brown v board of education ii case brief

heading 1 2 3 4 #this is just small column unstyled, not offset. heading

LIBRARY INFO

• Location & Parking
• Conference Rooms
• How to Print, Copy, and Scan
• Stack & Call Number Guide
• Main Library Contacts
• Staff Directory
• New Acquisitions
• Search the Catalog
• Federal Documents
• Current Awareness
• Access NYT & WSJ
• Research Guides
• Digital Collections
• Archives & Special Collections
• Legal Databases
• Ask a Librarian
• Interlibrary Loan & Document Delivery
• Technology Help
• Course Reserves
• Past Exams Database
• Course Offerings
• Bloomberg, Lexis, Westlaw Contact Info
• 1L Calendar
• Graduating Students
• Law Review Students
• Study Aid Guide
• Seminar Papers & Law Review Notes

Collection Services

• Faculty Document Delivery Requests
• Submit a Course Reserve
• Submit a Past Exam
• Scholarship Support
• Find Your Liaison
• Faculty Research Assistants

• Sweatt v. Painter (1950)
• Brown v. Board of Education I & II (1954, 1955)

Case Summaries

Selected case files, internet resources, print resources.

• Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)
• Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)
• School Prayer
• 4th Amendment
• 5th Amendment
• Voting Rights
• Mexican American Civil Rights
• Browse the Collection

Center for American History, UT Austin DI Number 01668 Hickman (R.C.) Photographic Archive, 1949-1961, 1969 Thurgood Marshall, A. Maceo Smith and other

While the decisions of the Supreme Court in  Sweatt v. Painter  and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education  led to the desegregation of graduate and professional schools in 1950, many black children continued to be denied admission to white elementary and high schools under state laws either permitting or requiring segregation.

In the fall of 1950, Reverend Oliver Brown attempted to enroll his eight-year-old daughter, Linda, at Sumner Elementary School. Sumner was the elementary school nearest their home in Topeka, Kansas. The principal refused to enroll Linda, who attended all-black Monroe Elementary School, because Sumner Elementary was open only to white children. With the assistance of the NAACP, Reverend Brown filed suit against the Board of Education.

In Clarendon County, South Carolina, schools for black children were funded at only a quarter of the level of schools for white children. The school board did not provide funds for supplies, building maintenance or buses to black schools. Reverend Joseph Albert DeLaine began circulating a petition among the black community requesting the school board provide buses. After the school board refused to provide a bus, parent Harry Briggs filed suit against Roderick W. Elliot, chairman of the school district, in a case known as Briggs v. Elliot.

In Prince Edward County, Virginia, all-black Moton High School was severely underfunded and overcrowded. Barbara Johns, a sixteen-year-old Moton junior, was a member of the school chorus, drama group, New Homemakers of America and student council. In the fall of 1950, she convinced the student council to ask the school board for better facilities for black students. The school board failed to respond, and Johns and the student council organized a strike. For the next two weeks, students picketed outside the school or stayed at their desks with their books closed. The student council contacted the NAACP to request their assistance to pursue legal action. The suit Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County was brought on behalf of 117 Moton students and argued that school segregation in Virginia should be ended.

In Wilmington, Delaware, black high school students were bused to Howard High School, located in a seedy section of downtown. Ethel Belton and her children lived in suburban Claymont, near the new Claymont High School, but her children took a 50 minute bus ride each way to attend Howard. After her children were denied admission at Claymont, Ethel Belton filed suit against the individual members of the school board in a case known as Belton v. Gebhart.

In Washington, D.C., black schools were severely overcrowded, often running double and triple schedules in order to accommodate the students, whereas white schools were half empty as a result of white flight to the suburbs. In September 1950, Gardner Bishop, a local barber and activist, led a group of 11 children and their parents to all-white John Philip Sousa Junior High in an attempt to enroll the children. After the children were denied enrollment, suit was filed against C. Melvin Sharpe, president of the board of education, in a case known as Bolling v. Sharpe.

After being denied the relief requested by various federal district courts, these cases reached the United States Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the cases of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Va., and Gebhardt v. Belton. In these cases, the arguments focused on whether the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprived black children of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. Since Bolling v. Sharpe dealt with the District of Columbia rather than a state, the argument in that case focused on whether segregation of the public schools of Washington D.C. violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

In December 1952, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in these cases. In an unusual move, the Court requested time for additional oral arguments, which were held in December 1953. In May 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous decisions of the Court in both Brown and Bolling. In Brown, the Court found that segregation in public education had a detrimental effect on minority children because it was interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. This unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation.

In Bolling, the Court found that racial discrimination in the Washington, D.C. public schools denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Due to the legal peculiarities of the District of Columbia, Chief Justice Warren noted that the Fifth Amendment did not contain an equal protection clause while the Fourteenth Amendment, which was the basis of the decision in Brown, did contain one. Lacking an equal protection standard on which to base the invalidation of the District's segregation, Warren relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" to find the segregation of the Washington D.C. schools unconstitutional.

