Abbreviations: MI, myocardial infarction; IHD, ischemic heart disease; PSI, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety Indicator; RN, registered nurse; ADL, activities of daily living; UTI, urinary tract infection; CHD, coronary heart disease; VTE, venous thromboembolism; PSA, prostate-specific antigen; HCAHPS, Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems.
All studies used multivariable regression analysis to assess the association between the exposure and outcome variables in a longitudinal or cross-sectional sample. Because studies varied in their unit of analysis, from patient or physician to county, region, or state, the number of observations per study ranged from 50 to more than 132 million ( Table 1 ). For example, Dhankhar and Khan 10 analyzed 100 state-year observations and Yang et al. 11 analyzed 2,354,561 births.
The studies measured the extent of malpractice liability risk in a given environment in several ways ( Table 1 ). Physicians’ malpractice insurance premiums and the presence of liability-limiting tort reforms in the state were the most common exposure measures (n=21 studies). Other measures included the frequency of paid claims in the state or county (n=13), insurance premiums (n=7), average payment per paid claim (n=8), physicians’ claims history (n=5), total malpractice payments in the state or county (n=2), jury awards in the county (n=1), immunity from malpractice liability (n=1), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare Malpractice Geographic Practice Cost Index (MGPCI) (a measure of premium costs to physicians in local liability insurance markets) (n=1), and composite measures incorporating more than one of the foregoing (n=3). Data sources for exposure measures included the National Practitioner Data Bank (a national repository of information on paid malpractice claims), insurance industry rate surveys, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, jury awards databases, and 50-state summaries of state legal reforms.
Outcome measures included patient mortality; hospital readmissions, avoidable admissions, and prolonged length of stay; receipt of cancer screening services; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) and other measures of adverse events and postoperative complications; measures of hospital and nursing home quality; and patient satisfaction (see Table 1 for measures used in each study). Three quarters of the studies (28/37) focused on hospital care only, and nearly half (16/37) focused on obstetrical care. Studies outside the obstetrics context commonly measured associations between liability risk and patient mortality, although more recent studies examined associations with PSIs. Data sources for outcome measures included Medicare and other claims data, vital statistics records, physician practice group databases, cancer registries, and surveys.
Of the 16 studies examining obstetrical care, 9 identified no significant associations between liability risk and quality in the direction of deterrence ( Table 2 ). Seven studies found limited evidence of associations, i.e., the statistical significance, direction, or both of the associations were sensitive to the model specification used, the patient group studied, or the outcome measure examined.
Studies Examining Associations Between Malpractice Liability Risk Measures and Obstetrical Care, 1990–2019 (n=16) a
Authors (Year) | Exposure Measures | Outcome Measures | Evidence for deterrence? |
---|---|---|---|
Entman et al. (1994) | Physician’s claims history | Quality of obstetrical care, frequency of obstetrical adverse events | No |
Sloan et al. (1995) | Claim frequency, total payments (at county and physician level) | Fetal mortality, low Apgar score, neonatal mortality, infant mortality, mortality/impairment at age 5 | Limited. No significant associations in 21 of 23 models tested. |
Sloan et al. (1997) | Claim frequency | Prenatal care | Limited. No significant associations in 7 of 8 models tested. |
Dubay et al. (1999) | Premiums, tort reforms | Apgar scores | No |
Dubay et al. (2001) | Premiums, tort reforms | Prenatal care, low birthweight, low Apgar score | No |
Klick & Stratmann (2007) | Tort reforms | Infant mortality | Limited. No significant associations in 25 of 28 models tested. |
Kim (2007) | Claim frequency, average payment | Prenatal care, c-sections for patients with breech presentation | No |
Currie & MacLeod (2008) | Tort reforms | Preventable birth complications; Apgar score | Limited. Caps are associated with higher complications. No deterrence associations for other reforms or Apgar scores. |
Dhankhar & Khan (2009) | Claim frequency, average payment | Combined maternal/fetal mortality, neonatal mortality, maternal morbidity, birth trauma, 3 other birth complications | Limited. No significant associations in 54 of 56 models tested. Significant associations found for neonatal respiratory distress syndrome, for privately insured patients only. |
Yang et al. (2012) | Premiums, tort reforms | Birth injury, low Apgar score, low birthweight, preterm birth | No |
Frakes (2012) | Tort reforms | Low Apgar score | No |
Iizuka (2013) | Tort reforms | Obstetrics PSIs (birth injury, maternal trauma), in-hospital mortality for obstetrical patients | Limited. In hospital-level models, CSR associated with increased complications but not mortality; associations not significant in patient-level models. No deterrence associations for other reforms. |
Frakes & Jena (2016) | Tort reforms | Obstetrics PSIs (preventable birth complications, maternal trauma) | No. |
Zabinski & Black (2018) | Tort reforms | Obstetrics PSIs (birth injury, maternal trauma) | Limited. Significant in 13 of 24 models tested. Driven by maternal trauma, not baby injury. |
Frakes & Gruber (2018) | Legal immunity (military) | PSIs, neonatal mortality, birth trauma, preventable birth complications | No |
Malak & Yang (2019) | Tort reforms | Birth outcomes (1-year mortality, preventable birth complications) | No |
PSI = Patient Safety Indicator; JSL = joint-and-several liability rule reform; CSR = collateral-source offset rule reform
Several studies found no significant association between liability measures and outcomes in the direction of deterrence. Entman et al 12 found that obstetricians’ personal history of malpractice claims was not associated with quality of care or frequency of adverse events. Three studies using malpractice premiums as the exposure measure found no associations with Apgar scores, low birthweight, preterm birth, or birth injury. 11 , 13 , 14 In a study of military physicians, who are immune from malpractice litigation related to their care of active-duty servicemembers (but not other patients), Frakes and Gruber 15 found no association between immunity and several adverse birth outcomes (preventable delivery complications, neonatal mortality, neonatal trauma, and maternal trauma in vaginal deliveries). Two studies by Dubay et al 13 , 14 found that tort reforms were not associated with prenatal health care utilization, low birthweight, or Apgar scores. Frakes 16 also found no association between tort reforms and Apgar scores. Frakes and Jena 17 did not find tort reforms to be associated with any of several obstetrical PSIs. Kim 18 found neither claim frequency nor average claims payments were associated with prenatal care utilization or use of cesarean delivery in patients with breech presentation. Malak and Yang 19 found no association between tort reforms and infant mortality or preventable birth complications.
Several studies identified limited evidence of an association between liability measures and outcomes in the deterrence direction. Sloan et al 20 found a significant association between liability risk and birth outcomes in the direction of deterrence in 2 of 23 models tested. In county-level analyses using survey data, both claim frequency and total claims payments were associated with reduced risk of fetal mortality. However, these associations did not achieve statistical significance in physician-level models, and neither liability measure showed significant associations with any of the other 4 outcome variables (low Apgar score, 5-day neonatal mortality, infant mortality, or death or permanent impairment at age 5) in any model. In analyses using a larger sample of county birth records, no associations between liability risk measures and birth outcomes were significant at the p<0.05 level.
A subsequent study by Sloan et al 21 found claim frequency to be significantly associated with prenatal care utilization in the direction of deterrence in 1 of 8 models tested. In physician-level models, claim frequency was significantly associated with greater use of alpha-feto protein tests, but not with greater use of ultrasound or diabetes tests. The relationship between claim frequency and use of amniocentesis was significant in the direction opposite of deterrence (i.e., claim frequency was associated with less use of amniocentesis). In county-level models, no significant associations were observed between claim frequency and any of 4 measures of patient satisfaction (doctor is interested in your and your baby, doctor fully explained the reason for each test and procedure, doctor ignored what you told him/her, and you felt you could call doctor with questions).
Dhankhar and Khan 10 also examined claim frequency, along with mean payment amounts per paid claim. Among 56 models (in which patients with Medicaid coverage and those with private insurance, and births involving necessary and unnecessary cesarean sections, were analyzed separately), 53 models found no significant associations with the 7 birth outcomes examined. Two models found a significantly lower risk of neonatal respiratory distress among patients with private insurance and unnecessary c-sections. One model found a reverse deterrence association (i.e., increased claim frequency was associated with an increased risk of neonatal respiratory distress) for Medicaid patients with necessary c-sections.
Three studies that examined tort reforms also found no evidence of an association between liability risk and health outcomes in the direction of deterrence in most models. Klick and Stratmann 22 studied 7 tort reforms in relation to mortality among black and white infants (modeled separately) and found no significant deterrence associations in 25 of 28 models. Only collateral-source rule reform (which consists of deducting from plaintiffs’ malpractice awards amounts already reimbursed by insurance and other sources) was consistently associated with mortality across model specifications in the direction of deterrence (i.e., tort reform was associated with increased infant mortality), although this association was observed only among black infants. Joint-and-several liability reform (which consists, in cases involving multiple defendants, of limiting the damages each must pay to an amount proportional to that defendant’s percentage fault for the injury) was associated with increased mortality for white infants in 1 of 2 model specifications, but was not significant in either model specification for black infants. Two models produced reverse deterrence findings, i.e., greater liability was associated with worse outcomes. Currie and Macleod studied 4 tort reforms in relation to preventable birth complications and low Apgar scores, and found that noneconomic damages caps were associated with an increase in the preventable complication rate but were not associated with Apgar score. Joint-and-several liability reform was associated with a decrease in preventable complications, which is a reverse deterrence finding because that reform limits defendants’ liability. There was no significant association between joint-and-several liability reform and low Apgar score, or between the other tort reforms examined (punitive damages caps and collateral-source rule reform) and either of the outcomes. Iizuka 23 examined 4 tort reforms and 4 birth-related PSIs, modeling them at both the hospital and patient levels, and found that only collateral-source rule reform was significant in a direction consistent with deterrence, and only in hospital-level models that examined injuries to neonates (2.36 more injuries per hospital-year when collateral-source rule reform was implemented to reduce liability, p<0.01) and mothers (5.7 more injuries per hospital-year, p<0.05); neither of those associations was significant in the patient-level models.
In an analysis that examined the relationship between noneconomic damages caps and 3 PSIs plus a pooled PSI, Zabinski and Black 24 found more consistent associations in the direction of deterrence across model specifications, but only for maternal outcomes. In a model examining all states, the coefficient was significant and positive (i.e., in the direction of deterrence) for the pooled measure and 1 PSI (representing a 7% increase in the rate of maternal trauma in vaginal deliveries when noneconomic damages were capped), but not for the other 2 PSIs (neonatal injury and maternal trauma in deliveries without instruments). In single-state models, the association between noneconomic damages caps and outcomes was significant for the pooled measure and 1 PSI in 4 of 5 states, significant in 1 state for 1 PSI, and significant in 2 states for the other PSI.
