domestic statehood and foreign policy essay

What Is the Relationship Between Domestic and Foreign Policy?

Explore maps and charts that illustrate how climate change, terrorism, COVID-19, and internet freedom require both international and domestic solutions in an increasingly interconnected world.

U.S. President Joe Biden receives his coronavirus disease (COVID-19) booster vaccination at the White House in Washington, U.S., September 27, 2021.

Source: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque.

Domestic policy and foreign policy: a blurred line 

What happens abroad affects people at home, and what happens at home affects the world. That's why foreign policy—national policies advancing interests outside a country’s borders, and domestic policy — national policies advancing interests within a country’s borders are often deeply connected. In fact, drawing a clear line between domestic and foreign policy is sometimes impossible. The close relationship between the two policy areas means that policymakers need to critically assess decisions about foreign affairs while also considering the impacts on domestic issues, and vice versa. In many cases, multiple government offices need to coordinate to tackle interconnected national and international challenges. It also means that seemingly distant policy areas have more immediate consequences inside a country than anticipated. 

Let’s explore a few examples of the connections between domestic and foreign policy.  

Public Health: What do domestic COVID-19 vaccine policies tell us about foreign policy?

When the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, the world quickly realized no one country could solve the pandemic alone. Containing the virus domestically required a clear understanding of the risks and strategies beyond each country’s borders. Indeed, in May 2021, World Health Organization Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the pandemic “will not be over anywhere until it’s over everywhere.”

During the pandemic, governments around the world worked individually and together to produce effective and safe vaccines . Some democratic governments started initiatives that gave government funding to private companies to produce a COVID-19 vaccine. Other governments, such as those of Russia and China, nationalized their vaccine production process.

In 2021, many countries began rolling out their COVID-19 vaccination programs. During that time, many leaders found that balancing the needs of one’s country with the needs of other countries around the world was complicated.

Policy decisions about vaccines had both international and domestic effects that were often interrelated. For example, decisions about how to vaccinate one’s own population were also connected to decisions that considered the needs of other countries where vaccines were equally or more scarce. The ability of some countries to fight off the spread of the disease would have clear knock-on effects for other countries. The United States, for example, invested domestic taxpayer money to develop vaccines and then, by March 2023, exported over 687 million vaccines around the world alongside those shared at home. That decision was based on the idea that the virus’s spread in other countries could ultimately harm U.S. citizens’ health. This idea raised some controversy, as citizens debated how the United States should balance its domestic and international health efforts.

The distribution of U.S.-developed vaccines abroad can also function as a tool of soft power . Countries can use vaccine development and distribution to exert international influence or to pressure other countries. Certain countries found that the development of domestic vaccine programs could  boost their international prestige. The Chinese Communist Party, to enhance their image after its initial COVID-19 response, poured funding into the development of a COVID-19 vaccine and vowed to provide the world with two billion doses after its completion. The vaccine, Sinovac, was the most used COVID-19 vaccine in the world in February 2022. But, vaccines developed by other countries soon surpassed China’s vaccine dominance. As of November 2022, the most widely used vaccine was the United Kingdom’s Oxford-AstraZeneca (in use in 185 countries), followed by the United State’s Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines, in use in 165 and 114 countries respectively.  

Policy Decision Interactive: Vaccine Nationalism vs. Multilateralism

Terrorism: how are domestic and international terrorism related.

Counter-terrorism policy is another area that can illustrate how a country’s foreign and domestic policy connect. As discussed in our terrorism module , definitions of terrorism around the world vary, and are usually based on the idea that violence is driven by ideology. The rising threat of domestic terrorism in the United States is changing previous notions that terrorism only comes from abroad. 

In the United States, many factors have contributed to the current terrorist threat.They often include a mix of domestic and international drivers. Lone wolves are actors without an explicit group affiliation but who sometimes cite other actors or groups as inspiration for their attacks. Many are radicalized online and mobilized to carry out violence quickly. These can include U.S. citizens and residents who attack based on varied motivations. Terrorist networks can also cross borders, including by leveraging the borderless online space, requiring coordinated policies and security forces to track and secure against those threats consistently, and in partnership with other countries’ authorities.  

Domestic terrorists can be radicalized abroad and still attack at home, so the successes and failures of counterterrorism policies in one country can have outcomes in another. Debates sometimes arise about the appropriate ways to investigate suspected terrorists based on their national origins, and domestic and international suspects sometimes receive different treatment. Treating foreign suspected terrorists harshly has shaped scandals in the United States, most notably the mistreatment of foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay . Some experts suggest treatment of foreign nationals in a country’s courts through torture or humiliation, which critics argue occurred at Guantanamo, can incite further terrorist violence around the world in response.

Policies on terrorism can influence both domestic and international threats, even though those policies are sometimes separated by different systems. Often, the smooth sharing of information between domestic and international government agencies within and among countries is critical to monitoring potential threats, regardless of their country of origin. The line between domestic and foreign policy on terrorism can be blurry, requiring multiple actors within a policy system to coordinate activities and seek to understand both the domestic and international effects of policy through strong interagency cooperation.

Climate: How does national policy on climate change impact other countries?

Another example of the connections between foreign and domestic policy is climate and environmental policy. Climate and environmental challenges require global solutions. Climate related policies can affect many elements of people’s lives, including the air they breathe, basic safety, and the availability of energy and food - thus, no one country can fully contain the results of their actions within their national borders. Furthermore, as discussed in our climate module , no climate concern can fully be solved through national policies alone, and domestic decisions can influence how people in other countries live, breathe and work.

Domestic policies can help—or harm—other countries due to spillover effects. For example, take U.S. plastic reduction policies. In recent years, several U.S. states have banned single-use plastic straws. These bans aim to help lessen plastic pollution in the immediate and wider environment.  Plastic waste covers forty percent of the earth’s ocean surface, and plastic straws could be swirling around for two hundred years—which is how long it takes for them to decompose. Discarded plastic can travel hundreds of miles in the ocean, so trash in the southern United States could be ingested by animals in Mexico. Single-use plastic straw bans can reduce waste in one locality, and may help inspire other regions and countries to adopt similar policies. And bans aren’t just for straws - plastic bag bans or taxes are effective in reducing plastic us, decreasing it by up to 100 percent in certain regions!

Countries' domestic policies on plastic waste can also harm other countries. Many countries export some of their plastic waste to foreign countries to be processed, known as ‘waste export’—yielding problems for receiving countries already inundated with their own waste. India, for example, is a country that receives large amounts of those exports, which is a major problem given its relatively poor practices of plastic waste management. India  accounts for an estimated 21 percent of mismanaged plastic waste worldwide and 13 percent of plastic waste emitted into the ocean in 2019. This problem is international—over 60 countries export plastic waste to India, intensifying the problem. It is often rich countries that export waste to poorer countries, making the process all the more problematic.  

Cyberspace : How do internet policies in some countries affect people around the world?

Many countries attempt to regulate cyberspace within their borders through domestic internet security policies. Those policies can have international effects, benefiting or harming the business interests of companies abroad by governing if and how they operate inside those countries and shaping how people around the world interact and how they gain information. Known as the Great Firewall , China’s internet censorship is one of the most oppressive policies in the world, and restricts how international businesses can operate in China (banning, for example, popular companies and products such as Google and Facebook). 

Internet and data regulations exist all over the world.The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is another internet regulation act active in Europe, that aims to protect the privacy of users by alerting them if a website seeks to access their personal data. Many states in the United States are adopting GDPR-inspired laws requiring users to express consent for information gathering. Such laws can reduce the freedom of businesses all over the world to mine user data from certain regions for their marketplace goals.

According to one analysis from Google, more than 40 governments engage in restrictions of online information, “a tenfold increase from just a decade ago.” For example, YouTube has been blocked in Turkey, Guatemala suppressed WordPress blogs in 2009 during a political crisis, and Iran has stifled political dissent by blocking social media platforms. Vietnam actively filters political content from social media. Because cyberspace is borderless, internet policies like these can have various knock-on effects well beyond the jurisdictions where they originate. For this reason, a true understanding of the implications of domestic internet policies requires considering how policies can impact people and businesses all over the world.  

Whether a country’s national policy prevents sea animals from ingesting plastic far from where it was discarded, whether terrorism policy in one country decreases or increases terrorist threats in another, whether family members and businesses in the United States and China can communicate over Facebook, or whether countries make vaccines available to other countries, the same rule holds true: what happens at home affects what happens abroad. 

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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 1, 1998, review article, domestic politics, foreign policy, and theories of international relations.

• James D. Fearon 1
• View Affiliations Hide Affiliations Affiliations: Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637; e-mail: [email protected]
• Vol. 1:289-313 (Volume publication date June 1998) https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.289
• © Annual Reviews

A significant and growing literature on international relations (IR) argues that domestic politics is typically an important part of the explanation for states' foreign policies, and seeks to understand its influence more precisely. I argue that what constitutes a “domestic-political” explanation of a state's foreign policy choices has not been clearly elaborated. What counts as a domestic-political explanation is defined by opposition to systemic or structural explanations. But these may be specified in several different ways—I spell out two—each of which implies a different concept of domestic-political explanations. If a systemic IR theory pictures states as unitary, rational actors, then a domestic-political explanation is one in which domestic-political interactions in at least one state yield a suboptimal foreign policy relative to some normative standard. Or, if a systemic IR theory pictures states as unitary, rational actors and also requires that attributes of particular states not enter the explanation, then a domestic-political explanation is any one that involves state characteristics other than relative power. Implications of each approach are developed, and examples from the literature are provided. I also address the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between a “systemic theory of international politics” and a “theory of foreign policy,” arguing that there is an important and natural sense in which they are the same.

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• DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV.POLISCI.1.1.289
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Politicization, populism, and foreign policy, case, data, and methods, poland’s domestic political context and politicization dynamics, the politicization of poland’s foreign policy under pis.

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Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means: Pathways and Patterns of Populist Politicization

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David Cadier, Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means: Pathways and Patterns of Populist Politicization, Foreign Policy Analysis , Volume 20, Issue 1, January 2024, orad035, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad035

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This article argues that populism in power translates into a greater tendency to politicize foreign policy, in the sense of defining and articulating foreign policy preferences in opposition to political predecessors, using foreign policy as an instrument and ground to battle political opponents, and over-prioritizing domestic incentives and considerations over external ones. Paradoxically, compared to other classical determinants of foreign policy, how populism relates to domestic political competition has received scant attention. Yet, populist actors’ strategies in dealing with political opposition are at the same time distinctive and consequential. This article advances a typological theoretical framework shedding light on the pathways, patterns, and implications of populist politicization, which it illustrates empirically with reference to the case of Poland.

Este artículo argumenta que el populismo en el poder se traduce en una mayor tendencia a politizar la política exterior, en el sentido de definir y articular las preferencias en materia de política exterior en oposición a los predecesores políticos, de utilizar la política exterior como instrumento y terreno para combatir a los oponentes políticos, y de priorizar en exceso los incentivos y las consideraciones internas sobre las externas. Paradójicamente, la forma en que el populismo se relaciona con la competencia política interna ha recibido escasa atención en comparación con otros determinantes clásicos de la política exterior. Sin embargo, las estrategias de los agentes populistas para hacer frente a la oposición política son, al mismo tiempo, distintivas y consecuentes. Este artículo propone un marco teórico tipológico que pretende arrojar luz sobre las vías, patrones e implicaciones de la politización populista, la cual ilustramos empíricamente con referencia al caso de Polonia.

Cet article avance que le populisme au pouvoir se traduit en une propension accrue à la politisation de la politique étrangère, en termes de formulation et d'articulation des préférences de politique étrangère en opposition de celles des gouvernants précédents, d'utilisation de la politique étrangère comme un instrument et une arène pour attaquer les opposants politiques, et de priorisation à l'excès des considérations et motivations de politique intérieure au détriment des dynamiques et finalités internationales. De façon paradoxale, en comparaison des autres déterminants traditionnels de la politique étrangère, la façon dont le populisme se rapporte à la compétition politique nationale n'a reçu que peu d'attention. Pourtant, les stratégies des acteurs populistes à l'égard de l'opposition politique sont à la fois distinctives et portent à conséquence. Cet article propose un cadre théorique typologique qui met en lumière les vecteurs, caractéristiques et implications de la politisation populiste et qui est appliqué empiriquement au cas de la Pologne.

After being elected into office, populist actors seize the reins of their countries’ foreign policy while remaining engaged at the same time in domestic political competition, though now with a view to retain rather than conquer power. The way they engage in the latter is bound to have repercussions on how they conduct the former. Populism is, indeed, defined and characterized by a distinctive manner of “practicing adversarial politics” ( Urbinati 2019 , 38)—that is, of representing, battling, and mobilizing against political opponents. As documented by the scholarship in Foreign Policy Analysis, the type of strategy chosen by governments in dealing with political opposition is in turn a key mediating factor in how and to what extent domestic politics’ affects foreign policy ( Hagan 1995 , 130; Hudson 2014 , 153). The way governing populists relate to their political competitors and predecessors is therefore likely to be an important parameter in how populism influences foreign policy and thus requires analytical attention. How does populism feed the politicization of foreign policy? Of what kind, in what ways, and with what implications?

The foreign policies of populist actors have recently become the focus of a vibrant and fast-expanding scholarly literature (for an overview, see Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann 2021 ; Chryssogelos et al. 2023 ; Wajner and Giurlando 2023 ). A first, seminal line of research has analyzed how and whether populism translates into specific preferences, dispositions, or orientations in foreign affairs (“populist foreign policy”) ( Chryssogelos 2017 ; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017 ; Plagemann and Destradi 2019 ). Another, more recent line of investigation has examined how populism relates to some traditional determinants of foreign policy, such as leadership traits, operational codes, role conception, political ideology, national identity, or historical memory ( Cadier and Szulecki 2020 ; Özdamar and Ceydilek 2020 ; Wehner and Thies 2021 ; Friedrichs 2022 ; Ostermann and Stahl 2022 ; Thiers and Wehner 2022 ). Yet, in this context, the effects of populist governments’ domestic political strategies—another classic determinant of foreign policy—have, by contrast, received little attention. This is somehow paradoxical considering that, by definition, populism is grounded in and emerges from domestic politics and that populist actors’ tendency to politicize foreign policy once in office is one of the features best documented across cases and regions—from India to the US and from Argentina to Hungary ( Chryssogelos 2017 , 16; Destradi and Plagemann 2019 , 717; Wojczewski 2019 , 296; Visnovitz and Jenne 2021 , 684; Fouquet 2023 , 10). The few FPA works looking into the domestic political strategies of populist actors provide valuable insights but rarely focus on adversarial politics as such. Daniel Wajner (2022 ) has shed light on how governing populists seek internal legitimacy by projecting the “people” transnationally and by identifying enemies abroad, while Stephan Fouquet (2023 ) has shown that the personalistic–plebiscitarian nature of populist mobilization leads populist actors to be guided by political opportunism and the desire to maximize popular support in foreign policy decision-making. I argue, however, that confronting political opponents is precisely at the core of these populists’ legitimation, mobilization, and popularity-maximizing strategies and that it needs, therefore, to be made central in theorizing their effects on foreign policy. 1 Similarly, while there is a near intuitive consensus in the literature that governing populists tend to politicize foreign policy, the patterns, pathways, and implications of this politicization have rarely been specified, let alone theorized or systematically examined empirically. The two notable exceptions in this regard—Angelos Chryssogelos (2019 ) documenting patterns of “nationalist re-politicization” and “societal re-politicizations” in Greece and Sandra Destradi, Plagemann, and Taş (2022 ) contrasting “anti-elitist politicization” and “people-centric” politicization in India and Turkey 2 —have not exhausted the topic as they focus on a specific, issue-oriented, and elite-focused form of politicization. It does not amount to the sole—or, this article argues, necessarily the main—type of populist politicization, and, as such, the latter invites additional theory development ( Destradi, Plagemann, and Taş 2022 , 489; Ostermann and Stahl 2022 , 17).

I argue that populism translates into a greater proclivity to use foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics by other means. 3 More specifically, the logics of differentiation, mobilization, and salience inherent to populism feed populist actors’ tendency to define their foreign policy preferences and choices in opposition to those of their political predecessors (“counter-step foreign policy”); invest foreign policy as an instrument and as a ground to battle political opponents (“battleground foreign policy”); and over-prioritize domestic political considerations over external ones in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy (“subdued foreign policy”). As such, more than from an ideological or political commitment to move it to the realm of public choice (or “back to the people”), populist politicization proceeds from using foreign policy as a repertoire, terrain, and instrument in dealing with the political opposition.

The article begins by setting forth a framework theorizing three pathways and three corresponding patterns of populist politicization of foreign policy. In doing so, it builds on an action-oriented and opponents-focused conceptualization of politicization borrowed from public policy, on a syncretic approach to populism as a political practice that relies on insights from comparative politics, and on the FPA scholarship on opposition politics and its effects. Combined, these lenses allow reaching a two-step theoretical objective: theorizing (a) governing populists’ distinct ways of relating to political opposition and (b) how it spills over and shapes foreign policy. Subsequently, the data and method employed are presented, as well as some elements of context on the empirical case. Methodologically, the article relies on a building-block approach to typological theorizing ( George and Bennett 2005 , 233–44) and on a case-study analysis of Poland. Central Europe stands out as a region that is often regarded as a “laboratory” of populism in power ( Enyedi 2020 ), yet it has rarely been studied under the prism of populist politicization of foreign policy. Finally, the typological patterns and pathways of populist politicization, and their implications, are illustrated empirically by examining the foreign policy practices of Poland’s populist right-wing government in power from 2015 to 2023. In conclusion, and so as to increase their generalization potential, these frameworks and findings are confronted with other national and regional cases of populist governments, with the help of the available scholarship.

The approach chosen allows the article to make a three-fold contribution. First, it advances the theorization of the relationship between populism and foreign policy by building on a syncretic approach to populism as a representational and mobilizational practice: while most studies rely on the ideational or discursive conceptualizations of populism, this article also builds on insights from the politico-strategic and, to a lesser extent, stylistic approaches. Second, the article contributes to the broader discussion on the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy, one that has been largely dominated by the scholarship on party politics (see, for instance, Raunio and Wagner 2020 ; Hofmann and Martill 2021 ), while by contrasts the strategies of government in dealing with political opposition have received less (recent) attention. Third, the analysis adds to the literature on the politicization of public policy and of foreign policy in particular. It documents patterns of action-oriented and government-initiated politicization, while most studies focus on issue-oriented and non-executive politicization.

