
In 1954, China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, under which, India acknowledged Chinese rule in Tibet. It was at this time when former Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai"
In July 1954, Nehru wrote a memo directing a revision in the maps of India to show definite boundaries on all frontiers; however, Chinese maps showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian territory as Chinese. On being questioned, Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of People's Republic of China, responded that there were errors in the maps
Top People's Republic of China leader, Mao Zedong felt humiliated by the reception Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959. Tensions increased between the two nations when Mao stated that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians
China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet became one of the most prominent reasons for the Sino-Indian War
Various conflicts and military incidents between India and China flared up throughout the summer of 1962
On July 10, 1962, around 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul and used loudspeakers to convince the Gurkhas that they should not be fighting for India
In October 1959, India realised that it was not ready for war after a clash between the two armies at Kongka Pass, in which nine Indian policemen were killed; the country assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas

India-China Border Face-off UPSC Notes:- Download PDF Here

Violence in the Galwan Valley on the India-China border has claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers.

Where is Galwan Valley?

The River has its source in Aksai Chin, on China’s side of the LAC, and it flows from the east to Ladakh, where it meets the Shyok River on India’s side of the LAC.
The valley is strategically located between Ladakh in the west and Aksai Chin in the east, which is currently controlled by China as part of its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
At its western end are the Shyok River and the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road. Its eastern mouth lies not far from China’s vital Xinjiang Tibet road, now called the G219 highway.

Where does the Line of Actual Control lie?

The LAC lies east of the confluence of the Galwan and Shyok rivers in the valley, up to which both India and China have been patrolling in recent years.
After the June 15 clash, however, China has claimed that the entire valley lies on its side of the LAC.

Territorial claims and LAC claims

They are not the same. The distinction between territorial claims and LAC claims is sometimes blurred.
The LAC refers to territory under the effective control of each side, not to their entire territorial claim. For instance, India’s territorial claims extend 38,000 sq km on the other side of the LAC across all of Aksai Chin, but the LAC India observes runs through the valley.

It is true that the LAC has never been demarcated and there are differences in perception of where it lies in more than a dozen spots, but there have not been previous incidents in the valley.

Indian troops were armed. All troops on border duty always carry arms, especially when leaving the post.
Those at Galwan too did carry arms. But, long-standing practice (as per 1996 & 2005 agreements) did not allow the use of firearms during faceoffs.

1996 Agreement

The 1996 agreement is on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.
Article VI (1) of the 1996 agreement says “With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas… Neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometres from the line of actual control . This prohibition shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges.”
However, it is Article VI (4) that is more applicable in the current instance : “If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.”

2005 Agreement

In Article 1: “the two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means”.
The 2013 Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation also stated that neither side shall use its military capability against the other.

India’s border infrastructure:

India has been strengthening its border infrastructure along the LAC.
The strengthening of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road may have angered the Chinese. The Chinese demand in the ongoing negotiations is also premised on India stopping its infrastructure development.

Change in the status of J&K:

One popular argument is that China’s move is driven by local factors such as India’s decision to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Read more on this in the article, Article 370 .

Bilateral tensions:

The relations between the two countries have been steadily deteriorating.
India has been against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) . China further views India’s assertions regarding Gilgit-Baltistan as an implicit attack on the CPEC.
India has put curbs and restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment.

China’s internal dynamics:

The internal pressures that have been generated within China — in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic, are also influencing Chinese behaviour.
The COVID-19 pandemic is the most serious health crisis that China has faced since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The Chinese economy has been on the downslide which is also contributing to increasing political pressure on the country’s leadership.
The coupling of political and economic tensions has greatly aggravated pressures on Chinese leadership and the rising tide of anti-China sentiment the world over has further worsened matters.
Chinese aggression has been observed not only along the LAC but also in the South China Sea. This might indicate a deliberate planning on the part of the Chinese leadership to divert attention from domestic issues.

India’s alignment with the U.S.:

While India professes to be non-aligned, it is increasingly perceived as having aligned with the U.S.
An evident degree of geopolitical convergence also exists between the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific, again directed against China.
India is a member of the Quad (the U.S., Japan, Australia and India) which has a definite anti-China connotation.
The U.S. President’s proposal of redesigning the G-7 , including countries such as India (India has conveyed its acceptance), but excluding China, provides China yet another instance of India and China being in opposite camps.
India is being increasingly projected as an alternative model to China, and being co-opted into a wider anti-China alliance which China clearly perceives as a provocation.

India’s traditional clout in its neighbourhood was slipping:

For India, tensions with Pakistan have been high keeping the troops occupied in the border areas.
Nepal raised boundary issues with India.
Sri Lanka is diversifying its foreign policy and China is making deep inroads into that region.
Bangladesh was deeply miffed with the Citizenship Amendment Act.
Even in Afghanistan, where Pakistan, China, Russia and the U.S. are involved in the transition process, India is out.
Though the LAC has never been demarcated there had not been previous incidents in the valley. By now staking a claim to the entire Galwan Valley and up to the confluence of the rivers, China is, in India’s view, unilaterally altering the LAC.
This goes against the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), under which India and China agreed to strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides.

Undemarcated borders:

The alignment of the LAC has never been agreed upon, and it has neither been delineated nor demarcated.
There is no official map in the public domain that depicts the LAC. The current understanding of the LAC reflects the territories that are, at present, under the control of each side, pending a resolution of the boundary dispute.

Difference in claims:

For the most part, in the western sector, the LAC broadly corresponds with the border as China sees it. However, India and China do not agree on the alignment of the LAC everywhere.
Differences in perception, particularly in 13 spots in the western, middle and eastern sectors of the border, often lead to what are called “face-offs”, when patrols encounter each other in these grey zones that lie in between the different alignments. Some of these areas are Chumar, Demchok and the north bank of the Pangong Lake in the western sector, Barahoti in the middle sector, and Sumdorong Chu in the east.

Chinese tactics:

China has in several territorial disputes, intentionally left its claims ambiguous.
The Chinese haven’t stuck to their previously agreed positions. China’s alignments of the LAC have kept changing.
The border skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control seem to be indicative of the Chinese approach to use the border problem to pressurize India on other issues.
The principal responsibility for intelligence assessment and analysis concerning China rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and to a lesser extent, the Defence Intelligence Agency.

Summit diplomacy

“Summit conferences apply to the meeting of heads of government of the leading powers in an effort to reach broad measures of agreement”.

Why are there more summits?

The rise of summitry is a consequence of the paucity of resources of smaller nations who are less able to finance and sustain a vast diplomatic service and thus rely on summits for representation and negotiation.
It will speed up the process as heads of countries are directly negotiating.
The preference given recently to summit diplomacy over traditional foreign policy-making structures proved to be a severe handicap.
Summit diplomacy cannot be a substitute for carefully structured foreign office policymaking.
India believed the tensions between India and China were diffused after the Doklam crisis as we had meetings at the highest level in Wuhan and Mamallapuram.
Prime Minister Nehru had a good equation with Premier Zhou En-lai.

What’s next?

Bilateral relations in other areas will be under considerable strain. Soft landings cannot be expected.
No leadership-level contact between the top leaders of the two countries can be anticipated in the near term.
Indian businesses in China and Chinese business operations in India can expect the going to be tougher than before. The scenario of trade and investments could encounter similar obstacles.
In areas that impinge on national security, as in the cyber field and in telecommunications, and in technologies that enable spying and surveillance (5G, for instance), stringent controls, exclusions and clampdowns can be expected in the treatment and the entry of Chinese companies in India.
The circumstances that led to the India-China war of 1962 offers an analysis of the Chinese approach.
Faced with the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and increasing isolation globally, the Chinese chose to strike at India rather than confront Russia or the West.
This is not the time for India to be seen as the front end of a belligerent coalition of forces seeking to put China in its place.
India has consistently followed a different policy in the past, and it is advisable that it remains truly non-aligned and not become part of any coalition that would not be in India’s long-term interest.
It requires advanced weapons and technologies for its military.
India is ambitious and wants to be a great power and the US and the Western world recognise this and are willing to partner India.
This presents a big opportunity for India whose continental size, large market, young and skilled labour, and shared values with the West makes it an attractive destination. In fact, an alliance of democracies could crystallise with economic cooperation at its core.
There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation.
It continues to block India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and continues to needle New Delhi in the UNSC over Kashmir.

Much of India’s diplomacy in the last few years has been to counter China and its influence. India faces China as a competitor in Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Indo-US ties are complementary, and a formal alliance will help realise the full potential of these relations.

Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal. China will not be to India, what the Soviet Union was.
In the post-COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice — of alignment.

Given the current circumstances, India should strategize an action plan aimed towards protecting its sovereign interests.

Prepare militarily:

India needs to be prepared, continue to build roads and improve the infrastructure along the border, to keep itself ready to deal with any contingency.
India must improve the military capacity of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command given its immense geostrategic value, as it overlooks Asia’s maritime strategic lifeline and the world’s most important global sea lane.

Pressure points:

India could choose to leverage the sensitivity of the Chinese to the one-China policy and other vulnerabilities like the Tibet issue and Hong Kong protests, to force a change in China’s attitude.
This would allow India to signal to China that it has options, and that China would be wise not to escalate these situations too far.

Shifting focus:

To counter China India must look for options beyond LAC.
India should demonstrate that it is willing and capable of influencing the maritime balance in East Asia, where China faces off a combination of the United States, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia and sometimes Malaysia and the Philippines as well.
China perceives a vulnerability in the Malacca strait given its marked dependence on the sea lines of communication for its vast trade and energy imports.

Going global:

India should go global to defend against China. India’s counter to Chinese power in the Himalayas should be to assume a more global role of its own.
In Asia and Africa, debt-traps induced by the BRI are gradually stoking discontent. If India focuses on leveraging its advantages as a development partner, particularly in the post-COVID-19 era, it can use its newfound influence as a bargaining chip against Chinese interests in these countries.

Building alliances:

India must build power-balancing alliances.
This provides an opportunity to build partnerships with such countries to balance China’s growing influence.
India can give itself leverage against China by improving its bilateral relationships with other countries that are similarly worried about China’s growing influence — such as Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and even the U.K.
One way to reinvigorate SAARC is to revive the process of South Asian economic integration.

Aligning with the United States:

This is also an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly and unequivocally with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
A closer alignment with the U.S. represents India’s opportunity to counter China, while efforts to foster regional partnerships and cultivate domestic military capabilities, although insufficient by themselves, could play a complementary role.
Moving into a closer partnership with the US would allow India an opportunity to rebalance the Indo-Pacific region.
India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.

Taking the long view:

India’s leverage and balancing power within the Indo-Pacific and the world beyond stems from its strong democratic credentials, the dynamism of its economy, its leading role in multilateral institutions, and the strategic advantage of its maritime geography — an asset possessed by few other nations, and which must be deployed much more effectively to counterbalance the Chinese ingress into this oceanic space that surrounds us.
The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to many of India’s Asian friends and partners enabling a high-resolution envisioning of Chinese aggressiveness.

Conclusion:

Good neighbourhood relations are crucial for national stability and well-being.
If India is to disengage from economic involvement with China and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chain networks closer home, it cannot be a prisoner of the short term.
It is time for India to boldly take the long view in this area as also on its South Asia policy.
India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to take an active stand. Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in military power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
This would force China to reconsider its tactics and force it towards negotiations with India.

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India China Relations: Evolution Timeline, Border Disputes, and Challenges

This Article is based on the news “ Jaishankar to China: It’s in our common interest not to mass troops at the LAC ” which was published in the Indian Express. China has lodged a diplomatic protest with India over the Prime Minister’s (PM’s) visit to Arunachal Pradesh , where he dedicated the newly-built Sela Tunnel to the nation .

: , , , ,and .

Effect of policies and Politics of Developed and Developing countries on India and its interests.

Sela Tunnel inauguration: China lodges Diplomatic Protest Over PM Modi’s Arunachal visit

It connects Assam’s Tezpur to the West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh.
It will also ensure better movement of troops along the frontier region.
Chinese Objections: China claims Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet routinely objects to Indian leaders’ visits to the state to highlight its claims. China has also named the area as Zangnan.
Rejection of Chinese Territorial Claims: India has repeatedly rejected China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that the state is an integral part of the country.

Evolution of India China Relations: A Timeline

India china relations – early years (1950s-1960s):.

1950: India recognizes the People’s Republic of China, and establishes diplomatic relations.
1954: Signing of Panchsheel Agreement emphasizing peaceful coexistence.
1962: Sino-Indian War over border disputes, China wins decisively.

India China Relations – Post-war Scenario:

1959-1962: Unilateral changes to the Line of Actual Control , leading to conflict.
Decades later, China claims Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part, straining ties.

India China Relations – Strategic Distance (1970s-1980s):

Limited diplomatic and trade engagements due to mutual distrust.
India’s closeness with the Soviet Union and China’s stance against the USSR heighten tensions.
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from 1978 paved the way for economic growth , and openness.

India China Relations – Efforts for Normalization (1980s):

1988: Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China marks significant advancement.
Agreements were signed to maintain peace along the border, Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was established in 2012.

Post-Cold War Era (1990s onwards):

Economic cooperation rises as focal point, significant increase in trade and investment.