Overall, studies found very limited or no evidence of associations between liability risk and outcomes in obstetrical care that indicate deterrence. The variations in findings were not clearly correlated with the choice of either the exposure measure or the outcome measure, although only 1 of the 6 studies that examined mortality as an outcome found any evidence of an association.
Twenty studies examined the relationship between liability risk and patient mortality (in settings other than obstetrical care) and 15 found no statistically significant associations in the direction of deterrence ( Table 3 ). Three studies reached different conclusions about deterrence depending on the liability measure modeled and states investigated, 24 – 26 and 2 studies yielded less equivocal evidence of deterrence. 27 , 28
Studies Examining Associations Between Malpractice Liability Risk Measures and Patient Mortality in Non-Obstetrical Contexts, 1990–2019 (n=20) a
Authors (Year) | Exposure Measures | Outcome Measures | Evidence for deterrence? |
---|---|---|---|
Kessler & McClellan (1996) | Tort reforms | MI & IHD patients’ mortality | No |
Kessler & McClellan (2002) | Tort reforms | MI & IHD patients’ mortality | No |
Konety et al. (2005) | Tort reforms | Bladder cancer patients’ mortality | No |
Dhankhar et al. (2007) | Claim frequency, average payment | MI patients’ mortality | Limited. Yes, for claim frequency. No, for payments. |
Baicker et al. (2007) | Premiums, payments per physician | Medicare patients’ total & disease-specific mortality | No |
Shepherd (2008) | Tort reforms | State-level, non-motor-vehicle accidental death rates | Limited. No significant associations in 4 of 6 models tested. |
Sloan & Shadle (2009) | Tort reforms | Medicare patients’ 1-year survival post-hospitalization for MI, breast cancer, diabetes, & stroke | No |
Lakdawalla & Seabury (2012) | Jury awards | County-level, all-cause mortality | Yes |
Avraham & Schanzenbach (2015) | Tort reforms | CHD & MI patients’ mortality | No |
Bekelis et al. (2015) | Claim frequency, average payment | Cranial neurosurgery patients’ mortality, unfavorable discharge | No |
Missios & Bekelis (2015) | Claim frequency, average payment | Spine surgery patients’ mortality | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2016) | Premiums, paid claims, composite measure | Colorectal surgery patients’ 30-day postop mortality | No |
Frakes & Jena (2016) | Tort reforms | Inpatient mortality | No |
Bartlett (2017) | Claim frequency, tort reforms | Population mortality due to iatrogenic causes | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2017) | CMS malpractice cost index, claim frequency, tort reforms, composite measure | MI, heart failure, pneumonia patients’ 30-day mortality | Yes, except in claim frequency models. |
Minami et al. (2017) | Premiums, claim frequency, composite measure, average payment | 30-day postoperative mortality | No |
Frakes & Gruber (2018) | Legal immunity (military) | 90-day & 1-year mortality | No |
Zabinski & Black (2018) | Tort reforms | 2 fatal PSIs & pooled measure | Limited. No significant associations in 14 of 18 models tested, including all models pooled across states. |
Moghtaderi et al. (2019) | Tort reforms | Medicare patients’ mortality | No |
McMichael (2019) | Tort reforms | AMI patients’ mortality | No |
MI = myocardial infarction; IHD = ischemic heart disease; CHD = coronary heart disease; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Of the 15 studies that reported no significant associations between liability measures and mortality in the deterrence direction, 9 used tort reforms as the measure of liability risk and 6 used claim frequency, average payment per paid claim, jury awards, or other measures ( Table 3 ). These studies were also diverse in the patient populations studied, ranging from narrowly defined disease groups (e.g., patients with bladder cancer, 29 patients undergoing cranial neurosurgery 30 ) to wide patient populations (e.g., all Medicare patients 31 , 32 ).
Two of the 3 studies that found limited evidence of deterrence used tort reforms as the measure of liability risk. Zabinski and Black 24 focused on noneconomic damages caps and found no significant deterrence relationships in 14 of 18 models tested, including all models that pooled data from more than one state. In 2 of 5 single-state models, damages caps were significantly associated with higher mortality for 2 of the 3 mortality measures (one individual PSI and a measure pooling 2 death PSIs). Shepherd 26 modeled 6 tort reforms and found that 2 (total damages caps and collateral-source rule reform) were significantly associated with state-level, non-motor-vehicle-related deaths in the direction of deterrence (i.e., deaths increased when liability was limited), whereas 2 (noneconomic damages caps and punitive damages reform) were significantly associated with mortality in a reverse-deterrence direction (deaths decreased when liability was limited), and 2 (periodic payment and joint-and-several liability reform) had nonsignificant results. A study by Dhankhar et al 25 that used claim frequency and average payments per paid claim as the liability risk measures found that an increase in the number of paid claims by one case per 100,000 population was associated with a statistically significant, 13% lower risk of in-hospital mortality among patients with myocardial infarction, but found no association between mean payment amounts and mortality.
Two studies found more consistent evidence of an association between liability risk and outcomes in the direction of deterrence. Lakdawalla and Seabury 27 estimated that a doubling of a county’s jury award dollars per capita in malpractice cases was associated with a 2% decrease in the county’s all-cause mortality rate; this is a surprisingly large effect size considering that only a small fraction of deaths were due to medical injury. Bilimoria et al 28 examined 3 measures of liability risk in a model of 30-day mortality for hospitalized patients with myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia. The authors found that claim frequency was not significantly associated with mortality, although higher Medicare Malpractice Geographic Practice Cost Index was significantly associated with lower mortality for all 3 conditions, and a composite liability measure was significantly associated with lower mortality for patients with heart failure. However, most studies found no evidence of an association between higher liability risk and lower patient mortality.
Six studies examined the relationship between liability risk and hospital readmissions and a seventh examined associations with avoidable hospitalizations ( Table 4 ). All 6 studies found no significant association between liability risk and readmissions, despite testing diverse liability measures and patient populations ranging from narrow (e.g., patients undergoing colorectal surgery 33 ) to broad (e.g., patients seeing military physicians 15 ). In an analysis of avoidable hospitalizations, Frakes and Jena 17 found no significant association between 4 tort reforms (noneconomic damages caps, punitive damages caps, collateral-source rule reform, and joint-and-several liability reform) and hospital readmissions. 17
Studies Examining Associations Between Malpractice Liability Risk Measures and Readmissions and Avoidable Hospitalizations, 1990–2019 (n=7) a
Authors (Year) | Exposure Measures | Outcome Measures | Evidence for deterrence? |
---|---|---|---|
Kessler & McClellan (1996) | Tort reforms | MI & IHD patients’ 1-year readmissions | No |
Kessler & McClellan (2002) | Tort reforms | MI & IHD patients’ 1-year readmissions | No |
Frakes & Jena (2016) | Tort reforms | Avoidable hospitalizations | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2016) | Premiums, claim frequency, composite measure | Colorectal surgery patients’ 30-day readmissions | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2017) | CMS malpractice cost index, claim frequency, tort reforms, composite measure | MI, heart failure, and pneumonia patients’ 30-day readmissions | No |
Minami et al. (2017) | Premiums, claim frequency, composite measure, average award | 30-day postoperative readmissions | No |
Frakes & Gruber (2018) | Legal immunity (military) | 30-day readmissions | No |
MI = myocardial infarction; IHD = ischemic heart disease; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Six studies examined the association between liability risk and rates of PSIs or other measures of postoperative complications outside the obstetrical care context ( Table 5 ). Of these, 4 studies found no evidence of deterrence, 15 , 30 , 33 , 34 1 found evidence in only a small number of the many models included in the study, 28 and 1 found evidence in the majority of models tested. 24
Studies Examining Associations Between Malpractice Liability Risk Measures and Other Outcomes, 1990–2019 (n=12) a
Authors (Year) | Exposure Measures | Outcome Measures | Evidence for deterrence? |
---|---|---|---|
Bekelis et al. (2015) | Claim frequency, average payment | Unfavorable discharge for cranial neurosurgery patients | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2016) | Premiums, claim frequency, composite measure | 30-day postoperative complications for colorectal surgery | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2017) | CMS malpractice cost index, claim frequency, tort reforms, composite measure | 5 PSIs | Limited. No significant associations in 11 of 15 models tested. |
Minami et al. (2017) | Premiums, claim frequency, composite measure, average award | 10 nonfatal postoperative complications | No |
Frakes & Gruber (2018) | Legal immunity (military) | Had any PSI | No |
Zabinski & Black (2018) | Tort reforms | 13 non-obstetrical, nonfatal PSIs | Yes, in 62 of 93 models tested, including 3 of 4 models pooled across PSIs and states. |
Baicker & Chandra (2005) | Premiums, average payment, paid claim frequency | Elderly Medicare patients’ mammography rates | Limited. Yes, for average payment. No, for premiums and claim frequency. |
Frakes & Jena (2016) | Tort reforms | 6 cancer screening measures | No. |
Konetzka et al. (2013) | Claim frequency | 3 measures of nursing home quality | Limited. No significant associations in 2 of 3 models. |
Stevenson et al. (2013) | Nursing home’s claims experience in past 18 months (whether ≥1 paid claims were incurred, total indemnity payments, indemnity+defense payments) | 9 measures of nursing home quality | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2017) | CMS malpractice cost index, claim frequency, tort reforms, composite measure | 17 Hospital Compare process-of-care quality measures | No |
Sloan et al. (1997) | Claim frequency | Obstetrical patient satisfaction ratings | No |
Bilimoria et al. (2017) | CMS malpractice cost index, claim frequency, tort reforms, composite measure | 10 HCAHPS patient satisfaction ratings | No |
Carlson et al. (2019) | Physician’s claims history | Press Ganey patient experience scores | Yes |
PSI = patient safety indicator; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; HCAHPS = Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems.
The variation in results across studies is not clearly attributable to the choice of exposure or outcome measures. 28 However, although the 4 studies that found no significant association between liability risk measures and health outcomes included a wide range of liability measures (claim frequency, average payments, premiums, legal immunity, and composite measures), none used tort reforms as the exposure measure. The study that reported limited evidence of deterrence, Bilimoria et al, 28 included tort reforms as an exposure measure and concluded there was no “consistent pattern of association” with 5 PSIs across the reforms (quantitative results were not reported). The same study found, in 15 other models testing the association of 3 other types of liability measures with each of the 5 PSIs, that findings were significant in the deterrence direction in 2 models (MGPCI and iatrogenic pneumothorax; and MGPCI and unintentional punctures/lacerations). Two models had significant results in the reverse deterrence direction, and 11 other models found no significant association between liability measures and outcomes.