Action-Oriented, Government-Initiated and Opponents-Focused Politicization

If a “Sartori Concept Stretching Competition” was to be organized in political science (see Sartori 1970 ), both politicization and populism would be strong contenders. Starting with the first, variegations in scholarly conceptualizations notably stem from differences in terms of level and object of analysis: individual political behavior, national political system, or international institutions such as the EU ( Zürn 2019 ). The few studies available on the populist politicization of foreign policy ( Chryssogelos 2019 ; Destradi, Plagemann, and Taş 2022 ) mainly rely on conceptual approaches developed for the third level, that of regional or international governance. There, politicization is authoritatively defined by Michael Zürn as “the making of collectively binding decisions a matter or an object of public discussions” ( Zürn 2014 , 50) and, elsewhere, as “moving something into the realm of public choice” ( Zürn 2019 , 978). Another seminal definition reasoning at the same level identifies the “expansion of actors and audience” in political decision-making as one of the empirical benchmarks of politicization, along with “salience” and “polarization of opinions” on a given issue or policy domain ( de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2016 ).

However, there is little evidence that populist governments seek to meaningfully broaden the public debate about, or involve a greater number of actors in, their foreign policy decisions (for instance, by organizing referenda, public consultations, or meaningful parliamentary debates), except maybe when it comes to migration. On the contrary, populists tend to centralize foreign policymaking, sideline civil society actors and foreign policy administrations, and castigate political opponents as traitors to disqualify their inputs. This invites turning to another conceptualization of politicization, namely, the one developed by the literature in public policy analysis for the national political level, which in fact appears better tailored to FPA’s middle-range theoretical focus. In this article, politicization is thus understood as “the use of public policies by elected representatives as a political resource in the competition to exercise political power” ( Hassenteufel and Surel 2008 , 81; see also Hassenteufel 2011 , 157-186). It remains about “making previously unpolitical matters political” ( Zürn 2019 , 978), but the main entrepreneurs of politicization are governing actors rather than non-governing ones. In addition, in this understanding, politics (or the political) is conceived as an “activity, action or conflict” rather than as a “sphere, system or field” ( Wiesner 2021b , 4). Such action-based (rather than spatially connoted) conception of politics leads to approaching politicization as an active use of contingency in “creating controversy, conflict, contentiousness, or contestation” ( Wiesner 2021a , 268) and allows paying attention to the politicization not just of issues but also of actors ( Déloye and Haegel 2019 ).

In paving the conceptual ground toward theorizing how populism feeds the politicization of foreign policy, it appears useful to briefly reflect on how it can be distinguished from non-populist politicization or even technocratic de-politicization . The opposition with the later dynamic, which amounts to removing an issue from the sphere of political debate (for instance, by invoking its technicality), is rather straightforward. It is interesting to note, though, that technocratic de-politicization and (governing) populist politicization originate at the same level and invites, therefore, the same empirical focus—namely, governments’ actions, documents, practices, and speech acts ( Wiesner 2021a , 271). De-politicization has been identified as the “dominant model of statecraft” ( Flinders and Wood 2014 , 135) in the twenty-first century, not least as it allows reducing decisions costs associated with ideological controversies, and the baseline expectation for contemporary governments should therefore be to de-politicize rather than politicize foreign policy. Populist governments thus seem to stand out as an exception in that sense. To be sure, instances of non-populist politicization of foreign policy exist and have notably been thoroughly documented by the scholarship on diversionary war (for an overview, see Pickering and Kisangani 2005 ). But these insights precisely help distinguishing and delineating patterns of populist politicization in the sense that the latter, as will be demonstrated below, are not of a diversionary nature: Foreign policy is used not to deflect but to re-focus attention on domestic politics. More generally, the difference between non-populist and populist politicization is also situated in the various motivations (building policy coalitions or retaining political power) and strategies (accommodation, insulation, or mobilization) identified by the scholarship on oppositional politics and foreign policy ( Hagan 1993 ). Comparatively, non-populists relate more to the first motivation and make greater use of the first two strategies than populists (see blow).

As made clear by this brief discussion, the difference between populists and non-populists in how or whether they politicize foreign policy has less to do with a strict demarcation (either/or) than with a greater tendency (more/less)—just like the domestic and the foreign have to be thought as two ends of a continuum ( Rosenau 1997 ). This in turn invites conceptualizing populism in terms of degree or, in other words, as a practice (see Chryssogelos et al. 2023 , 15–17).

As populism remains an essentially contested concept and as its relationship to politicization is undertheorized, I chose to combine various conceptual lenses rather than adopting one over the others. This allows casting a wider net in identifying possible patterns and pathways of populist politicization of foreign policy. More crucially, I contend that these various lenses are complementary to the extent that they all have something to say about how populist actors relate to political opposition and, more generally, act in domestic politics, as well as about the implications for their foreign policy. Three distinctive populist logics—pertaining to differentiation, mobilization, and salience—can be identified in particular.

Populist Logic of Differentiation and Counter-Step Foreign Policy

The discursive, stylistic, and ideational approaches to populism all suggest that populism is less about being something than about not being something. First, following Ernesto Laclau, populism can be understood as a logic of political articulation (or discursive practice) by which the identity of the “people” as underdog is constructed in opposition to the “elite” as power ( Laclau 2005 ; Panizza and Stavrakakis 2021 ). The populist discourse constructs a chain of equivalence between unsatisfied social demands and through the “identification of social negativity” ( Laclau 2005 , 38), that is, by castigating the power seen as frustrating these demands in the first place. In that sense, populism very much amounts to an othering discourse: “there is no populism without discursive construction of an enemy—the ancien regime , the oligarchy, the Establishment or whatever” ( Laclau 2005 39). The “power” in opposition to which populists in office discursively construct their political identity can refer to cosmopolitan elites or supranational institutions, but also to previous governments and political opponents, though this has received less attention in the literature.

Foreign policy provides both a repertoire and a terrain for these articulatory practices. On the one hand, populist actors tend to amalgamate the domestic establishment and political opponents with foreign Others as “collaborative ‘enemy of the people’” ( Wojczewski 2019 , 296). On the other hand, they project the structural logic of populist discourse onto the international sphere and represent their non-populist predecessors as having served the interests of the “elite” of, and kept the country down as an “underdog” on, the international scene ( Cadier 2021 ). Both feed a politicization of foreign policy in the sense of articulating foreign policy contents with reference to domestic politics and notably lead populists to define their foreign policy in opposition to that of their predecessors.

The stylistic approach, which also understands populism as a practice but places the emphasis on aesthetic, embodied, and mediatized performances, suggests a similar logic of differentiation and pattern of definition in opposition. Populism’s stylistic transgression is established and affirmed in its antagonistic relationship to “proper” ways of doing politics: Populist actors rely on the sociocultural “low” and on “bad manners” to embody, and appeal to, the “people” against the technocratic “elites” ( Moffitt 2017 ; Ostiguy 2017 ). This populist “plebeian grammar” and antagonistic logic tends to be reproduced at the level of government in the ways of exercising public authority and making decisions ( Ostiguy and Moffitt 2021 , 50–51). Populist governments can thus be expected to use their foreign policy performances to mark a stylistic rupture with the “elites” and to define their foreign policy style in opposition to that of their political predecessors and opponents.

Rather than as practice, the ideational approach conceptualizes populism as a “thin ideology,” that is, as a mental map or logic of political imagination ( Stanley 2008 ; Hawkins et al. 2018 ). Though its explanatory focus is at the cognitive rather than discursive-performative level, its insights confirm populism’s inherent logic of differentiation and how it might feed the politicization of foreign policy. One of the common and defining coordinates of the populist mental map is anti-pluralism: Populists consider that they and they only are the true representatives of the “people” and, as a consequence, they tend to regard any political opposition as fundamentally illegitimate ( Müller 2016 ). Added to its characteristic Manichean logic ( Mudde 2004 , 544), the populist mental map can thus be expected to translate into certain cognitive and psychological dispositions toward perceiving, interpreting, and defining foreign policy with reference to political opponents. Donald Trump’s apparent obsession with vilipending and exiting Barrack Obama’s signature diplomatic achievements—from the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran to the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Trans-Pacific Partnership—stands out as a paragon of such counter-step foreign policy.

I contend that the logic of differentiation inherent to populist political discourse, style, and imagination means that populist governments have a greater tendency to define their foreign policy identity, posture, and preferences in opposition to those of their political opponents and predecessors. This can be studied in two ways. First, through the content analysis of populist governments’ documents, speeches, and statements and the examination of how often they mention, and emphasize contrast with, their political opponents or predecessors in relation to foreign policy. Second, through within-case comparison and by analyzing existing contrasts with non-populist predecessors in terms of foreign policy outputs, performance, and implementation.

Populist Logic of Mobilization and Battleground Foreign Policy

Populism is not only a distinctive way to represent or perceive political opponents but also to deal with them. Following the politico-strategic approach, populism can be conceptualized as a distinct set of “methods and instruments [for] winning and exercising power” ( Weyland 2001 , 12). In this regard, populist actors exercise political authority based on “direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” ( Weyland 2001 , 14). This means, however, that they need to constantly mobilize their base and renew the loyalty of their supporters—hence populist actors’ tendency to treat “governing as a permanent campaign” ( Müller 2016 , 77). To intensify plebiscitarian and non-institutionalized support, populist actors notably “seek to direct the people toward a heroic mission,” such as “combating dangerous adversaries” at home and abroad ( Weyland 2017 , 58). They notably “declare war on” and “relentlessly attack” the political establishment ( Weyland 2022 , 17, 20). In other words, the castigation and de-legitimizing of political opponents is central to the populist logic of mobilization and self-legitimation. Foreign policy provides a privileged terrain for such tactics, for it offers a platform to project heroism and offers a cast of external villains or dangers that can be linked to domestic adversaries.

Though not concerned with populism as such, the work of Joe Hagan allows specifying further the various types of strategies available to governments in dealing with the political opposition, the conditions in which they are activated, and the repercussions they might have on foreign policy. He distinguishes between three such strategies: accommodation (bargaining, compromising, or avoiding controversies with the opposition), insulation (ignoring, overriding, or suppressing political opposition), and mobilization (confronting the opposition to mobilize support for, and assert the legitimacy of, the regime and its policies) ( Hagan 1993, 6–8; 1995 , 128–32). 4 As transpires clearly from the preceding discussion, populism firmly corresponds to the latter type, whereby governments “emphasize foreign threats in a way that also discredit domestic opponents” ( Hagan 1993 , 7). By contrast, it appears antithetic to the first two strategies' tendencies to, respectively, “avoid domestically controversial actions” or “insulate foreign policy issues from domestic politics” ( Hagan 1995 , 128, 131). Interestingly, in his cross-national comparative analysis, Hagan finds that the mobilization strategy is more commonly activated in autocratic regimes than in democratic ones. The fact that, though operating in democratic settings, populist actors rely on such strategy speaks to their distinctiveness in how they politicize foreign policy. Furthermore, Hagan shows that the choice of strategies is generally contingent on the location, strength, and intensity of the political opposition. In situations where the opposition is “distrusted” and “unlikely to be accommodated”—as is structurally the case for populism as explained above—“foreign policy is correspondingly a viable means for unifying the public and discrediting domestic adversaries” ( Hagan 1995 , 130). In other words, the legitimization logic and mobilization imperatives inherent to populism feed the politicization of foreign policy in the sense of putting the latter at the service of confronting domestic adversaries (battleground foreign policy). More concretely, this can translate into two patterns. On the one hand, populist governments are likely to use foreign policy issues to attempt to make their political opponents look “bad” (i.e., dangerous, treacherous and incompetent). On the other hand, populist governments can be expected to hunt down and root out from existing foreign policy structures their political adversaries and their affiliates. Several populist governments have in fact engaged in a systematic and large-scale personnel overhaul of their foreign ministries to disempower career diplomats but also to replace those seen as close to the previous government with political loyalists ( Lequesne 2021; Taş 2022a ; Müller and Gazsi 2023 ).

In sum, I contend that the logic of mobilization inherent to populism means that populist actors have a greater tendency to use foreign policy as a terrain and instrument to battle their domestic political opponents. This can be studied and operationalized in two ways. First, through qualitative content analysis and the examination of how often foreign policy is invoked in relation to attacking, discrediting, or delegitimizing political opponents or predecessors. Second, by investigating the extent to which foreign policy decisions and implementation are aimed at weakening the latter.

Populism and the Over-Prioritization of Domestic Politics over Foreign Policy

Populist actors’ drive to define and use foreign policy in opposition to their opponents or predecessors is complemented by, and reinforces, a proclivity to treat this realm as subjugated to their domestic political objectives.

By essence, foreign policy boils down to “mediating the two-way flow between internal and external dynamics” ( Hill 2015 , 28). Stated differently, it entails arbitrating between domestic and external considerations in formulating and implementing foreign policy. In analyzing the parameters and determinants of this arbitration, some scholars have emphasized the role of structural factors. Gerry Alons (2007 )argues, for instance, that, in middle power liberal democracies, external and internal polarity will determine whether domestic or international incentives take precedence in preference formation. According to her model, however, the high level of internal polarity prevailing in Poland (i.e., a state-dominated domestic structure where the government has the ability to pursue policies against the will of societal actors) ( Gerry Alons 2007 , 216) should have led the PiS government to prioritize external interests and objectives, contrary to what has been the case, as is detailed below. This suggests that populism might be a factor in this context. Other scholars, instead, place the emphasis on agent-level factors and shed light on how decision-makers’ cognitive dispositions, heuristics, and political strategies affect how they integrate domestic political considerations into their foreign policy calculations. Faced with “countless political issues that compete for their attention at any point in time,” governing actors will indeed “concentrate their cognitive capacity [and the aforementioned arbitration] primarily on issues which are amongst their uppermost concerns, that is, which they consider most salient” ( Oppermann and Spencer 2013 , 42). In particular, Alex Mintz (1993 ) suggests that decision-making in foreign policy is characterized by a sequential process, whereby leaders begin with eliminating the option that would heavily damage their domestic political prospects (non-compensatory phase) before selecting remaining options based on their utility in other substantive dimensions (e.g., strategic, diplomatic, economic, social, etc.) (compensatory phase). On his part, Fen Osler Hampson (1984 ) showed that decision-making elites will have a greater tendency to privilege domestic political considerations in defining and acting upon foreign policy crises when they feel vulnerable politically at home. In light of the analytical angle adopted in this article, I focus here on these agent-level factors in investigating how populism influences the arbitration between domestic and external incentives.

The inherent logic of populism—whether conceptualized as a political strategy, discourse, or thin ideology—leads populist governing actors to regard and treat domestic political considerations as more salient. First, the volatility and precariousness of plebiscitarian and non-institutionalized support make populists especially vulnerable, which leads them in turn to over-prioritize the domestic political realm and the structural imperative of permanent mobilization. As documented by Fouquet (2023 , 6), populism “foreshortens time horizons on the quickly moving indicators of domestic politics” and incites to “use policies as instrument for scoring immediate political points”: Populists do not move beyond the political and non-compensatory phase of foreign policy decision-making. Similarly, as a logic of articulation, populism seeks above all to “hegemonize the [domestic] public sphere” ( Panizza and Stavrakakis 2021 , 22), that is, to impose an ideal, universal, and exclusive representation of the social. Relatedly, in their foreign policy discourse, populist actors tend to place the emphasis on societal security more than on other components (e.g., military, economic, environmental, etc.) ( Löfflmann 2022 ). Finally, as a logic of political imagination, populism is above all concerned with defending the sovereignty of the “people” and its “heartland” ( Taggart 2000 ), which mainly evokes the national or domestic realm. For populists, the priority is often more to preserve the state from external influences than to transform its external environment —hence their relative disinterest in foreign policy and international affairs.

I contend that populist actors have a greater tendency to over-prioritize domestic political incentives and considerations over external ones in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. This can be studied and operationalized in two ways. First, through process-tracing and by examining the respective influence of domestic political and external factors in explaining a concrete foreign policy decision. Second, through qualitative content analysis and by tracing possible discrepancies between populist actors’ stated foreign policy objectives and actual foreign policy outputs.

Populist politicization of foreign policy (action-based and actor-oriented)

The paper builds on a case study analysis of Poland, where the populist radical right party Law and Justice ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość— PiS) has been in power from 2015 to 2023. This case is relevant to the empirical and theoretical analysis of populist politicization in several ways. First, Poland can be regarded as a “most-likely” case when it comes to the influence of populism on foreign policy because the PiS has been in control of executive power (government and presidency) for eight continuous years. Second, the case of Poland allows disentangling the dynamics of politicization and personalization—which often find themselves associated in the literature—as PiS’ all-powerful leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, has not been holding any executive functions during that time (except between October 2020 and June 2021). Third, the Polish case provides an opportunity to illustrate the specific, action-oriented understanding of politicization adopted in this article, as well as to unpack the sequential links between technocratic de-politicization and populist re-politicization.

In terms of empirical data, the article builds on a qualitative content analysis of official documents, speeches, and public statements from PiS leaders and policymakers, as well as on semi-structured interviews with Polish diplomats, governmental advisers, and experts (including some affiliated with PiS). In the selection of texts, the emphasis has been placed in particular on declarations to the domestic press, as this is where politicizing practices can be expected to be more apparent.

When it comes to methods, the paper adopts a “building-block” approach to typological theorizing and relies on within-case congruence. Typological theories “identify recurring conjunctions of mechanisms and provide hypotheses on the pathways through which they produce effects” ( Bennett 2001 , 1517). In this context, pathways are understood as “analogous to syndromes in pathology” ( George and Bennett 2005 , 235). Typological theorizing allows “making complex phenomenon manageable by dividing it into variants or types” ( George and Bennett 238) and, as such, appears well suited for emerging research programs and theory development ( Elman 2005 , 298). Typological theorizing is, indeed, open to the possibility that the same outcome (in our case: politicization) can manifest itself in different variants (in our case: foreign policy patterns) and can arise through different pathways or values from the same variable (in our case: populism and its various inherent logics). As such, this approach allows working through the logical implications of the theory while integrating the multidimensionality of both patterns and pathways of politicization and studying them in conjunction. Congruence and a case-study analysis of Poland are used to illustrate and test the (typological) theoretical expectations set forth.