India China Relations – 2003:

Occasional military standoffs over regions like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

India China Relations – Recent Developments:

2017 : Doklam standoff leads to significant strain.
June 2020: Galwan Valley Clash results in casualties on both sides, intensifying tensions.

was proposed, which was an 890-km boundary extending from Bhutan to Burma but was not accepted by China. : the eastern sector which spans , the middle sector in , and the western sector in . while China claims Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, which it refers to as ‘South Tibet’, as its territory.

India China Relations: Bilateral Ties

Political: On 1 April, 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Economic Ties: Bilateral trade has grown significantly, reaching US$100 billion by 2022 , with India becoming a large market for project exports from China.
Cultural: India and China have a history of cultural exchanges and have established institutions like the Yoga College in China.

Multilateral cooperation: India and China continue high-level engagement at regional fora such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS groupings reflecting common agenda for growth and development.
Both countries have initiated the “ hometown diplomacy ”, held two informal summits in Wuhan and Chennai respectively.

Challenges Associated with India China Relations

Five finger policy: .

China considers Tibet to be the right hand’s palm of China with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) as its five fingers.
An estimated 50,000-60,000 troops have been posted on either side of the India-China border in eastern Ladakh.

Salami Slicing Strategy:

For instance , China has constructed around 628 well-off villages along India’s borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region, understood as dual-use infrastructure for both civil and military purposes.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

India opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) , as it violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity , as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through parts of the Pakistan occupied Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Aggressive Policies in the Neighbourhood:

String of Pearls is a geopolitical and geostrategic initiative which includes a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. Ex- Hambantota port.

Debt Trap Diplomacy:

Recent change in Maldives’ stance towards India, setting a deadline for withdrawal of Indian troops from Maldives, is a consequence of its growing proximity to China.

India’s Import Dependency:

Further, India’s dependency on Key Starting Materials (KSM) from China exceeds 50% for its Pharmaceutical industry.

Water Dispute:

No formal treaty has been established for the sharing of the Brahmaputra River water has been a significant source of tension with China constructing numerous dams in the upper reaches of the river on which India has raised objections.

South China Sea and India:

China’s “Nine-Dash Line” refers to a demarcation line used by the People’s Republic of China to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea .
China recently voiced objection to Vietnam’s invitation for India to invest in the oil and natural gas sector in the contested SCS .

: United States, Japan, Australia, and India. To keep the strategic sea routes in the free of any military or political influence. It is basically seen as a strategic grouping to reduce Chinese domination. is also referred to as the To discuss “common areas of mutual interest, to strengthen the economic partnership in trade and investment in respective regions and beyond”. was by Russia, India and Iran. offers multi-modal connectivity from India to Europe, potentially reducing transit time and costs. : to , including expansion of trade and investment.

Way Forward to India China Relations

India china border disputes resolution: .

Both nations engage in more regular dialogue at the highest levels. Both should seek to adapt the principle of “mutual and equal security ” i.e., military deployments of mutually acceptable size near the borde r – to the reality of a heavily militarised frontier.

Economic Cooperation:

India should try to facilitate the development of alternate global supply chains and diversify the imports from other countries.
India may also consider signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in order to boost its exports to China.

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Mechanism:

There is an urgent need to build structures and capabilities to counter Chinese grey zone threats.
This should include d eployment of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) , introduction of Rafale jets to bolster border security, joint military exercises, etc.

Cultural Diplomacy:

Initiatives such as student exchange programs, cultural festivals, and joint research projects .
Language exchange programs can also help in fostering confidence and trust among the people of both countries.

Track Diplomacy:

Track One diplomacy refers to formal negotiations between nations conducted by professional diplomats.
Track Two diplomacy refers to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners .

Proper Implementation of Vibrant Villages Programme:

Vibrant Villages Programme was introduced in Budget 2023-24 for the development of villages in states bordering China, i.e., Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

Replicating ANC to other Regions:

The ANC has proved that units of India’s three armed forces can march, sail, fly and fight “jointly” and seamlessly, under a single commander.
The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is an integrated tri-services command of the Indian Armed Forces, based at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Which one of the following statements best reflects the issue with Senkaku Islands, sometimes mentioned in the news?

(a) It is generally believed that they are artificial islands made by a country around South China Sea.

(b) China and Japan engage in maritime disputes over these islands in East China Sea.

(d) Through International Court of Justice declared them as no man’s land, some South-East Asian countries claim them.

. (15 marks, 250 words)

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When Nehru Looked East: Origins of India-US Suspicion and India-China Rivalry

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8 India-China War, 1962

Published: February 2020
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Opposing perspectives among key policymakers account for India’s failure to prepare for the possibility of an attack by China to enforce its claim lines on the northern border. Prime Minister Nehru, influenced by Zhou Enlai’s assurances that China would never cross the McMahon Line, was reinforced by Defense Minister Krishna Menon’s belief that China, as a communist state, would never invade. They turned aside recommendations from the COAS, K. S. Thimayya, that India had to build up its forces to meet a potential Chinese attack. The war exposed Asianism as an illusion and nonalignment as unrealistic for a weak military power.

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United States Institute of Peace

Home ▶ Publications

Three Things to Know About China-India Tensions

While neither side wants escalation, their actions risk exacerbating a classic security dilemma, leading to costly, high-stakes competition.

By: Daniel Markey, Ph.D. ; Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.

Publication Type: Analysis

Relations between the two Asian giants have soured over the last decade, particular following a 2020 border brawl between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley. While there are credible concerns that these nuclear powers’ ties are trending in the wrong direction — particularly as both sides continue provocative actions — neither Beijing nor New Delhi wants to see an escalation toward a more serious conflict. For its part, the United States has sought to deepen its security and economic relationship with India as the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies and considers it a vital partner in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. But don’t expect India to simply follow the United States lead, as New Delhi remains hewed to its policy of nonalignment amid rising major power competition and an emerging multipolar world.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping meet in Wuhan, China, April 27, 2018. Even as tensions simmer, both leaders want to prevent an escalation that could lead to conflict. (Indian Ministry of External Affairs)

USIP’s Andrew Scobell and Daniel Markey explain how each side views the souring of relations, what the near-term outlook is for their bilateral ties and what it all means for the United States.

How do Beijing and New Delhi, respectively, perceive the rise in tensions?

Scobell: For the present, China seeks to maintain a cordial working relationship with India, setting aside contentious issues such as the unresolved border dispute while it plays a long game to advance its interests. For the foreseeable future, Beijing desires to keep New Delhi contained in a geostrategic South Asian box with the lid on tight, while China conducts business-as-usual diplomacy and commerce with India. Chinese leaders perceive India as an over-sized middle power with great power pretentions.

That said, in recent years Beijing has taken New Delhi more seriously as a threat to national security and an impediment to China taking its rightful place as the dominant Asian power on both the landmass and littoral of a vast continent. Consequently, China has — among other things — doubled down on its long-standing “all weather relationship” with India’s South Asian nemesis Pakistan. This Beijing-Islamabad continental axis includes sizeable and enduring military and economic dimensions.

China considers India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, intent on stirring up trouble along their common Himalayan border and collaborating with other powers to contain China’s rise and counter China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean region. Moreover, Beijing has noticed New Delhi’s burgeoning economy, expanding military capabilities and is still absorbing the psychological impact of India overtaking of China as the world’s most populous state in mid-2023. China has also taken note of India’s expanding security ties with the United States and its membership in the reenergized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (commonly called the Quad) along with Australia, Japan and the United States.

Nevertheless, Beijing welcomed New Delhi — along with Islamabad — into the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017 and China and India are founding members of the BRICS forum. Yet, India stands out as the most important developing world state to opt out of Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative, China’s Belt and Road program launched with great fanfare in 2013.

Markey: India’s relations with China have suffered a series of blows over the past decade punctuated by the deadly border skirmishes of 2020. Since then, the two sides have remained locked in an “ abnormal ” state of relations. This is far from the trajectory that Indian policymakers anticipated a decade ago when Prime Minister Modi came to power. Then, top Indian experts and seasoned policymakers foresaw a future of balanced ties between India and all other world powers, including China. Indeed, Modi and his team perceived China as an economic partner essential for India’s growth and development.

That Indian impulse remains powerful even now; over the past year the Modi government appears to have held out hope for a return to more normal relations with China. Indian diplomats believed that military-led talks with their Chinese counterparts on the contested border would deliver enough progress to enable a resumption of summit-level diplomacy with China in 2023, a year of high-profile diplomacy in which Modi was slated to host the SCO, attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa and host the G-20. However, Indian expectations went largely unmet. New Delhi downgraded the SCO to a virtual summit at the last minute, Modi and Xi had only cursory and apparently unproductive discussions in Johannesburg, and Xi snubbed India by electing to skip the G-20 altogether.

What is the near-term outlook for the relationship?

Markey: The China-India diplomatic stalemate of 2023 could easily persist throughout 2024. Modi has strong incentives to hold a tough line with Beijing. Politically, Modi faces an upcoming national election campaign in which India’s opposition party leaders have already criticized his handling of relations with China. Having cast himself as a staunch nationalist, Modi cannot afford to look weak before the Indian electorate. Strategically too, Indian leaders must fear that even the appearance of concessions to China would be as likely to encourage further bullying as to buy stability.

This does not mean India relishes its ongoing contest with Beijing. New Delhi simply feels that the ball is in Beijing’s court: India has been forced to respond to China’s military provocations along the Line of Actual Control and, more generally, to an array of Chinese political, economic and military intrusions into India’s traditional sphere of influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. For now, given the asymmetry of power that favors China, the best New Delhi can do is to redouble its investments in border defenses and cultivate closer ties with outside powers — above all, the United States — with a shared interest in deterring Chinese aggression. Yet even India’s defensive moves risk exacerbating a classic security dilemma with China, prompting an ever more costly, high-stakes competition.

One potential bright spot in this otherwise gloomy picture came in the most recent 20th round of military talks. The two sides reportedly agreed to avoid provocative actions during the brutally cold Himalayan winter and to discuss options for mutual reductions in border troop levels during the spring and summer.

Scobell: While China looks to manage its often testy and sometimes volatile relationship with India, the distrust and suspicion that has cast a dark shadow over Beijing-New Delhi ties for six decades — since the 1962 border war — have persisted and been reinforced by more recent bloody border clashes . Whereas in past decades Sino-Indian tensions and the climate of confrontation were largely geographically confined to their remote landlocked borders, the arena of confrontation has expanded to include the maritime realm — in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Moreover, both China and India now compete for influence and status on the global stage, including for leadership of Global South countries. All this suggests that bilateral relations are unlikely to improve significantly in the foreseeable future.

What does this mean for U.S.-China rivalry and the U.S.-India relationship? And how should Washington respond?

Scobell: Washington should look to strengthen its partnership with New Delhi in ways that reassure India and deter China. While there are limits to the extent to which U.S.-Indian security ties can strengthen because of New Delhi’s strong tradition of nonalignment there is nevertheless room to enhance strategic cooperation in ways that benefit both the national security of each democracy as well as strengthen the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

Washington can meanwhile make clear to Beijing what U.S. goals and interests are vis-à-vis New Delhi. While Chinese leaders may be reluctant to accept such messages at face value, without articulating objectives and priorities, the United States risks Beijing drawing its own uncontested conclusions about U.S. intentions. Clear messaging and constant communication between the United States and China has never been more important. This is true not only in the broader context of U.S.-China global strategic competition but also in the more bounded space of South Asia.

Markey: The Biden administration clearly perceives closer ties with India as a cornerstone in its strategy for geopolitical competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. Yet it is India’s sense of vulnerability to Chinese aggression that has, more than any other factor, led New Delhi to embrace Washington’s offer of strategic partnership. The American liberal democratic worldview, U.S. global leadership and “Western values” all hold rather limited appeal to New Delhi’s current crop of leaders. To the contrary, they would prefer a global order defined by multipolarity in which India could safely sidestep geopolitical competition between China and the United States while navigating its own way to global leadership.

U.S. policymakers should understand India’s distinctive perspective on competition with China. Although India and the United States both see China as a strategic problem, they view it through different lenses of national interest and ideology. India’s leaders are cognizant of the risks they run by a festering border dispute with China and remain uncomfortable with how that insecurity is forcing India into greater dependence on Washington. Such insights should inoculate U.S. policymakers from the false impression that India is eagerly joining a U.S.-led coalition against China and should introduce caution into Washington’s expectations for an alliance-like partnership with New Delhi.

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At Pacific Islands Forum, Tensions Flare Over Taiwan, Geopolitics and Climate

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Last week, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) met in Nukuʻalofa, Tonga, to discuss the challenges affecting the region. The PIF is an intergovernmental organization with the purpose of enhancing cooperation among the countries and territories of Oceania, including Australia, New Zealand, 14 independent Pacific Island countries, and France’s territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia. China and the United States interact with the PIF as dialogue partners and the Pacific Islands have emerged in recent years as another arena of great power competition.