A study by Zabinski and Black, 24 which tested noneconomic damages caps only, was an outlier in terms of findings, and identified evidence of deterrence in most (62/93) models tested. For example, in models that pooled multiple PSIs and all states, the authors found that caps were associated with a 0.16 percentage point increase in the incidence of any PSI (p<0.05) and a 0.04 percentage point increase in the incidence of operating room PSIs (p<0.05). The findings concerning deterrence were relatively consistent across pooled models, but were mixed for models of individual PSIs and single states.
Overall, most studies found that higher liability risk was not associated with improved performance on PSIs or decrease rates of postoperative complications.
Two studies investigated the relationship between liability risk and rates of clinically appropriate cancer screening ( Table 5 ). Baicker and Chandra 8 identified significant associations between liability risk and mammography rates in models using mean malpractice claim payments as the exposure measure, but no significant associations in models using claim frequency or insurance premiums. Frakes and Jena 17 found no relationship between tort reforms and cancer screening rates.
Three studies examined process-of-care measures of quality ( Table 5 ). The study by Bilimoria et al 28 of 17 Hospital Compare measures found no significant associations in the direction of deterrence between the state malpractice environment and process-of-care quality measures. Stevenson et al 35 examined the relationship between a nursing home’s claims experience and 9 process and outcome measures of quality and also found no significant deterrence relationships. In analyses of nursing home quality, Konetzka et al 36 found a significant association in a deterrence direction in 1 of 3 models. Claim frequency was significantly associated with a more favorable ratio of registered nurse to total staffing hours, although the effect size was small (2.4% increase in the ratio for a 1-standard-deviation increase in claim frequency).
Two studies found no significant association between liability risk and patient satisfaction, although a third study found evidence of deterrence ( Table 5 ). Sloan et al 21 found no relationship between claim frequency and obstetrical patients’ satisfaction ratings, and Bilimoria et al 28 found that MGPCI, claim frequency, tort reforms, and a composite measure were not associated with Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems ratings. However, Carlson et al 9 found that emergency physicians who experienced a claim had significantly higher patient experience scores after the claim was filed (increase of 6.52 in Press Ganey percentile rank, 95% CI 0.67–12.38).
Study-specific assessments of risk of bias are provided in Supplemental Appendix eTable 2 . Although the quality of these articles could not be assessed using standard quality assessment tools, the methodological assessment we conducted revealed that, with few exceptions, 10 , 25 , 26 most studies included in this review used appropriate analytical methods, including good controls for confounding and exploration of the robustness of results to changes in model specification. The varied study results were not evidently attributable to the choice of measures, analytic approaches, or sample sizes. Although all of the studies in this review have limitations, none can be dismissed as methodologically unsound. The study that had outlier findings, Zabinski and Black, 24 did not have obvious weaknesses other than its narrow focus on noneconomic damages caps.
However, the quality assessment identified several methodological limitations that may affect the ability of some studies to accurately measure the extent and nature of associations between the exposure and outcome measures. First, a general limitation of the evidence base examined is that all studies but one 15 examined that extent of change in the outcome measures when liability risk was higher versus lower, rather than the absolute effect associated with tort liability risk. Second, although studies that examined what happened during hospitalization may find no evidence of deterrence, it is possible that liability risk affects inpatient mix. In areas with high liability risk, physicians who are concerned about liability might be more inclined to admit to the hospital patients whose need for hospitalization is less clear (i.e., these patients may be healthier than other admitted patients on average). After tort reform is passed, there may be lower tendency to admit such patients, in which case the average admitted patient would have higher severity of illness and be more prone to poor outcomes. The most likely consequence of such selection effects would be spurious positive findings of deterrence; they are less likely to invalidate null findings.
Third, in some studies that used tort reforms as the exposure measure, only a few states adopted reforms during the study period. For example, in the study by Zabinski and Black 24 only 5 states changed their noneconomic damages caps laws in the years studied. In such circumstances, regression estimates may have low precision and be subject to confounding by unobserved, time-varying effects. 37
Fourth, some analyses may have unexplored problems of two-way causation. For instance, adverse events are an established risk factor for malpractice claims. 36 , 38 , 39 A regression model that evaluates the relationship between adverse event rates and claim frequency without accounting for this cannot support the kind of causal inference a firm conclusion about deterrence requires.
Fifth, some studies relied on state- or county-level outcomes data. For instance, Klick and Stratmann 22 used state infant mortality rates, Baicker and Chandra 8 used state-level mammography rates for Medicare patients, Shepherd 26 used state mortality rates for non-motor-vehicle accidents, and Lakdawalla and Seabury 27 used county all-cause mortality rates. Drawing causal inferences with such measures can be problematic because group aggregation reduces information and may mask important differences between individuals in the group. 40
Sixth, aggregation was also common in construction of exposure variables. Most studies measured liability risk indicators at the state or county level, rather than the level of the individual physician, and no studies measured physicians’ perceived levels of liability risk. Physicians may have different awareness of and reactions to such environmental indicators, making physician-level analyses preferable. More studies should examine whether particular physicians change their clinical behavior after they have been sued and, ideally, parse sued physicians according to the subjective intensity of their liability experience.
Seventh, some studies were narrow in focus. Kessler and McClellan 41 , 42 examined only patients hospitalized with 2 cardiac conditions; Konety et al 29 focused solely on patients with bladder cancer; Avraham and Schanzenbach 43 only studied deaths due to coronary heart disease; Missios and Bekelis 44 only included patients who had spine surgery; Bekelis et al 30 focused on patients who had undergone cranial neurosurgery; and Bilimoria et al 33 only included patient who had colorectal surgery. Findings from these distinct analyses may or may not replicable in broader samples.
This review of 37 studies of malpractice deterrence conducted since 1990 found that most studies suggest that higher risk of malpractice liability is not significantly associated with improved healthcare quality. Studies that examined obstetrical care were most likely to have identified some significant associations, but even in that domain there was inconsistency across analyses, including analyses within the same study, and most analyses did not identify evidence of deterrence. Notwithstanding some methodological shortcomings, collectively this body of evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion that higher tort liability risk was not systematically associated with safer or higher-quality care in the hospital setting. Because only a limited number of studies addressed care delivered in other settings, it is not possible to draw conclusions about deterrence in those clinical contexts.
In theory, the deterrence effect of malpractice liability risk could proceed through three mechanisms. The first is economic: malpractice claim payments impose a direct financial sanction. Most physicians are well insured for malpractice 45 and awards rarely exceed coverage limits, 46 but physicians may experience economic effects if their insurance premiums increase or their medicolegal track record adversely affects their clinical income. 47 Healthcare facilities may be affected by economic sanctions more readily than physicians because their insurance generally involves greater experience rating, meaning that premiums are determined in part based on how costly the facility’s claims were in a prior period. The second mechanism (which is less applicable to healthcare facilities) is that the psychological stress and trauma of litigation can be severe, and physicians will endeavor to avoid experiencing them. 48 , 49 The third mechanism is informational. Not all malpractice claims are meritorious, but some convey information about deviations from standards of care. Individual clinicians, healthcare facilities, health insurers, and regulators may then respond to those signals in ways that may prevent harm.
Our systematic review suggests that notwithstanding these theoretical mechanisms, malpractice liability risk may not be effective in preventing substandard care. One possible explanation relates to the etiology of medical error. Some errors involve momentary or inadvertent lapses at the individual clinician level. 50 , 51 Although hospitals might be able to implement systems to identify some such errors before they cause harm, other errors are not amenable to the kind of conscious precaution taking (at either the hospital or the physician level) on which the deterrence model relies.
Previous reports have identified 3 other problems, which have continuing relevance. 45 The first (and perhaps largest problem) is that most instances of medical negligence that cause harm never become malpractice claims, whereas many claims of uncertain or no merit are filed. The poor fit between claims and negligence introduces noise into the deterrent signal, reinforcing physicians’ perceptions that claims do not convey valid information about their quality of care.
Insurance is a second contributing factor. Unlike causing a motor vehicle crash, causing a malpractice injury does not ordinarily result in higher insurance premiums for the involved individual. It is actuarially difficult for insurers to apply experience rating at the physician level, so paid claims do not tend to manifest as direct economic sanctions for the physician. This is less of a problem at the facility level, where self-insurance and experience rating are common.
A third issue is uncertainty about the legal standard of care. Physicians complain that they do not know what “negligence” is—i.e., precisely what the law requires in a given clinical situation. Such uncertainty may contribute to undercutting the desired behavioral change.
Policy levers exist that could address these problems. For example, adopting enterprise liability, a reform that shifts the primary locus of liability from individual practitioners to larger organizations such as hospitals or accountable care organizations, would be helpful. 45 Organizations experience the economic aspect of deterrence more strongly than physicians because they are sued more often and have experience-rated insurance. 45 Organizations are also better positioned to effectuate changes in care that transcend individual practitioners. Another pertinent lever would be widespread implementation of communication-and-resolution programs (CRPs), through which healthcare facilities disclose adverse events to patients, rapidly investigate them, and offer proactive compensation when deviations from the standard of care have caused harm. 52 These programs could result in a higher proportion of negligent events receiving compensation, thereby reinforcing the economic and psychological mechanisms of deterrence. Further, under CRPs, injuries that are not due to negligence are less likely to become claims because facilities explain to patients what happened; preventing such claims strengthens the informational function of litigation because claims more reliably point to actual quality problems.
This systematic review has several limitations. First, because studies of deterrence in the malpractice context are published in journals in a wide range of disciplines, there is a risk that some studies were missed. To minimize this risk, we searched multiple databases spanning the medical, public health, economics, business, and legal literatures. Second, some articles reported incomplete or vague information. Articles varied in the amount of detail provided about the data sources, data years analyzed, and model estimation methods employed. Additionally, some did not report full quantitative results for some models, and articles varied in how quantitative results were reported (e.g., with beta coefficients or odds ratios). Third, some articles reported the results of a very large number of different models and model specifications (for example, one reported 84 models 34 ). These circumstances complicated our effort to summarize studies and provide quantitative results that are interpretable and comparable across studies. Fourth, no validated instrument was available for assessing quality or risk of bias in studies of the type included in this review; consequently, this assessment has greater subjectivity than is optimal.
Is greater risk of malpractice liability associated with better quality of care?
In this systematic review of 37 studies of obstetrical care outcomes, patient mortality, hospital readmissions, avoidable hospitalizations, and other measures, statistically significant associations between liability risk and quality-related outcome measures were rarely observed. Most studies focused on inpatient care.
Most studies in this review found no association between greater risk of malpractice liability and healthcare quality.
Supplemental appendix, acknowledgments.