By definition, any analysis of politicization dynamics and adversarial politics ought to be a situated one. Three specific features of the Polish domestic political context have been conducive to the politicization of foreign policy by the PiS government and therefore deserve mention.

The first contextual characteristic takes roots in the post-communist transition and its interpretation and representation by PiS. As explained by Stanley Bill and Ben Stanley (2020 , 379), the transition “raised higher-order questions about the very legitimacy of political actors” and “their lack of resolution is one of the major causes of the fundamental cleavage in Polish party politics.” More than the “regime divide” (opposing former communists and dissidents), it is the “transition divide” (opposing various factions of the opposition who had ideological divergences and competing for influence) that has had a lasting structuring effect on Polish politics ( Bill and Stanley 2020 , 383). The PiS considers that the conservative, religious, and patriotic wing of the opposition has been unduly sidelined to the profit of the “liberals” and the “left.” Since the 1990s, Kaczyński has in fact repeatedly suggested that a secret deal had been struck between the communist apparatchiks and the liberal opposition in the context of the Roundtable discussion, whereby the former would have agreed to relinquish their political power in exchange for retaining their economic assets in the new regime. 5 The narrative about the transition has become a cornerstone of the party’s political mythology and has tainted the way it relates to its political opponents. As noted by Alex Kazharski (2022, 118 ), the “real or imagined links of the “liberals” or the “left” to the ancien regime are used to stigmatize and delegitimize political rivals and their political agendas.” The party constantly denounces them as illegitimate and seems obsessed with, not so much “elites” in general, but more specifically the liberal elites that emerged from the transition—and in particular those that came to compose the Civic Platform Party ( Platforma Obywatelska [PO]) and the governments it led between 2007 and 2015. This is confirmed empirically by a region-wide analysis: In comparison to other Polish, Czech, or Slovak populist parties, “attacks on the homogenous ‘elite’ played a smaller role than other core elements of populism” in PiS political rhetoric, which has “focused on a specific rival rather than employing a general anti-establishment campaign” ( Engler, Pytlas, and Deegan-Krause 2019 , 1323).

Relatedly, a second feature pertains to the mode of governance of the previous PO government (2007–2015). Bill and Stanley (2020 , 381, 379) characterize it as grounded in the “meta-politics of moderation” and as “benignly neglectful monism”: a technocratic and conflict-avoiding managerialism that denied the legitimacy and credibility of alternatives to neoliberalism. PiS denounced this mode of governance as removing a number of political, economic, and cultural questions from the public sphere—and sought to change this state of affairs once in power. In this sense, in Poland as in other European countries, populist politicization amounts at least partly to a re-politicization ( Chryssogelos 2019 ). More generally, as explained again by Stanley Bill and Ben Stanley (2020 , 382),

the de-politicization of the public sphere as a result of tranquil, efficient technocratic governance […]has moved contestation to the meta-political sphere, where political battles are still fought not only over who has the best ideas, but over who has the right to have ideas at all

Hence, added to the afore-described “transition divide,” the succession of technocratic de-politicization and populist re-politicization has fed the polarization of Polish politics, both in its traditional sense of “conflict” over the “fundamentals” of politics ( Sartori 1970 , 14) and of “political intolerance” ( Schedler 2023 ). 6

The third and final domestic political characteristic that ought to be taken into account is, as suggested by Hagan, the location and strength of the opposition. During the first mandate of the PiS government (2015–2019), Donald Tusk, the head of the previous government and most powerful PO politician, held the function of President of the European Council. Their political archenemy's leading and personifying one of the EU institutions certainly fed the PiS government’s politicization of Poland’s European and foreign policy. This was only reinforced by the fact that Donald Tusk himself did not refrain from using his position and influence in Brussels to occasionally weigh in on the Polish domestic political game. As we will see, the PiS government’s uncompromising attitude in EU politics has thus proceeded not just from “populist euroscepticism” ( Csehi and Zgut 2021 ), but also from the desire to mark a rupture with, and carry forward the battle against, the PO government and its still-active leader.

This brief contextualization endeavor has led to identifying three opportunity structures for the politicization of foreign policy in Poland: polarization of domestic politics, preceding de-politicization, and the strength of the opposition. This paves the way for the empirical analysis of how the PiS populist government has seized upon them, but these opportunity structures can also be regarded as mediating conditions when applying the proposed theoretical framework to other national contexts.

In analyzing the politicization of foreign policy in Poland, I focus on the PiS government’s actions and declarations with regard to a number of key policy areas: the EU, Germany, Russia, and the United States. The objective is to discern the various patterns of politicization and foreign policy types theorized above (counter-step, battleground, and subdued) and see how they are linked to the corresponding pathways and populist logics (differentiation, legitimization, and prioritization).

PiS Counter-Step Foreign Policy on the EU and Germany

The policy areas where change has been most salient under the PiS government—namely, the attitude toward European integration, the strategy inside the EU, and the relationship with Germany ( Cadier 2021 )—are precisely those where the previous PO government (2007–2015) had built its distinctive foreign policy brand. As it was regarding the EU’s structural funds and internal market as a crucial vector for its domestic agenda of economic modernization, the PO government had made of installing Poland in the EU core its cardinal foreign policy objective (see, for instance, Sikorski 2012 ). To this end, it cultivated a close bilateral partnership with Germany—more than any previous Polish government—and amended the representation of that country in Polish official discourse, from over-powerful historical neighbor to indispensable leader of Europe. Though to a lesser extent, it also sought to upgrade its ties with France by signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Paris and a contract to buy fifty military helicopters from Airbus (while Warsaw had generally been opting for American manufacturers when it comes to armaments). Finally, the PO government invested in the instruments of EU external action (such as European Defense or the European Neighborhood Policy) and depicted, more generally, Poland’s anchoring and activism in the bloc as a way to further its national security ( Cianciara 2022 ).

When it suceeded the PO in power, the PiS government constantly, methodically, and explicitly sought to reverse these policy directions and initiatives. Not only was there an almost symmetric contrast in the European and German policies of the two governments, but PiS foreign policy actors also explicitly emphasized and claimed this contrast when articulating their foreign policy preferences and justifying their foreign policy choices.

Rather than as a power-maximizing opportunity for Poland, the PiS foreign policy executive tended to represent the EU as a liability or threat. Prime Minister Szydło castigated the “folly of Brussels elite”; foreign minister Waszczykowski called on the necessity to “radically reduce the level of trust” and “introduce a negative policy” toward the EU; and President Duda likened EU membership to Poland’s nineteenth-century occupation by foreign powers. 7 The negative characterizations of the EU in yearly programmatic speeches by PiS foreign ministers, more than under any other Polish government since 1989 ( Zuba 2021 ), also provide evidence in that sense.

When it comes to its strategy inside the EU, rather than installing Poland in the first circle of EU powers, the PiS government sought to “withdraw from the EU mainstream” ( Zwolski 2017 , 175) and build an alternative core around initiatives such as the Bucharest Nine or the Three Seas Initiative. A PiS foreign policy adviser justified this position by opposing it to that of the previous government: The latter’s “desire to fit with the EU mainstream” and conviction that “Poland should speak with one voice with other member states” were, in his view, wrongly conveying the image of a country “not able to act by itself.” 8 More concretely, the PiS government overturned several of the aforementioned decisions taken by the previous executive: It backtracked on European defense projects such as Eurocorps and pulled the plug on the helicopter deal with Airbus.

Most crucially, the PiS government downgraded Germany as a foreign policy partner. To the contrary, it relentlessly denounced Berlin’s political, economic, and cultural influence in the EU and re-emphasized Germany as a historical other . Rather than using it as a vector to increase Poland's influence in Europe, the PiS government largely defined its European policy in opposition to Germany and sought to build a counterweight to its power ( Balcer et al. 2017 , 3–4). To the PO foreign minister famously quipping in 2011 that he was now “fearing German inaction more than Germans in action” ( Sikorski 2011 ), the PiS foreign minister opposed a quasi-symmetric denunciation of German “imperialism” in Europe and an insistence that “the EU needs not German leadership, but German self-restraint.” 9 More generally, PiS affiliates have often articulated their government’s policies toward Germany as a necessary corrective of those pursued by the previous executive (see, for instance, Grajewski 2015 ). The party largely built its political brand around the rejection of the quotas decided at the European level during the 2015 refugee crisis, which it depicted as imposed on Poland by Germany with the help of the PO government. Similarly, the measures aimed at “re-polonizing” the national media landscape targeted German-owned companies above all and were presented as made necessary by the fact that the Tusk government had acted as a “Fifth column” of German interests in these and other sectors. 10 Finally, though not directly pertaining to foreign policy as such, the PiS government’s “counter-step” attitude was also particularly salient when it comes to its historical policy and its stated objective of overturning the “pedagogy of shame” purportedly promoted by the PO executive ( Cadier and Szulecki 2020 ). 11 For instance, after his government took over and ostentatiously reformatted the Gdansk World War II Museum created by the PO executive, the PiS Deputy Minister of Culture argued that “changes were necessary because the original exhibition purportedly adopted a German point of view” (cited in Siddi and Gaweda 2019 , 10). The PiS leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, was even blunter: He claimed that the museum was “Tusk’s gift to Angela Merkel” (cited in Jaskułowski and Majewski 2023 ).

In sum, on the EU and on Germany, the PiS government clearly and explicitly sought to take the counter-step to its predecessor: It often articulated its foreign policy preferences and choices in opposition to those of the PO government, and it presented its own policies as a corrective. In other words, in line with the populist logic of differentiation, it used its foreign policy communication and actions to mark a contrast with its political adversaries. This contrast is salient not just in terms of rhetoric but also in actual policy decisions, and, in this sense, the theoretical approach proposed complements the available scholarship on the PiS government’s foreign policy by accounting for why policy change was most salient in relation to the EU and Germany in particular.

Foreign Policy as a Ground to Battle PiS Political Opponents: Denigration by Foreign Association and Political Purging at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The PiS government regularly used foreign policy as a terrain and instrument to attack, discredit, and weaken its political opponents. In particular, it made a point of representing these opponents as dangerous, treacherous, and self-serving, and of rooting out their affiliates from foreign policy structures.

In light of its role in Poland’s security imaginary, Russia stands out as an all-designated topic for denigration by foreign association. While in the opposition, PiS had constantly accused the PO government of being guilty of negligence, if not complicity, in the crash of the Polish presidential plane in Smolensk in 2010, 12 which the party and Jarosław Kaczyński in particular publicly attribute to Russia. Once in power, even though a previous independent investigation had concluded to an accident, the PiS government re-opened the case and tasked the controversial and conspiracy theory-prone former Minister of Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, to conduct a new assessment on the topic ( Koschalka 2020 ). More generally, PiS policymakers and advisers have often depicted the PO government as being “soft” on Russia and as exposing, thereby, Poland to the Russian threat. A PiS adviser described Donald Tusk’s exit from national politics to take the helm of the European Council in 2014—the year of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine—as a “desertion in times of threat.” 13 The PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński more explicitly associated Tusk with Moscow by claiming that his “point of view often coincides with Russian propaganda” and that he has often been on the “wrong side” when it comes to confronting Russia. 14 The efforts at suggesting a collusion between the PO government and Russia re-doubled in the perspective of the legislative elections of Fall 2023. The public television TVP, which the PiS turned into a mouthpiece for its political communication, aired in the summer of that year a multi-episode documentary (“Reset”) serving that narrative. The PiS government pushed, and the PiS-controlled lower chamber adopted, a bill on countering Russian influence in Poland, which would have allowed banning from public office individuals suspected of being under such influence ( Tilles 2023 ). This legislative act was soon renamed “Lex Tusk” by national and international commentators, as it was clear that it was targeting first and foremost the PO leader, and in fact the EU launched a legal probe into it ( Foy 2023 ). Finally, less than a month before the election, the PiS Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak released and used classified documents dating from 2011 to attack the (then in office) PO government and accuse it of being ready to “give up half of Poland” in the event of an invasion by Russia. 15 Several Polish military experts criticized this politically motivated move for its divulgation of secret information on the country’s defense plans, posture, and doctrine.

These attempts at delegitimization by foreign association especially stand out when it comes to Russia, because in terms of policy substance, there was little difference between the policies of the PO and PiS governments and because Poland is, more generally, the European country where the political class is probably most cohesive in its hostility toward Russia. Beyond Russia, the PiS leadership has accused its political opponents of serving the interests of other foreign groups or external powers, be they global cosmopolitan elites or other historical foes such as Germany. This was put most bluntly by Jarosław Kaczyński when, in Parliament, he addressed PO representatives in these terms:

You are the external party today, you are compromising Poland, you are against Poland. You are and have always been. 16

The Rule of Law infringement procedure launched by the EU Commission was also articulated in these terms by the PiS leadership: Kaczyński suggested that the EU Commission and the domestic opposition were working together in “attacking” Poland, 17 while President Duda warned that “liberal-left elites” were trying to remove Poland’s government by using people trained by the communist secret services and support from Western Europe ( Tilles 2020 ).

Finally, PiS policymakers and advisors voiced accusations of covetousness against the previous government in relation to EU institutions and foreign actors. They suggested, for instance, that the PO government’s pro-European policy was largely motivated by the desire to secure prominent positions in Brussels for two of its leading figures, Tusk and Sikorski ( Grajewski 2015 , 74). More generally, Kaczyński suggested that the opposition was “was working under foreign orders” and “cynically counting on fortunes that they will earn by enslaving Poland.” 18

The transposition of populist oppositional politics to foreign policy did not only manifest itself in rhetorical attacks, but also translated into endeavors to dislodge from, or sideline in, foreign policy structures the civil servants that were deemed close to the previous government. On the one hand, several such diplomats were relegated to minor or dead-end positions within the Ministry, with some even having to leave the career. 19 In addition, the PiS government published a list of about sixty-six diplomats accused of having collaborated with the secret police during the communist regime, leading to the dismissal of fifty-one of them. 20 On the other hand, the PiS government introduced a structural reform of the diplomatic service that facilitated the appointment of political loyalists in the foreign ministry.

In sum, the PiS government largely moved the battle against its political opponents to the realms of foreign policy topics and institutions. The populist logic of legitimization and mobilization led it to seek to build support for its policies and assert its own legitimacy by attacking its political predecessors and adversaries with reference to foreign policy, notably by associating them with foreign powers. This led, in turn, to anchoring certain representations of foreign policy themes and actors on the basis of their domestic political utility rather than substantive features.

Poland’s Foreign Policy and PiS Over-Prioritization of Domestic Political Goals

In running and implementing Poland’s foreign policy, the PiS government clearly prioritized internal considerations over external ones.

First, it is noteworthy that the topics on which the PiS government adopted an “uncompromising” or even “confrontational” posture at the EU level ( Balcer et al. 2017 , 31) mainly related to its domestic political, rather than foreign policy, agenda. For instance, it vetoed several EU external action texts on the ground that it took issue with the definition of “gender equality,” which is linked to its domestic conservative agenda. 21 By contrast, in spite of its strong Atlanticist orientation and active courting by the Trump administration, the PiS government did not break ranks with other EU member states on issues such as trade or Iran.

Second and most crucially, in several instances, the PiS government adopted positions that served its domestic political strategy while being detrimental to the country’s foreign policy interests—or even to the PiS government’s own foreign policy preferences. In particular, the PiS government did not hesitate to jeopardize Poland’s position and image in the EU for the sake of battling its political opponents. After the PiS government failed to rally any member state (not even Orban’s Hungary) in preventing the re-election of Donald Tusk at the helm of the European Council, the then PiS foreign minister denounced the election process as “rigged.” 22 This amounted to casting a shadow on the legitimacy of the EU’s highest intergovernmental setting, where Poland is itself a deciding member.

The precedence given to expected domestic political gains over foreign policy costs was salient even on topics that ranked high among the PiS government’s foreign policy priorities. For instance, some of the PiS governments’ domestic initiatives led to strained relations with their highest valued foreign policy partner, the United States. This is true of the closure of the liberal channel TVN24 (owned by the American group Discovery) or of the so-called “Holocaust Law,” which prompted Washington to impose a temporary ban on presidential-level visits (see Cadier and Szulecki 2020 ). Finally and interestingly, an analyst who had served as foreign policy advisor to both the PiS and PO governments noted that, on Germany, the former was harsh in public rhetoric but rather accommodating in private negotiations, while the opposite was true for the latter. 23 This suggests that the PiS government used foreign policy first and foremost for its signaling and mobilizing potential in domestic politics, and then tried to compensate for this through backchannel diplomatic exchanges.

In sum, the populist logic of salience provides a theoretical explanation to Polish analysts and practitioners’ concurring view that the PiS government treated foreign policy as “secondary” or “subordinated” to its domestic political objectives ( Balcer 2016 ; Kuźniar 2016 ) and that Kaczyński in particular was “not interested in foreign policy” but saw it instead mainly as a domestic instrument. 24

Once in power, populist actors tend to approach the two-level game of international politics in a distinctive manner. They are more likely to prioritize—and go “all-in”—at the domestic table, even at the risk of weakening their hand at the international table. In addition, they tend to carry forward the domestic game at the international table, investing the latter to attack their domestic political opponents or mark a difference with their predecessors. In other words, populist actors tend to politicize foreign policy in the sense of using it as the continuation of domestic politics by other means.

This article has set forth a theoretical framework accounting for this tendency and has tested and illustrated it empirically through a case-study analysis of Poland. More specifically, relying on typological theorizing, it has conceptualized several pathways and patterns of this politicization, with the former referring to certain logics inherent to populist practice and the latter to certain ways of conducting foreign policy. The logic of differentiation leads populist actors to define and articulate their foreign policy in opposition to that of their political predecessors ( counter-step foreign policy ). The logic of mobilization entices populist actors to use foreign policy as a terrain and instrument for attacking and denigrating their domestic political opponents ( battleground foreign policy ). Finally, the logic of salience makes populist governments or leaders over-prioritize domestic considerations in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy ( subdued foreign policy ).