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President Joe Biden’s top national security aide, Jake Sullivan, met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week, along with other top Chinese officials, as Washington and Beijing look to address bilateral tensions. Relations hit one of their lowest points in years in August 2022 after then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and China responded by cutting off bilateral communications on areas ranging from military matters to climate cooperation. But both sides have attempted to pull back from the brink with a series of high-level meetings in the last two years, including between Biden and Xi in November 2023.

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International Relations

Make Your Note

India-China Conflict

03 Jul 2020
10 min read
GS Paper - 2
India and its Neighbourhood
Effect of Policies & Politics of Countries on India's Interests

Why in News

Recently, the third round of Corps Commander-level talks was held between India and China.

Both the sides emphasised on expeditious, phased and step-wise de-escalation in areas close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as priority.

Indian and Chinese troops scuffled at Pangong Tso in Ladakh on 5/6 th May.
After the first round of talks on 6 th June, 2020, clashes occurred in Galwan Valley (Ladakh) that claimed 20 Indian soldiers’ lives and an unknown number of casualties on the Chinese side.
India and China fought a war in 1962.
India has moved in additional divisions, tanks and artillery across the LAC to match Chinese deployments.
Further, India has approved the purchase of 33 Russian fighter jets and upgrades to 59 war planes at a cost of Rs. 18,148 crore.
Citing the “emergent nature of threats” from mobile applications, including popular ones of Chinese origin such as TikTok, ShareIt, UCBrowser, and Weibo, the government has banned 59 apps.
However, the tensions on the border, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic , have thrown light on India’s economic dependencies on China.
India remains reliant on Chinese products in several critical and strategically sensitive sectors, from semiconductors and active pharmaceutical ingredients to the telecom sector, where Chinese vendors are involved not only in India’s 4G network but in on-going 5G trials as well.
In April 2020, the Indian government tightened FDI norms coming from the countries which share land borders with India. Government approval has been made mandatory.
It has described the app ban action as “a deliberate interference in practical cooperation” between the two countries. China’s State media has warned of economic repercussions, such as affecting outbound Chinese investment into India.

Possible Reasons Behind Increased China’s Deployment at the LAC

India’s decision to strengthen its border infrastructure ( Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road ).
India’s United States tilt (e.g. Quad ) amid US-China tensions.
China views India’s assertions regarding Gilgit-Baltistan, as an implicit attack on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) , China’s flagship programme.
China’s growing assertiveness over the South China Sea .
Political and economic tensions within China due to Covid-19 pandemic.
India being a growing power in Asian region.

Line of Actual Control

Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

The alignment of the LAC in the eastern sector is along the 1914 McMahon Line.
The McMohan line marked out previously unclaimed/undefined borders between Britain and Tibet.
The middle sector is the least disputed sector, while the western sector witnesses the highest transgressions between the two sides.
India's claim line is different from that of the LAC. It is the line seen in the official boundary marked on the maps as released by the Survey of India , including Aksai Chin (occupied by China) .
In China’s case, LAC corresponds mostly to its claim line, but in the eastern sector, it claims the entire Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet.
The claim lines come into question when a discussion on the final international boundaries takes place, and not when the conversation is about a working border i.e. LAC.
The aim was a comprehensive solution encompassing all three sectors. The agreed boundary would follow well-defined geographical features and respect the interests of the settled populations.
During Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China in May 2015, the proposal to clarify the LAC was rejected by the Chinese.
However, in the Wuhan (2018) and Mahabalipuram (2019) summits, both China and India had reaffirmed that they will make efforts to “ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas”.

Relevance of Pangong Tso Lake

Location: It is a long narrow, deep, endorheic (landlocked) lake situated at a height of more than 13,000 ft in the Ladakh Himalayas.
Significance: It lies in the path of the Chushul approach, one of the main approaches that China can use for an offensive into Indian-held territory.
India claims that the LAC is coterminous with Finger 8 but it physically controls area only upto Finger 4.
Chinese border posts are at Finger 8, while it believes that the LAC passes through Finger 2.

Way Forward

Detailed protocols are in place for troops to handle face-off incidents. The countries need to stick to the 2005 protocol and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.
On 1 st April, 2020, India and China completed their 70 years of diplomatic relations . Both sides should acknowledge that the situation is precarious, and that the recent days in particular have undone decades of painstakingly negotiated confidence-building mechanisms.
For India, the first priority has to be to restore the status quo ante at the border as it existed in April. This will require both a display of military strength at the border by standing up to Chinese aggression, and diplomatic work by making it clear to China that its intervention will lead to heavy costs across all spheres of the relationship.
India cannot afford to sever all its economic links with the world’s second-largest economy, even in the digital space. Chinese finance will help in sustaining India’s start-up economy. However, through Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan , India can try to replace chinese products with domestic products in the sectors where it is possible. Further, it needs to boost up its economic relations with other countries.

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India China Relations Essay | Essay on India China Relations for Students and Children in English

February 14, 2024 by Prasanna

India China Relations Essay: China and India are two powerful countries in Asia, And These are the two most populous countries and amongst the fastest developing important economies in the World.

The tone of the relationship has varied over time; the two international locations have sought economic cooperation with each other, while time-honored border disputes and economic nationalism in both international locations are the foremost factors of contention.

You can also find more Essay Writing articles on events, persons, sports, technology and many more.

Long and Short Essays on India China Relations for Students and Kids in English

We are providing essay samples on a long essay on India China Relations of 500 words and a short essay on India China Relations150 words on the topic of India China Relations for reference.

Long Essay on India China Relations Essay 500 Words in English

Long Essay on India China Relations Essay is usually given to classes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Looking around the World, the relationship between India and China is now all the hottest topics to discuss. The relationship between India and China is also called Sino-Indian relations or Indian–Chinese relations, which refers to the bilateral relationship between India and China.

Relations between contemporary China and India have been characterised by border disputes, resulting in some military conflicts. The first one is Sino- Indian War of 1962. The Sino-Indian War, also known as the Indo-China War and Sino-Indian Border Conflict, A Chinese disputed Himalayan border was the main cause of the war. After that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai drew the LAC (Line of Actual Control) in 1959.

The second one is Nathu La and Cho la incident in 1967. It was a series of military clashes between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, According to Independent sources, India achieved a “decisive tactical advantage” and managed to hold its own against Chinese forces. According to the Chinese claims, the number of soldiers killed was 32 on the Chinese side and 65 on the Indian side in the Nathu La incident; and 36 Indian soldiers and an ‘unknown number of Chinese were killed in the Cho La incident.

Then just after 20 years, In 1986, a military standoff took place between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley bordering the Tawang district, Arunachal Pradesh and Cona County, Tibet. It was initiated by China moving a company of troops to Wangdung, a pasture to the south of Sumdorong Chu that India believed to be its territory. The standoff was the first military confrontation along the disputed McMahon Line after the 1962 warfare and gave rise to fears of escalation.

In the end, both India and China realised the danger of inadvertent conflict, and after initial posturing, they thought to de-escalate their deployments. The standoff ended with the status quo maintained.

But this is not the end. In early 2017, the two countries clashed at the Doklam plateau along the disputed Sino-Bhutanese border. However, since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties.

Now Both countries have steadily established military infrastructure along with border areas including amidst the 2020 China-India skirmishes( these are part of an ongoing military standoff between China and India.)

This year, again, on 15th June 2020, a lethal military conflict over disputed territory in the Himalayas shook the edifice of China-India relations.

And still, this confrontation series is happening.

Other than The first records of contact between China and India was written during the 2nd century BCE. Buddhism was transmitted from India to China in the 1st century CE. At that time, Trade relations via the Silk Road acted as economic contact between the two regions. They had strong contact before the transmission of Buddhism. In Epic Mahabharat, those references can be found.

Now we can highlight the economic relationship between India and China. China is the biggest trading partner of India. India mostly imports electrical machinery, cell phones, heavy machinery, telecom, power, plastic toys. And China imports organic chemicals, mineral fuels, cotton, ores, plastic items, nuclear machinery, fish, salts, electrical machinery and iron and steel from India.

Recently, after occurring the Ladakh confrontation series attack, current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, banned 49 Chinese apps. Indian citizens are now trying to boycott all Chinese products after learning consequences.

Short Essay on India China Relations Essay 150 Words in English

Short Essay on India China Relations is usually given to classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

In July 2020, Current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi banned 49 apps. Now, this number is 118. If we want to know the background of this step, we need to know about the relationship between India and China.

India and China are the most powerful developing region in Asia. We can define relations between China and India by the events of border disputes; They had Sino-Indian War in 1962. In this war, China was victorious over India. After Sino – Indian war, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister of that time, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai drew the LAC (Line of Actual Control) in 1959.

In 1967, Nathu La and Cho la incident happened. The incidents were several attacks from China. In this incident, 65 Indian soldiers and 35 Chinese soldiers died.

After those attacks, the bitterness of the relationship increased. After 2007 China became one of a powerful countries in the World. Many terrorist groups provoked China to attack LAC. These were some confronts from 2017 to 2020.

India and China now only have some economic relationships. But after having these consequences now, India is trying to cut the tie with China. And Indian citizens are now rigid to boycott every Chinese thing.

10 Lines on India China Relations Essay in English

India and China are the most powerful developing countries in Asia.
China is the biggest trading partner of India.
India faces a trade imbalance heavily in favour of China.
In 1959, India and China drew the imaginary LAC.
The warfares between India and China are the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Nathu La and Cho la incident in 1967, and some attacks from 2017 to 2020.
There are roughly 800 Chinese companies in the Indian domestic market.
In 2020, China had the largest active-duty military force in the World, with about 2.18 million active military personnel.
On 11th May 2020, a clash took place between India and China. Several soldiers on both sides had sustained injuries.
The current Indian Prime Minister banned 49 Chinese apps.
China still wants to create a battle tension at LAC and border skirmishes.

FAQ’s on India China Relations Essay

Question 1. Does China import anything from India?

Answer: China imports organic chemicals, mineral fuels, cotton, ores, plastic items, nuclear machinery, fish, salts, electrical machinery and iron and steel from India.

Question 2. What India Imports from China?

Answer: India imports electrical machinery, cell phones, heavy machinery, telecom, power, plastic toys and critical pharma ingredients, furniture, pharma, fertiliser, food, and textiles, etc. from China.

Question 3. What is LAC Ladakh?

Answer: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is an imaginary demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Question 4. Is the iPhone made in China?

Answer: Apple products are assembled in China.

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Sub-Imperialist India in Washington’s Anti-China “Pivot”

President Biden and Prime Minister Modi of India before the 2023 G20 Summit. Twitter , Public Domain, Link .

Narendra Modi, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) foremost leader, is, as of June 9, 2024, in his third consecutive five-year term in office as India’s Prime Minister. But unlike his earlier two terms in office, when the BJP had a majority in Parliament, he now heads a coalition government. A business-as-usual line of action, however, seems to be carrying the day. The Modi regime since 2014 has unleashed what I have called semi-fascism , which has been nourishing India’s sub-imperialist tendencies. 1 In this article, I try to understand sub-imperialist India’s role in U.S. imperialism’s Indo-Pacific, anti-China “pivot” project. 2 (New Delhi, of course, denies any role in China’s “containment.”)

How did India emerge as a sub-imperialist power and key collaborator with the United States in the U.S. Indo-Pacific anti-China project? I suggest the answer lies in the political-economic foundations of India’s “dependent development” and sub-imperialism. Within this structural setting, India has sought to derive “national advantage” from the trade and technology wars, as well as the New Cold War unleashed by U.S. imperialism against China. Key to this process is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), a strategic security dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, paralleled by joint military exercises (named “Exercise Malabar”) of extraordinary scope. The U.S. imperialism/Indian sub-imperialism relationship has deepened following the putting in place of agreements related to consolidation of the interoperability of the U.S. and Indian armed forces. These moves are coordinated in opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s presumed “String of Pearls” strategy. The reignition of hostility along the India-China border (the “Line of Actual Control,” or LAC) reflects an aspect of the relationship. Though directly antagonistic dimensions of the relationship are also present, India-U.S. relations in their entirety must be seen within “the whole,” centered on China’s resistance to U.S. imperialism.