Dr. Frakes reported support from the National Institute on Aging, grant R01-AG049898. Dr. Studdert reported receiving grants from the Stanford University Medical Indemnity and Trust Insurance, which is wholly owned by Stanford Hospital and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital. Dr. Mello had full access to all the data in the study and takes responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. The data analysis was performed by M.M., M.F., E.B., and D.S.
Michelle M. Mello, Stanford Law School, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA. Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA.
Michael D. Frakes, Duke Law School.
Erik Blumenkranz, Stanford Law School, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA.
David M. Studdert, Stanford Law School, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA. Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA.
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In this paper, I discuss Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs and argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.
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Goldberg and Zipursky advance an intellectually rich and elaborate theory of tort law based on the key relational element that arises between the right of the claimant not to be injured or suffer loss, and the corresponding duty of the defendant not to violate the plaintiff’s right. The respective duty and right that arise, Goldberg and Zipursky Footnote 1 tell us, are the content of relational directives which result from legal practices within valid legal systems (pp. 92–98). They defend what they call a conduct theory of rights Footnote 2 and show that legal practices generate legal directives, whose content are indeterminate rights and duties. The institutionalised courts of law engage in the task of elucidating these rights and duties and issue directives (pp.46, p. 239 and pp. 254–259), and therefore rights and duties are neither general nor have their source in morality, but are rather a legal duty and a corresponding legal right of this specific plaintiff and this specific defendant once the courts have elucidated them.
The core arguments of Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs , are drawn from ideas and published materials emerging from a lengthy engagement with theorists who advocate either corrective justice as foundational of tort law or the view that law can be reduced to economic analysis. Footnote 3 For the former group of theorists Footnote 4 the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant as formulated by the pair right/duty, which will be called the relationality thesis, is paramount and the action or conduct of the defendant cannot be severed from the loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff. By contrast, for the latter group of theorists, the defendant’s action or conduct is severable from the loss or injury of the plaintiff. Furthermore, there is no intelligible or normative connection between them and, therefore, judgements of responsibility in tort law (for example, responsibility in negligence) lack any rational and principled foundation. Consequently, economic analysis theorists argue, tort law should be reduced to policy decisions made by judges whose main concern is to advance a scheme that guarantees a fair distribution of losses and gains. Like corrective justice theorists, Goldberg and Zipursky (p. 4, p.13, p.26, p.89 and p. 181) Footnote 5 argue that the relationality thesis is key to understanding and providing an intelligible unity to the complexity of torts or wrongs that are part of current common laws. Thus, defamation, nuisance, product liability, negligence, and privacy, all find a common core in the idea that a wrong has been committed and, therefore, a breach of a duty has occurred, which corresponds to the right of the defendant not to be injured or suffer loss. Unlike corrective justice theorists, however, Goldberg and Zipursky do not rely on the Kantian framework of rights and duties, conceptions of personhood or rational agency. Footnote 6 Goldberg and Zipursky ground rights and duties on the emergence of practice-based directives. This view will be called the ‘directive-based relationality thesis’. In addition to the directive-based relationality thesis, Goldberg and Zipursky put forward the idea that theorists should also consider the role that courts have in intervening to solve the right-duty dispute. Goldberg and Zipursky aim to show that the law of torts empowers the plaintiff to redress the wrong suffered through civil recourse (p. 13, p. 15, p. 29, pp. 30–37, p. 42, p. 52, p. 72, p. 80, p. 9l, p. 113, p. 115, pp. 163–165). Footnote 7 It is an ‘empowerment’ as the plaintiff instigates the claim and can decide at any moment to abandon it. This additional feature further elucidates the directive-based relationality thesis within tortious relations. Thus, tort law is not a matter of a moral right that has been violated by the defendant’s conduct and the corresponding moral right of remedy. It is a matter of a legal empowerment through a civil recourse conferred on the plaintiff by the law.
In philosophical terms, this theory addresses the question of the normative and justificatory force of tort law as specifically legal and not moral. On the normative and justificatory aspects, it relies on the directive-based relationality thesis; but the normative force of the directive-based relationality thesis emerges as a combination of legal practices and self-understanding of these legal practices (p. 15). There is neither, Goldberg and Zipursky tell us, the need to advance a Kantian framework of political and moral philosophy to give content to the relationality thesis and, consequently, to justify the intervention of the State, nor is there the need to use the Kantian framework to show the immanent formal features that are displayed in the correlation between a duty and a right in tort law. Furthermore, there is no need to resort to an empirical reality, such as vengeance (p. 65 and pp. 121–122), to explain the characteristic normative language used by the courts (p. 6 and p. 12), nor to advance an Archimedean conception of objective morality and moral truths. Goldberg and Zipursky insist, nonetheless, that there is an immanence and an inner normativity of law (pp. 61–62 and pp.190–191), Footnote 8 but that it is always legal in character as provided by the empowerment of the law (p.2, p. 4 and pp. 86–89), and by the fact that it is the courts that elucidate the content of the right and duty.
My criticism of their rich and complex theory, however, will concentrate on the philosophy of action presupposed by Goldberg and Zipursky, which aims to show that action, or the conduct of the defendant, cannot be severed from the plaintiff’s loss or injury. I will argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence. I infer that as their arguments refer to all aspects of tort law, they also apply to specific torts, i.e. negligence.
The criticism is formulated in terms of the following dilemma:
If the directive-based relationality thesis is at the centre of the tort of negligence, then a description or explanation of the defendant’s action and conduct should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence. On the other hand, if the sound philosophy of action shows that we cannot sever the defendant’s conduct from the plaintiff’s injury, then the defendant’s action might become part of the core explanation of the law of negligence. Therefore, the directive-based relationality thesis-in terms of the right-duty pair-as emerging legal practices is secondary to an explanation in terms of the defendant’s action. Either it is the case that the defendant’s actions and conduct should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence or, the defendant’s action and conduct is part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence and the directive-based relationality thesis is secondary to the former. Furthermore, the directive-based relationality thesis might be dispensable.
The intuitive puzzling idea that emerges from the dilemma is that within Goldberg and Zipursky’s tort theory the role of a sound theory of action is unclear. If they were to advance a correct explanation of action, then this theory will have normative consequences and provide a grounding for tort law. This would require us to investigate carefully what action is, and what the conditions are for identifying and evaluating action. Furthermore, methodologically speaking, Goldberg and Zipursky’s would be starting from an explanation of action as the ‘core’ explanation, and subsequently the directive-based relationality thesis will be derivative and follow as a normative thesis to the action theory. Instead, they start with the idea that actions cannot be severed from their results or consequences and they introduce this idea as the correct conception of action. There is no explanation of why this is so, no further argumentation or grounding is provided. The methodological route that Goldberg and Zipursky seem to follow is the opposite from the one suggested. Their conception of action derives from the directive-based relationality thesis that they defend. However, we have no reason to believe that this is a sound explanation of action.
If the premises of the dilemma are sound, then Goldberg and Zipursky would need to choose between the following two options: (a) embrace the directive-based relationality thesis, in which case they would need to ignore the argument that defends the view that action and injury or loss are not severed and, consequently, an explanation in terms of action becomes unnecessary and plays no central role in the tort of negligence; or (b) embrace a sound theory of action whereby action and injury or loss are not severed, in which case they would need to ignore the directive-based relationality thesis or at least explain how it is derivative of their sound theory of action as it will play no central role in the explanation and justification of negligence law. Both alternatives seem unpalatable. In the latter case, if they ignore the directive-based relationality thesis, the explanation should be carried out in terms of action, conduct, capacity and probably outcome-responsibility, Footnote 9 partially ignoring or suspending the question of rights and duties. In a weaker version of this option, they would need to show how the directive-based relationality thesis is derivative of or dependant on their sound theory of action. If they embrace the directive-based relationality thesis, they would need to ignore the question concerning action and conduct as non-severable from injury and loss as central or paradigmatic. This is because it would render mysterious the role played by this theory of action in a coherent explanatory and justificatory theory of negligence law; all the explanatory and justificatory work would be done by the directive-based relationality thesis. Inevitably, however, once we ignore or discard the idea that a defendant’s action cannot be severed from the plaintiff’s injury in describing negligent actions, problems related to moral luck and consequentialist puzzles will arise. It will not be clear why our legal and social practices, and self-understanding do not embrace ‘moral luck’ conceptions, consequentialist, or economic analyses of the law of negligence. Furthermore, as a counter-analysis, a more robust formulation of the right/duty pair would need to be provided to rescue the relationality thesis (or at a least a variation of it). Therefore, Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s theory might collapse into Weinrib’s or Ripstein’s corrective justice theory.
I will now explain in detail the two premises of the dilemma.
Premise 1: If the directive-based relationality thesis is at the centre of the tort of negligence, then the defendant’s action and conduct should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.
In English law, the courts identify a number of key conditions that need to be satisfied for a legal action in negligence to be successful. First, the plaintiff needs to show that the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. This is determined by two key concepts, foreseeability and proximity. Footnote 10 Second, the plaintiff needs to demonstrate that there has been a breach of the standard of care, which is the standard of a reasonable person in the same position and circumstances as the defendant. Footnote 11 Third, the plaintiff should prove that the defendant’s action caused the injury or loss and, finally, Footnote 12 that the type of damage, i.e. loss or injury, was not too remote. Footnote 13 The analysis in the US legal system differs slightly, as much focus is placed on the notion of risk. One of the factors that needs to be considered when determining whether the defendant has a duty of care to the plaintiff is whether the defendant engaged in the creation of the risk which resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. Footnote 14
However, arguably, in both jurisdictions as in many other common law jurisdictions, the primary element is that there is a duty that the defendant owes to the plaintiff and that the latter has a right not to be injured or suffer a loss. In both the English and US legal systems as in many others, Footnote 15 the standard of care is objective and the law of negligence becomes closer to a scheme of quasi-strict liability (p. 191). It does not matter whether the defendant has subjectively done everything that she or he could have done, i.e. whether they took all the precautions or steps to avoid the harm or loss that in her own assessment were necessary. The defendant will be liable if he or she has fallen below the objective standard of care of the reasonable person engaged in a similar action or activity. This ‘quasi-strict liability’ scheme has been the target of criticism by a number of theorists Footnote 16 who argue that there can be no blameworthy action as there is no knowledge that the defendant should have had, and therefore liability for negligent acts cannot be justified. In other words, the defendant was not in control of her actions as she was unaware or oblivious of what she was doing when she was doing it. Arguably, Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory provides an answer to this sceptical challenge in the following terms. The conduct or action, including how the defendant conceived her action or the knowledge that she had when she was engaged in the negligent action, play no role in the justification and explanation of the law of negligence (pp. 248–249). Footnote 17 Goldberg and Zipursky point out that the correct description that identifies a negligent act is ‘x negligently injured y’ and not ‘x acted carelessly, and y suffered a setback because of x’s careless act’. They assert:
To ground a claim for negligence, the plaintiff’s injury must ordinarily be a realization of the aspects of the defendant’s behavior Footnote 18 that rendered it careless: the plaintiff’s injury must be capable of being cogently described as having an immanent within the defendant’s carelessness . Footnote 19 Negligence, in other words, contains a directive that enjoins careless injuring, not careless conduct itself, nor even harm caused (in any manner) by careless conduct (pp. 248–249).