While this article has focused on the case of Poland, insights from the available scholarship suggest that these patterns of foreign policy politicization have been present in several other countries and regions where populists have been in power. For instance, the logic of differentiation and counter-step foreign policy are salient in how Trump made of re-negotiating the “bad deals” consented by its predecessors and of ending the “long nightmare of America’s economic surrender” one of its key foreign objective ( Löfflmann 2022 , 549), as well as in how Turkey’s AKP articulated its activism toward the Middle East as a corrective of Kemalists’ alleged negligence of the region ( Taş 2022b , 2879). These two cases also very much exhibit patterns of battleground foreign policy fed by the logic of mobilization: Trump withheld the US aid to Ukraine to arm twist its government into opening an investigation on the business dealings of Joe Biden’s son ( Löfflmann 2019 , 122), while Recep Tayyip Erdogan has equated the political opposition to supporters of Turkish terrorism and Western imperialism ( Destradi, Plagemann, and Taş 2022 , 484). In Hungary, personal re-shuffles at the MFA were largely motivated by FIDESZ’s distrust of the agents having served under the previous leadership and desire to fill positions with political loyalists ( Visnovitz and Jenne 2021 , 691; Müller and Gazsi 2023 ), while in Italy, the fact that the populists’ Lega and M5S have been targeting Mateo Renzi much more than Mario Draghi in their rhetorical attack suggests they are more set on denigrating political opponents than representatives of technocratic elites. Even more so, the logic of salience and populist actors’ over-prioritization of domestic political considerations appear to be shared across the board. Belém Lopes, Carvalho, and Santos (2022 , 12) show that Brazil’s Jahir Bolsonaro approached foreign policy “always [as] a matter of catering to his constituencies” and left “topics that were not fungible in terms of votes in the hands of career diplomats.” Such tendencies are also reflected in Italy’s M5S and Czechia’s Andrej Babis marked disinterest in foreign affairs, even after they made it to government ( Coticchia 2021 ; Weiss 2021 ). It should be noted, however, that in these latter cases, the first two patterns of politicization appear by contrast less salient: Babis did not, for instance, seek to root out political adversaries from foreign policy structures and rarely used foreign policy themes to attack the opposition. Similarly, in their analysis of Narendra Modi’s speech, Destradi et al. (2022 ) find that the Indian leader has rarely politicized foreign policy in the sense of contesting the policies of previous governments and political opponents. In that sense, this article’s theoretical framework would gain from being refined further by being applied to other country cases. Future research could notably test whether the mediating conditions identified in Poland as conducive to populist politicization—namely, polarization in domestic politics, preceding de-politicization, and the strength of the opposition—help explain variations across national contexts.

This brief comparative perspective also allows qualifying the argument set forth in this article. It is not that populists always, or that only populists, politicize foreign policy in the sense of using it as the continuation of domestic politics by other means, but that they have a greater tendency to do so due to populism’s inherent logics in relating to domestic politics and opposition. From one populist leader or government to another, one or another patterns of politicization might be more or less pronounced, because the different logics feeding them might be more or less acute. Understanding populism as a practice permits to conceive it is a matter of degree: Populism is not something that populists are, but something that they do, and that they can do more or less depending on the occasion, context, or issue area. Variations can be exhibited not only within but also across logics: They are not automatically linked, and, as we saw, populist executives might mobilize one more than the other.

Populist governments’ strategies in dealing with their political competitors have been a blind spot in the thriving scholarship on the relationship between populism and foreign policy. The focus on what populist actors say, do, or believe about the “people” and the “elite” has obfuscated the way they relate, more prosaically, to their political opponents and predecessors. Yet, not only does it appear hardly satisfactory to have our analytical categories defined by the actors we study, but in addition, as this article has shown, the influence of populist oppositional politics on foreign policy tends to be at the same time distinctive and consequential. In that sense, this analytical angle has a lot to contribute to the study of populism in international relations as well as to the FPA literature on domestic politics more generally.

Both of the aforementioned authors acknowledge in fact that populists seek to generate legitimacy over and popular support against political opponents ( Wajner 2022 , 421; Fouquet 2023 , 8), but they do not retain this aspect in analyzing side-effects for foreign policy.

Angelos Chryssogelos (2019 , 608–9) defines “nationalist re-politicization” as “opposing specific policies under the pressure of internationalization” and “societal re-politicizations” as “challenging the legitimacy of internationalized state elites,” noting that the latter corresponds to and flows from populist practice. On their part, Sandra Destradi, Johannes Plagemann and Hakki Tas (2022 , 480) define “anti-elitist politicization” as “generating awareness and mobilizing followership [. . .] by resorting to a narrative of oppression at the hands of elite” and “people-centric politicization” as “highlight the virtues of the ‘true people’ [. . .] and focus on emotions of hope and aspirations to global standing.”

This expression, itself paraphrasing Clausewitz, is borrowed from Valerie Hudson (2014 , 141).

In the same vein, Valerie Hudson (2014 , 149–53) distinguishes between four types of strategies in dealing with the political opposition: ignoring, compromise, direct tactics, and indirect tactics. She notes that the latter, which notably include outpersuading the opposition, forming internal alliance against it, or deflecting the nation’s attention, have the greatest impact on foreign policy ( Hudson 2014 , 154).

This narrative is, for instance, forcefully articulated in his memoirs ( Kaczyński 2016 ).

On the links between populism, anti-populism, and polarization, see Stavrakakis (2018 ) and  Roberts (2022 ).

“Mocne słowa Szydło w Sejmie: Nie będziemy uczestniczyć w szaleństwie brukselskich elit,” DoRzeczy , May 12, 2017, https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/30477/mocne-slowa-szydlo-w-sejmie.html ; “Waszczykowski: ‘Musimy drastycznie obniżyć poziom zaufania wobec Unii’,” wPolityce , March 12, 2017, https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/331123-podwojne-standardy-w-ue-waszczykowski-musimy-drastycznie-obnizyc-poziom-zaufania-wobec-unii-zaczac-prowadzic-takze-polityke-negatywna; “Polish president likens EU to past occupations,” Deutschewelle (DW) , March 15, 2018.

Interview with an adviser to the Polish Foreign Minister, Warsaw, October 2017.

“Zbigniew Rau: Rosyjska agresja na Ukrainę stała się dla Europy momentem przebudzenia,” Rzeczpospolita , August 22, 2022, https://www.rp.pl/publicystyka/art36907821-zbigniew-rau-rosyjska-agresja-na-ukraine-stala-sie-dla-europy-momentem-przebudzenia .

See, for instance, “Kaczyński aims to ‘repolonize’ foreign-owned media but admits ‘international reaction’ a problem,” Notes from Poland , 20 July 2020, https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/07/20/kaczynski-calls-for-repolonisation-of-media-but-admits-international-reaction-makes-it-difficult/ .

The PiS government had elevated early on historical policy as a core component and priority of its international diplomacy (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2017 ).

The crash of the presidential plane in April 2010 led to the deaths of the then-Polish President Lech Kaczyński and ninety-five other high-ranking officials. In a cruel historical parallel, the trip was organized to commemorate the 1940 Katyn massacre, where thousands of members of the Polish elite were assassinated by the Red Army.

“Kaczyński: Gdy w grę wchodzi żywotny interes Polski, Tusk jest przeciw,” Gazeta Prawna , June 12, 2022, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8452528,kaczynski-tusk-przeciw-zywotny-interes-polski.html .

“Opposition accuse defence minister of ‘treason’ for declassifying military plans from their time in power,” Notes from Poland , September 18, 2023, https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/09/18/opposition-accuse-defence-minister-of-treason-for-declassifying-military-plans-from-their-time-in-power/ . The minister was instrumentalizing and misrepresenting contingency plans, stating that in the event of an invasion from the East, the enemy’s progression could not be immediately stopped and the country could only be defended through a counter-attack. NATO defence plans for the equally flat Baltic States are said to operate along the same line.

“Kaczyński do PO: ‘Jestes ́ cie partia ̨ zewne ̨ trzna’,” Gazeta Prawna , March 9, 2017, http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1026095,kaczynski-do-po-partia-zewnetrzna-pis.html .

“European Court of Justice ‘supports the Polish opposition’, says Kaczyński,” Notes from Poland , February 27, 2020, https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/02/27/european-court-of-justice-supports-the-polish-opposition-says-kaczynski/ .

“Jarosław Kaczyński w tygodniku Sieci: Dalej nie możemy się cofnąć,” wPolityce , August 7, 2022, https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/609598-kaczynski-w-tygodniku-sieci-dalej-nie-mozemy-sie-cofnac .

Multiple interviews with Polish diplomats, Warsaw, September 2017.

Interview with a Polish diplomat, Warsaw, October 2017; “‘De-communisation’ leads to Foreign Ministry dismissals,” Telewizja Polska (TVP), May 23, 2019, https://polandin.com/42757884/decommunisation-leads-to-foreign-ministry-dismissals .

“Poland rejects Presidency conclusions on Artificial Intelligence, rights,” Euractiv , October 26, 2020.

“Poland fumes at ‘cheating’ EU for keeping Donald Tusk in top post,” The Guardian , March 13, 2017.

Interview with a Polish expert, Warsaw, May 2017.

Interview with a Polish diplomat, Warsaw, October 2017.

Author Biography

David Cadier is an Assistant of Professor of International Relations at the University of Groningen, Netherlands, and an Associate Researcher at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies (CERI) in Paris. His research interests lie with the foreign policies of the EU and its member states, EU-Russia relations, Central Europe, and populism in international politics.

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 9th EISA European Workshop in International Studies organized in Thessaloniki in July 2022 and at the workshop “How to study the international effects of populism” organized at the University of Freiburg in July 2023. The author is grateful for the precious feedback received on these occasions, as well as for those of the two anonymous reviewers.

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The effect of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making

Foreign Policy includes all interactions of individual nation – states with other states. In the wake of globalization, in the 21 st century it is particularly important, owing to the interdependence of states. With the advent of international society and globalization implications of foreign policy for each nation-state are far greater. The study of Foreign Policy therefore has become ever more critical and important. The study of Foreign Policy is not limited to any particular school of social science but is a relevant subject for all. In International Relations this study is particularly important as foreign policies form the base for international interactions between individual states.

In the 21 st century, decisions by one state affect more than just the participating countries. Scholars as well as well policy analysts and even the general public, have a greater desire to understand foreign policy decisions and what motivates the head of government in his foreign policy decision making. Scholarly research on leadership and foreign policy decision making show a far more sophisticated and complex view of the issue than most of the simplistic views seen in the popular press. The popular press prefers pointing finger at the executor of foreign policy decisions as it is easier to blame one person than a group or a system. However scholarly research uncovers the motivations behind foreign policy decision taken by the executor or in better words head of a government.

Foreign Policies are designed by the head of government with the aim of achieving complex domestic and international agendas. It usually involves an elaborate series of steps and where domestic politics plays an important role. In this paper I will critically analyze the role of head of government of a country in foreign policy decision making and how he is influenced by domestic politics. Foreign policies are in most cases designed through coalitions of domestic and international actors and groups. When analyzing the head of government or in other words the executor of foreign policies many motivating factors can be identified to explain the rationale behind decisions taken. Some factors of influence include the leader’s own personality and cognition, degree of rationality, domestic politics and international and domestic interest groups. However out of all the factors mentioned it is domestic political environment that shapes the entire framework of decision making in a country even in international context.

Argument & structure

My argument is that the scope of the head of government in making decisions is first and foremost defined by the political system where he is operating. Depending on the power vested in his post and the importance of political and public consensus in the state in question, the head of government can make foreign policy decisions. Other factors such as rationality, personality, international organizations also hold influence on the head of government. However they can also be compromised by the political environment, again depending on the kind of system practiced.

In the course of this essay I will examine the impact of political environment on the leader’s decision making, considering leaders in different political systems. I have taken cases of three countries of varying political systems to do so. The countries chosen are the United States of America, China and Jordan. The United States is a constitutional republic and representative democracy whereas China is a centrally governed socialist republic. On the other hand Jordan is constitutional monarchy. Taking these three countries as examples will allow analysis of leaders in a broad spectrum of political environments. Here we can see how in very different systems the head of government behaves differently and how the system influences his decisions. By viewing examples of past foreign policies made by each country, I hope to demonstrate how three very different kind of domestic political systems influenced foreign policy decisions in each case.

A thorough study of past literature as well as news, memoirs of leaders will be used in this analysis. I will conduct primary research from historical data and secondary research from scholarly material available to analyze the influence of political environment as well as other factors on foreign policy decision making. In the argument for political environment being the most important factor affecting foreign policy decision making, I will analyze factors such as power vested in the head of government, acceptability in the domestic system, consensus of others in the system, strategic decision making, personality of the leader, rationality, and the impact of interest groups. Important elements of the external environment affecting the head of government include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. International Non-governmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations also hold influence over foreign policy decision making by the head of government. The paper concludes with an explanation of how foreign policy is multilevel and multifaceted phenomenon. No one theory can be completely linked to explaining foreign policy decisions. However a generalization can be made by viewing past trends to present an estimate of the rationale behind foreign policy decision making.

Foreign Policy

To understand foreign policy decision making I will first draw on traditional explanations of foreign policy and then proceed to the influence of domestic politics, the issue of acceptability, strategic choice, rational choice, and finally psychological theories of decision making as well.

Foreign policy is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. [1] Foreign Policy includes not only military action but trade and humanitarian interactions as well. When trying to analyze the role of the head of government in foreign policy decision making it is important to know what is motivating him. Depending on the political system of the head of government, the influencing factors will vary. For the head of government in a democracy such as India consensus of the office and public opinion will play an important role. A socialist republic like China may be harsher in taking decisions which may not meet public consensus but have a long term national agenda.

The political environment

The political environment of a country includes all laws, government agencies, and lobbying groups that influence or restrict individuals or organizations in the society. When talking about the head of government and his decisions the most important factor is the political environment he is operating in. Even international decisions taken by the head of government depends on domestic politics. The political system will determine the heads scope and power in foreign policy decision making.

Political system can be defined as a set of formal legal institutions that constitute a government or a nation-state. It can also be defined over a broad range of categories. For example, a country with no ruler can be called one with Anarchical system and one with a single ruler, Feudalism. However, this is a very simplified view of a much more complex system of categories involving views such as who should have authority, how religious questions should be handled, and what the government’s influence on citizens should be.

The following is a list of a range of political systems and the kind of leadership followed in each. Sometimes there can be a blend of two systems in a country where as a few are very far apart in ideals.

• Democracy has rule by majority.
• Republic is rule by law.
• Islamic Democracy is also rule by majority but in Islamic context. It combines aspects of Theocracy and Democracy.
• Anarchism has rule by all or in other words no one.
• Monarchy is ruled by one person who is absolute leader.
• Meritocracy means rule by the best.
• Technocracy is rule by scientists/intellectuals.
• Sultanates are an Islamic political structure combining features of Monarchy and Theocracy where it is believed rule is by Allah.
• Westminster system is rule by republic and representative democracy through parliament.
• Feudalism is also rule by lord or king.

The Domestic political environment & Foreign policy

National leaders, especially the head of government has to play a two level game between international and domestic politics. According to Neack, the head of government in any kind of political system is motivated by two similar goals: retain political power and build and maintain policy coalitions. [2] The domestic politics can also influence him either because he wants to achieve domestic goals through foreign policies or he wants his foreign policy decisions not to interfere with domestic agendas.

Barbara Farnham especially highlights the issue of acceptability of policies and its influence on the decision making by head of government. In the modern world in most political systems, implementation of proposed policies requires a consensus by the government and not only the leader’s whim. The degree of acceptability required will depend on the political system where the decision maker is operating. For example any foreign policy in a democratic system that does not have consensus is likely not to succeed. In a Feudalistic system acceptability may not be as important at all times. Regardless, in any kind of political system domestic politics interferes with foreign policy decisions. The head of the government has to cope simultaneously with international and domestic imperatives and the head of government has to maintain a good face locally and internationally.

Before considering any other characteristics of the desired policy, acceptability is most likely to be considered. The head of the government has to consider domestic sentiments as well as the international situation. If there is a conflict between domestic and international interest the head of the government will probably give emphasis to domestic interest, or surpass the situation altogether. [3]

The influence of domestic politics can be demonstrated here with the example of an India and US treaty. The foreign policy in question here was a nuclear treaty that was to be made between India and the United States in 2005. India had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and demanded to hold on to and foster its nuclear capabilities to defend itself as long as other countries did so as well. There was opposition from US regarding that and especially regarding the tests conducted by India as well as the enemy state Pakistan in 1998. The 2005 treaty was designed with the aim of allowing India to continue not signing the NPT in exchange of allowing the International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA) to conduct inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities. This treaty also allowed India to reprocess nuclear fuel for energy generation and validated its position as a nuclear weapons power. Despite it being a win win situation for India, the head of government was prepared to withdraw from this treaty to protect domestic political issues. At the time a coalition government was in power in India called the UPA. Manmohan Singh was selected by the Congress Party leadership to be prime minister and head the government.  In 2007, the communist party, threatened to bring down the coalition government if this nuclear agreement was made with the United States. The main opposition party, BJP also strongly opposed this treaty as the collapse of the government would be beneficial for them. The treaty in discussion did not require the parliament’s approval but pressured by the threat of losing office the head of government was prepared to back down from this treaty. If the Communist party had withdrawn from the coalition re-elections would be called and there was no guarantee for Congress that they will regain power. So, Manmohan Singh declared that he would not risk a general election for the sake of the treaty. [4] Eventually the Communist party agreed to re submitting the treaty but that is a different issue. The point I would like to bring forward from this example is that the head of government of India was prepared to sacrifice a very important foreign policy for domestic politics. So it can be concluded that the head of government tries to satisfy domestic pressures even at the cost of international developments.

Strategic decision making in a Political Context

Strategic Perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare. Domestic politics plays an important role when taking strategic foreign policy decisions because the threats anticipated or already executed are to do with national security issues. Considering the case of United States, it was seen that the event of 9/11 changed the perceptions of security threats at home and as a result the following foreign policy decisions. President Bush targeted Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq as a direct result of the Al Qaeda attacks. In October 2001 Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom with allies such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom to punish those responsible for the 9/11 attack. [5] But not only retaliatory, anticipatory action was taken by the head of government at that time with view of protecting the world against terrorism. In the light of recent terrorist attacks this kind of foreign policy was not met with political opposition. The head of the government had support of its office and thus could execute the attacks on Iraq on the basis of threats posed by Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction as well as aiding terrorist activities. This example demonstrates how implication on domestic politics can be viewed from a strategic perspective to take strategic foreign policy decisions.