In May 1955, the Supreme Court issued an enforcement decree applicable to both Brown and Bolling, commonly known as Brown II. The Court held that the problems identified in Brown and Bolling required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in the Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

View Cases:

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ​

Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)

Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)

• Docket Sheet
• Bench Memorandum
• Draft of per curium opinion concerning State of Kansas' failure to defend
• Memorandum from Justice Frankfurter regarding The Segregation Cases
• Memorandum from Justice Frankfurter to court discussing case
• Segregation Research Report prepared by law clerks
• Justice Clark's handwritten notes from oral argument
• Law clerk's recommendations for segregation decree
• Sheet with oral argument schedule and notation of briefs filed with the court
• About Brown v. Board of Education Brown Foundation
• Brown v. Board at Fifty: "With an Even Hand" Library of Congress
• Brown v. Board of Education University of Michigan Library Digital Archive more... less... Oral Arguments in Bro​wn I
• Brown v. Board of Education National Historic Site National Park Service
• Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Encyclopaedia Britannica
• Brown v Topeka Board of Ed. Famous Trials, by Professor Douglas O. Linder
• Case Profile: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka University of Michigan Law School, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse
• Documents Related to Brown v. Board of Education National Archives more... less... Biographies of Key Figures Brown v. Board of Education Timeline Order of Argument in the Case, Brown v. Board of Education
• Federal Records Pertaining to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) National Archives
• Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
• Brown v. Board of Education C-SPAN, Landmark Cases: 12 Historic Supreme Court Decisions
• Looking Back: Brown v. Board of Education National Public Radio

Journal Articles

• "Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement" by Michael J. Klarman Virginia Law Review 80, no. 1 (1994): 7–150. more... less... Link is to HeinOnline (login required). Also available in print at the Tarlton Law Library .
• "Brown II: A Case of Missed Opportunity?" by Trina Jones Law & Inequality 24, no. 1 (2006): 9–30.
• "Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs" by James E. Pfander Law & Inequality 24, no. 1 (2006): 47–80.
• "Brown v. Board of Education: A Selected Annotated Bibliography" by William H. Manz Law Library Journal 96, no. 2 (2004): 245–266.
• "Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown" by Reva B. Siegel Harvard Law Review 117, no. 5 (2004): 1470–1547.
• "Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education" by John David Fassett et al. St. John's Law Review 78, no. 3 (2004): 515–567.
• "Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education II" by Gordon B. Davidson, Daniel J. Meador, Earl E. Pollock, and E. Barrett Prettyman Jr. St. John's Law Review 79, no. 3 (2005): 823–885.
• "Tangled Up in Brown" by Allan Ides Howard Law Journal 47, no. 1 (2004): 3–28. more... less... Link is to HeinOnline (login required). Also available in print at the Tarlton Law Library .
• "Was Brown's Declaration of Per Se Invalidity Really Out of the Blue? The Evolving 'Separate But Equal' Education Jurisprudence from Cumming to Brown" by Mark Strasser Howard Law Journal 47, no. 3 (2004): 769–794. more... less... Link is to HeinOnline (login required). Also available in print at the Tarlton Law Library .
• "What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education" by Mark Tushnet and Katya Lezin Columbia Law Review 91, no. 8 (1991): 1867–1930. more... less... Link is to HeinOnline (login required). Also available in print at the Tarlton Law Library .
• << Previous: Sweatt v. Painter (1950)
• Next: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) >>
• Last Updated: Feb 20, 2024 12:48 PM
• URL: https://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/clark

• History & Society
• Science & Tech
• Biographies
• Animals & Nature
• Geography & Travel
• Arts & Culture
• Games & Quizzes
• On This Day
• One Good Fact
• New Articles
• Lifestyles & Social Issues
• Philosophy & Religion
• Politics, Law & Government
• World History
• Health & Medicine
• Browse Biographies
• Birds, Reptiles & Other Vertebrates
• Bugs, Mollusks & Other Invertebrates
• Environment
• Fossils & Geologic Time
• Entertainment & Pop Culture
• Sports & Recreation
• Visual Arts
• Demystified
• Image Galleries
• Infographics
• Top Questions
• Britannica Kids
• Saving Earth
• Space Next 50
• Student Center
• Introduction & Top Questions

Background and case

What is the significance of Brown v. Board of Education ?

What was the aftermath of brown v. board of education .

• When did the American civil rights movement start?

Brown v. Board of Education

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

• Constitution Center - Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
• United States Court - History - Brown v. Board of Education Re-enactment
• National Archives - Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
• Ohio State University - Origins - The Long-Term Legacies of Brown v. Board
• Public Broadcasting Service - American Experience - Brown v. Board of Education
• BlackPast - Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
• Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
• Table Of Contents

What did the Supreme Court decide in Brown v. Board of Education ?

In Brown v. Board of Education , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that racial segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The 1954 decision declared that separate educational facilities for white and African American students were inherently unequal.

Brown v. Board of Education is considered a milestone in American civil rights history and among the most important rulings in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. The case, and the efforts to undermine the Court's decision, brought greater awareness to the racial inequalities that African Americans faced. The case also galvanized civil rights activists and increased efforts to end institutionalized racism throughout American society.