The legal directive establishes the nexus between the injury and the careless conduct. But the nexus is not in terms of an evaluation of the conduct, but in virtue of the right-duty pair and the directive-based relationality thesis. This is a paradoxical position because the role of the different criteria to evaluate conduct is now unclear, e.g. in English law foreseeability and proximity, and reasonable person as standard of care; in the US, reasonable risk. Because Goldberg and Zipursky do not provide a detailed and justified theory of action through which we could assess conduct or action in general, it is not clear how negligent conduct, philosophically speaking, can be determined and assessed. The philosophical and conceptual implication of phrases in this paragraph such as, “ the plaintiff’s injury must ordinarily be the realization of the aspects of the defendant’s behavior “ or, “ the plaintiff’s injury must be capable of being cogently described as being immanent within the defendant’s carelessness ” are unclear. What do ‘being immanent’ and ‘realization’ mean here? We will try to elucidate this in the next section when we engage with Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of action and the second premise of the dilemma.
For Goldberg and Zipursky, the core view that explains and justifies the tort of negligence is the directive-relationality thesis, i.e. the plaintiff’s right not to be injured or suffer loss and the defendant’s duties that are elucidated by the courts and are the content of practised-based directives of the law of negligence. The special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is also shaped by the empowerment in the form of a civil recourse that is conferred on the plaintiff by the State. According to this view, consequently, the question related to the defendant’s subjective understanding and description of her action, or whether the defendant was a proximate cause of injury or loss suffered by the plaintiff is not at the core of the justificatory and/or explanatory framework of the law of negligence. The knowledge and conduct of the defendant and whether it was foreseeable that the action of the defendant will cause the harm seems irrelevant. The directive-based relationality thesis seems to do all the required work as the right-duty pair define what kind of action is a negligent one.
Premise 2: if the sound philosophy of action shows that we cannot sever the defendant’s conduct from the plaintiff’s injury, then the defendant’s action might become part of the core explanation of the law of negligence. Therefore, the directive-based relationality thesis in terms of the right-duty pair is secondary to an explanation in terms of the defendant’s action.
In spite of what has been said in Premise 1, Goldberg and Zipursky engage in an explanation in terms of a theory of action. Their theory of action is a key argument against moral luck views on action and consequentialists theories in tort law. The puzzle of moral luck in contemporary philosophy was first introduced by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, and subsequently applied to tort law by Jeremy Waldron. In reply to Williams’ paper “Moral Luck”, Footnote 20 Nagel Footnote 21 asks whether we are responsible for actions that are beyond our control, e.g. circumstances, opportunities, capacities, temperament, contingencies in the world. According to Nagel, the success or failure of our actions depends on what is happening in the world when we act. Williams calls this ‘moral luck’. The idea of the agent losing control of her actions due to contingencies in the world, including who we are and how we are constituted, undermines any standard notion of responsibility and moral judgement. As Nagel puts it, “the self which acts and is the object of moral judgment is threatened with dissolution by the absorption of its acts and impulses into the class of events”. Footnote 22 But Nagel insists that a moral judgement is not what happens, it is not about a state of affairs, but about an active self. He merely outlines this active self in his piece on moral luck, but provides a clearer idea in The Possibility of Altruism Footnote 23 and The View from Nowhere Footnote 24 . The active self is capable of identifying and distinguishing between what belongs to us, when we engage in choosing and rational deliberation, and what is just a mere happening. Thus, we cannot take a merely external evaluative view of ourselves, and understanding our actions is key to shaping the contours and borders of what we have done, as opposed to what is merely happening in the world. We cannot, Nagel tells us, operate and make ourselves intelligible if we operate as causes in the empirical and contingent world. Contrast Nagel’s position with Williams’ view on the matter. Williams focuses on rebutting the view that we are immune to moral luck and that the agent’s reflective assessment and justification of her own actions are not subject to luck. Footnote 25
The example of the painter Gauguin illustrates Williams’ point. The painter abandons his wife and children to pursue a career in painting. His success as a painter, i.e. giving a unique artistic legacy to the world and defining the way human existence is meaningful, cannot be separated from any justification of his actions. But his success cannot be foreseen by him or anyone at the moment of his actions . If Gauguin fails, he has done the wrong thing; if he succeeds, his actions might be justified. Footnote 26 Of course, this justification is not moral, but it is within a life that adheres to certain values, i.e. a life that is meaningful through aesthetic experience. Williams recognises that this justification is not towards others, i.e. the children will still have grounds for reproach, but the justification will operate retrospectively. Williams’ point is that at the moment of the action , Gauguin cannot act in light of all the relevant rational considerations that apply to him Footnote 27 because much of the justification of his actions will depend on his talents, deliberative capacity Footnote 28 and character, and how he successfully develops these talents. This is what Williams calls ‘intrinsic luck’. Footnote 29 He tells us “the locus of intrinsic luck, largely lie in him -which is not to say, of course, that they depend on his will, though some way ”. Footnote 30 However, he recognises that the locus of intrinsic luck can lie outside the agent. Williams seems to hint to the idea that agency continues once we have performed our actions, when we look back and ponder over the consequences of our actions. Footnote 31 We can see these consequences as part of our actions, in spite of the fact that we may have had no knowledge of the action and did not intend it. According to Williams, we would expect that the lorry driver, who runs over a child by accident, has particular feelings about what happened, and that these feelings cannot be easily eliminated by arguing that what happened was not his fault. The lorry driver recognises that the consequence, i.e. the death of the child, has resulted from his act, i.e. his driving the lorry. Footnote 32 For Williams it would be an insane conception of rationality if we expected people not to feel or own the consequences of their actions, or if we expected them to detach themselves from the unintended aspects of their actions. Footnote 33 However, let us recall that for Williams, this evaluation is not in terms of moral blameworthiness as one cannot make clear judgements of liability and moral blameworthiness. The latter, in principle, requires control, but in cases of non-intentional action there is no control. Footnote 34 He concludes that agency cannot be purified of contingencies in the world and, therefore, any sound account of rationality and responsibility need to consider this impure conception of the self. Furthermore, he wishes to emphasise that our assessment and justification of actions is not exclusively from the moral point of view, where actions and consequences are severed, as Nagel aims to show.
Let us now analyse how these ideas have been examined in tort law. Honoré and Gardner, Footnote 35 inspired by Von Wright’s philosophy of action and norms, Footnote 36 outline an alternative conception that navigates between Nagel’s and Williams’ positions. Gardner, following Honoré’s argument that responsibility in the law of negligence is about outcome-responsibility, establishes a distinction between results and consequences. Thus, results are within the description of the action and therefore are part of what the agent is doing and what we bring to the world as agents. By contrast, consequences are outside the scope of the action, and are merely ‘happenings’. Footnote 37
Waldron Footnote 38 also takes up Williams’ points on moral luck to establish a case for the replacement of negligent liability for a scheme where losses and gains are distributed in terms of adequate models of fairness and justice. Waldron aims to show that the law of negligence is basically unjust as we cannot justify liability in negligence for the alleged harm that the plaintiff has suffered as result of the defendant’s action given that others may have acted in a similar manner, i.e. were equally morally wrong, but were lucky enough not to injure or cause any loss to anyone. His argument is well illustrated with the following example:
Two drivers, named Fate and Fortunate, were on a city street one morning in their automobiles. Both were driving at or near the speed limit, Fortune a little ahead of Fate. As they passed through a shopping district, each took his eyes off the road, turning his head for a moment to look at the bargains advertised in a storefront window. In Fortunate’s case, this momentary distraction passed without event. The road was straight, the traffic in front of him was proceeding smoothly, and after few seconds he returned his eyes to his driving and completed his journey without accident. Fate, however, was not so fortunate. Distracted by the bargain advertised in the shoe store, he failed to notice that the traffic ahead of him had slowed down. His car ploughed into a motorcycle ridden by a Mr. Hurt. Hurt was flung from the motorcycle and gravely injured. His back was broken so badly that he would spend the rest of his life in a wheelchair. Fate stopped immediately to summon help, and when the police arrived he readily admitted that he had been driving carelessly. Footnote 39
Like in Williams’ case of the painter Gauguin, Waldron invites us to reflect on the complexity of action and its connection to blame and responsibility. If world contingencies and happenings are inevitably merged with our actions, then it is difficult to justify from the moral standpoint that we are responsible in negligence, and moral luck seems to pervade our tortious actions. Similarly, if liability in negligence is grounded in our conduct and blameworthy action, then it is difficult to justify that Fate is liable whereas Fortunate is not. The moral viewpoint as defended by Nagel is challenged by this example. Fate and Fortunate conducted themselves in exactly the same way, and there is no justification for both attributing liability to Fate and justifying the transfer via compensation of 5 million US dollars from Fate to Hurt, which bankrupt him. Neither Fate nor Fortunate choose to act in the way they did.
We took a detour in order to understand the context within which Goldberg and Zipursky propose their conception of action. It aims to undermine Waldron’s position and therefore, indirectly, any ‘moral luck’ type of analysis of action and consequentialist position on action theory, including economic analysis of law. But it also aims to put pressure on the moral standpoint of blame and responsibility as advocated by Nagel, for example, where an action is assessed only by virtue of what the active self engages with and, therefore, the self is isolated from results or consequences. They navigate between the Scylla of the moral standpoint and the Charybdis of the ‘moral luck’ position on action and consequentialist analyses. They argue that in tort law, including the law of negligence, the plaintiff’s injury cannot be severed from the defendant’s negligent action. According to Goldberg and Zipursky, Waldron’s description of Fortunate and Fate formulate actions as a sequence of events in the world where contingencies occur. For Waldron, the description of the action that corresponds to Fate’s performance of action would be “the driver was driving the vehicle at high speed, the child jumped in front of the vehicle, the vehicle ran over the child and therefore the driver’s action caused the injury of the child”. By contrast, the description of Fortunate’s action would be “the driver was driving the vehicle at high speed”. Under these two sets of descriptions of negligent action, we cannot understand why Fate is liable while Fortunate is not. They both performed the same actions, but Fate was unlucky due to contingencies of happenings that were beyond her control. By contrast, Fortunate was lucky in terms of happenings. It is unfair to establish liability in negligence on the basis of happenings, especially in negligence, where actions are non-intentional and caused by inadvertence, lack of knowledge or unawareness. It seems that sceptical positions have the upper hand here.