The United States foreign policy in political context

When talking about foreign policy and international society the United States is a country mentioned almost everywhere and every time. The United States holds great economic, political, and military influence on the entire world. The domestic political system of the United States is that of a constitutional republic and representative democracy, “in which majority rule is tempered by minority rights protected by law.” [6] The government is regulated by a system of checks and balances defined by the U.S. Constitution. The head of government cannot take foreign policy decisions without at least two third support of the Senate. The president is allowed to enter into treaties with foreign states through executive agreement without the senate’s approval but such agreements are rarely long standing. It is the Congress that has the power to conduct commercial activities with other states as well as go to war.

The president is the commander in chief and the head of the government and despite relying on consensus of the senate he has significant control over policies. The degree of control over the senate depends on the individual leader, his leadership style and personal charisma. The president holds the title of commander-in-chief of the nation’s armed forces and appoints its leaders, the secretary of defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [7] Bureaucratic organizations within the US government include Office of the President, National Security Council, State Department, Defence Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Embassies, Consulates, Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, etc.

Foreign Policies of the United States are greatly influenced by the domestic political environment, the economic implications and the president’s standing in the polls in lieu of policies taken by him. In case of wars, it is even more sensitive. War requires resources such as money, troops, and equipment and in a democracy, resources require continued public support. The people’s representatives in Congress control public spending. If a majority of lawmakers vote against the war, it will be defunded. If a military plan is not supported by majority of lawmakers it will be called off or at best be changed. However, it is the Presidents job to convince the Congress of the validity of any decisions, which must incorporate domestic political agendas. For example, in World War II, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall recommended that the right military strategy was to focus on Germany first, merely holding the line against Japan until the bigger threat was defeated in Europe and only after Germany was out of the way should the country move forces east and deal with the Japanese. President Franklin D. Roosevelt opted instead for parallel offensives against both Germany and Japan at the same time. According to his policy the United States actually attacked Japan before it began its first attacks on Germany. A crucial motivating factor behind this decision was that Roosevelt was worried that he would lose domestic political support for the war if he ignored the country that attacked the United States at Pearl Harbour, fighting Germans instead. Most people today think the U.S. strategy in World War II was pretty successful but instead of solely basing it on military advice the head of government at that time considered the issue of domestic politics. Actually the United States strategy in World War II was greatly influenced by the president’s need to maintain popular support at home. [8]

The Foreign policy of China in a political context

The People’s Republic of China is a socialist republic governed through the Communist Party of China, the Central People’s Government and their provincial and local counterparts. The leadership of the Communist Party is stated in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Under the dual leadership system, each local bureau or office is under the theoretically coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level. People’s Congress members at the county level are elected by voters. [9]

The President of the People’s Republic of China, officially appointed by the National People’s Congress, is an office under the National People’s Congress and it is the head of state. The National People’s Congress is the highest authority of state power in China. It meets every two weeks to review domestic and foreign policy matters. The State Council also has a significant role on policy designs.

The post of President alone holds a merely ceremonial position with no real power. Before the 1990s, presidents did not have any administrative power and the position was that of a powerless figurehead. Without veto he had to execute the decisions of National People’s Congress. However, since 1993 the President also serves as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. This not only gives him the position but also power and makes him responsible for establishing policy and direction for the state as well as foreign policy decisions.

China officially states it “unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favourable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development. [10]

China’s foreign policy is implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . However, the Foreign Affairs Ministry is subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Communist Party of China , which decides on policy-making. Much of Chinese foreign policy is designed in think tanks which are formally outside the government. These think tanks are however sponsored and supervised by the government. Discussions in the think tanks are unofficial and are generally less restricted.

Chinese foreign policy is perceived by the world to be of somewhat realist nature. National interest and agenda is given precedence instead of pursuing optimal solution for benefit of international society. In such conservative situation domestic politics plays an even greater role than described earlier in the case of United States. Here the head of government is less worried about acceptability and more concentrated on achieving domestic agendas.

The Chinese government has recently greatly opposed the awarding of Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China. For over two decades, Liu Xiaobo has been a strong spokesman for the application of fundamental human rights in China. He took part in the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and was a leading author behind Charter 08, the manifesto of such rights in China which was published on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 10th of December 2008. [11] However he was arrested and sentenced for eleven years of imprisonment by the Chinese authorities for subversive activities against Chinese government. The Chinese government expressed dismay on the award and called the Norwegian ambassador in Beijing to officially express his disagreement and protest. Following the announcement on October 8 2010, the Chinese government ordered the deletion of all print and broadcast stories on the topic.  China protested to Norway, saying that the relations between the two countries were damaged because of this incident. However, before the Chinese government could make an official complaint the Norwegian foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre said that a Chinese complaint to the Norwegian government would be vain, as the committee was independent from the Norwegian government, although it was appointed by the Parliament of Norway. [12] [13]

China’s disapproval of the Nobel Prize and insistence of keeping Liu Xiaobo imprisoned has been criticized by intellectuals and diplomats all over the world. However China is still maintaining that Liu Xiaobo has behaved in rebellious manner against the state and it is wrong to award him the Peace Prize for doing so. The Chinese head of government here is not worried about maintaining popularity in the international society. Neither is he allowing this news to be spread domestically and let Xiaobo gain domestic public sympathy. China is concentrating on national interest and letting domestic politics over rule foreign policy affairs.

The Foreign policy of Jordan in political context

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. Politics of Jordan takes place in a framework of a parliamentary monarchy, whereby the Prime Minister of Jordan is head of government, and of a multi-party system. The king holds the highest power in the government and signs and executes all laws. However his veto power may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the National Assembly. He appoints and may dismiss all judges by decree, approves amendments to the constitution, declares war, and commands the armed forces.

The Kingdom of Jordan is a small one in the Middle East but holds an important role in the international society.  Although a developing country with limited resources and weak economy it is surrounded by powerful neighbours such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Due to its strategic position and geopolitical importance to regional and global powers Jordan plays an important role in international politics. Throughout history Jordan has been subject to international, regional and domestic wars and revolutions and to protect themselves maintained international allies and domestic military prowess. [14]

In the argument for political systems influencing foreign policy we can look at Jordan’s decision in the 1990 intervention of Iraq by USA. At that time, unlike other Middle Eastern neighbours such as Syria and Egypt, Jordan kept out of the war urging for the improbable peaceful solution. King Hussein, the head of government did not support Iraq either and called for Iraqi withdrawal. Public opinion in Jordan was mixed. Some wanted to defend Iraq against USA and its allied forces but Jordan armed forces remained neutral. The regimes cautious stance kept King Hussein’s domestic popularity intact but Jordan suffered severe economic repercussions. The US, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia stopped all foreign aid to Jordan. Exports to and from Arab countries declined significantly as well. Many Jordanians working in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were sent back. [15] Despite all this repercussions the King chose to maintain domestic popularity. Even though Jordan follows a system of Monarchy it is a democratic one, whereby public opinion is important for the King to remain in power. Thus because of the nature of the political system the King in this situation choice to maintain domestic popularity and thus it can be concluded his decision may not have been an optimal foreign policy one, but rather was influenced by domestic political environment.

The head of government as a Rational Actor

Moving away from political system as the main focus I will now look at the head of government as a rational actor. The Rational Actor Decision Making Model assumes that all foreign policy decision-makers are same in nature, each state’s decision making process  involves a single unitary actor making all the decisions and most importantly that each unitary actor makes rational choices. This approach draws somewhat from the realist school of thought that believes that In international politics states are only distinguishable by the relative power they hold, and not by their internal characteristics. [16] To make a Rational Decision the head of government has to have perfect problem recognition and definition, he must be able to evaluate all possible policy options and then select the best one to achieve the desired goal. It is difficult to pinpoint a policy to be completely rational. Some may argue President Bill Clinton’s choice to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 was a rational decision. On 29 March 1999, after five days of NATO bombing, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton offered the following rationale for U.S. participation: “Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.” [17] His actions may be deemed as the best solution considered after exhausting all other possible policies. However it is unlikely he was the unitary actor in this foreign policy decision.

It is important to bring up political system even here as the rationality of the head of government is subject to influence of political context. The political environment where the head of government is operating forms the basis of rationality for the leader. It can be said Hitler was being rational because he knew what he wanted and he chose the best alternative to achieve that. Depending on the situation and environment the rationality of decisions can be interpreted. Also in many political systems of today’s time there is no singular actor making and executing all decisions. Government systems are complex bureaucracies.  For example, In the United States, the U.S. President shares decision-making with the National Security Council, Defence Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and depends on the senate’s vote for approval of those decisions.

However, it is important to mention absolute rationality is hardly achievable even if the political system allows it. It is highly unlikely to know all information regarding an issue and exhaust all possible solutions to select the one that will surely achieve the desired objective. The biggest drawback to Rational Decision Making is Bounded rationality [18] .  Humans are prone to errors and they most certainly do not know everything. The government is usually overloaded with policy agendas.  The head of the government has to handle many issues at the same time and cannot spend enough time on any one of these issues.  The pressures of circumstance limit the ability to choose. In the end he may have to make satisficing decisions rather than optimizing ones. And as already mentioned domestic politics plays a crucial role in the process. Sometimes for domestic agendas foreign ones may have to be compromised as we have already seen in the case of India – USA Nuclear Treaty of 2005.

The head of government as an Individual

The head of the government in most cases is not an individual actor. Foreign Policy decisions are collective or influenced by others in the political system. He is subject to group think (a type of thought within a deeply cohesive in-group whose members try to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas [19] ). However, when assuming that the he is taking decisions solely, personality and cognition are extremely important factors.

A cognitive approach assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision making. It does not assume individual awareness, open-mindness, and adaptability relative to an “objective” environment, but assumes individuals are likely to view their environment differently and operate within their own “psychological environment” [20] From the definition of cognitive decision making we get the word environment, which includes political environment. Even for an individual decision maker his cognition is likely to be influenced by the political environment he is operating in.

Analyzing the head of government as an individual requires looking into the personality traits approach as well. The Personality Traits Approach [21] takes into consideration the totality of qualities and traits, as of character or behaviour that are unique to a specific person. It is similar to the cognitive model in taking the leaders personal views as the most important. However it specifically points out what the personality traits an individual may possess to understand decisions made by him. The personality traits can be listed as

• The need for power
• The need for affiliation
• The level of cognitive complexity
• Degree of trust in others
• Nationalism
• Belief that someone has control over events
• Task orientation

Different Political leaders have different personalities and thus different takes on situations. In 1991, President George Bush Senior called Saddam Hussein ‘another Hitler’, with little attention to what was different either about the two men or about Iraq in 1990 and Germany in 1938. Fitting Saddam into an existing frame through use of analogical reasoning gave the president a readily accessible script about how to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. [22] Maybe a different leader of the same country would have different view point of the situation. Regardless of the opinion the President’s decision had to be based on many other factors. The US did not go to war with Iraq in 1991 only because of the Presidents dislike of the Iraqi ruler. So personality approach gives more of a insight into a Leaders opinions rather than an explanation of his actions.

External factors

To some extent the influence of political systems may be compromised by Interest Groups within the state and Non- State Actors as well.  Interest groups [23] include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Besides the political system, political lobbyists and the military can be considered part of the broader political environment of a country. Outside the domestic political environment, non state actors such as International Non-governmental Organization and Global Public Policy Network can influence the head of government in his foreign policy decisions.

Another important influence outside the political environment for the head of government is the media of the country and opinion of general public. There is a complex relationship between the head of government, policy makers, the opposition party, media and the general public [24] . When a foreign policy problem arises policy makers, under the governance of the head of government present the problem and its solution. Sometimes the media can beat the government to it and present their own framework. The issue may be presented in such a manner as to influence the public opinion. However the response depends of the similarity of the solution with the existing political culture of the country. I will again draw on the 9/11 situation in USA. The government presented that 9/11 issue as a terrorist attack on USA where innocent civilians were killed. So, public opinion wholly supported any kind of retaliatory foreign policy against terrorism. Sometimes the framework presented the government may be contested by opposition party and become an issue of argument in domestic politics.

Domestic Politics VS International Organisations

The impact of International Organizations [25] is significant because of the increasing power of international society and international law. International organizations such as the World Trade Organization have the power to urge states to reconsider their foreign policy decisions. WTO intervention was crucial during the US and EU “banana wars” incident. However Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations are representatives of the member states and cannot be called a non-state influence. The domestic politics of the representative states are very much in play when they take decisions on such forums. But, policy decisions may not always be favourable to every member state in domestic or international context as there is a majority vote and complex decision making process.

International Organizations no doubt have influence on international society but a nation-state may ignore decisions by such organizations to achieve domestic agendas. As mentioned earlier post 9/11 decisions were taken by the US government in light of threats on United States. Drawing from the same example we can say that President Bush and allies decided to attack Iraq in 2003 because domestic politics demanded so at the time, despite the disapproval of the United Nations. In March 2003, the US government announced they will use military force to get rid of Saddam Hussein as well as weapons of mass destruction being produced in Iraq. Prior to this decision, there had been much diplomacy and debate between the member states of the United Nations Security Council on how to deal with the situation but a majority consensus had not been reached to approve the military attack. The Secretary General of United Nations at that time, Kofi Annan said in an interview to BBC the decision to take action in Iraq should have been made by the Security Council, not unilaterally. In response to Annan’s opinion, Randy Scheunemann, a former advisor to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said “I think it is outrageous for the Secretary-General, who ultimately works for the member states, to try and supplant his judgement for the judgement of the member states.” [26] This shows that although international organizations have a influence over foreign affairs of member states sometimes domestic agendas take precedence. The head of such Organizations sometimes are nothing but mediators between head of governments. Foreign policy decisions are ultimately taken by the head of governments with consideration to both domestic and international agendas.

Foreign Policy is made and conducted in complex domestic and international environments. Decisions made the head of government are a result of complex interactions. There are no definite answers on why leader’s take the decision they do. In this paper I have merely attempted to highlight some motivating factors for foreign policy decision making especially bringing out the impact of political environment. The reason why I have chosen political system as the foundation for decision making by the head of government is because, regardless of the kind of system the head of government’s ultimate goal is to remain in power. He is to some extent first and foremost obligated to fulfil domestic expectations before making any foreign policy decisions. Even a completely Monarchic leader has the fear of being overthrown. Acceptability in domestic politics is therefore crucial to the head of government.

As mentioned earlier, foreign policy is made and conducted in complex domestic and international environments. Domestic politics influences foreign policy decisions and if a policy is not accepted at home it unlikely to succeed in the international context. Foreign Policy analysis needs to be multilevel and multifaceted in order to understand the complicated motivational factors and nature of foreign policy. Sometimes, leaders may have to resort to suboptimal foreign policy due to domestic political demands. In an earlier cited example we can see that the head of government in India, Manmohan Singh, was willing to sacrifice a very legitimate foreign policy agreement which would have beneficial for the country itself also, to safeguard his position in office. Also in the cases cited I have highlighted how in different political systems the head of government is influenced by the domestic politics. In the United States we have seen that, it being a democracy, acceptability and consensus of the senate is a prime concern for the head of government. On the other hand China is not afraid to adopt stringent foreign policies because rather than acceptability and popularity, achieving domestic agendas holds greater importance. In Jordan we see that despite being a Monarch where decisions solely lie on the head of government, the decisions taken by him were to maintain domestic popularity. It was King Hussein who had the authority to take decisions as he pleases but he chose to maintain a good face at home rather than pursue a foreign policy that was urged by great powers such as the US and Saudi Arabia.

I have also touched upon other factors that may influence the head of government in foreign policy decision making such as rationality and individual cognition. The role of International Organizations and media was also mentioned in the later part of the paper. However from all the examples cited I can conclude in most cases, domestic politics forms the basis of any decision making for the head of government. After that many other factors come into play and may steer his decisions in different directions.

Bibliography

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§   Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. & Zbaracki Mark J. (1992). Strategic Decision Making. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13. Special Issue: Fundamental Themes in Strategy Process Research

§   Farnham, Barbara. (2004). Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making . Political Psychology. Vol. 25, No. 3, Special Issue (Part Two): Prospect Theory

§   Garceu, O. (1958). Interest Group Theory in Political Research . The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies . Vol. 319 no. 1 104-112

§   Hey, Jeanne A K. (2006). Small States in World Politics. Lynee Reinner Publishers

§   Hermann, Margaret G. & Hermann, Charles F. (1994) Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How . International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 33, No. 4, pg 361-387

§   Hermann, Margaret G. & Preston, Thomas. (1994). Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements . Political Psychology. Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George

§   Hill, Christopher. (2003). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

§   http://www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55414.htm National People’s Congress system overview on China.org.cn. Accessed on  October 11,2010

§   http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/ . Accessed on October 9 2010

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§   http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024405,00.html. Accessed on October 11 2010

§   http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1008/nobel.html. Accessed on October 11 2010

§   http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2004_August/ai_n6253912/pg_9/ . Accessed on October 6 2010

§    Iraq war illegal, says Annan http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm . Accessed on October 9 2010

§   Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, page 9

§   Kaarbo, Juliet. (1997).  Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research . Political Psychology. Vol. 18, No. 3, pg 553-581

§   McKay, Amy. (2008). A Simple Way of Estimating Interest Group Ideology . Vol. 136, No. 1/2, pg 69-86

§   Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2 nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

§   Pauly, Robert. (2010). US Foreign Policy in the Post 9/11 World . US Foreign Policy . Ashgate Publishing Ltd

§   Souva, Mark & Rohde, David. (2007). Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy . Political Research Quarterly.Vol. 60, No. 1, pg 113-123

§   Scheb, John M., and John M. Scheb II (2002). An Introduction to the American Legal System . Florence, KY: Delmar, p. 6

§   Tallberg, Jonas. (2010).  The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, 54,  pg 241-265

§   The Air Force in Facts and Figures (Armed Forces Manpower Trends, End Strength in Thousands)” . Air Force Magazine . May 2009. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2009/May%202009/0509facts_fig.pdf . Accessed on October 9 2010

§   War by Other Means. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/27/war_by_other_means . Accessed on  October 10,2010

[1] Hill, Christopher. (2003). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

[2] Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

[3] Farnham, Barbara. (2004). Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Political Psychology. Vol. 25, No. 3, Special Issue (Part Two): Prospect Theory

[4] Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

[5] Pauly, Robert J. (2010) US Foreign Policy in the Post 9/11 World. US Foreign Policy. Ashgate Publishing Ltd

[6] Scheb, John M., and John M. Scheb II (2002). An Introduction to the American Legal System . Florence, KY: Delmar, p. 6.