Legacy of the British Raj: India’s 1962 China War

The British Raj (rule) left a recurring flashpoint in the Indian subcontinent in the form of ill-defined borders, and independent India has followed in its footsteps. Independent India fueled the fire of Tibetan separatism by extending help and support to Tibetans hostile to Beijing. By the 1950s, it had also claimed the territory of Aksai Chin (in 1958); insisted on complete adherence to the so-called McMahon Line; de facto junked UN Security Council Resolution 47 (adopted April 20, 1948) on the right to self-determination in Kashmir; and circumscribed—in certain aspects—the sovereignty of Nepal, Sikkim (which was eventually absorbed into India in 1974), and Bhutan. 3

By 1958, New Delhi was refusing to negotiate the border dispute with China by insisting that the Chinese accept the lines demarcated by the McMahon Line in the Northeast and by its own 1954 maps in the Northwest. Worse, New Delhi began implementing provocative military measures that, in the British imperial vocabulary it used, were called “forward policy,” even more so since November 1961. 4 Not only were these provocations underway, but an anti-Chinese hysteria was “manufactured” in the country. Moreover, New Delhi reckoned that it had the added advantage of the pro-India proclivities of the West, the Soviet Union, and the then newly established nonaligned movement. 5

China, despite its position that, as a matter of principle, it cannot accept unequal treaties imposed by the imperialist powers, was (and has all along been) willing to negotiate to resolve all its border disputes. Indeed, by 1960, China tacitly went by the McMahon Line as it applied to the Eastern Himalayan region in its agreement with Burma. This was a hint that it was willing to do the same at the time in negotiations with India. But India persisted with its forward policy and its refusal to negotiate to resolve the dispute, leaving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with almost no alternative but to engage in a rapid and clinical counteroffensive from October 20 to November 20, 1962. 6

India’s defeat in its 1962 war against China precipitated a huge crisis of confidence. Indian “patriots” of all hues felt deeply humiliated. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army, after defeating the Indian Army in “India’s China War,” and with India still refusing to negotiate, unilaterally declared a ceasefire and withdrew to twenty kilometers north of the McMahon Line (even though China then considered that line imperialist-imposed). Significantly, they withdrew to Ladakh, where they were stationed before the start of hostilities. As the English-born Australian journalist and scholar Neville Maxwell, who was the South Asia correspondent for the Times of London from 1959 to 1967, quoted a former Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office in the Sunday Times in June 1966: “The Chinese withdrawal to their original lines after a victory in the field [was] the first time in recorded history that a great power has not exploited military success by demanding something more.” 7

Maxwell’s account exposed the myth of Chinese “aggression.” In his view, all China wanted (and still wants) was a negotiated settlement that would guarantee stability at its borders. But Jawaharlal Nehru stuck to the old colonial claims and a belief that Aksai Chin had been part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries. As Maxwell wrote: “On the diplomatic front India was meeting every Chinese appeal for a mutual military standstill and negotiations with demands for unilateral Chinese withdrawal from all territory claimed by India.” 8 In the face of defeat, however, Nehru’s hegemonic position in the Indian establishment suffered a jolt. In the nonaligned movement, too, there was a loss of face. But India’s 1962 China War certainly brought the United States into a closer relationship with India following Nehru’s acceptance of U.S. military assistance.

All successor Indian governments have continued with Nehru’s refusal to “submit India’s border claims to negotiation.” 9 Perhaps the Indian power elite’s deep-rooted antagonism, stemming from the humiliating defeat in India’s China War of 1962, has yet to be overcome. This power elite still wants the Indian public to continue falsely to believe that China was the invader and that India’s reckless, British colonial-inspired forward policy had nothing to do with the causes of the war. This effort includes the refusal to declassify the Indian army’s own 1963 assessment of the causes of this defeat, analyzed in the Henderson Brooks-Prem Bhagat Report (the main part of which Maxwell had access to when he was writing India’s China War ). Indeed, once more, now in the twenty-first century, the Indian power elite has on occasion been more than willing to accept U.S. imperialism’s false depiction of China as an aggressive, expansionist power and widely propagate this image among the Indian public.

Legacy of the British Raj: The Himalayan States and More

Post-Independence, in the age of decolonization, New Delhi began to perpetuate colonial forms of domination over Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim, indeed absorbing the latter in 1974. To the extent that Nepal and Bhutan have achieved a degree of independence in India’s dealings with them at least one important reason has been “the emergence of a strong neighboring power, China.” 10 India’s defense coordinates, however, continue to include Nepal and Bhutan, although Indian troops must not be openly stationed on these states’ borders with China. The two small Himalayan nations have been against such stationing of Indian troops since India’s 1962 China War.

In classic colonial categorization, Nepal and Bhutan (and Sikkim prior to its 1974 absorption into India) have been and are “buffer states,” an “explicit part” of the “colonial design of territorial insulation for India, three lines and two layers thick.” There was first an “inner line…where direct British administration ended.” This inner line included the North-East Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh, which, in the Chinese view, India held (and holds) as the heir of British colonialism. “The next line was represented by the Durand line in NWFP [the North-West Frontier Province, now part of Pakistan], the northern borders of Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the McMahon line for India proper.” The outermost lines “were the borders of Tibet and Afghanistan with China and Russia, the perceived hostile powers. In this way the Himalayan states became buffer states behind another buffer state, Tibet, after 1910,” even though Chinese suzerainty was a fact, reluctantly conceded. 11

No wonder Chinese suppression of the rebellion of the Tibetan oligarchy in March 1959 alarmed the Indian power elite. The Chinese communists were accused of violating the autonomy agreement of 1951, suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, depriving the Tibetan lamas and feudal landlords of their freedom (to ruthlessly exploit their serfs). 12 After all, for New Delhi, the “territorial insulation for India” of the “outermost line” and the “second layer” from China (the “perceived hostile power”) had disappeared. For India as the “successor” to British “rights,” forward policy was then, thus, more than due.

As “independence for India loomed [in the mid-1940s], the British…[prepared] for the transfer of ‘responsibilities’ in the [three] Himalayan states.” Immediately following independence in 1947, “India made agreements with the Himalayan states freezing the status quo”: in 1949 with Bhutan, in July 1950 with Nepal, and in December 1950 with Sikkim. 13

The treaty with Nepal had a “mutual defence article and an article regulating arms imports.” The treaty with Sikkim “reaffirmed Sikkim’s protectorate status and gave India the right to station troops in Sikkim for defence purposes.… Sikkim was but one step from absorption.” 14 The treaty with Bhutan “refurbished the existing colonial relationship.” The second clause of it made Bhutan agree “‘to be guided by the advice of the government of India in regard to its external relations’…[which] infringes Bhutan’s sovereignty and raises questions of the validity [in international law] of the entire treaty.” Article Six of the treaty allows Bhutan’s import of arms, but only at the discretion of India. Article Nine, on the adjudication of disputes, is “weighted in India’s favour.” Article Ten “declares the validity of the treaty will be ‘in perpetuity.'” 15

However, China wanted (and wants) Bhutan to be sovereign and independent, and especially so with the deepening of the Sino-Indian border dispute that witnessed “increasing Indian involvement in Bhutan’s affairs,” to the extent that New Delhi even began to consider Bhutan “as part of its ‘forward policy’ in the Himalaya.” In December 1958 and March 1959, “Zhou Enlai in notes to India claimed that any border dispute that there might be between China and Bhutan was none of India’s business.… After the first Sino-Indian border clashes took place, Bhutan refused an Indian request to allow its troops to enter Bhutan. The following day 21 October 1962, China issued a statement…declaring China would never invade Bhutan.” 16

Almost a decade following India’s China War of 1962, India relaunched its bid to be acknowledged as the regional power in South Asia. Military “aid”—including, crucially, Indian military intervention in East Pakistan during the Bengali nationalist war of liberation from Pakistan in 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh—seemed to have proved such prowess. But it did not take long to evoke Bangladeshi resentment when New Delhi tried to exercise a predominant influence over Dacca. Then, in 1988, India’s military intervened under the rubric of Operation Cactus in the Maldives (a former British colonial protectorate) to prevent an attempted coup d’état to overthrow the Washington-, London-, and New Delhi-backed autocratic Maldivian president, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Significantly, an Indian Peace Keeping Force intervened militarily in Sri Lanka in 1987−1989, backed by Washington in the civil war that had begun in 1983, to “neutralize” the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, this turned out to be a costly misadventure in which India persisted, even when the Indian Peace Keeping Force was eventually perceived as an “occupation army” and asked to leave, which it finally did in 1990.

In sum, following in the footsteps of the British Raj and in line with ultranationalist delusions of an Akhand Bharat and “Greater India,” New Delhi seems to have sought to establish unequal, superior-subordinate relations with the countries of South Asia. 17 But there is a larger perspective in which to examine the roots of India’s sub-imperialist proclivities in the new millennium.

The Political Economy of Indian Sub-Imperialism

Drawing on the Brazilian Marxist scholar and activist, Ruy Mauro Marini, and his understanding of dependency, I conceive of dependency for India as a structural relation of subordination of the state (and big Indian capital) in the post-Independence period to the state (and monopoly capitalist class) of the United States and other monopoly capitalist countries. This is in a framework within which the composition of the forms of superexploitation in the relations of production in India were significantly modified over time to ensure the expanded reproduction of this subordinate relation. The three forms of superexploitation in the relations of production are surplus value derived from the real wage being lower than the value of labor power; surplus value from significant extension of the working day without adequate remuneration; and surplus value from increase in the productivity of labor (through systematic reliance on import of more capital-intensive technology), together with severe intensification of labor.

The disparate parts of the production system in India are: domestic and subsistence production; petty-commodity production; production from subordinate small and medium Indian capital; production from subordinate big Indian capital; and production from relatively less-subordinate big Indian capital and leading multinational capital. This structure of production stems mainly from the historical reality that India has not been through the stage of competitive capitalism. Moreover, this unequal, disparate structure of production, scarred by superexploitation, has been marked by value transfers, unequally divided in their upward flow through the degree of monopoly/monopsony hierarchy within the economy and onward to the global imperialist center. Superexploitation is rationalized on the basis that subordinate capitals, including big Indian business, deem it necessary to compensate for the loss of value and surplus value they endure. Or to put it the other way around, the India’s loss of value to international capital in the unequal exchange process is predicated on the superexploitation of those at the lower income levels in its population.

Over time, the relative weight of the surplus value from high labor productivity cum severe intensification of labor in the superexploitative relations of production increases. A part of the surplus product/value also transfers to big Indian capital and multinational capital, with onward transfer to the global imperialist center. Even as these changes have been necessary for the expanded reproduction of dependency, they also bring about the transition from peripheral underdevelopment to semiperipheral underdevelopment. The latter, euphemistically called “dependent development,” signifies change in how the country is integrated in the world-capitalist system following national capitalist development. However, there are additional conditions required to ensure the expanded reproduction of the relations of dependency and “dependent development.” 18

“Workers” in India are engaged in domestic and subsistence production, petty-commodity production, production based on the formal subsumption of their labor to capital, and production based on the real subsumption of their labor to capital. 19 Taken together, they constitute one huge mass of human beings whose “living [and working] conditions represent the focal point of all [the] inhuman conditions in modern [Indian] society.” 20 In India, this huge, exploited majority also includes at its bottom the socially oppressed, toiling Dalit and tribal communities. There has been no marked improvement in the relative standard of living of the exploited majority. This is mainly because the change in the structure of production has not been accompanied by a similar change in the occupational structure of the labor force. And with the relatively greater opening of the Indian economy to international trade, investment, and finance from the 1990s onward, this structural malady is worsening.

Domestic and subsistence production, petty-commodity production, and production from the formal subsumption of labor to capital are subordinate forms of production under capitalism. Large corporate capital engaged in the real subsumption of labor takes advantage of these conditions to negate labor’s potential gains that have been institutionalized in protective labor law. A large reserve army of labor relative to the active army of wage labor, relatively low-priced worker-consumption goods and services produced by the subordinate forms of production, and resort to subcontracting to subordinate capital together make possible payment of low money wages—benefiting institutionalized large corporate capital that extracts surplus value by the real subsumption of labor. All of this is done by violating laws regarding the minimum wage rate, working conditions, and social security payments.

Unpaid domestic work, subsistence/petty-commodity production, and production based on the formal subsumption of labor to capital lay the groundwork for big Indian business and the subsidiaries of multinational corporations to potentially gain super-profits through a combination of twentieth/twenty-first-century technology and nineteenth-century labor practices. But, of course, such super-profits also come from capture of the hindmost of the value transfers, including concealed “value” transfers from unpaid reproductive, domestic, and subsistence labor.

For Marini, sub-imperialism “implies two basic components: on the one hand, an intermediate organic composition of national productive systems on the world scale and, on the other hand, the exercise of a relatively autonomous expansionist policy, not only accompanied by a greater integration in the imperialist productive system but also maintained within the hegemonic framework exercised by imperialism on the international scene.” 21 A sub-imperialist power is not able to overcome the structure of dependency—technological and import dependence, especially in the production of capital goods, capitalist consumption goods, and sophisticated armaments. 22 Big Indian businesses cannot do without reliance on the center’s multinational corporations, both within India and where they engage in outward foreign direct investment in the state-of-the-art manufacturing sector.

This understanding of the main political-economic characteristics of sub-imperialism suggests why the Modi government was driven to legislate labor codes (yet to be adopted) to replace India’s protective labor laws, and thus to institutionalize the superexploitation of those who produce the surplus value and the surplus product. Importantly, the labor codes also legitimize severe intensification of labor in the factories of companies like Maruti Suzuki India, the Indian subsidiary of Suzuki Motor Corporation, which use high labor-productivity technologies.

But despite the superexploitation of Indian labor, technological dependence and lack of international competitiveness in the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the East and Southeast Asian economies have forced India to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). India withdrew from the RCEP because its manufacturing sector has not been able to withstand the import competition that came from implementation of the free trade agreements it had already entered with the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), plus Japan and South Korea.

The most significant structural change since the 1980s has been the emergence of a relatively independent financial complex that sits on top of the world’s real economy and its national units, significantly influencing the structure and behavior of those real economies and the corporations therein. 23 Following the globalization of India’s financial markets in the first decade of the twenty-first century, international financial capital has been a prominent structural characteristic of the Indian economy.