Goldberg and Zipursky aim to show that Waldron’s description of negligent action is mistaken. In tort law and the law of negligence and, arguably, (though they do not put the point according to this exact formulation) from the point of view of the law of negligence and tort law entrenched in legal practices , the correct description of negligent action is as follows: “the speedy driver carelessly ran over a child and this resulted in injury” and this is, according to tort law, what Fate did. By contrast, Fortunate only “drove carelessly at high speed”. Of course, from the point of view of the Road Traffic Act, 1988, both Fortunate and Fate violated the Act and the consequence will be a fine. However, within the perspective of tort law , the duty of non-injury is attached to the description of the act and in the example, only Fate violated the duty of non-injury . It is unclear how Honoré and Gardner’s description of action in terms of results and not consequences sheds further light on, or perhaps complements, Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of action. I suspect that the key difference is as follows. Goldberg and Zipursky would like to make legal descriptions parasitic on legal concepts and the way these concepts are interpreted and elucidated by the courts. By contrast, Honoré and Gardner’s theory of action might stand independently of interpretative legal practices.
If Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s view on action is sound, then the role of the directive-based relationality thesis is unclear. The justification can be done within this theory of action. The courts would only need to identify the correct description of negligent action, i.e. the plaintiff’s action caused the defendant’s injury.
Let us now analyse the conclusion of the dilemma:
Either it is the case that the defendant’s actions and conduct should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence or, the defendant’s action and conduct are part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence, and the directive-based relationality thesis is secondary to the former. Furthermore, the directive-based relationality thesis might be dispensable.
Goldberg and Zipursky need to make up their minds about the role that their theory of action ought to play within the justificatory and explanatory framework of the tort of negligence. If they embrace the directive-based relationality thesis, then the right-duty pair determines and defines the negligent act. A theory of action, therefore, as construed in terms of a description where the injury is part of the act performed by the plaintiff plays no role in the justification and explanation of the tort of negligence. Furthermore, the description of the action is merely a legal description, which is defined by the right-duty pair.
A theory of the right-duty pair will be sufficient to explain key features of the tort of negligence, and the interconnected idea of the civil recourse that is conferred by the State on the plaintiff would remain intact. Goldberg and Zipursky rely on historical and pragmatic arguments to give further flesh to their theory of rights. The so-called conduct theory of rights aims to defend the view that entrenched practices and the interpretations of courts elucidate the content of our rights and duties in tort law and the law of negligence. It is still open to debate whether this conception based on practices is sufficiently normative and robust to ground a theory of rights, which are typically characterised as non-empirical, practical and normative. By contrast, a conduct theory of rights might be contingent on practices, interpretative elucidations and self-understanding, and subject to historical conditions. Footnote 40
Additionally, an objector might raise the issue of the character of action and defend the view that action and injury should be severed. This is precisely Nagel’s point. We cannot look at the performance of our action from the empirical perspective, where contingencies might undermine our self-understanding of what we are responsible for in terms of what we can control. However, contra Nagel, Goldberg and Zipursky do not look at the action from the empirical perspective. They try to show that the action ought to be looked from the law of negligence point of view . However, arguably, the legal point of the tort of negligence does not automatically convert this point of view into a correct normative conception of the law. It is, Nagel would argue, in conflict with our moral practices and moral understanding where blameworthy action plays a key role. Furthermore, if there is to be any meaningful normative language, e.g. duty, breach of a standard, this normative language would need to have some relationship with the moral perspective or moral point of view.
The opposite position, Waldron’s and Williams’ conception of action, puts further pressure on Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of action. Waldron and Williams would insist that our actions are inevitably merged with contingencies in the world, including our character, temperament, what we can see, know or be aware of at the moment of an action. The law of negligence cannot carve a conceptual space through which action and results are not severed, and at the same time, explicitly ignore the deeper reasons why they should not be severed. They cannot separate the non-severance of action and injury from its deeper rationality . We cannot justify cases like that of Fate as different from cases like Fortunate and it is unclear why this law of negligence or legal point of view should have a privileged position over the ‘moral luck’ view, the empirical and/or moral point of view. What is the character of this special normative perspective given by legal concepts and legal practices through which we make this distinction?
The idea of entrenched legal practices does not seem sufficient to ground the distinction, which by now might seem arbitrary. Goldberg and Zipursky would need to ignore the theory of action as it plays no role in the directive-based relationality thesis, though they will not be, therefore, armed with a theory of action that dismantles the pervasiveness of moral luck in negligent actions. They will indirectly open the path for reducing negligence law to consequentialist or economic conceptions of law.
As shown by the second horn of the dilemma, Goldberg and Zipursky could fully embrace their conception of action as a description of injury necessarily connected to the description of the negligent act that is performed by the defendant. This conception will explain why we are responsible for negligent actions, but as the primary explanatory and justificatory role will be in terms of a philosophy of action, we need to engage with an explanation of proximate causation, capacity, etc. The directive-based relationality thesis would subsequently be derivative or dispensable as all the work will be done by these key concepts. Footnote 41
Goldberg and Zipursky reject the latter argumentative strategy and insist that the directive-based relationality thesis and the idea of civil recourse conferred on the plaintiff are at the core of their explanatory and justificatory theory of tort law and, therefore, also negligence law. They fail, however, to explain the role of their theory of action in tortious actions.
I will now explore a potential response to the challenge of the role of their theory of action for tortious action and, more specifically, negligent action. Goldberg and Zipursky could argue that their theory of action is derivative of the directive-based relationality thesis. The latter and, therefore, the pair right/duty determines and defines what a negligent action is. The pair right/duty is, Goldberg and Zipursky could argue, a scheme of interpretation that gives intelligibility to the unity of bodily movements and injury/loss suffered by the defendant. They could state that the moral standpoint, ‘moral luck’ viewpoint, and economic analysis theorists fail to understand that the scheme of interpretation as providing intelligibility of action ought to be in terms of rights/duties. Goldberg and Zipursky’s underlying argument would therefore be that the directive-based relationality thesis and the concepts of right and duties are the conditions of possibility that enable us to engage with the practice of negligence law. Ideas of right, duty and empowerment through civil recourse are historically entrenched in legal practices and are also currently practised by the courts of different jurisdictions. The right not to be injured and the duty of non-injurious action is a scheme through which we can identify and give content to the driving, and injury and loss caused by the speedy driver. If there is another speedy driver who does not injure anyone, then the scheme of interpretation does not apply to her .
The right-duty pair and, consequently, the directive-based relationality thesis are crucial to our self-understanding and to the practices of courts and legal practitioners of the law of negligence. Furthermore, Goldberg and Zipursky could argue that ‘moral luck’ consequentialists and economic analysis theorists’ notion of action are mainly empirical and fail to have any intelligibility from the point of view of the agent who engages in the action. On the other hand, Nagel’s proposal is merely moral, but not legal. The speedy driver who collides with another vehicle and as a result injures the passengers in that vehicle does not see the injury as severed from his driving.
Arguably, however, Goldberg and Zipursky’s hypothetical response would engage neither with Nagel’s moral standpoint, nor with the ‘moral luck’ or economic analysis viewpoint. ‘Moral luck’ and economic analysis theorists could argue that it is true that the speedy driver does not refuse to appropriate and be responsible for the injuries that he has caused to the plaintiff by his negligent driving. However, speedy driver’s self-understanding is confused and muddled by the fact that another speedy driver was lucky and did not actually cause any injury, even though her conduct was equally negligent. In Waldron’s example Fate will ask why she ought to pay for losses that she caused through actions she was unaware of, when Fortunate, who behaved exactly like her, did not cause any injury and therefore is not liable simply because she was lucky. The fact that Fortunate did not cause injury was merely ‘good’ luck Footnote 42 . This is precisely Williams’s point; it would be insane to advocate a theory of rationality and responsibility that would ask for a purified conception of agency, and that would isolate us either from the contingencies of the world or from a purely normative legal conceptual scheme though it is the result of practices. We can still question it, and the fact that is entrenched in practices does not give any special status or consolation to Fate’s pressing question. Fate needs to understand why her action is truly blameworthy . Judgements of liability against her and not against Fortunate contradict our self-understanding. There ought to be a symmetry between Fortunate’s and Fate’s attributions of liability. Self-understanding can go both ways and might undermine a scheme of interpretation in terms of the right-duty pair onto negligent action.
Goldberg and Zipursky also fail to see the moral standpoint. The moral standpoint resists the idea that descriptions of actions should merge with contingencies of the world which we cannot control. Legal practices show a continuity with moral normativity at the level of the interpretative tasks of the courts. This position is clearly defended by Goldberg and Zipursky. But their theory of action seems to isolate legal normativity from moral normativity. Moral self-understanding can show its ugly head in our legal self-understanding either through the interpretative engagement of the courts or the practices of legal practitioners. Furthermore, the application of a scheme of interpretation of right-duty comes after the specific negligent action has been performed. It does not help to guide us in our actions, when we are engaged in reasons and tracking good-making characteristics as it is a mere scheme of interpretation.
In this paper it has been shown that there is a tension between Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of action, which defends the view that negligent action and injury should not be severed, and their directive-based relationality thesis. The role of their theory of action is unclear since all the explanatory and justificatory theoretical work is done by the directive-based relationality thesis. I have also tried to demonstrate that either the moral standpoint of action, or the moral luck position on responsibility might appear in our self-understanding of negligent action. Thus, the possibility of a pure law of negligence with its own normative point of view is problematic as courts in their interpretative tasks engage with both the moral standpoint and moral luck analysis to determine liability in the law of negligence. The moral standpoint or a moral luck type of analysis might show the ‘impurity’ of action and undermine the law of negligence normative point of view that justifies liability. We need further explanations to purge the impurities of a moral standpoint or moral luck analysis in our legal assessment of liability in negligence. It seems that a political or moral philosophical position beyond the notion of historically entrenched practices might be necessary.
John C.P Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, Recognizing Wrongs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2020).
The conduct theory of rights advances the argument that rights and duties are grounded on legal practices. For the idea of legal practices as grounding facts, Goldberg and Zipursky rely on the view defended by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd Edition, 1997) . Thus, legal rules and directives are valid by virtue of facts that obtain independently of whether the rules are morally justifiable. According to Goldberg and Zipursky, the model of rights and duties is a description of our legal practices, e.g. rights and duties figure in the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights and in other pieces of legislation, e.g. Vermont’s Fair Credit Reporting statute and, therefore, rights and duties exist “ by virtue of the existence of valid legal directives within a legal system that require some set of persons (including the set of all persons) to treat some set of persons (including the set of all persons) in certain ways, or that enjoin some set of persons from treating some set of persons in certain ways. These relational legal directives or legal norms are conduct rules” (p. 97).