[7] The Air Force in Facts and Figures (Armed Forces Manpower Trends, End Strength in Thousands)” . Air Force Magazine . May 2009. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2009/May%202009/0509facts_fig.pdf . Accessed on October 9 2010

[8] War by Other Means. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/27/war_by_other_means . Accessed on  October 10,2010

[9] http://www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55414.htm National People’s Congress system overview on China.org.cn. Accessed on  October 11,2010

[10] http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/ . Accessed on October 9 2010

[11] http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/press.html . Accessed on October 11 2010

[12] http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024405,00.html. Accessed on October 11 2010

[13] http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1008/nobel.html. Accessed on October 11 2010

[14] Hey, Jeanne A K. (2006). Small States in World Politics. Lynee Reinner Publishers

[15] Hey, Jeanne A K. (2006). Small States in World Politics. Lynee Reinner Publishers

[16] Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

[17] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2004_August/ai_n6253912/pg_9/ . Accessed on October 6 2010

[18] Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. & Zbaracki Mark J. (1992). Strategic Decision Making.  Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13. Special Issue: Fundamental Themes in Strategy Process Research

[19] Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, page 9.

[20] Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

[21] Hermann, Margaret G (1994) Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements . Political Psychology. Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George.

[22] Khong Y F, ‘Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of 1965’ (Princeton 1992)

[23] Garceu, O. (1958). Interest Group Theory in Political Research. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies . Vol. 319 no. 1 104-112

[24] Neack, Laura. (2008). The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era (2nd Ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

[25] Souva, Mark & Rohde, David. (2007). Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy. Political Research Quarterly.Vol. 60, No. 1, pg 113-123

§   [26] Iraq war illegal, says Annan .http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm. Accessed on October 9 2010

Written by: Zaara Zain Hussain Written for: Professor Alan Chong Written at: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Date Written: 2010

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• ‘Almost Perfect’: The Bureaucratic Politics Model and U.S. Foreign Policy
• Politics of Continuity and US Foreign Policy Failure in Central Asia
• An “Invitation to Struggle”: Congress’ Leading Role in US Foreign Policy
• The Puzzle of U.S. Foreign Policy Revision Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program
• Analysing Chinese Foreign Policy
• How National Identity Influences US Foreign Policy

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Argument: Why U.S. Cities and States Should Play a Bigger Role in Foreign Policy

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Why U.S. Cities and States Should Play a Bigger Role in Foreign Policy

Part of making foreign policy work better for americans is empowering local leaders..

• U.S. Foreign Policy

In a 2009 essay, I coined the term “formestic” to describe the inevitable intertwining of foreign and domestic policy and the fact that solutions to global challenges often lay at home—and vice versa. Although I’m not holding my breath for the word to catch on, the observation that foreign and domestic policy are inseparably connected is a core conviction of U.S. President Joe Biden’s team. He made the point repeatedly during the run up to the November 2020 elections and has kept making it since. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan was one of the architects of a “ foreign policy for the middle class .” If there is a Biden doctrine, breaking down the silos of foreign and domestic policy would be a fundamental element.

The reason why these realms are deeply connected is simple: The United States is only as influential abroad as the strength of its economy, institutions, people, and ideas at home. But if that fact has sunk in, the discussion has mostly revolved around what the federal government can do, such as repairing and building national green infrastructure, investing in research and development, and shoring up the day care system. Encouragingly, the Biden administration has vowed to measure foreign-policy success by what that policy delivers for everyday Americans. “Everything we do in our foreign policy and national security will be measured by a basic metric: Is it going to make life better, safer, and easier for working families?” Sullivan said in February.

So far, so good. But what has been missing in the debate so far is the crucial role that U.S. states, cities, and communities can play. Cities’ and states’ economic policy choices concerning infrastructure, innovation, and other areas create the economic strength that U.S. power rests on. When local governments invest in their residents—via education, health care, housing, and other basic needs—they are laying the domestic foundation of foreign-policy success. Local governments and communities raise and empower the workers, inventors, caregivers, entrepreneurs, entertainers, and soldiers of tomorrow. When their programs and institutions are equitable, they help eliminate systemic racism and gender inequality, LGBTQ and religious bias, and other injustices. This aids foreign policy in two ways: Not only will the United States’ international reputation improve as it addresses its wrongs, but it will have the benefits of the full team it needs instead of leaving people behind and talents untapped.

It may come as a surprise to some, but state and local governments interact with the world outside U.S. borders in many more ways than in the past. Local leaders are the actual boots on the ground when transnational threats hit U.S. shores, setting pandemic rules, distributing vaccines, coping with extreme weather, and caring for migrants. Local governments have become key national security actors.

Their direct role in foreign policy has also been growing. For example, U.S. local leaders regularly nurture relationships with foreign governments. In any given week in Los Angeles, where I am the deputy mayor for international affairs, Mayor Eric Garcetti could be speaking with his counterparts in Tokyo, Jakarta, or Mexico City, the ambassadors of India or France, or the secretary-general of the United Nations. Before the pandemic, Los Angeles hosted heads of state and government ministers on a regular basis. Of course, these relationships do not define the contours of national ones, but the sum total of local ties—involving government, civil society, business, and countless individual people—is a critical stabilizer. In a democracy, especially one with a federal, decentralized system, these ties create the political space for closer relations or, in some cases, frostier ones.

Most major global cities have more active international engagements supported by greater resources than U.S. cities do.

Some relationships deserve a city like Los Angeles’ special attention—perhaps because of their outsized economic impact or their importance to a large diaspora community. With the Mexican Foreign Ministry, we created the Mexico-Los Angeles Commission , a first-of-its-kind, city-to-nation citizens’ commission that paired leaders in key sectors. We were honored when Japan chose to launch its third global public diplomacy hub, Japan House, in our city; currently, we are testing Japanese zero-emission equipment at the busy Port of Los Angeles. Vietnam and the United States need a nonstop flight to connect them, and Los Angeles is the best airport for that critical route. Paris and Los Angeles agreed to cooperate to make their Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024 and 2028, respectively, equitable, sustainable, and innovative. With the United Kingdom, we are working on mobility innovation and gender equity progress. Finally, the city’s large Armenian-American diaspora demanded an active role for elected officials in addressing the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Los Angeles’ role has been “formestic” indeed.

Mayors also cooperate across borders every day. Garcetti has convened mayors from around the world through the auspices of C40 , where he chairs a group of nearly 100 climate-ambitious cities. The mayors discuss not only what more their cities can do to address the climate crisis but also pragmatic details of how best to respond to COVID-19 and how post-pandemic recovery must be just and green. Los Angeles belongs to many other active city networks, some dedicated to specific topics such as gender equity , some broader, like the Urban 20, a network of cities in the G-20 countries that advocates for a more progressive agenda than their nations do. Los Angeles is also one in a network of global cities that are measuring their progress toward the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

This may sound like a large set of international initiatives for a city hall in California. But the truth is most other major global cities have more active international engagements supported by greater resources than U.S. cities do.

Cities and states could do even more with support from the Biden administration. If foreign policy is to serve everyday Americans, these channels should be expanded and deepened.

Here are a few suggestions to start.

On climate policy, the Biden team could push to involve U.S. and global cities at the upcoming U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow. The world’s cities have shown a much higher level of ambition than most nations have. Their progress could inspire others.

Second, the administration could use experts from U.S. cities as technical advisors in international development just like Japan and other countries do. Cities and states have concrete, on-the-ground expertise in areas like how to use technology while protecting privacy, how to transition away from coal, how to write green building codes, and how to budget transparently.

Finally, the administration could work with cities and community colleges to inspire a diverse new generation of young people to devote their careers to international relations, administration, and business. We started the Mayor’s Young Ambassador program to send disadvantaged community college students, about a third of whom had never boarded an airplane before, on their first trips overseas and also brought international leaders to talk to hundreds of Black and other college students of color about career paths. This program could be replicated across the country.

To give these and many other ideas more traction, the U.S. State Department should establish a permanent office for city and state diplomacy as proposed in congressional legislation last year. A key provision of that plan is to detail federal foreign service officers to state capitols and city halls to support the growing foreign-policy agenda at the state and local level. This team could keep the State Department aware of local concerns and priorities, build on local connections with foreign partners, guide local leaders when they interact with countries that may have malign intentions, and otherwise bolster what cities and states have been doing in recent years. Many other countries have such offices.

Washington could take a page from the Defense Department and place more staff in places where they can interact with Americans outside the Washington bubble.

Along with this new team for subnational diplomacy, which would be better off located outside Washington, the State Department could also add staff to the Offices of Foreign Missions, which are already located in U.S. cities like Los Angeles, Houston, and Chicago. Washington could take a page from the Defense Department and place more staff in places where they can interact with and learn from Americans outside the Washington bubble while at the same time carrying out important State Department functions. To assist U.S. public diplomacy, for example, the State Department should have a liaison office in Los Angeles that focuses on the U.S. entertainment industry’s soft diplomacy and consult with it on the censorship it faces abroad. Similarly, a State Department liaison for public health based in Houston, which is home to one of the largest agglomerations of medical institutions in the world, could work on international collaboration involving hospitals, biotech companies, and state and local governments.

There are still other ways the Biden administration could operationalize the formestic agenda. The State Department, for example, could make better use of U.S. embassies all over the world to address domestic concerns. Many domestic agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, station staff at major embassies to work on narrow bilateral issues. They should be encouraged to take their domestic U.S. mandate with them and think more broadly about how their work abroad could benefit Americans. And although the U.S. Agency for International Development is in the business of helping developing countries, its staff abroad should also be scoping the territory for innovative local solutions to bring back home.

One of the many reasons I am so happy with the Biden team as it reaches its 100-day mark next week is this administration is determined to finally break down the foreign and domestic silos. Appointing Susan Rice, a former national security advisor, to head domestic policy in the White House is another signal.

But this blending is easier said than done. The divide between the United States’ domestic and foreign-policy communities is deeply ingrained—not just within government bureaucracies on all levels but in universities, think tanks, the media, and political campaigns. Only at the very top of the food chain—in the White House—is there a clear view of how the two realms are inescapably connected. Marrying the national and local would give the Biden administration more partners willing and able to pursue a holistic approach.

This article appears in the Summer 2021 print issue.

Nina Hachigian is the deputy mayor of international affairs of Los Angeles and a former U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. X:  @NinaHachigian

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Article contents

Comparative foreign policy analysis.

• Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis Department of Political Science, The College of Wooster
•  and  Ryan Beasley Ryan Beasley School of International Relations, University of St Andrews
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.398
• Published online: 24 May 2017

Comparative foreign policy analysis (CFP) is a vibrant and dynamic subfield of international relations. It examines foreign policy decision making processes related to momentous events as well as patterns in day-to-day foreign interactions of nearly 200 different states (along with thousands of international and nongovernmental organizations). Scholars explore the causes of these behaviors as well as their implications by constructing, testing, and refining theories of foreign policy decision making in comparative perspective. In turn, CFP also offers valuable lessons to government leaders.

This article surveys the evolution of CFP as a subfield over time, with special attention to its contributions to academic understanding and policymaking. It begins with a review of the characteristics and contributions of CFP, followed by acknowledgment of early works that helped establish this area of study. The next section of the article reviews major thematic focuses of CFP, including theories of international pressures and factors that may drive state foreign policy as well as strong foundations in studies of domestic politics. Key internal actors and conditions that can influence state foreign policies include individual leaders, institutions and legislatures, bureaucratic organizations and government agencies, and public opinion and nongovernmental organizations. Following this survey of actors and contemporary theories of their role in foreign policy decision-making, the article develops two illustrations of new directions in CFP studies focused on political party factions and role theory in comparative perspective.

• comparative foreign policy
• decision-making
• international conflict and cooperation
• domestic actors
• international relations theory
• factionalism
• role theory

Introduction

Comparative foreign policy analysis (CFP) is a vibrant and dynamic subfield of international relations. It examines foreign policy decision-making processes related to momentous events as well as patterns in day-to-day interactions of nearly 200 different states (along with thousands of international and nongovernmental organizations). In many ways, CFP offers theoretical frameworks that help to capture the “heartbeat” of global politics. Scholars explore key questions and problems over time, including the causes of state behaviors as well as their implications by constructing, testing, and refining theories of foreign policy decision-making in comparative perspective (Brummer & Hudson, 2015 ; Breuning, 2007 ). In turn, CFP also offers valuable lessons for governance (Kaarbo, 2015 ; Houghton, 2007 ; Hudson, 2005 ).

This article proceeds as follows. First, it examines distinguishing characteristics of the development of the comparative foreign policy subfield, including its evolutionary focus and interdisciplinarity. It explores key actors engaged in foreign policy-making, from individual decision makers and small groups to states and international organizations. Second, the article examines contemporary areas of focus in the scholarship, including questions of links to international relations theories such as neorealism and constructivism, and agent-structure explorations of how domestic and individual-level factors may impact state foreign policy behaviors. Third, it surveys methodological approaches in the subfield, with special attention to the blend of richness and rigor in many studies. Finally, this article explores several promising avenues of current investigation—the applicability of social psychological models to explain majority-minority interactions in foreign policy-making and the potential for national role conceptions to influence state foreign policy in predictable patterns. Both examine critical questions of agency and structure and illustrate opportunities for advancement of middle-range theory in the subfield.

Studying Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

The development of the comparative foreign policy subfield reflects several key characteristics. First, even though CFP has deep roots, it is relatively young. The origins of this area of study date back to mid- 20th-century scholarship (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954 ; Sprout & Sprout, 1957 ; Rosenau, 1966 ). Second, CFP is inherently interdisciplinary—drawing from theories and ideas in many related disciplines. Third, and perhaps surprisingly, CFP also is a rather cohesive subfield, populated by several generations of scholars who sought to advance theoretical understanding of foreign policy-making in comparative perspective. These qualities have enabled advancements in theory that represent fascinating potential contributions to broader international relations scholarship. Fourth, CFP is also a highly policy-relevant subfield, with insights about subjects, lessons of history, actors, factors, and conditions that can be incredibly useful for decision-makers. Each of these qualities of CFP is explored in further detail below.

CFP emerged as a variant of international relations and diplomacy studies in the mid- 20th century and quickly evolved original frameworks for policy analysis. It connects the study of international relations (the way states relate to each other in international politics) with the study of domestic politics (the functioning of governments and the relationships among individuals, groups, and institutions). Because theories of international relations are primarily concerned with state behavior, the study of international relations includes explanations of foreign policy. Traditional theories, however, tend to focus on the external environment as the primary or single explanation of why states do what they do in global affairs. Those who study foreign policy certainly draw on these theories, as will be discussed shortly, but they also look at theories of domestic politics focused inside the state for further explanation. Theories of domestic politics, found in the study of U.S. politics and in the study of comparative politics, share this attention to internal factors. These theories, however, tend to explain the functioning of the state or political system and the domestic policies that are chosen—they rarely comment about the effects of internal politics on a state’s foreign policies.

Up to the 20th century , scholar Deborah Gerner argues, “neither foreign policy nor international relations constituted a distinct field. Diplomatic history probably came the closest to what is now labeled as ‘foreign policy,’ and much of what we call international relations came under the rubric of international law, institutional analysis, or history” ( 1992 , p. 126). Driving much of nascent international relations theorizing at the time was realism, though it is important to note that the liberal (idealist) worldview did emerge as a way to study policymaking in the interwar years (Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995 ). International relations assumed its contemporary form as an academic discipline after World War II. In some ways, this was in response to the rigidity of the realist framework as a search for powerful alternative theories.

Many of the founding works in the CFP subfield were interdisciplinary in nature. For example, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin ( 1954 ) drew on insights from psychology to propose a systematic decision making framework for the study of international relations, in contrast to the virtual dismissal of human agency in realism. They championed a decision making focus of study, analyzing behaviors of “those acting in the name of the state” ( 1954 , p. 65). In essence, national interest does not represent an objective universal. Rather, foreign policy choices derive from multiple sources, including the backgrounds of individual decision makers and the organizational framework in which decisions are made. In a similar vein, Harold and Margaret Sprout’s article, “Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics” (Sprout & Sprout, 1957 ) called for greater attention to the “psycho milieu” of individuals and groups involved in foreign policy decisions. This focused on the international context as it is was perceived and interpreted by these decision makers. James Rosenau championed a more scientific study of foreign policy, linking domestic and international conditions in his classic article, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” ( 1966 ). He argued that comparative politics offered valuable insights on the “internal influences on external behavior” and that this study would bridge the fields of international and comparative politics. Critically, he called for the advancement of theory frameworks by proposing relationships between variables such as natural attributes and state behavior.

The foreign policy analysis subfield is rather cohesive. Several generations of scholarship have built on early foundations to explore the causes and implications of foreign policy decisions. Subjects of study also have proliferated (read: moving from traditional diplomatic studies of great power behaviors to developing countries, and from realist-infused structural frameworks to new and alternative paradigmatic perspectives such as dependency theory). In the behavioral era of the 1960s and 1970s, many CFP scholars appeared to “catch the fever” of Rosenau’s call for generalizeable theory and the search for a scientific study of foreign policy (McGowan & Shapiro, 1973 ). The inability of such approaches to generate substantial progress toward overarching theories of foreign policy led some to see CFP as having failed, but others argued that this ultimately resulted in a broader and more tolerant field (White, 1999 ). Indeed, subsequent generations of researchers have continued to build on and help shape the canon of CFP scholarship, and even as theory lenses have widened, comparative analysis has remained a key feature.

The CFP subfield is also policy-relevant. Drawing on insights from decades of inquiry, foreign policy analysis has made valuable contributions to theory development and policy prescriptions (Zambernardi, 2016 ). Early examples of applications of foreign policy frames include studies of wars over independence and decolonization (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993 ), attempts to manage the Arab-Israeli conflict (Aoun, 2003 ; Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2014 ), and studies of humanitarian intervention (Clarke & Herbst, 1997 ; Smillie & Minear, 2004 ). CFP scholars also played a prominent role in articulating and shaping the democratic peace thesis (Maoz & Russett, 1993 ; Doyle, 2011 ). CFP scholars have contributed a great deal to understanding transitions to democracy and the critical role that different forms of democracy can play in shaping foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Blanton, 2005 ; Coleman & Lawson-Remer, 2013 ). Alexander George, one of the pioneers in the study of foreign policy, made explicit the call for scholars and practitioners to “bridge the gap” ( 1993 ) in the hopes of improving policy and policymaking.