National production systems, including India’s, have witnessed a gradual dismantling. The production of capitalist consumption goods and capital goods have a relatively lower domestic value added to the value of production than before. Given the structural problem of effective demand that comes with the pursuit of a private, investment-led growth strategy, exacerbated by extreme inequality, self-imposed limits on deficit spending for civilian purposes, and limping mass consumption demand, the importance of “capitalist” consumption goods production, military production, nuclear energy, the nuclear weapons program, and exports has been emphasized. 24

A domestic military-industrial complex and nuclear program are predicated upon relative autonomy vis-à-vis U.S. imperialism, but such autonomy is constrained by technological dependence and failure to develop national systems of integrated production. Militarism and the imperative to build a military-industrial complex are driven not merely by refusing to negotiate with China to resolve longstanding border disputes and the de facto voiding of the Security Council’s 1948 resolution on Kashmir, but also from becoming a strategic partner in U.S. imperialism’s anti-China project.

A dependent military-industrial complex is in place in India, for, even as India has been one of the world’s largest importers of armaments, its market for armaments never becomes saturated. 25 This process begins with the ever-increasing supply of armaments to the U.S. armed forces and those of U.S. allies and strategic partners, mainly from the U.S. military-industrial complex, especially those armaments based on advances in science and technology devoted to constantly developing the means of destruction. China’s demand for armaments increases in response to overt U.S. hostility. 26 When there is a supply of such armaments to China’s armed forces to defend China—mainly from the U.S. military threat—the demand for such armaments by India’s armed forces also increases and is met through both imports and domestic military production. It is U.S. imperialism that has been drawing and driving China and India into arms races, cementing the role of the United States as a “major defense partner” to India. 27

Big Indian business has been making significant inroads in defense procurement aided by the government using the “offset policy,” under which foreign suppliers of defense hardware must source a part of the contract value locally, to encourage the foreign companies to set up joint ventures with big Indian private business partners. The latter are mere junior partners of the foreign equipment manufacturers.

India’s Production Linked Incentive Scheme and associated “Make in India” (for India and the world) initiative must be viewed in the international context as attempting to derive national advantage from the trade and technology wars and the New Cold War unleashed by U.S. imperialism against China. 28 The U.S. government has been pressuring U.S. multinational capital to shift production in the global supply chains they control from China to countries like India.

Increasingly, big Indian businesses have become arbitrageurs of India’s cheap “human capital,” with a structural propensity to rely systematically on imports of technology, especially following the institution of stronger intellectual property rights and the rules governing them, and structurally adjusting to the imperialist center-determined, changing international division of labor. But, of course, these businesses compensate, through superexploitation and surplus transfers from subordinate producers, the loss of value and surplus value that they suffer due to being a dependent capitalist class.

The digital economy has, however, excited top managers of U.S. big tech companies to applaud India as a “global technology/software superpower.” The reality is found in the “Silicon Valley Imperial Innovation System,” the principal features of which are the derivation of innovation advantage through adroit network management of an unequal international division of scientific-technological labor in research and development efforts, with Silicon Valley as the pivot around which the semiperipheral research and development links are entwined, while strategic investment (including “venture capital”) and intellectual property management ensure control over the resulting innovations.

The knowledge and efficiency of a semiperipheral workforce in the science-technology-engineering-mathematics field (who are paid a fraction of the salary of their Silicon Valley counterparts) assembled in technological innovation-oriented “global capability centers” and startups, and—through outsourcing and offshoring—in Indian cities such as Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai are significant sources of profit capture by U.S. tech companies. 29 Silicon Valley’s technological advantage stems, in part, from technologically innovative labor in India carried out by an Indian science-technology-engineering-mathematics workforce, mainly for U.S. tech companies. The unequal relation between Silicon Valley in the United States and the so-called New Silicon Valleys in India reflects the imperialism/sub-imperialism relation.

Another aspect of U.S. big tech’s unequal relation with big Indian capital is in the realm of “mining” the data of users, or what India’s topmost billionaire, Mukesh Ambani, has called “data colonization.” Ambani has asked Modi to end this capture by global corporations. 30 But after Ambani’s telecom business Reliance Jio (a part of his conglomerate, Reliance Industries) grabbed a major share of the telecom market, he opportunistically collaborated financially (through selling Reliance Jio stock) and technologically with U.S. tech giants such as Facebook (Meta) and Google (Alphabet), both of which were given representation on the Reliance Jio’s board. Mining the data of users is at the core of the business models of both Facebook and Google. Indeed, by then Reliance Jio was already collaborating with Microsoft, a major supplier of cloud storage services in India, to set up data centers in India.

Now if one considers the fact that U.S. big tech companies like Microsoft, Google, and Facebook give the U.S. government direct access to their users’ data, and that the U.S. government advances the global business interests of U.S. big tech companies, then one has to reckon with the reality of the U.S. “government-corporate surveillance complex.” 31 Will there then be the possibility of user data access to the Anglosphere intelligence alliance, Five Eyes (comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand)? There is an indication that India is also on its radar, for instance, following intelligence shared among Five Eyes partners that New Delhi’s covert operatives were involved in an assassination in Canada. 32 Here is the possibility of sub-imperialist India entangled in U.S. imperialism’s worldwide web of surveillance capitalism. 33 Unlike China’s digital sovereignty, India, despite its abundant talent, does not seem to be bent on having its own companies equivalent to Facebook, Google, or WhatsApp.

Sub-Imperialist India in Imperialist Geopolitics

It should by now be evident that I consider the framework of sub-imperialism important in understanding India’s role in U.S. imperialism’s confrontation with China. In this account of Indian sub-imperialism, it is necessary to emphasize the current global (and unstable) balance between the U.S.-led Triad imperialism of the Global North and an emerging multipolar Global South, with a few semiperipheral countries—China most prominently among them—showing the way toward multipolarity. This is through a rejection of Washington’s “rules-based international order” (the rules set by the United States in a clique with other powerful countries, and hence, hardly international), while instead advocating abiding by the UN-based order of sovereign states reinforced by international law. 34 Acutely aware of this global and unsteady balance, and with the United States bent on retaining its global dominance by “containing” China, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran, among others, India has been engaged in a contradictory role, trying to appear neutral, or “multi-aligned,” but, given the structure of India’s rule by its dominant classes, it is essentially partisan, siding with U.S. imperialism.

What are the geopolitical moves that have taken India to where it is now as a sub-imperialist power in the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific, anti-China “pivot”?

The obscurantist Hindutva “nationalist” BJP sensed a golden opportunity when in 1991–1992 the hegemonic bloc promoting consensual support for the dependent, monopoly capitalist, ruling class across Indian civil society, took a complete ideological U-turn toward neoliberalism. 35 The BJP rapidly consolidated (not entirely successfully) the majority Hindu electorate into a unified vote repository to win electoral mandates. Electoral successes in 1999, 2014, and 2019 opened the way to making and furthering inroads into the political management of the ideologically transformed hegemonic bloc, and, from there, to entrenchment in the citadel of political power—the office of the prime minister.

Fortunately for the Modi government that took office in 2014, integrating India into Washington’s anti-China, Indo-Pacific “strategic planning was well under way during the [Congress party-led] United Progressive Alliance government (2004–2014).” The then U.S. president Barack Obama had launched Washington’s “Pivot to Asia” in late 2011, aimed at ending China’s resurgence—economic, diplomatic, and strategic/military—in the region, by which time the U.S.-India strategic partnership was already off the ground. The process only had to be undertaken “much faster under the Modi government.” 36

Much of the anti-Communist Asian security architecture put in place from the 1950s onward took the form of the San Francisco system of highly asymmetric, “hub-and-spoke” bilateral security alliances, with the United States as the “hub” and the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand as the “spokes.” U.S. pressure on Japan over the years, especially post-September 11, 2001, to shoulder more of the defense responsibility, and the resources increasingly demanded, has been instrumental, among other driving factors, to the revival of Japanese militarism. Moreover, even as the United States has retained the highly asymmetric, hub-and-spoke architecture of bilateral security alliances marked by domination-subordination, Washington has been exhorting and guiding the “spokes” countries to also enter security alliances among themselves.

Importantly, Washington has brought together trilateral partnerships/alliances (U.S.-Japan-India and U.S.-Australia-Japan) and a quadrilateral partnership (the Quad and U.S.-Australia-Japan-India). A significant geopolitical reception that the concept and term “Indo-Pacific” received was in the U.S. renaming in 2018 of its “Pacific Command” as “Indo-Pacific Command.” Japan’s role should, however, not be underestimated. One influential view is that “Japan originated the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”—even though the term itself was revived (it was originally used by the German-Nazi geopolitical analyst Karl Haushofer) by Hillary Clinton in 2010. Japan inaugurated the first iteration of the Quad in 2007, and cooperated with the United States in 2017 to revive a more robust Quad 2.0.” 37

Renaming and assigning credit aside, it is obvious that now the eastern Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific have together become the organizing framework for security and military strategy and its related aspects of deployment and partnerships. India has a distinct locational advantage in concentrating and deploying its forces in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) compared to China, given the latter’s extended and more vulnerable lines of communication that would hinder the rapid concentration and deployment of its forces. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, once a naval base and penal colony of the British Raj, have been developed as a vital defense establishment hosting the Andaman and Nicobar Command operated jointly by India’s army, navy, and air force. Constant development of and upgrades to military and related civilian infrastructure despite the ecological threat this entails, especially since 2001, have been considered pivotal, as the southern group of these islands are close to the main shipping lane from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea via the Malacca Strait.

With respect to U.S. naval deployment in the IOR, New Delhi has been insisting on application of the Goldilocks principle—neither a “too hot” deployment nor a “too cold” stationing of the U.S. Navy there, but “just the right amount,” envisaging a leading role for the Indian Navy in this expanse. India has been designated as a “net security provider” in the IOR. Exercise Malabar, which has eventually become an integral part of the Quad, originated as a U.S.-India initiative. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington began to establish “defense cooperation” with New Delhi. Of course, New Delhi had already begun to alter its foreign policy in line with what Washington expected, for instance, secretly allowing U.S. military planes to refuel at Indian airports during the 1990–1991 Gulf War that witnessed U.S. imperialism’s barbaric bombing of Iraq. At the time, India needed IMF and World Bank conditional loans in the wake of fiscal and balance of payments crises. Exercise Malabar was on its way, which started in 1992 as a bilateral U.S.-India naval exercise, the main aim being the building of interoperability between the participating naval forces.

Exercise Malabar was expanded to include Japan, Australia, and Singapore in 2007, the year the Quad was initiated, but the next year, Australia became ambivalent regarding the implications of participation in this Indo-Pacific anti-China Quad. However, in 2010 Australia indicated its intent to return, eventually becoming a permanent partner in Exercise Malabar from 2020 onward. This followed the 2017 Quad meeting in Manila at which the then U.S. president (Donald Trump) and the then prime ministers of India (Modi), Japan (Shinzo Abe), and Australia (Malcolm Turnbull) agreed to counter China militarily and diplomatically in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the South China Sea . 38

The United States, Japan, and Australia (so far tentatively) envision a multinational NATO-like military alliance to sustain U.S. hegemony, which is being challenged by China, in the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region. Note the eastern drift of the Malabar exercises. In 2020, the U.S., Japanese, Australian, and Indian naval forces of the Quad came together for Exercise Malabar in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, near the Malacca Strait. In 2021, the exercise was held by the Quad countries’ navies in the Philippine Sea and the Bay of Bengal; in 2022, in the East China Sea; and, in 2023, in the South Pacific Ocean.

As we have seen, the Indian Navy has been in military exercises with the U.S. and Australian navies and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force not merely in the Indian Ocean—the Indian Navy’s “primary area of interest,” according to its Maritime Security Strategy of 2015—but also near the Malacca Strait, in the Philippine Sea, in the East China Sea, and in the South Pacific Ocean. What is so far absent is a Quad Malabar exercise in the South China Sea. But, provocatively, a U.S. Seventh Fleet’s guided-missile destroyer led ships from India, Japan, and the Philippines in a military cruise through the South China Sea on May 2–8, 2019. The Indian and Republic of Singapore navies also cohosted the first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, held on May 2–8, 2023, in the South China Sea.

A July 2016 ruling at the Hague of the Permanent Court of Arbitration—in a proceeding in which China was not represented—in favor of the Philippines declared that Beijing’s claimed territorial “historic rights” in the South China Sea over the area within the “nine-dash line” have no legal basis. 39 With alacrity, Washington insisted that the court’s ruling was “binding.” But, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, China was wholly within its rights to opt out of and not be bound by any arbitration to which it had not agreed. Indeed, in the past, several developed capitalist countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom, have done the same. Moreover, the United States is not even a signatory to the Convention. The other claimants in such disputes in the South China Sea, Malaysia and Vietnam, also joined in to support the arbitration court’s ruling, but so too did India, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and others.