Calabresi, G., The Costs of Accidents (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Coase, R., “The Problem of Social Cost”. In: 4 Journal of Law and Economics (1950), pp. 1–44; Posner, R., “A Theory of Negligence”. In: 1 Journal of Legal Studies (1972), pp. 29–96.
Weinrib, E., The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Ripstein, A., Equality, Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Private Wrongs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
At p. 82, Goldberg and Zipursky refer to the idea of rules as generators of relational wrongs. At pp. 92–98, they explain how relational legal directives give rise to legal rights and duties.
See Weinrib, E., The Idea of Private Law , Chapter 5 and Ripstein, A., Equality, Responsibility and the Law , Chapter 3.
At p. 124, they make a distinction between narrow and wider civil redress. The former refers to the right to redress legal wrongs as in tort law, whereas the latter refers to the private right of action.
Goldberg and Zipursky insist that torts are wrongs, not construed as blameworthy acts, but as violations of the plaintiff’s right not to be injured. They also argue in favour of taking at face value the normative language of law and the fact that there is an inner normativity of law (pp. 211 and pp. 252–253).
See Honoré, T., Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) and Gardner, J., From Personal Life to Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). See also Perry, S., “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law”. In: 77 Iowa Law Review (1992), pp. 449–514.
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781. For the objective standard of care in professional negligence, see Bolam v Friern Hospital Management [1957] 1 WLR 583 and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428.
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 (HL).
American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of Torts, Third: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. For a defence of the normative dimension of risk imposition, see Oberdiek, J., Imposing Risk (Oxford: OUP, 2017).
See Honoré, T, Responsibility and Fault , at p. 17.
Most of the contemporary literature in the field focuses on either sceptical views of negligence, e.g. H. Hurd and M. Moore, ‘Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence’. In: Criminal Law and Philosophy (2011), pp. 147–198; G. Rosen, ‘Skepticism about moral responsibility’, Philosophical Perspectives (2004), pp. 295–313 and Zimmerman, ‘Moral Responsibility and Ignorance’, Ethics (1997), pp. 410–426; or views that engage in complex and subtle explanations concerning the key components of negligence and the way we need to grasp them, i.e. directly via our expectations of knowledge that people ought to have, or derivatively by tracing the point of knowledge/belief that the actor actually had prior to the negligent action. The standard view is that two or more of these key components offer the ground for responsibility for a negligent action or show that we are unable to demarcate between recklessness and negligence, e.g. Husak, D., ‘Negligence, belief, blame and criminal liability: The special case of forgetting’, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2011), pp. 199–218; Ferzan, K. K, ‘Opaque Recklessness’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2001), pp. 597–652; Ferzan, K. and Alexander, L, Crime and Culpability (Cambridge: CUP, 2012); Fitzpatrick, W., ‘Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge’, Ethics (2008), pp. 589–613; Stark, F. Culpable Carelessness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Yaffe, G., “Intoxication, Recklessness and Negligence”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2012), pp. 545–583.
There is a specific conception of ‘wrong’ advocated by Goldberg and Zipursky which is not related to blameworthiness or conduct (pp.187–199). A conduct is ‘wrong’ when it is attributed as such by the courts in their interpretation of the legal material (p. 106 and 182). The argument underlying the view that conduct is irrelevant in negligence is that there is an objective standard of care, which is defined according to what a reasonable person would do in the specific circumstances (p. 104 and p. 107). Assessment of liability is in terms of what the defendant ought to have done, not what they actually do (pp.191–192).
The emphasis is mine.
Williams, B, “Moral Luck”. In: 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1976), pp. 115–135. Reprinted in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Nagel, T., “Moral Luck”. In: 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1976), pp. 137–151.
Ibid., p. 145.
Nagel, T, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
Nagel, T, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Williams, B., “Moral Luck”, p. 22.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., p. 26.
Williams, B., “Moral Luck”, p. 26.
For a way of understanding this retrospective reflection of our own actions, see my chapter “The Backward-Looking Puzzle of Responsibility in Negligence: Some Preliminary Thoughts for Understanding Inadvertent Actions”. In: Agency, Negligence and Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
Williams, B., “Moral Luck”, p. 28.
Ibid., p. 29.
See footnote 16 above for references on the sceptical position.
Gardner, J., From Personal Life to Private Law, pp. 58–64.
Von Wright, G.H, Norm and Action (Abingdon: Routledge and Kegan 1963), pp. 39–41.
Gardner uses his conception of action to establish that the duty of care in negligence law is only a duty to try and not a result-requiring duty, From Personal Life to Private Law , at p. 64.
Waldron, J., “Moments of Careless and Massive Loss”. In: Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law , Owen, D.G. (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 387–408.
Waldron, J., “Moments of Careless and Massive Loss”, p. 387.
This is an aspect that we have no time or space to explore further, but is something lurking in the vicinity that could be problematic.
See Hart, H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.149–152 and Raz, J. “Responsibility and the negligence standard”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2010), pp.422–452 and “Being in the world”, Ratio (2010), pp. 422–452, for an explanation based on a theory of action grounded on capacities.
See comments on the infelicitous and ambiguous use of the term ‘moral luck’ by Williams, Gardner, J., From Personal Life to Private Law , p. 61.
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Rodriguez-Blanco, V. The Law of Negligence, Blameworthy Action and the Relationality Thesis: A Dilemma for Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law. Law and Philos 41 , 63–82 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09430-w
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Andrew Robertson, On the Function of the Law of Negligence, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , Volume 33, Issue 1, Spring 2013, Pages 31–57, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqs034
This article offers an understanding of the law of negligence which explains its concern with both interpersonal justice and community welfare. It argues that close attention to the structure of the duty of care inquiry and the reasoning in duty cases suggests that the law of negligence has an underlying community welfare purpose, but that purpose is not to be found in notions of deterrence, compensation or the improvement of standards of behaviour. The community welfare purpose underlying the law of negligence must be one that is more directly served by doing interpersonal justice. The best available explanation is that the law of negligence functions to maintain civil peace by providing an avenue of recourse for certain interpersonal wrongs. This analysis explains why the duty inquiry focuses primarily on considerations of interpersonal justice but, like other private law doctrines, also attends to the community welfare effects of imposing liability.
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In this comprehensive guide on tort law research paper topics , we delve into the diverse and intriguing realm of tort law, presenting an array of thought-provoking research paper topics that will captivate students of law and allied disciplines. We aim to equip students with the knowledge and resources needed to embark on successful research journeys within this complex and evolving legal domain. Whether you are interested in negligence, intentional torts, strict liability, or other facets of tort law, this guide will serve as a valuable compass, navigating you through the process of choosing a compelling research topic and crafting a well-structured and compelling research paper. To complement your efforts, we introduce iResearchNet’s custom writing services, offering expert assistance and personalized solutions to unlock the full potential of your tort law research. Embark on your academic journey with confidence and allow iResearchNet to empower you in your pursuit of excellence in tort law studies.
Tort law, a vital branch of civil law, governs personal injury and wrongful actions that result in harm or damage to individuals or property. It provides a legal framework for seeking remedies and compensation for victims. As students of law, understanding the various facets of tort law is essential, and exploring research paper topics in this area can be both enlightening and rewarding. In this section, we present a comprehensive list of 100 thought-provoking tort law research paper topics, divided into 10 categories with 10 topics in each. These topics cover a wide spectrum of tort law issues, encouraging students to delve deeper into this fascinating field and contribute to its ongoing evolution.
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In conclusion, tort law encompasses a vast array of legal principles and case scenarios that demand careful analysis and thoughtful consideration. This comprehensive list of 100 research paper topics offers students an opportunity to explore the intricate world of tort law, where personal rights intersect with legal duties and responsibilities. As aspiring legal scholars, delving into these topics can foster a deeper understanding of the complexities of tort law, as well as inspire innovative research and critical analysis. By investigating these themes, students can contribute to the ongoing development of tort law, ensuring that justice and accountability remain at the forefront of this essential branch of civil law.
Tort law, a foundational pillar of civil law, represents the realm where personal rights and legal duties intersect, offering a labyrinth of legal principles and case scenarios that significantly impact individuals, businesses, and society at large. As students of law embark on their journey into the world of tort law research, they unlock the doors to a captivating realm where civil wrongs and legal remedies intertwine. This article serves as a comprehensive guide to explore the diverse range of research paper topics in tort law, providing students with a unique opportunity to delve into critical issues, landmark cases, and emerging challenges within this captivating branch of law.
The Essence of Tort Law
Tort law is a legal domain that governs the obligations and liabilities arising from civil wrongs and injuries caused by one party to another. This section provides an in-depth understanding of the essence of tort law, explaining its historical context, underlying principles, and key distinctions between torts and other branches of law. By exploring the origins of tort law and its evolution over time, students gain a profound appreciation for its role in protecting personal rights, promoting accountability, and maintaining social order.
Negligence and the Standard of Care
One of the most prominent facets of tort law is negligence, wherein individuals are held responsible for their actions or omissions that lead to harm. This section delves into the intricacies of negligence law, discussing landmark cases and the evolving standards of care. From the historic Bolam test to the modern Montgomery ruling, students explore the journey of negligence law and its impact on the duty of care in various scenarios.
Intentional Torts and Civil Wrongs
Within the framework of tort law lies a spectrum of intentional torts, where harm is deliberately inflicted on another individual. This section examines torts such as battery, assault, defamation, and false imprisonment, offering insights into the legal elements required to prove such civil wrongs. Additionally, students explore how intent plays a pivotal role in distinguishing intentional torts from negligence claims.
Strict Liability and Product Liability
Strict liability represents a unique aspect of tort law, where liability is imposed regardless of fault or intent. In this section, students navigate the realm of strict liability, analyzing ultrahazardous activities and the implications of non-negligent liability. The focus then shifts to product liability, exploring the legal ramifications of defective products and the responsibilities of manufacturers in ensuring consumer safety.
Tort Law and Public Policy
Tort law is not devoid of social, economic, and political implications. This section investigates the intersection of tort law and public policy, delving into the consequences of tort reform, the role of punitive damages, and the impact of tort litigation on businesses and society. Students explore how public policy considerations influence tort law, shaping its landscape and ensuring a balance between individual rights and societal interests.
Tort Law in an International Context
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, tort law faces unique challenges in a globalized setting. This section examines the international implications of tort law, discussing the application of torts across borders, foreign sovereign immunity, and the complexities of transnational tort claims. Students explore the harmonization efforts within international tort law, understanding the diverse legal approaches in different jurisdictions.