The next section explores some of the key questions and problems that have motivated research on CFP over time. Several defining features have come to characterize much comparative foreign policy analysis research. First, it is agent-centered, taking seriously the importance of actors that are involved in making foreign policies. Second, both the international system and domestic political contexts are viewed as important influences on foreign policy and policymakers. Third, while objective material conditions are seen as important, the subjective understandings and interpretations of individuals are also viewed as a significant factor shaping foreign policy. Fourth, while generally committed to developing theories and trying to explain foreign policy through causal inferences, the field embraces a very wide variety of specific research methods, spanning both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Finally, CFP research can be usefully organized into different “levels of analysis” (see Singer, 1961 ) defined by the primary factors that are used to explain foreign policy, ranging from those external to states to those internal to the minds of foreign policy decision makers. This serves as an organizational platform for the discussion that follows, drawing attention to agency, contextualism, subjectivity, and different methodologies.

Contemporary Dimensions of Study in CFP

CFP analysis begins with theories that identify different factors, actors, and conditions that can influence state foreign policies. Scholars recognize that any such explanation typically involves multiple factors, or “variables,” that drive research in CFP. Levels of analysis offer a framework for categorizing the impact of these factors. First, international system dynamics may help to explain state foreign policy development—such as how the international system is organized, the characteristics of contemporary international relations, and the actions of others. Scholars posit that these factors can cause the state to react in certain ways. The second category points to internal factors such as characteristics of the domestic political system—institutions and groups—that can shape a state’s foreign policy. A third category explores the influence of individual leaders and offers agent-focused perspectives on foreign policy-making.

External Factors and Foreign Policy

States are situated within an international system that may constrain the latitude of their behaviors. In a comparative sense, the global distribution of economic wealth and military power allows some powerful states to pursue their preferred options in foreign policy, but disadvantages others. For example, the People’s Republic of China may have greater opportunity to influence regional politics than does the Philippines or Vietnam. Realism has been a dominant framework of explanation in international relations scholarship for nearly a century, and scholars have argued that states’ foreign policies are solely a product of the international system—merely a reaction to external conditions and other actors. Realism operates on the assumption of anarchy—the absence of an overarching government in the international system—as one of the most important external conditions that affect foreign policies. In an anarchic world, states must look out for their own interests. The result, realists argue, is distrust, competition, and conflict among states (Wohlforth, 2008 ; Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009 ). These are reflected in challenges such as the difficulty of constructing security communities in the Asia-Pacific region or negotiating an end to tensions in the Middle East (Acharya, 2001 ).

Although various approaches to realism can capture important aspects influencing state foreign policies—the primacy of security interests and the drive for power among all states—they do have some noted limitations. Neorealism, or “structural” realism, for example, has been critiqued for focusing on structures and anarchy, which are relatively constant, while at the same time trying to account for variations in individual states’ foreign policy behaviors (Barkin, 2009 ). Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether Neorealism is a theory of foreign policy at all: Offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer clearly claim to explain the power-seeking propensities of states ( 2001 ), while defensive realists like Waltz explicitly deny this represents a theory of foreign policy (Waltz, 1979 ). Neo-Classical Realism (cf. Rose, 1998 ) focuses on foreign policy and has continued to give primacy to power as the driver of states’ behaviors while introducing various factors inside the state into their explanations.

Economic power, and not just economic wealth to purchase military capability, can give a state influence in international politics through programs such as sanctions or promises of an economically rewarding relationship. Indeed, because of changes in the international system, economic power may be more significant in an era of increasing interdependence and globalization (Wivel, 2005 ). Liberalism focuses on the emergence of interdependence in the international system (Keohane & Nye, 1997 ) that persuades states to find cooperation, rather than conflict, more in line with their interests (Doyle, 1997 ). Economic liberalism argues that all states will be better off if they cooperate in a worldwide division of labor, with each state capitalizing on its comparative advantage in production.

Theories of liberalism cast a wide net for explanations of foreign policy. A centerpiece is their attention to the importance of international organizations to help coordinate cooperative efforts by states. What autonomy may be sacrificed in the short term, liberals believe, is offset by the long-term benefits of stability, efficiency, and greater wealth (Keohane, 1984 ; Martin & Simmons, 1998 ). International governmental organizations have especially strong potential influence in the modern system, seen in the capacities of organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization to shape different states’ foreign policies. Liberalism also recognizes the growing power of non-state actors in a complex, interdependent system, and these actors increasingly influence the foreign policies of states. The rise of multinational corporations and their influence in a globalized system has changed international political dynamics. Globalization may connect more economies in worldwide financial and trading markets, but it has not done so evenly. Dynamics of regional economic integration illustrate contemporary opportunities and challenges in globalization. Both rich and poor states are engaging in agreements and dialogues to establish greater interdependence at the regional level. The European Union (EU) is the most successful effort, particularly with the establishment in 1999 of a common currency. There have been other recent attempts at regional integration in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America in response, in part, to globalization. Thus, regional integration provides another layer of external factors that may affect states’ foreign policies. Interestingly, however, EU states have persistently struggled to coordinate their non-economic foreign policies.

Constructivism offers valuable contributions to CFP and international relations. From a constructivist perspective, the international system is composed of the social interactions of states and shared understandings of them in international society (Kaarbo, 2015 ). For constructivism, anarchy and interests are not defined structural constraints; rather they are constituted of the actions of agents, such as states, and the meanings, or ideas, that agents attach to them (Onuf & Klink, 1989 ; Wendt, 1999 ). Norms of appropriate behavior, for example, become international structures that constrain states’ foreign policies (Kratochwil, 1989 ). Whether or not states should intervene for humanitarian reasons, trade slaves, or develop nuclear weapons are all examples of norms that have changed over time. States may contribute to the development of norms, such as actions by the Austrian government to promote a humanitarian norm related to banning nuclear weapons or the role of Canada in fostering international negotiations on banning land mines. Constructivists also argue that states often avoid violating norms, even if it is in their interest to do so, and when they do violate standards of appropriate behavior, other actors may sanction them or shame them, even if they lack traditional notions of power or if condemnation is not in line with their material interests (Keck & Sikkink, 1998 ). Although states do not always comply with international laws, the system does seem to carry some kind of moral, normative authority that states support (Lantis, 2016 ; Hurd, 2007 ; Ku & Diehl, 1998 ). In these ways, ideational, and not just material conditions, do shape foreign policies.

Neo-Marxist dependency theory offers an alternative set of explanations for foreign policy in comparative perspective (Wallerstein, 1974 ). For example, some studies of African foreign economic relations highlight the importance of their post-colonial drives for development and their relations with international organizations including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Callaghy, 2009 ). These relationships sometimes complicate questions of independence, however, as developing countries see domestic and even foreign policy decisions impacted by their need for strong relations with benefactors. Other studies highlight the dependent asymmetry of many ties between developing countries and international organizations (Shaw & Okolo, 1994 ; Nzomo & Nweke, 1982 ), which can translate through voting patterns in the United Nations or other initiatives (Moon, 1983 ; Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995 ). Related studies have examined dependency and foreign policy implications in Asia (Weinstein, 2006 ) sub-Saharan Africa (Ahiakpor, 1985 ), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ferris & Lincoln, 1981 ; Mora & Hey, 2004 ; Braveboy-Wagner, 2008 ). And in recent work, Giacalone ( 2015 ) adapts a dependency lens to analyze Latin American foreign policies as hybrid extensions of realism (what she terms “peripheral neo-realism”) and idealist approaches (“peripheral neo-idealism”).

In summary, scholars have proposed a range of external factors that may impact states’ foreign policies. Realism proposes that states motivated by self-interests will seek military power and create alliances, and that weak states will often submit to more powerful actors. Liberalism suggests that an interdependent international system will result in more cooperative foreign policies, support for organizations that help coordinate activities, and submission of economically weak states to the forces of the international marketplace. Constructivist perspectives point to socially created meanings that develop into international norms which in turn guide actors’ behaviors. Proponents of each of these perspectives agree that foreign policies are a result of states’ rank, status, and links to other actors in the international system.

Internal Factors and Foreign Policy

CFP scholars have developed a substantial literature focused on internal sources of foreign policy. These works highlight the CFP focus on agents within domestic political contexts and examine the great diversity of political systems, cultures, and leaders that may result in different foreign policy decisions by states, even in the face of similar external pressures. These often challenge the parsimony of realism or the international institutional focus of liberalism to introduce greater complexity associated with the actors, factors, and conditions that may drive state behavior more directly. These works also showcase connections to comparative politics research on domestic political systems, by showing how these factors may alter states’ international behavior.

Government institutions represent a first set of domestic actors and conditions that can impact foreign policy decision making. The prevailing scholarship in CFP focuses on democratic systems where decision making authority is somewhat diffuse, while other work attends to authoritarian systems. The foreign policy process can be quite different for democracies—decision making authority tends to be diffused across democratic institutions, and thus more actors are involved. While leaders in authoritarian systems may prefer to make decisions by themselves, they too can face domestic constraints (Weeks, 2012 ) and may have to deal with divided institutional authority (Hagan, 1994 ). Democratic leaders, however, are directly accountable to political parties and the public and thus must often build a consensus for foreign policy.

Liberal theory argues that because of these differences in government organization, democracies will behave more peacefully than will authoritarian systems (Bausch, 2015 ; Maoz & Russett, 1993 ; Jakobsen, Jakobsen, & Ekevold, 2016 ). The difficulty of building a consensus among a larger set of actors and mobilizing them for conflict constrains the war-making abilities of democratic leaders. Furthermore, democratic institutions are built on and create a political culture that is likely to emphasize the value of peaceful resolution. However, despite these expectations, the proposition that democracies are generally more peaceful in their foreign policy is not supported by most evidence. Democracies and authoritarian governments, it seems, are both likely to be involved in and initiate conflict. Democracies, however, rarely fight other democracies (Rosenau, 1966 ). Other scholars (Calleros-Alarcón, 2009 ; Zakaria, 2003 ) focus on links between degrees of democracy and conflict, arguing that illiberal systems tend not to formulate foreign policies that promote global peace.

Second, bureaucratic structures and processes also affect foreign policy. State bureaucracies are charged with gathering information, developing proposals, offering advice, implementing policy, and, at times, making foreign policy decisions. Because of the complexities involved in dealing with the many issues of international politics, governments organize themselves bureaucratically, assigning responsibility for different areas or jurisdictions of policy to separate agencies or departments. Scholars have shown that this has serious implications for foreign policy (Kaarbo, 1998a , 1998b ; Allison, 1974 ; Hollis & Smith, 1986 ; Marsh, 2014 ). Bureaucratic conflict is a common problem, for example, in the process of making foreign policy in the United States and Japan. The conflict in viewpoints may create inconsistent foreign policy if departments are acting on their own, rather than in coordination. It may also result in compromises that are not necessarily in the best interests of the state (Ball, 1974 ). While many studies have focused on applications in a few select countries, scholars have begun to explore applicability of bureaucratic politics to other cases of foreign policy decision making in countries such as China (Qingmin, 2016 ), Argentina and Chile (Gertner, 2016 ), and Sweden and Finland (’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1997 ).

Societal groups represent a third important set of actors that can impact foreign policy decision-making. Studies show that leaders may be more likely to pay attention to and react to the opinions of specific, organized societal groups than to the society at large, as they play the role of linking society to the state or of opposing and competing with the state. Interest groups articulate a particular societal sector’s position and mobilize that sector to pressure and persuade the government (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008 ; Kirk, 2008 ; Haney & Vanderbush, 1999 ). These groups are varied and may be based on a single issue, on ethnic identification, on religious affiliation, or on economics. Economic groups often have an interest in foreign relations as they seek to promote their foreign business adventures abroad or to protect markets from competitors at home (Krasner, 1978 ). For example, China’s foreign policy engagement in Africa has been heavily influenced by economic and business interests (Sun, 2014 ), and similar dynamics are at work in Australian commitments to India (Wesley & DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011 ). Watanabe ( 1984 ) argues policy-makers and interest groups may establish mutually supportive relationships to help achieve policy goals. He describes these “symbiotic relationships” as involving exchanges of influence and political advocacy for valuable resources such as information, votes, and campaign contributions. In this context, Congress becomes both a “target and ally” ( 1984 , p. 61). Ultimately, the impact of an interest group on foreign policy may depend on the particular issue, how organized the group is, its resources, and the relationship between the interest group and the government (Glastris et al., 1997 ; Haney & Vanderbush, 2005 ).

Political parties, although often part of the government, also play the role of linking societal opinion to political leadership (Hagan, 1993 ). In many ways, political parties function much like interest groups. In some countries, such as Iran, only one party exists or dominates the political system, and the party’s ideology can be important in setting the boundaries for debate over foreign policy decisions and in providing rhetoric for leaders’ speeches. In such cases, parties become less important than factions, which often develop within political parties. Factions are also important in political systems in which one party holds a majority in parliament and rules alone. In these countries too, factions may disagree over the direction of the country’s foreign policy, as have the pro- versus anti-European integration factions in the British Conservative Party (Benedetto & Hix, 2007 ; Rathbun, 2013 ). Party factions may seek to outmaneuver each other or they may be forced to compromise for the sake of party unity. Even if there is a consensus within the party, foreign policy might get captured by the intraparty fighting as factions compete with one another for party leadership. In some countries with multiparty systems, such as India, Germany, and Israel, the political scene is so fragmented that parties must enter into coalitions and share the power to make policy. In such cases, each foreign policy decision can be a struggle between coalition partners, who must get along to keep the coalition together (Ozkececi-Taner, 2006 ; Kaarbo & Beasley, 2008 ).

Public opinion and attitudes represent a fourth dimension of domestic factors that can impact foreign policy development. In democratic systems public opinion may, for example, be for or against their state intervening militarily in another country or signing a particular trade agreement. The public may agree on an issue or may be deeply divided. Scholars continue to debate the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, even in highly democratized states in which policy supposedly reflects “the will of the people.” Some argue that leaders drive public opinion through framing messages in line with their preferences or that they ignore the public altogether (Entman, 2004 ; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2000 ; Foyle, 2004 ; Chan & Safran, 2006 ). But this is challenged by other works asserting that public attitudes can and do impact foreign policy decision making at different stages (Jentleson, 1992 ; Knecht & Weatherford, 2006 ). Research argues that how leaders perceive and respond to public opinion can matter in select circumstances, and that public attitudes can be catalyzed by highly salient issues (Nacos, Shapiro, & Isernia, 2000 ). The media also play a role in this relationship as it too may influence public opinion on foreign policy. The information that the media provides the public may also be biased in favor of the government’s policies (Entman, 2004 ; Holsti, 1992 ).

Finally, core values and national identities are also connected to a society’s political culture—the values, norms, and traditions that are widely shared by its people and are relatively enduring over time. These enduring cultural features may also set parameters for foreign policy (Johnston, 1995 ; Katzenstein, 1996 ; Berger, 1998 ). A country’s culture may value, for example, individualism, collectivism, pragmatism, or moralism, and these culturally based values may affect foreign policy. Cultures that place a premium on morality over practicality, for example, may be more likely to pass moral judgment over the internal affairs and foreign policy behaviors of others. Culture may also affect the way foreign policy is made. Cultures in which consensual decision making is the norm, for example, may take longer to make policy, because the process of consultation with many people may be just as important as the final decision (Sampson, 1987 ). However, despite the general recognition that cultural particularities do affect foreign policy, such concepts can be difficult to operationalize and measure (whether quantitatively or qualitatively), and this has limited some assessments of culture and foreign policy (Lantis, 2015 ).

Individual Leaders and Foreign Policy

Leaders sit “at the top” of government. In many political systems, the head of state or head of government has substantial authority to allocate state resources and make foreign policy. CFP provides fertile ground for the development of substantial comparative work on leadership in foreign policy, in part because the potential influence of key individuals in power represents an important commonality across different political systems and regions (Kamrava, 2011 ; Korany, Hillal Dessouki, & Aḥmad, 2001 ). For example, fascinating studies have been developed on the role of leadership in the foreign policy of Arab states (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2014 ), former President Dilma Rousseff’s influence on Brazilian foreign policy (De Jesus, 2014 ), and the impact of individual leaders on nuclear weapons programs in France, Australia, Argentina, and India (Hymans, 2006 ).

Studies show that individual characteristics of leaders matter in influencing foreign policy decisions (Hermann, 1980 ; Levy, 2003 ). Characteristics of leaders seem to be more important when the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, and complex, and when the leader is involved in the actual decision making rather than delegating his or her authority to advisers (Gallagher & Allen, 2014 ; Greenstein, 1975 ). Under such conditions a leader’s personality and beliefs may be especially influential in foreign policy, but determining whether or not leaders have influenced foreign policy can be challenging (Jervis, 2013 ).

CFP analysts also have explored the roots of individual leaders’ decisions in their personal history. Childhood or early political experiences, for example, may have taught policy-makers how certain values and ways of handling problems are important. Leaders’ cognitions and belief systems also influence foreign policy (Rosati, 2000 ). Human beings tend to prefer consistency in ordering the world around them and thus often ignore or distort information that contradicts what they already believe (Beasley, 2016 ). Studies show this is especially likely when we have strongly held “images” of other countries. Leaders who see another country as their enemy, for example, will often selectively attend to or perceive information about that country in a way that confirms their original belief. For this reason, images are extremely resistant to change, even if the “enemy” is making cooperative gestures (Holsti, 1976 ; Jervis, 1976 ; Vertzberger, 1990 ).

Political psychologists have made important contributions to understanding foreign policy decision making. Here, scholars argue that leaders can be categorized into types of personalities. Some leaders, for example, may be motivated by a need to dominate others and may thus be more conflictual in foreign policy, whereas others may be more concerned with being accepted and may therefore be more cooperative. Some leaders are more nationalistic, more distrustful, and believe that the world is a place of conflict that can only be solved through the use of force, whereas others see themselves and their state as part of the world community that can be trusted and believe that problems are best solved multilaterally (Dyson, 2006 ; Schafer & Walker, 2006 ; Hermann, 1980 ). Leaders’ decision making style or how they manage information and the people around them can also be important. Some leaders may choose to be quite active in foreign policy-making, whereas others champion isolationism. Some leaders are “crusaders” who come to office committed to a foreign policy goal; others are interested in keeping power or bridging conflicts. They tend to be sensitive to advice and are reluctant to make decisions without consultation and consensus (Goemans & Chiozza, 2011 ; Hermann, 1993 ; Kaarbo, 1997 ).