The use of “international law” in the service of the colonial powers and imperialism, its place of origin, was hardly challenged prior to the advent of the United Nations, and largely remains shaped by those same powers today. 40 In no area is this truer than in relation to sovereignty. China has opted out of international arbitration on sovereignty issues but has always been willing to resolve such disputes through negotiations leading to a bilateral agreement. 41 Washington, however, is bent on imposing its way. It deployed the U.S. Navy to conduct a joint patrol with its Philippines counterpart to the Scarborough Shoal, a reef in the South China Sea that is also under dispute. Although such patrols risk initiating military standoffs with Chinese vessels, Washington seems bent on militarizing the disputes in the South and East China Seas. 42

The Imperialism/Sub-Imperialism Relationship and “Greater India” Geopolitics

How then may one characterize the imperialism/sub-imperialism relationship between Washington and New Delhi, especially with respect to the former’s Indo-Pacific anti-China project? Marini emphasized the fact that the sub-imperialist state and its capitalist class are “not in any kind of strategic conflict with imperialism. Instead, the lines in the relationship between imperialism and sub-imperialism are blurred by an ‘antagonistic cooperation’ which ties the dependent country’s own cycle of capital to the dominant economy of the advanced centre.” The term “antagonistic cooperation” used by Marini implies that there is “a degree of conflict” between the state (and capitalist class) of the imperialist country and the state (and big business) of the sub-imperialist country, but this does not lead “to a breakdown in relations or open confrontation.” Cooperation and collaboration “prove more the rule than the exception.” 43

This “antagonistic cooperation” framework (underlying the imperialism/sub-imperialism relationship) is illustrated by the course taken by Washington’s conflict with New Delhi over India’s nuclear program and its eventual resolution. Washington was initially antagonistic toward New Delhi in the wake of Pokhran-II—five nuclear bomb test explosions conducted by India at the Indian Army’s Pokhran Test Range on May 11 and 13, 1998. 44 The United States imposed direct economic sanctions and temporarily suspended the joint Exercise Malabar. New Delhi, however, to the satisfaction of Washington, explained that it had conducted the nuclear tests because of the imperative to develop nuclear weapons and capabilities to counter the “China threat,” and offered to collaborate with Washington. 45

After extensive negotiations, Washington’s response was the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative of July 2005, leading to the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008. This in turn cleared the pathway for Nuclear Suppliers Group states to export uranium to India, which had rejected the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This agreement also facilitated New Delhi’s civil nuclear cooperation agreements with a few other “friendly” countries. Moreover, Washington assisted India in joining the multilateral export control regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group, in order to gain access to dual-use imports. 46 But one must ask: in enabling the 2008 nuclear agreement with India and getting India, which was not party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, a waiver for nuclear trade, to what extent was the United States going to force India to align its foreign, defense, and security policies with those of its own?

The intent of the United States to force India to align its foreign, defense, and security policies with those of its own was undisguised. The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (the Hyde Act) adapted the prerequisites of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to authorize nuclear cooperation with India. What conditions did the Hyde Act oblige the United States to fulfill? India must have “a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States.” 47 Moreover, the conditions governing nuclear transfers to India, that is, “nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology” or “ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology” must, among other things, be consistent with “the common defense and security” of the two countries. 48 Further, “nuclear commerce with India” must remain “in the national security interest of the United States.” 49 This is imperialism written into U.S. law.

Nevertheless, in turning a potentially conflictual situation into one of cooperation and by treating India as an exception and a de facto nuclear weapons state, Washington thus found a way for India to supplement or make available the limited supplies of uranium ore mined and processed in India for military purposes. After all, a strategic partnership in the making, with New Delhi as a junior partner in Washington’s Indo-Pacific anti-China project, was what mattered.

Marini’s characterization of the relationship between imperialism and sub-imperialism as one of “antagonistic cooperation” throws light on the contradictions, i.e., internal conflicts tending to split the two functionally united entities. Antagonism and cooperation, however, cannot go on together for long, unless cooperation turns the antagonism into its opposite, non-antagonism, as when India became a nuclear weapons state. This is what leads me to reformulate the imperialism/sub-imperialism relation by suggesting that although the contradictions between an imperialist power and its sub-imperialist partner are both antagonistic and non-antagonistic in nature, for the sub-imperialist power is both a victim and a beneficiary of imperialism, the antagonistic contradictions tend to be handled by the two entities in a manner that prevents them from developing into open antagonism.

In other words, given the Indian ruling class and its interests, when a contradiction assumes an antagonistic form, it is handled in a cooperative manner that fashions it as non-antagonistic, as in the instance of India’s emergence as a nuclear weapons power. But this is no more than a tendency. The cause of antagonism may, however, also be India taking advantage of Washington’s antagonistic contradictions with China, deriving a much better bargain for allowing itself to be drawn into the Sino-American conflict in the Western Pacific. This included its continuing embrace of Russia, India’s largest external source of crude oil, for cheap oil, fertilizers, S-400 Triumf mobile surface-to-air missiles, and nuclear power plants, all with payments in national currencies. Russia has helped to resolve India’s LAC dispute with China, mainly in what India refers to as Eastern Ladakh. Keeping some antagonistic elements in the U.S. imperialism/Indian sub-imperialism relation alive and well might just be to sub-imperialist India’s advantage. Of course, the likely outcome of a contradiction on this scale between an imperialist power and its sub-imperialist partner is that there is potential for such a non-antagonistic contradiction to turn antagonistic, or a managed antagonistic contradiction to turn openly antagonistic, if it is not handled properly by making mutual adjustments. After all, the imperialist/sub-imperialist partnership evolves and develops over time with the emergence and resolution of contradictions. 50

The opposing tendencies in the imperialism/sub-imperialism relation have so far not been allowed to turn openly antagonistic. The provisions in all the agreements related to the consolidation of the interoperability and other aspects of the military partnership of the armed forces of the U.S. and India are now being implemented. These include the General Security of Military Information Agreement (signed in 2002) and its Industrial Security Annex (signed in 2019); the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (signed in 2012); the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (signed in 2016); the award of U.S. Strategic Trade Authorization status (in 2017); the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (signed in 2018); the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (signed in 2020); and the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (signed in 2022). In addition, there are the Security of Supply Arrangements and Reciprocal Defense Procurement Arrangement agreements signed in 2023. Among other things, the security agreements enable the United States to store armaments in India for use in times of supply disruptions. 51

The Indian power elite considers such enhancement of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership as vital to the process of India realizing its “leading power” ambitions. At Washington’s behest, since 2019, India has been what self-styled Indian security analysts call “a permanent invitee” to G7 summits. Specifically, designating India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016 entitled it to defense technology sharing at a “level commensurate with that of…[the] closest [U.S.] allies and partners” in return for the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, under which the U.S. military can “forward deploy” at Indian military bases. 52 India has also become one of the hubs for the U.S. Navy’s maintenance, repair, and forward deployment of its ships and other military assets in the Indo-Pacific. In return, India now has access to U.S. military bases, including refueling facilities, in Djibouti, Diego Garcia, Guam, and Subic Bay.

The Quad is now widely viewed as an anti-China “diplomatic” and military arrangement, that is, relatively “loose.” However, unlike India, Japan and Australia are “key NATO global partners,” whose national security policy is beholden to the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” and they are hosts to U.S. military bases. New Delhi has not yet opted for that kind of military alliance with Washington. Nevertheless, India does not seem to have any strategic discord with the United States over the latter’s approach to questions regarding Israel-Palestine, Iran, and Taiwan, or over the functional U.S. relations with Pakistan—even as New Delhi continues to maintain its beneficial relations with Russia and Iran despite the U.S. sanctions. The case of India’s friendly relations with Russia has clear antagonistic aspects in the sub-imperial relations that now are increasing.

The Indian state also exercises a degree of relative political autonomy vis-à-vis the United States by tactically leaning on the semiperipheral country bloc, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Chinese and Russian-led Eurasian Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But unlike China and Russia, countries in the BRICS, and the SCO, which have unambiguously rejected the geopolitics of Triad imperialism led by Washington, India has been (and is) running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.

India’s state-led infrastructural projects in South Asia are, however, overshadowed by China’s BRI, which some member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have joined, with the exceptions of India and Bhutan (the latter under the former’s tutelage). Importantly, as part of the BRI, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port infrastructure combined with onward shipping has been creating a significant alternative route. Oil is to be brought via pipeline from the Gwadar Port to southwestern China; exports from that region are in turn to be transported to Gwadar for onward shipment to their destinations.

Financed mainly by the China Development Bank, the China Ex-Im Bank, the China-promoted Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the BRICS New Development Bank, the BRI combines debt-financed infrastructural development tied to contracts with China’s state-owned and private enterprises, with industrial development in the vicinity. 53 Of course, BRI projects also cover Central Asia, West Asia, and Africa, as well as the Indochina Peninsula, through the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor. In South Asia, these projects are mainly in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, operating through, respectively, the CPEC (including the aforementioned expansion of the Gwadar Port); the expansion of the Hambantota Port, operating since 2010 in Sri Lanka; the Belt and Road cooperation between China and Bangladesh; the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network between Nepal and China; and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. 54

Under Sri Lankan management, the Hambantota Port incurred heavy losses, and, in the face of deep financial distress and unable to service the debt, the Sri Lankan government in 2016 went in for a debt-equity swap, handing over the port on a ninety-nine-year lease to a Chinese state-owned enterprise that was given a majority stake in the company managing the port. As per the agreement, the Chinese state-owned enterprise consented to undertake substantial investments to make the port profitable, and then divest a part of its equity stake to a Sri Lankan company within ten years. 55

The long lease of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Chinese management of it have raised security concerns and apprehensions in New Delhi and Washington. The imperialist power and its sub-imperialist partner decided to match Chinese influence. They began by building a deepwater terminal in Colombo Port, with a U.S. International Development Finance Corporation loan tied to Modi’s favored big Indian business group, the Adani Group of Companies, one of whose ventures, Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone, has a 51 percent equity capital stake in the Colombo Western Container Terminal. 56

What has stirred deep security apprehensions in India’s power elite are the CPEC, including the Gwadar Port, and the Hambantota Port. This is evident in repeated references to the U.S. military-intelligence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton’s “String of Pearls” geopolitical presumption that China is putting into place military-cum-economic assets and relationships along its maritime communication lines from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Persian Gulf. 57

In the IOR, New Delhi and Washington have been warning Sri Lanka and the Maldives against allowing growing Chinese influence. Enhanced Indian military influence in the Maldives has been resented locally, and elections in the fall of 2023 and spring of 2024 brought an overwhelming victory for forces demanding national sovereignty. The new government expelled the Indian armed forces and ended secret agreements that infringed national sovereignty. But, for India and the United States, the fact that the Maldives—a British protectorate from 1887 until independence in 1965—is located on the main marine routes of the Indian Ocean and is close to the U.S. military base in Diego Garcia seem crucial to keeping this archipelago away from “Chinese influence.” 58 Already, the national sovereignty forces have been universally termed “Pro-Chinese” in the Western media. 59

Renewed Hostility Along the India-China Border LAC

Renewed hostility along the India-China border LAC is related to India’s deepening strategic partnership with the United States. Crucially, it was the United States that provided India with real-time military intelligence in 2020−2021 related to the military skirmishes along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and West Tibet, and where Ladakh touches Xinjiang in the north and Tibet in the east and south. On the ground, the skirmishes have been due to differences in what China considers the LAC and what India insists is the LAC. Yet, soon after these military encounters, China seemed to indicate that it was not intent on gaining territory in areas lying between the LAC as defined by the Indian and the Chinese sides and that it was willing to keep in mind the actual state of the border areas. This is when it withdrew from “the grey zone around Pangong lake.” 60 But, despite this conciliatory gesture on Beijing’s part, in late 2022, the Indian government organized a U.S.-India high-altitude military exercise in the northern state of Uttarakhand, just one hundred kilometers from the disputed India-China border.

What explains the renewed hostility along the LAC in the India-China border dispute?

On June 26, 2017, Indian troops crossed over the Sikkim section of India’s border with China to block the construction of a road on the Chinese side in the Doklam (or Donglang) Plateau, creating a third point of conflict on the border with China. India’s Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, Indian big media, and most self-styled security experts suggested that China was bent upon pushing the Sino-Indian-Bhutanese border further south so that in the event of war, it would be better placed to “grab” the Siliguri corridor—the so-called chicken’s neck—linking West Bengal and the rest of India to seven northeastern states, thereby cutting off the only in-country direct land link with those states. That this far-fetched presumption justifies incursion into territory claimed by China and under Chinese control (but disputed by Bhutan, which is under Indian domination) reflects the extent of the buildup of hostility towards China since the Modi regime came into office in 2014.

India under the Modi government has disregarded the September 1993 India-China Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, the 1996 Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures, and the 2005 Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures. Taken together, these were accords on maintaining the status quo on the LAC pending a settlement of the border dispute (the 1993 agreement); military confidence building measures to be undertaken to avoid the outbreak of hostilities (the 1996 agreement); and modalities to implement the confidence building measures (the 2005 protocol).