As students immerse themselves in the vast expanse of tort law research paper topics, they discover the richness and complexity of this essential branch of law. From negligence and intentional torts to strict liability and international dimensions, the topics offer a stimulating platform for critical analysis and scholarly exploration. By engaging in the study of tort law, students not only contribute to the advancement of legal principles but also embrace the profound significance of accountability and justice in safeguarding individual rights and societal welfare. The ever-evolving world of tort law presents boundless opportunities for research and academic growth, empowering the legal scholars of tomorrow to shape the future of this crucial branch of the legal system.
Choosing a compelling and relevant research paper topic is the crucial first step towards producing a well-structured and insightful paper on tort law. With a multitude of intriguing subjects to explore, selecting the right research topic can be both exciting and challenging. This section provides students with a comprehensive guide on how to choose tort law research paper topics that not only captivate the audience but also offer substantial opportunities for in-depth analysis and critical examination.
Selecting a captivating and suitable research paper topic in tort law requires careful consideration of personal interests, current issues, landmark cases, and practical relevance. A well-chosen topic not only stimulates your intellectual curiosity but also enables you to contribute meaningfully to the field of tort law. With a clear research question in mind, embark on your academic journey with enthusiasm, knowing that your exploration of tort law research topics will shed light on critical legal principles and contribute to the ever-evolving landscape of civil justice.
Writing a well-structured and insightful tort law research paper requires a systematic approach and adherence to certain guidelines. This section provides a step-by-step guide to help students navigate the process of crafting a compelling research paper on tort law. From formulating a strong thesis statement to effectively organizing the content, here are essential tips to enhance the quality of your work:
Remember to proofread and edit your research paper thoroughly to eliminate any grammatical errors or inconsistencies. Seek feedback from peers or professors to gain valuable insights and improve the overall quality of your paper. By following these guidelines, you can confidently produce a well-crafted and impactful tort law research paper that showcases your understanding of legal principles and analytical skills.
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Tort law is a multifaceted and evolving field that demands in-depth understanding and critical analysis. With our comprehensive list of research paper topics, expert writers, and customized solutions, you can delve into the various aspects of tort law with confidence. Whether you are exploring medical malpractice, product liability, negligence, or other tort-related issues, our writers have the expertise to deliver an exceptional research paper tailored to your needs.
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Third-year law student Annabelle Lincoln recently presented her research at the inaugural SportsLand Summit, held at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. The summit gathered prominent figures in sports, healthcare, technology and human performance.
Lincoln's presentation focused on a research paper she co-authored with fellow CWRU Law students Nathaniel Arnholt and Trey Quillin. The research began in the fall of 2023, with the students exploring varying sports law topics. Ultimately, Lincoln, Arnholt and Quillin were encouraged to further explore their research in the spring semester, culminating in a research paper that was finalized over the summer.
Their paper explores the critical issue of collegiate athletes’ control over their personal data within college athletics. With rapid advancements in wearable technology, the ability to collect vast amounts of data on athletes both on and off the field has grown exponentially. This data is increasingly valuable to organizations, raising important questions about ownership of that information.
The legal frameworks governing athlete data rights are complex and vary depending on the athlete's status—whether professional, collegiate or amateur. While the research of Lincoln and her team primarily focused on collegiate athletes, they believe their findings may have broader implications for athletes at all levels. Those interested in the topic can find the full paper on the CWRU Law Athlete Data Lab website .
Reflecting on her experience, Lincoln expressed her gratitude for the opportunity to speak at such a prestigious event, which featured influential leaders such as David Jenkins, COO of the Cleveland Browns, and the CEO of the Rock Entertainment Group, Nic Barlage, along with top team physicians and HealthTech experts. She also thanked Sports Data Labs founders Stan Mimoto and Mark Gorski, and commended Professor Craig Nard for his guidance throughout her research journey.
Lincoln concluded by emphasizing the importance of their research, stating, "Nathan, Trey and I researched this topic extensively and hope our paper will be helpful to players and industry leaders moving forward."
20 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2020
NALSAR University of Law
Date Written: June 7, 2020
Indians, of late, have risen to the challenge of healthcare and increased their efforts to provide healthcare facilities to their underprivileged compatriots. This is primarily being done through NGOs and other organizations many of which are funded by the Government. One of the most popular ways to do so have been establishment of health centres which provide the poor with free of cost health services. As we know, instances of malpractice and negligence, unfortunately, have penetrated into every known field and medical field is no exception to this. The usual legal cases of medical negligence are usually covered under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 but not the cases of negligence and malpractice in the above mentioned health camps because the poor beneficiaries don’t qualify as “consumers” since they haven’t paid any sort of consideration for the services they availed. This research paper seeks to bring to light the role of NGOs and social activists as primary and secondary health care providers in India, unearth their underlying issues but at the same time, lends a special eye to the instances of medical negligence in their camps. The paper in its quest to do so, tries to answer few questions like whether those poor people have any remedy and if yes, then how can they avail it? And whether there is need for procedural guidelines and policy considerations to safeguard the rights of poor and save them from the vicious legal cycle of this country?
Keywords: Medical Negligence, Malpractice, Tort, India, Healthcare systems
JEL Classification: K13, I14, I18
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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This paper belongs to a unique category. It is a quasi-original research-review involving law research and medicolegal negligence, admixed with existing clinical nursing data involving adverse events and medication errors. Law refers to a set of rules enforced by a country's legal system.
Table 2 displays the annual scientific productivity and citations per document on medical negligence research, and shows that annual productivity of medical negligence research has increased gradually. Research output was very low in the beginning with only nine research papers published from 1954 to 1980 with an accumulated percentage of 1.94%.
This article was published on October 22, 2022, and updated on October 28, 2022, at NEJM.org.
David G. Owen*. After centuries of glacial development in the English forms of action, negligence law in America began to take shape during the 1830s and 1840s as a general theory of liability for carelessly caused harm. Conveniently (if roughly) dated to Chief Judge Shaw's 1850 decision in Brown v. Kendall,1 negligence emerged as a distinct ...
Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability" (1997) jeremy horder. Download Free PDF. View PDF. NEGLIGENCE IN LAW OF TORTS SADAF QADIR LLB-2 07-12-21 fNEGLIGENCE An action of negligence proceeds on the idea of duty of reasonable care on part of defendant and breach of that duty has caused injury to plaintiff.
This manuscript intends to create a standardized and well-structured accountability model that tackles patient negligence in healthcare systems. A random sample of 41 hospitals (33 private and 8 public) - representing more than 25% of hospitals in Lebanon - was selected for participation in interviews discussing compliance and ...
The tort liability system is intended to serve three functions: compensate patients who sustain injury from negligence, provide corrective justice, and deter negligence. Deterrence, in theory, occurs because clinicians know that they may experience adverse consequences if they negligently injure patients.
Data, negligence legislation, key cases, and law processes were collated and analysed based on court decision citations, legal impact and relationships between legislation application and case law.
Abstract. The elements of the tort of negligence are well known: injury, duty, breach, and actual and proximate cause. It is uncontroversial that the plaintiff must establish each of these elements to make out the prima facie case of negligence. Accordingly, there is no tort unless all of these elements are established.
Negligence law is often asked to adapt to new technologies. So it is with artificial intelligence (AI). But AI is different. Drawing on examples in medicine, fi ... UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 20-01. 63 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2020 Last revised: 2 Oct 2020. See all articles by Andrew D. Selbst Andrew D. Selbst.
In this paper, I discuss Goldberg and Zipursky's Recognizing Wrongs and argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.
Deficiency in Medical Services under Consumer Protection Law and Equivalency of Medical Negligence under the Law of Torts. Avinash Singh, Afsana Khan, International Journal of Legal Research, Volume 8(1) Page 311-328 (2021) ... The present paper will focus on the meanings, explanations, understandings and interpretations of medical negligence ...
IJCRT1705097 International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT) www.ijcrt.org 626 TORT OF NEGLIGENCE IN INDIA * Dr. Sweety Phogat Asst. Professor in Law C.R Institute of Law Rohtak, Haryana. ABSTRACT The law of torts in India presently, is mainly the English law of torts which itself is based on the principles of the common law of England.
The doctrine of contributory negligence is one of the most important rules in the law of torts, both in practical and in theoretical terms. ... Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 40/2014. 46 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2014 Last revised: 18 Feb 2016. ... the apportionment of damages; 5. the doctrine of contributory negligence is part of the law ...
This paper uses Australian Common Law in general; and NSW legislation [Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) or CLA] in particular. Firstly, this paper aims to apprise and alert Australian nurses about ...
The judge then instructs the jury on the specific law—that is, the rule of negligence (below). The jury then privately deliberates, reaches a verdict, returns to the court, and informs the judge. ... Guardado, JR. Medical Liability Claim Frequency Among U.S. Physicians. Policy Research Perspectives. 2017. Accessed April 29, 2022.
The community welfare purpose underlying the law of negligence must be one that is more directly served by doing interpersonal justice. The best available explanation is that the law of negligence functions to maintain civil peace by providing an avenue of recourse for certain interpersonal wrongs. This analysis explains why the duty inquiry ...
International Journal of Law 58 International Journal of Law ISSN: 2455-2194; Impact Factor: RJIF 5.12 Received: 11-09-2019; Accepted: 13-10-2019 www.lawjournals.org Volume 5; Issue 6; November 2019; Page No. 58-60 Medical negligence and law in global perspectives Dr. Surendra C Sapale
In this section, we present a comprehensive list of 100 thought-provoking tort law research paper topics, divided into 10 categories with 10 topics in each. These topics cover a wide spectrum of tort law issues, encouraging students to delve deeper into this fascinating field and contribute to its ongoing evolution.
The law of contributory negligence is often treated as an afterthought by academics. This tendency is particularly pronounced in the commercial law sphere, appa ... Law Problems (April 29, 2017). Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Forthcoming , Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 60/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com ...
Third-year law student Annabelle Lincoln recently presented her research at the inaugural SportsLand Summit, held at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. The summit gathered prominent figures in sports, healthcare, technology and human performance. Lincoln's presentation focused on a research paper she co ...
1.Introduction. Solar energy is emerging as a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy source. Utilizing heat storage devices for solar energy accumulation not only reduces carbon emissions but also promotes energy conservation [1], [2], [3].Currently, these devices store solar energy in phase change materials or heat storage tanks via a heat exchanger.
This research paper seeks to bring to light the role of NGOs and social activists as primary and secondary health care providers in India, unearth their underlying issues but at the same time, lends a special eye to the instances of medical negligence in their camps. The paper in its quest to do so, tries to answer few questions like whether ...