Methodologies

Given the breadth of issues that concern those who study foreign policy, it is perhaps not surprising that CFP researchers employ a wide variety of methods in their efforts to investigate factors influencing the behavior of states. This pluralism, however, is tempered by a somewhat more narrow epistemological commitment by most CFP work to developing generalizable explanations of foreign policy. In this sense, much CFP work stands in contrast to epistemological approaches emphasizing subjective “understanding” (Hollis & Smith, 1986 ) or any of a variety of other approaches that eschew explanation and generalizability as research goals (Tickner, 1997 ; White, 1999 ; Houghton, 2007 ). But consistent with its early focus on the interpretations of decision makers, a number of approaches take seriously the subjective experiences of individuals as they seek to understand the world.

CFP has deep roots in comparative politics and draws from the methods employed in that subfield. Lijphart’s ( 1971 ) seminal work closely examined the comparative method and the logic of comparative analysis with a small number of cases (“small-n” studies), contrasting it with experiments, statistical analysis, and single case studies. Subsequently, small-n analysis has been refined, and more sophisticated approaches to case selection and comparative case study design have emerged (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999 ). In particular, “process tracing” has been put forward as an important contribution to case study methods (Beach & Pedersen, 2013 ; George & Bennett, 2005 ) as a technique for exploring the underlying causal mechanisms involved (Falleti & Lynch, 2009 ). The case study method is particularly attractive to CFP researchers who are interested in specific decisions, or who may be motivated to improve actual policymaking processes.

In contrast to comparative case study approaches, many CFP scholars have employed broad statistical comparisons using established data sets, such as the Correlates of War (Singer, 1961 ) data set and the Militarized Interstate Disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004 ) data set. The development of large events-based data sets for the study of foreign policy—such as the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB; Azar, 1980 ) and the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON; Hermann, East, Hermann, Salmore, & Salmore, 1973 ) data set—were driven by the desire to bridge traditional and more quantitative approaches (Schrodt, 1995 ). Indeed, events data offer a more nuanced and wide-ranging set of dependent variables than the more conflict-oriented data sets that focus more on conflict and war (Oktay & Beasley, 2016 ). Moving toward more event-based data sets, McClelland ( 1978 ), for example, created the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS), data set which coded the discreet behaviors of countries around the world. Scholars such as Goldstein ( 1992 ) translated these categories into levels of conflict or cooperation, offering opportunities for more nuanced examinations beyond war and militarized disputes. This trend has continued, offering new sources for the statistical study of foreign policy (Gerner & Schrodt, 1994 ; Merritt, 1994 ).

Scholars of CFP who seek explanations that lie with individuals and small groups of decision makers can have difficulty accessing relevant data, often relying on archival analysis of decision making and detailed historical case studies. Content analysis and “at-a-distance” techniques, however, have offered ways to study decision makers and infer individual-level characteristics. These studies rely primarily on analyzing speeches and writings, often using computer software, and large data sets have been constructed that include measures of world leaders’ beliefs and personality traits (Young & Schafer, 1998 ). Such data collection techniques are not without problems, but they have allowed scholars to link individual-level characteristics with foreign policy decisions, giving greater access to subjective qualities of actors and their impact on foreign policy outcomes. Finally, concern with the micro-processes of individual and group decision making has led scholars to employ laboratory experiments as a way of testing specific psychological dynamics in a controlled environment (Geva, Mayhar, & Skorick, 2000 ; McDermott, 2011 ).

Foreign Policy Theories in Action

This section briefly explores pathways that link theory and practice in foreign policy development. This work underlines the important contributions of the subfield to date and offers examples of avenues for future advancement of the subfield.

Social Psychology and Minority Influence in Foreign Policy

Among the many fertile areas for further research on foreign policy in comparative perspective is the study of the relationship between factionalism and foreign policy. Factions can be defined as “any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share common identity or purpose, and are organized to act collectively—as a distinct bloc within a party—to achieve their goals” (Zariski, 1960 , p. 33). In studies of factionalism in Britain, Canada, Italy, and Japan, Francoise Boucek observes, “Political parties are not monolithic structures but collective entities in which competition, divided opinions and dissent create internal pressure” ( 2009 , p. 455; 2012 ). Additional studies in comparative politics examine typologies of intra-party groups with different attributes, including organization, function, and role, and they discuss projected impacts on political outcomes (Boucek, 2009 , p. 456; Belloni & Beller, 1978 ). Other work identifies links between factionalism, party government, and cabinet durability in parliamentary regimes (Köllner & Basedau, 2005 ).

Emerging studies recognizing factions as agents of change open exciting new avenues for foreign policy analysis in comparative perspective (Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2010 ; Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007 ). For example, Peake ( 2002 ) studies links between intraparty factionalism and U.S. foreign policy outcomes. He explores conditions that contribute to foreign policy challenges, as well as factors that might lead to greater opportunity for presidential coalition-building and advancement of their foreign policy agendas (Peake, 2002 ; Peake, Krutz, & Hughes, 2012 ). Gvosdev and Marsh ( 2013 ) also examine how different interests and factions have influenced Russian foreign policy in the Putin-Medvedev eras.

Contemporary research in social psychology also offers promising insights on how intraparty factionalism, or majority-minority differences, may influence the political process. For much of the 20th century , the traditional “conformity thesis” held that dissident voices in groups tend to yield to the majority position even when it is incorrect (Allen, 1965 ; Sherif, 1935 ; Maass & Clark, 1984 ; Milgram, 1963 ). However, Moscovici and others (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969 ; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972 ) successfully challenge traditional assumptions by showing how group members may exhibit deviance or nonconformity by attempting to persuade others to endorse alternative decisions. Minority views must be consistent in presentation and support for policy change. Over time, numerous studies (Maass & Clark, 1984 ) have reinforced the central premise of minority influence theory: consistent behavior by minorities will exert influence, whereas inconsistent behavior is likely to fail to bring about any change of the majority’s attitudes and perceptions (Tanford & Penrod, 1984 ). Related studies find minority influence to be most effective if alternative voices have enough time to present their position (Wachtler, 1977 ), argue in a firm but flexible manner (Mugny, 1975 ), and share the same social category as the majority (Maass, Clark, & Haberkorn, 1982 ). Hagan, Everts, Fukui, and Stempel ( 2001 ) also have argued that the interactions between minority and majority positions, or between government and opposition, can produce alternative outcomes including deadlock, compromise, and more serious policy inconsistencies. Kaarbo ( 2008 , p. 57) asserts, “The psychological processes involved in group polarization, persuasion, and other influence strategies” play critical roles in shaping outcomes.

Social psychological studies of factionalism offer potential for further comparative analysis of foreign policies. These themes are ripe for application to the study of phenomena such as centrifugal forces in the European Union (with the 2016 “Brexit” referendum and dynamic tensions over issues such as debt relief and Syria policy), efforts to consolidate democracy in post-war Iraq, or how the factionalism in major political parties in the United States during the 2016 presidential election threatened major foreign policy changes. This frame provides a conceptual bridge between individual and domestic levels of analysis and offers a rich avenue for future research on foreign policy in comparative perspective.

Role Theory and Foreign Policy

Role theory has burgeoned recently as an approach to comparative foreign policy analysis. In contrast to the work on party factionalism, role theory focuses more centrally on the interplay between the international system and the way in which states situate themselves within that system through their foreign policies. Role theory originates from a sociological perspective that views roles as social positions within groups, which provide cues for behavior. Roles themselves are socially constructed through the interactions of individuals within a given social system, and they provide more or less clear guidelines that direct behaviors and set expectations. CFP scholars adapt role theory to the international system by viewing it as a society of states, each of whom can take on specific roles. In this way role theorists manage to bridge material and ideational factors, domestic and international dimensions, and agents and structures (e.g., Barnett, 1993 ; Harnisch, 2011 ; Breuning, 2011 ).

Holsti ( 1970 ) is credited with bringing role theory to the study of foreign policy. His work was situated in the Cold War period, and he drew attention to the ways in which classes of states were conceived of within the international system according to the roles that they played, such as “regional leader” or “faithful ally.” He explicitly connected the domestic context to the national role conception of any given state but recognized the importance of other actors and international institutions as shaping role conceptions as well. Subsequently, role theorists have unpacked various dimensions associated with roles within the international system and sought to understand the processes through which roles are developed, enacted, resisted, contested, and changed (cf. Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016 ; Harnisch, 2012 ; McCourt, 2012 ; Walker, 1987 ).

While there are many concepts associated with role theory generally, some have been more frequently applied by foreign policy scholars (Thies, 2010 ). For example, scholars often label actors pursuing a role as “Ego,” and others within the international system who respond as “Alter(s).” Roles are social categories involving a role conception by Ego about what the role it is pursuing involves, as well as role expectations by Alter(s) about appropriate and inappropriate role behaviors. Role enactment is the foreign policy behavior of Ego, and attempts to change Ego’s role involve alter-casting Ego into a different role by providing cues or sanctions. This interplay between Ego and Alter(s) is the process of role socialization, which usually involves a dominant or primary socializer. A state needs to have both the material resources and social status to effectively assume a role within the international system, that is, its master status must be consistent with the role it is taking (Thies, 2013 ).

Role theory illustrates several key dimensions associated with CFP research. Role theory research is interested in the interaction of both domestic and international factors, as states and their leaders seek to enact roles consistent with their domestic context and expectations, while international actors may sanction role-inappropriate behavior and alter-cast states into different roles. Role theory also embraces subjectivism, as roles must be understood and socially constructed through interactive processes between social agents who are interpreting cues, demands, and expectations. Role theory is also sensitive to contexts, as different international systems allow for different roles, and states seek to enact particular roles in the face of situational demands and the specific cues and expectations of key players. Roles have also been studied at different levels of analysis, ranging from the beliefs of leaders (cf. Holsti, 1970 ) to national culture, to multi-level analyses (Walker, 1979 ), and this variety has been noted as both a strength of and challenge for role theory.

A number of contemporary role theory studies have examined European actors, such as the Czech Republic, Germany, and the EU (Beneš & Harnisch, 2015 ), Denmark and the Netherlands (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013 ), and European foreign policy more generally (Aggestam, 2006 ). Other applications have examined role theory in non-European regional contexts such as the Middle East (Barnett, 1993 ; Ovah, 2013 ), former Soviet republics (Chafetz, Abramson, & Grillot, 1996 ), and Latin America (Wehner, 2015 ). Individual country studies such as those on Indian foreign policy (Hansel & Möller, 2015 ), British foreign policy (McCourt, 2011 ), Chinese foreign policy (Harnisch, Bersick, & Gottwald, 2016 ) and Moldovan foreign policy (Cantir & Kennedy, 2015 ) have also illustrated the value of role theory in helping to account for state behavior.

Role theory offers several avenues for future research. A key issue involves the degree to which both material and ideational factors can be integrated within role theory accounts of states’ behaviors. This could potentially bridge foreign policy approaches with broader international relations theories. Some recent work (Beasley & Kaarbo, 2017 ) has sought to explore the nature of sovereignty within the international system as it conditions the types of roles available to states and the way states socialize one another into or out of particular roles. The relationship between sovereignty and roles, however, is not entirely clear and would benefit from examinations that consider regional differences in sovereignty. Regional transformations of sovereignty associated with the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, for example, would undoubtedly benefit from an examination of the changing roles of key actors. Similarly, recent work on China’s role in the international system (Harnisch, Bersick, & Gottwald, 2016 ) could be extended to consider the different ways in which sovereignty and roles are transformed with the changing security dynamics in the East Asian region. Such efforts might serve to better connect the comparative foreign policy approach to role theory with broader theories of international relations.

This article has explored a number of key questions and themes that have motivated CFP research over time. It has examined some of the major theoretical frameworks and variables that have driven research, as well as offered samples of the types of work that link factors to foreign policy outcomes in comparative perspective. The article also illustrates characteristics of the development of the CFP subfield over time, including its relative “youth,” interdisciplinarity, and scholarly commitment to cohesion. Most CFP scholarship devotes attention to agency within the broader international system and domestic political contexts, and it embraces a wide variety of specific research methods, spanning both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The subfield also draws in critical observations from related disciplines regarding subjective understandings of the foreign policy context. Along with a commitment to cohesion and cumulation of knowledge (especially of middle-range theory), these qualities have enabled advancements in scholarship in a relatively short period of time. Finally, this article outlines important avenues for future progress in CFP analysis. The subfield is well positioned to continue to support rich and diverse studies—with great relevance for understanding and making policy in the 21st century .

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United States Foreign Policy Analytical Essay

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Introduction

United states foreign policy, usa foreign policy during (1815-1941), usa foreign policy during (1941-1989), usa foreign policy during (1989-present), works cited.

Several countries today have established legal frameworks that determine how they relate with other nations. The United States of America has a comprehensive foreign policy which governs its relationship with other countries. “Since independence, the economy of U.S. has been flourishing and it is today one of the most developed countries in the world” (Hastedt 65).

This has given it a dominant position in the world political arena and it has also influenced how it deals with other nations. “The diplomatic affairs of this country are always under the guidance of the secretary of the State” (Carter 82). However, final decisions on diplomatic affairs are only made by the president.

America’s foreign policy has always been shaped in such away that it favors its interests. It protects its corporations and other commercial organizations from any unfair treatment and competition (Kaufman 15). This has always been done to ensure that no country challenge its economic position.

U.S. has been using its power to suppress other nations that may be thinking of emerging as its competitor. For example it checked the influence of U.S.S.R. In order to continue dominating many countries, the U.S. government keeps on extending its authority and power over many nations.

“It has achieved this by simply influencing the social-economic and political institutions of some countries which are vulnerable to political influences” (Carter 130). Such practices are prevalent in countries which are poor and can not sustain themselves economically.

”Peace, prosperity, power, and principle,” have always acted as the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy, and its interests revolve around them (Hastedt 29). The U.S. government has been striving to maintain these values, but the only thing that has been changing is the prevailing conditions which influence the manner they are achieved (Hastedt 30). We can therefore examine the foreign policies of U.S in the following phases.

America came up with the policy of “isolation” after the end of its revolutionary war. According to this policy, US did not engage in conflict resolution programs and it always remained impartial whenever some European countries had a conflict with each other (Carter 101). For example, this was demonstrated during the First World War and it continued until the beginning of the Second World War. The main interest of US during the 19 th century was to develop its economy and this influenced how it conducted its diplomatic activities with other nations.

It forged trade ties with other countries which were ready to do business with it. In addition to these, it also engaged in building its territory through bringing more territories under its control. For example in 1819 it managed to conquer Florida; in 1845 it brought Texas under its control and the Russian Empire agreed to sell Alaska to US in 1867.

Imperialism was also partially practiced by U.S. “Foreign policy themes were expressed considerably in George Washington’s farewell address; these included among other things, observing good faith and justice towards all nations and cultivating peace and harmony with all countries” (Carter 74). The US government in many cases declined to engage in signing treaties. For example it refused to be part of the “League of Nations” (Kaufman 67).

There was a remarkable increase in U.S. engagement in peace initiatives during the post World War One, and this formed its key agenda in foreign relations. President Wilson came up with guidelines that were used in ending the First World War. The European powers had a meeting in Paris in 1919 in which they discussed the ways of solving the disputes which had previously led to war among them. “The Versailles Treaty was signed by the countries that attended the conference but U.S. government did not” (Hastedt 120).

This is because the US government felt that some of the members had contradicted some of steps which governed the treaty. U.S. also managed to carry out the disarmament program successfully in 1920s and it also helped Germany to reconstruct its economy which had been ruined by over engagement in war. U.S. tried to continue pursuing the policy of “isolation” during 1930s.

However, President Roosevelt joined the Allied powers during the Second World War and they managed to win it. Japan was forcefully removed from China by U.S. and they also stopped its possible invasion of the Soviet Union. “Japan was greatly humiliated and it reacted by an attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and the United States was at war with Japan, Germany, and Italy” (Carter 190).

The economy of U.S greatly improved after the second war, while the other European countries grappled with economic challenges. It was now one of the greatest countries and its power and influence was felt in many countries.

The emergence of the cold war in the post war period led to the split of the world into two spheres. These two spheres were dominated by Soviet Union and U.S. Non Aligned Movement was developed as a result of this process. The Cold War period only came to an end towards the end of the 20 th century. “A policy of containment was adopted to limit Soviet expansion and a series of proxy wars were fought with mixed results” (Kaufman 117).

The Soviet Union completely collapsed after the U.S. war against Iraq (Gulf War). America joined this war in order to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait so that peace and stability could be restored in that country. After the war, U.S. shifted its policy from Iraq because it was trying to be a threat to its interests in the region of Middle East (Carter 195).

America is still having an important role in world politics. Nonetheless, it is facing much opposition and competition from other countries like China. Its dominant role and influence has gone down and many countries from Africa are currently shifting their diplomatic relationships to the East. “U.S. foreign policy is characterized still by a commitment to free trade, protection of its national interests, and a concern for human rights”. A group of political scientists contend that the super powers seem to be having similar socio economic and political interests, and if they can find a good opportunity to pursue them together then we shall have a prosperous future.

Carter, Ralph. Contemporary cases in U.S. foreign policy: from terrorism to trade. Washington D.C: Press College, 2010.

Hastedt, Glenn. American foreign policy. New York: Longman, 2010.

Kaufman, Joyce. A concise history of U.S. foreign policy. New York: Rowman and Littlefield , 2009.

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IvyPanda. (2018, May 24). United States Foreign Policy. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/

"United States Foreign Policy." IvyPanda , 24 May 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

IvyPanda . (2018) 'United States Foreign Policy'. 24 May.

IvyPanda . 2018. "United States Foreign Policy." May 24, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

1. IvyPanda . "United States Foreign Policy." May 24, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "United States Foreign Policy." May 24, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

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Domestic politics and foreign policy of the maldives: implications for india.

Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, Dr Gulbin Sultana’s article on ‘Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy of the Maldives: Implications for India’ has been published in National Security, Vol. 7 Issue 2 (April-June 2024).

The article argues that India should acknowledge and feel confident about its own strength, and address concerns in the bilateral relations through dialogue and engagement with all the stakeholders in Maldives rather than adopting reactive measures.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author are personal and do not in any way reflect the views of MP-IDSA or the Government of India.

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