Indeed, with India under the Modi regime deepening its strategic partnership with the United States, the government ignored commitments made in the April 2005 India-China Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. The first article of this agreement explicitly states that the “differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.” Article Four states that the “two sides will give due consideration to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of mutual and equal security.” Article Five states that in attaining a resolution of the border dispute the “two sides will take into account, inter alia , historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas.” Moreover, as reflected in Article Seven, in “reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” 61

With the imperialist power’s support for the sub-imperialist power’s sovereignty claims, and the sub-imperialist power in partnership with the imperialist power in the latter’s anti-China Indo-Pacific project, will India, like China, conscientiously seek a reasonable negotiated settlement of the dispute with China? Will it adhere to the April 2005 India-China Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question? The India-China LAC remains on the list of the most militarized frontiers in the world. But here too, the aspect of antagonism in the U.S. imperialism/Indian sub-imperialism relation appears as, on at least the immediate, bounded aspects (that is, agreeing on an LAC) of the border dispute between India and China, talks continue in the context of both powers’ participation in the SCO. After an SCO meeting in the first week of July 2024, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar noted: “Met with CPC [Communist Party of China] Politburo member and FM [Foreign Minister] Wang Yi in Astana this morning. Discussed early resolution of remaining issues in border areas. Agreed to redouble efforts through diplomatic and military channels to that end.” 62

The Big Picture and Some Inferences

I have explained the emergence of India as a sub-imperialist power and a key U.S. collaborator in the latter’s anti-China Indo-Pacific project. But what of the big picture, “the whole” within which Indian sub-imperialism’s role in this U.S. imperial project is embedded?

Historically, the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific has witnessed invasion, occupation, colonization, and semi-colonization by the United States and the Western European powers—British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese—and Japan. Following the period of decolonization, catching up, economically and militarily, through various forms of delinking, has been an ongoing process, more concertedly in China. 63 Since 1949, China has been on a long transition within and beyond capitalism, most unlike and in total contrast with India.

Especially since 1978, China adroitly has balanced its stakes in the face of challenges associated with developing within the confines of the global capitalist system dominated by Triad imperialism and led by Washington. The leadership of the Communist Party of China continues to safeguard the Chinese state’s independence, directs the nation’s development and modernization, and constantly reminds itself that the people, the exploited and the dominated, “aspire to socialism.” The party’s perspective is that of “a long—very long—global transition from capitalism to socialism.” 64 There has been and is a socialist horizon in China’s anti-imperialist struggle. 65

China considers its historical territory to be the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. As far as land-sea boundaries and exclusive economic zones are concerned, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia (Papua New Guinea was ruled by Australia over nearly sixty years), and, later, Japan (which had colonized the Korean Peninsula), have benefited the most. Disputes have arisen in the East China Sea involving Japan, China, and South Korea over delimitation of exclusive economic zones and over sovereignty claims of Japan, China, and Taiwan to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands administered by Japan.

With the deterioration of Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. relations, Chinese aircraft “incursions” into Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)—itself a creation of the U.S. Armed Forces, and like all such ADIZs, having no basis in international law—raised alarms in Tokyo and Washington. China responded in 2013 by declaring its own ADIZ over the East China Sea, identifying, locating, and controlling aircraft there in the interest of its national security. Indeed, Beijing even hinted that it was considering proclaiming an ADIZ in the South China Sea.

Unnerved at this former semi-colony’s straightforward assertion of its sovereignty and its rights to development and modernization, economic and military—even with around four hundred U.S. military bases virtually surrounding China, the United States and Japan decided to further advance their Indo-Pacific organization for security and military advantage and its requirements of military deployment and strategic partnerships. With Australia and India as partners in the Quad, the four countries have been securing their sea lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific. China’s main response has been in the form of the BRI from 2013 onward, including its Maritime Silk Road, its Indo-Pacific Sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, West Asia (the Middle East), and Africa, linked by the development of ports. 66 In April 2022, China proposed a Global Security Initiative based on a rejection of military blocs, and adhering to the principle that one nation’s or bloc’s security should not be designed to undermine the security of other nations.

What I am suggesting here is that the whole in which sub-imperialist India’s participation in Washington’s anti-China project is embedded can be perceived when one looks at China’s catch-up, economic and military. China is responding to its past humiliation in the face of part invasion, part occupation, and semi-colonization, as well as the present U.S. imperialist threat. The latter is backed by U.S.-led, NATO-like allies (Australia and Japan) and sub-imperialist India. Essentially, what has ensued is a sequence of political, economic, geopolitical, military, and diplomatic moves and countermoves, with one side or the other anticipating the other’s moves/countermoves in advance. Thus, a perilous spiral has been proceeding upward, constituting a grave threat to the peoples of the Asia-Pacific and the world. 67

As far as India is concerned, I have no doubt that its dependent, monopoly-capitalist ruling class knows very well what kind of actions and policies promote what it regards as its interests. In the late 1950s, the Indian government felt that a negotiated settlement of the border dispute with China was not in its interests. Anti-Chinese hysteria was manufactured in the country to prepare the Indian people and the armed forces to bear the costs of the ambitions of the dependent capitalist class and the Indian power elite (who thought and acted much like the British did).

Tragically, even today this dependent, monopoly-capitalist ruling class reckons its interests—and the Indian power elite thinks and acts—not very differently from what they considered, thought, and did then. The U.S. ruling class during India’s 1962 China War convinced the U.S. government to extend military aid to India, which Nehru promptly accepted, thus improving U.S.-India ties. Like the U.S. government, the U.S. ruling class wanted India in the U.S. camp, with a military alliance and all the other components that went with such an association.

Mercifully, this did not happen then, even though sections of the Indian ruling class would have welcomed it. But as I have shown, there are hints that at least some of this can possibly happen now, though, of course, in a totally different international and national context. India is not yet in a security alliance with the United States in the same way that Japan and Australia are. But the Indian power elite, more than ever before, consider themselves the inheritors of the Akhand Bharat and Greater India that (in their imagination) is to come. Envisioning India becoming a “leading power” by collaborating with the United States in the latter’s anti-China Indo-Pacific project, New Delhi seems to be becoming a de facto military-security ally of Washington in the region.

In the big picture, “the whole,” centered on China resisting U.S. imperialism, with India, as a sub-imperialist power collaborating with U.S. imperialism in the latter’s anti-China Indo-Pacific project, is appalling. It is tragic that India’s power elite; its dependent, monopoly-capitalist ruling class; and its so-called Vishwa Guru (“tutor of the world”) have brought a country with a vibrant tradition of anti-imperialism, including solidarity with China’s resistance to Japanese imperialism during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), to such a deplorable denouement.

↩ For an earlier analysis of Indian semi-fascism and sub-imperialism, see Bernard D’Mello, India after Naxalbari: Unfinished History (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2018), chapter 9.
↩ The term pivot is a military expression related to “defense” in accordance with deterrence. I argue that Washington has brought India into its anti-China Indo-Pacific pivot to militarily constrain China. Its hostile anti-China policy is shared by both the Republican and Democratic parties.
↩ The Aksai Chin area/tract, linking Tibet with Xinjiang, and part of Xinjiang and Tibet provinces of China, has been claimed by India since 1954, when the government of India put a definitive northern boundary on its official maps. The so-called McMahon Line is a unilateral British colonial claim dating back to 1914 of a boundary between Tibet and British India in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar).
↩ India’s forward policy entailed patrolling as far as possible from present positions in the area claimed by New Delhi to belong to India, attempting to set up additional posts to prevent the Chinese from further advancing in this area, and striving to dominate Chinese posts already established in the area.
↩ Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).
↩ Maxwell, India’s China War .
↩ Maxwell, India’s China War , 419. China made a political decision not to retain the territorial gains of the war. A recent book, authored by a scholar who worked for three decades in the archives division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, which analyzes India-China relations from 1949 to the Indo-China war in 1962 and its aftermath, is also very insightful: A. S. Bhasin, Nehru, Tibet, and China (New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2021).
↩ Neville Maxwell, China’s Borders: Settlements and Conflicts (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 110.
↩ Neville Maxwell, “India-China Dispute Revisited: How It Could Be Resolved,” Economic and Political Weekly 47, no. 51 (December 2012): 10.
↩ Srikant Dutt, “India and the Himalayan States,” Asian Affairs 11, no. 1 (1980): 71. In introducing India’s relations with these small Himalayan states, I draw on this paper, as well as Srikant Dutt, “Bhutan’s International Position,” International Studies 20, no. 3–4 (1981): 601–23.
↩ Dutt, “India and the Himalayan States,” 73.
↩ Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, “ A Fool’s Game: India-China ,” Monthly Review 14, no. 9 (January 1963): 471.
↩ Dutt, “India and the Himalayan States,” 74.
↩ Dutt, “India and the Himalayan States,” 75.
↩ Dutt, “India and the Himalayan States,” 75; Dutt, “Bhutan’s International Position,” 603–4.
↩ Dutt, “Bhutan’s International Position,” 609–12.
↩ “Akhand Bharat,” in one version of ultranationalist thought, is an undivided India as it is claimed to have existed prior to Partition in 1947, which defined the nation’s geographical “Greater India” in such thought is the entire area around the Indian Ocean region adjoining the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and Southeast Asia, which (according to this line of thought) defines the nation’s ideological frontiers.
↩ My account in this and the preceding two paragraphs is an application and adaptation of the thought of Ruy Mauro Marini, The Dialectics of Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2022),15, 117, 165, 171, 177–78.
↩ Formal subsumption occurs when labor processes that originate outside of the capital relation are brought within it, as by imposition of the wage, while real subsumption occurs when the social relations and modes of labor arise upon, and are imbued with, the requirements of capital. See the draft of the sixth chapter of Capital : Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The Results of the Direct Production Process,” in Collected Works , vol. 34 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010).
↩ The matter in quotation marks is paraphrased from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’s description of the proletariat in England in the 1840s in their book, The Holy Family .
↩ Adrian Sotelo Valencia, Sub-Imperialism Revisited: Dependency Theory in the Thought of Ruy Mauro Marini (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 72.
↩ Capitalism is marked by an inherent drive from the capitalist side to reorganize the labor process and introduce new technologies to increase labor productivity so that more time is left to produce surplus value. But underdeveloped capital has a structural propensity to be dependent on developed capital for, and in the adoption of, more developed labor processes and technological changes.
↩ For an understanding of this process at the global level, see Paul M. Sweezy, “ The Triumph of Financial Capital ,” Monthly Review 46, no. 2 (June 1994): 1–11.
↩ In 2022–2023, the shares of income and wealth belonging to India’s top 1 percent, which “skyrocketed since the early 2000s,” were 22.6 percent and 40.1 percent, respectively. Considering the top 1 percent wealth share, “the ‘Billionaire Raj’ headed by India’s modern bourgeoisie is now more unequal than the British Raj headed by the colonialist forces.” Nitin Kumar Bharti, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, and Anmol Somanchi, “ Income and Wealth Inequality in India, 1922–2023: The Rise of the Billionaire Raj ,” World Inequality Lab Working Paper 2024/09, March 2024.
↩ The United States is, by far, the largest exporter of armaments (responsible for 42 percent of global arms exports in 2019–2023), and India is the world’s largest importer of armaments (9.8 percent of global arms imports in 2019–2023). Although in 2019–2023 Russia was India’s main armaments supplier, its share of Indian arms imports shrank from 76 percent in 2009–2013 to 58 percent in 2014–2018, and then to 36 per cent in 2019–2023. India has since been increasing its major armaments imports, mainly from France and the United States. Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2024.
↩ The U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile is 7.4 times more than that of China (as of 2023). Although China has been left with no alternative but to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, and may have even deployed a small number, its nuclear warhead stockpile will continue to remain much smaller than that of the United States. Still, this is enough to drive India (along with Pakistan, given their mutual nuclear arms race) to enhance its own nuclear stockpile. SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security—Summary (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024).
↩ A centerpiece of the U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy is “integrated deterrence,” which, among other things, involves the U.S. armed forces working together with its allies and strategic partners to contain the “most consequential strategic competitor”—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The strategy states that the U.S. Department of Defense will “foster advantage through advanced technology cooperation with partnerships like AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific Quad…advance our Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression and ensure free and open access to the Indian Ocean region…[and] support Ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America , 7, 14–15, 15).
↩ For the U.S.-China trade and technology wars and the cold war unleashed on China, see Zhiming Long, Zhixuan Feng, Bangxi Li, and Rémy Herrera, “ S.-China Trade War: Has the Real ‘Thief’ Finally Been Unmasked? ,” Monthly Review 72, no. 5 (October 2020): 6–14; Junfu Zhao, “ The Political Economy of the U.S.-China Technology War ,” Monthly Review 73, no. 3 (July–August 2021): 112–126; John Bellamy Foster, “ The New Cold War on China ,” Monthly Review 73, no. 3 (July–August 2021): 1–20.
↩ This barebones summary account of the “Silicon Valley Imperial Innovation System” and its India connection analytically draws on Raúl Delgado Wise and Mateo Crossa Niell, “ Capital, Science, Technology: The Development of Productive Forces in Contemporary Capitalism ,” Monthly Review 72, no. 10 (March 2021): 33–46.
↩ On U.S. big tech’s mining the data of Indian users, see “ Digitalisation in India: The Class Agenda [Part IV] ,” Research Unit for Political Economy, May 23, 2024, rupe-india.org.
↩ Beatrice Edwards, “ The Zombie Bill: The Corporate Security Campaign That Would Not Die ,” Monthly Review 66, no. 3 (July–August 2014): 54–69.
↩ Norimitsu Onishi and Ian Austen, “Two Hooded Gunmen, a Silver Getaway Car and a Slain Sikh Leader,” New York Times , September 23, 2023.
↩ The term “surveillance capitalism” and its analysis was first introduced in John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “ Surveillance Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age ,” Monthly Review 66, no. 3 (July–August 2014): 1–31.
↩ In a world abiding by the UN-based order of sovereign states reinforced by international law, the U.S. military would have to pull out of Taiwan—a recognized part of China—and Washington would have to abide by the UN Charter and any UN resolutions related to Taiwan.
↩ The hegemonic bloc is composed of big Indian businesspersons and a significant segment of small and medium enterprise owners, managerial personnel, government officials, technocrats, the middle class, big capitalist landowners, and rich peasants/farmers. The dependent monopoly-capitalist ruling class has, historically and contemporarily, mostly controlled huge conglomerates (“large business houses”). For instance, Tata emerged from the British opium trade to ultimately become a multinational conglomerate, with companies like Tata Steel Netherlands and Tata Steel UK as subsidiaries of Tata Steel, and Jaguar Land Rover as a subsidiary of Tata Motors. Tata Steel and Tata Motors, both parts of the Tata conglomerate, are headquartered in India. Other business houses include the Ambani and Adani conglomerates, the success of which can be tracked down to shrewd, parvenu businesspeople backed by powerful politicians.
↩ Research Unit for Political Economy, “ India, COVID-19, the United States, and China ,” Monthly Review 72, no. 4 (September 2020): 49; John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “Imperialism in the Indo-Pacific,” Monthly Review 76, no. 3 (July–August 2024): 1–4.
↩ Brendan M. Howe, “Geopolynomics and Japan: Asia-Pacific Policy Prescriptions,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 22(1), no. 5 (January 2024): 6.
↩ India’s “Look East” and “Act East” policies, carried out within the ASEAN framework, could not have made much headway without Washington’s backing and Canberra’s and Tokyo’s support.
↩ The “nine-dash line” is a group of line segments on maps that set out the claims of China and Taiwan in the South China Sea.
↩ See B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,” International Community Law Review 8 (2006): 3–27.
↩ “China’s Position Paper on South China Sea,” China Daily , May 6, 2024. This is the full text of the “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” December 7, 2014.
↩ In its April 2024 military exercises, the United States deployed an intermediate-range missile system in the northern Philippines, taking its New Cold War with China to a higher level. In May 2024, three Indian warships, as part of the Indian Navy’s long-range deployment to the South China Sea, docked at Manila to take part in a military exercise with the Philippines navy.
↩ Valencia, Sub-Imperialism Revisited , 74, 76–77.
↩ This was India’s second instance of nuclear testing; the first, its “Smiling Buddha” Pokhran Nuclear Test, was conducted in May 1974.
↩ This explanation appeared in a 1998 open letter that the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee wrote to then U.S. President Bill Clinton: Atal Behari Vajpayee, “Nuclear Anxiety; Indian’s Letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing,” New York Times , May 13, 1998.
↩ In 2008, with strong U.S. backing, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency entered a “safeguards agreement.” Thereafter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group gave India a waiver to engage in trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology without signing the nonproliferation treaty. India’s high expectations were, however, unmet. Nonproliferation measures, such as the separation plan, an “Additional Protocol” (that is, one additional to the safeguards agreement) with the international agency, and the group’s decision to tighten its controls on trade with nontreaty nations (for example, India), were, reportedly, influenced by U.S. dictates.
↩ Hyde Act of 2006, 22 United States Code 87, § 8001, 6B.
↩ Hyde Act, 22 USC 87, § 8003, d(3A).
↩ Hyde Act, 22 USC 87, § 8003, g(2D[ii]).
↩ I have here applied the principles outlined in Mao Zedong’s 1937 essay “On Contradiction” and his 1957 elaboration in the essay “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” both available at marxists.org.
↩ After assessing some of these developments in the India-U.S. defense relationship, Atul Bhardwaj, an ex-Indian naval aviator and a strategic affairs columnist in Economic and Political Weekly , wrote: “Despite these developments, both India and the US continue to deny that they are allies. India is relying on semantics to remain in denial about being a US military ally and…feign ignorance about the power asymmetries with the US.” Atul Bhardwaj, “India in Quasi Alignment with the United States: China Remains the Most Significant Factor that Strengthens the Ties between the United States and India,” Economic and Political Weekly 58, no. 28 (July 15, 2023): 8.
↩ White House, “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century,” June 7, 2016.
↩ For instance, the BRI has been developing a Digital Silk Road in South Asia, based on 5G base stations and the digital economy. Pravin Sawhney, The Last War: How AI Will Shape India’s Final Showdown with China (New Delhi: Aleph, 2022), 46–47. I am, however, highly skeptical about Sawhney’s main prediction—”India’s Final Showdown with China”—regarding AI-driven warfare.
↩ China and Myanmar, as well as China and Bangladesh, took the initiative to establish the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Belt and Road projects in Bangladesh, respectively, after India boycotted what was to be a Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar Economic Corridor connecting India and China through Myanmar and Bangladesh. China resurrected this proposal in 2015 as part of the BRI. In this section, I partly draw on John A. Mathews, “China’s Long-Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt and Road Initiative,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 17(1), no. 1 (January 2019): 1–6.
↩ Mathews, “China’s Long-Term Trade and Currency Goals,” 5.
↩ Ranga Jayasuriya, “Adani is Building a Port, Sri Lanka Is Trying to Sail Again,” Times of India , November 11, 2013.
↩ Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral , Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, July 2006.
↩ On May 22, 2019, a nonbinding resolution in the UN General Assembly declared that the Chagos Archipelago was a part of Mauritius, but the United Kingdom has continued to claim sovereignty over Chagos. Importantly, India has supported Mauritius’s claim to sovereignty over the archipelago. What might explain India’s stance? The United States and United Kingdom are bent on continuing to use Diego Garcia as a military base, and, apparently, Mauritius has indicated that it will allow the United States to retain its military base in Diego Garcia if it regains sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.
↩ See, for example, “Maldives: Pro-Chinese President’s Party Wins Big in Parliamentary Election,” Le Monde , April 21, 2024.
↩ Prem Shankar Jha, “ What Lies Behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative? ,” The Wire , March 19, 2021, in.
↩ For the text of this agreement, see the website of the Government of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, mea.gov.in.
↩ “EAM Jaishankar, His Chinese Counterpart Wang Hold Talks in Astana,” Hindustani Times , July 4, 2024.
↩ “Delinking” is here understood as “submitting the external relations to the logic of an internal development that is independent from them.” Samir Amin, “A Note on the Concept of Delinking,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 10, no. 3 (Winter 1987): 442.
↩ Samir Amin, “ What Maoism Has Contributed ,” MR Online, September 21, 2006.
↩ The post-revolutionary Chinese social formation is, however, neither capitalist nor socialist. The Chinese government has been steering the capitalist process in the economy, ensuring that financial globalization does not get the upper hand, but it has not dismantled the global labor arbitrage model of capital accumulation. I find it difficult to figure out the direction in which China is going, capitalist or socialist.
↩ For some of the facts in this and the previous paragraph, see Christian Wirth, “Securing the Seas, Securing the State: The Inside/Outside of ‘Indo-Pacific’ Geopolitics,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 19(3), no. 4 (February 2021), org .
↩ Regarding this dynamic situation, given the thoroughgoing opacity that encircles government and private business decision-making and actions, there are things that I do not know, and there are things that I will never know. This is even more the case now that there is no longer a WikiLeaks to make available to the public classified diplomatic cables sent to the U.S. State Department by its embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions abroad. Moreover, as a part of the public, I too am exposed to the vast state-of-the-art simulator of disinformation advancing capitalist/imperialist military, political, and economic/financial goals, which programs what I am made to see, read, and think. I keep wondering how this might inevitably be corrupting my consciousness—but I am on a journey of learning and reflection.

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Italian PM Meloni sees role for India in resolving Russia-Ukraine conflict

Italian pm giorgia meloni says india can play a role in resolving russia-ukraine conflict.

Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on Saturday said that India and China can play a role in resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

India and China can help resolve Russia-Ukraine conflict, says Italian PM Meloni.( File/ REUTERS/Claudia Greco)

"I believe China and India have a role to play in resolving the conflict. The only thing that cannot happen is to think that the conflict can be solved by abandoning Ukraine," France 24 quoted Meloni as saying after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of a conference.

ALSO READ- Vladimir Putin says India, China, Brazil could mediate Russia-Ukraine talks

Meloni's statement comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday named India among the three countries he is in touch with over the Ukraine conflict and said they are sincerely making efforts to resolve it.

In a separate statement, Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said earlier this week that India could play a role in facilitating dialogue with Ukraine as Prime Minister Narendra Modi "freely communicates with Putin, Zelenskyy, and the Americans".

"The choice of supporting Ukraine has been first and foremost a choice of national interest, and it's a choice that won't change," Meloni told the annual TEHA business forum in northern Italy.

ALSO READ- Meloni defends government after Italian culture minister quits over scandal

Modi, during his visit to Ukraine on August 23, the first by an Indian prime minister since the country gained independence in 1991, urged Zelenskyy to engage in direct talks with Russia, emphasising that both nations should not delay in seeking an end to the war.

The visit to Kyiv followed the prime minister's summit with Putin six weeks earlier, a meeting that raised concerns in some Western countries.

ALSO READ- Russian missiles blast Ukrainian military academy, hospital; over 50 killed: officials

In his meeting with Zelenskyy, the prime minister expressed his willingness to contribute personally to finding a peaceful resolution.

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India can play a role in resolving Ukraine conflict: Italian PM Meloni

Meloni had a bilateral meeting today with zelensky on the sidelines of the annual conference of the european house - ambrosetti (teha) forum at cernobbio on lake como.

She made the remarks after meeting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. | File Photo: Reuters

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Italy | After meeting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said, "I believe China and India have a role to play in resolving the conflict. The only thing that cannot happen is to think that the conflict can be solved by abandoning Ukraine.… pic.twitter.com/slZrTMKaQW — ANI (@ANI) September 7, 2024

(Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

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First Published: Sep 07 2024 | 11:32 PM IST

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India Can Help Resolve Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Italian PM Giorgia Meloni

Giorgia meloni's comments came after her meeting with mr zelensky met on the sidelines of the ambrosetti forum on saturday where the two leaders discussed the latest developments on the ground..

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on Saturday said that countries like India and China can play a role in resolving the conflict in Ukraine.

Giorgia Meloni's remarks, made at the Ambrosetti Forum in northern Italy's Cernobbio city on Saturday - where she also held a meeting with the visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky - came less than 48 hours after Russian President Vladimir Putin also highlighted India's efforts in solving the ongoing crisis in the region.

"It is obvious that if the rules of international law are broken we will get a multiplication of chaos and crisis, but it is also obvious that with the multiplication of crisis, we will have a natural fragmentation of the geo-economic space, that is, in the long run, economic globalization and questioning of the rules of international law will not walk together. This is what I also said to my Chinese counterparts, we must choose, because the two things do not go together, it is also the reason why I think that in the end nations, like China and India, can play a role and must play a role in resolving the conflict in Ukraine," said Giorgia Meloni.

On Thursday, while addressing the 9th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russian President Vladimir Putin had also mentioned India's role in providing a "helping hand" in resolving the issue.

"We respect our friends and partners who I think are sincerely interested in addressing and resolving all the issues associated with the conflict (with Ukraine). China, Brazil, India... I am in contact with my partners and I have no doubt that the leaders of these countries, and we have the relations of trust and confidence with one another, will be really interested in providing a helping hand," said Vladimir Putin.

Giorgia Meloni's comments came after her meeting with Zelensky met on the sidelines of the Ambrosetti Forum on Saturday where the two leaders discussed the latest developments on the ground and Ukraine's "most urgent needs" ahead of winter.

"The Head of State thanked for all the allocated military and technical assistance packages and emphasised the importance of transferring the relevant weapons to Ukraine as soon as possible," said Zelensky's office after the meeting.

It mentioned further that the Ukrainian President informed Giorgia Meloni about the situation on the battlefield, the recent shelling of the country's civilian and critical infrastructure and spoke about current defence needs.

"The leaders discussed steps to implement the decision of the G7 to provide Ukraine with nearly USD 50 billion from frozen Russian assets," Kyiv asserted.

It added that the restoration and reconstruction of Ukraine, in particular of its energy system, was one of the issues discussed during the meeting.

The Italian PM's office stated that Giorgia Meloni reiterated that support for Ukraine is a top priority on the Italian G7 Presidency's agenda and reaffirmed the ongoing commitment to Ukraine's legitimate defence and to a just and lasting peace.

The two leaders, it said, paid particular attention to the issue of reconstruction, also ahead of the next Ukraine Recovery Conference which will be held in Italy in 2025.

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Later, in her address at the 50th edition of The European House - Ambrosetti Forum at Villa d'Este in Cernobbio, Giorgia Meloni also highlighted the risks of destabilization for the geo-political and economic global space, and said she believed global actors such as China and India "will be able to play a role in resolving the conflict."

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

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