After the Brown v. Board of Education decision, there was wide opposition to desegregation, largely in the southern states. Violent protests erupted in some places, and others responded by implementing “school-choice” programs that subsidized white students’ attendance at private, segregated academies , which were not covered by the Brown ruling.

When was Brown v. Board of Education decided?

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown v. Board of Education on May 17, 1954. The case had been argued before the Court on December 9, 1952, and reargued on December 8, 1953.

Who was the attorney for the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education ?

In Brown v. Board of Education , the attorney for the plaintiffs was Thurgood Marshall . He later became, in 1967, the first African American to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Brown v. Board of Education , case in which, on May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously (9–0) that racial segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution , which prohibits the states from denying equal protection of the laws to any person within their jurisdictions. The decision declared that separate educational facilities for white and African American students were inherently unequal. It thus rejected as inapplicable to public education the “ separate but equal ” doctrine, advanced by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), according to which laws mandating separate public facilities for whites and African Americans do not violate the equal protection clause if the facilities are approximately equal. Although the 1954 decision strictly applied only to public schools, it implied that segregation was not permissible in other public facilities. Considered one of the most important rulings in the Court’s history, Brown v. Board of Education helped inspire the American civil rights movement of the late 1950s and ’60s.

In the late 1940s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began a concentrated effort to challenge the segregated school systems in various states, including Kansas. There, in Topeka , the NAACP encouraged a number of African American parents to try to enroll their children in all-white schools. All of the parents’ requests were refused, including that of Oliver Brown. He was told that his daughter could not attend the nearby white school and instead would have to enroll in an African American school far from her home. The NAACP subsequently filed a class-action lawsuit. While it claimed that the education (including facilities, teachers, etc.) offered to African Americans was inferior to that offered to whites, the NAACP’s main argument was that segregation by its nature was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. A U.S. district court heard Brown v. Board of Education in 1951, and it ruled against the plaintiffs. While sympathetic to some of the plaintiffs’ claims, it determined that the schools were similar, and it cited the precedent set by Plessy and Gong Lum v. Rice (1927), which upheld the segregation of Asian Americans in grade schools. The NAACP then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In October 1952 the Court consolidated Brown with three other class-action school-segregation lawsuits filed by the NAACP: Briggs v. Elliott (1951) in South Carolina , Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (1952) in Virginia , and Gebhart v. Belton (1952) in Delaware; there was also a fifth case that was filed independently in the District of Columbia , Bolling v. Sharpe (1951). As with Brown , U.S. district courts had decided against the plaintiffs in Briggs and Davis , ruling on the basis of Plessy that they had not been deprived of equal protection because the schools they attended were comparable to the all-white schools or would become so upon the completion of improvements ordered by the district court. In Gebhart , however, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that the original plaintiffs’ right to equal protection had been violated because the African American schools were inferior to the white schools in almost all relevant respects. In Bolling v. Sharpe (1951), a U.S. district court held that school segregation did not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (the equal protection clause was not relevant since the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to states). The plaintiffs in Brown , Biggs , and Davis appealed directly to the Supreme Court, while those in Gebhart and Bolling were each granted certiorari (a writ for the reexamination of an action of a lower court).

Brown v. Board of Education was argued on December 9, 1952. The attorney for the plaintiffs was Thurgood Marshall , who later became the first African American to serve on the Supreme Court (1967–91). The case was reargued on December 8, 1953, to address the question of whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have understood it to be inconsistent with racial segregation in public education. The 1954 decision found that the historical evidence bearing on the issue was inconclusive.

LSD+ gives you access to over 50,000 case briefs, more than anyone else. Start your free 14-day trial today. Read as much content as you want during your trial, and you can cancel any time and keep access for the full 14 days.

Supreme Court of the United States - 349 U.S. 249, 349 U.S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 2d 1083, 75 S. Ct. 753, 1955 U.S. LEXIS 734, SCDB 1954-085

Contributed by Pilea

Integration of segregated public schools must proceed with "all deliberate speed"

What are the specific remedies to implement school desegregation?

Remand the case to local courts to allow remedies/desegregation to proceed with all deliberate speed.

LSD+ exclusive

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.

Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum

• Arguments over the specific remedies that would implement school desegregation were postponed until the 1954 term arguments. (CJ Warren wanted to unite the Court behind a single opinion)
• (despite this case, integration of the public schools did not meaningfully accelerate until after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which conditioned receipt of federal funds for education on states’ compliance with desegregation)
• Hey! This is the holding for Pennoyer v. Neff. It probably isn't the holding for the brief you're looking at. Join LSD+ for full access.
• A named property within the court's jurisdiction is attached to satisfy an unrelated claim, despite the owner of said property being a non-resident of the state.
• A named property within the court's jurisdiction is attached as the basis for the suit (e.g., to quiet title), despite the owner of said property being a non-resident of the state.
• An individual is sued who is a resident of the state, or who has been served with process while physically located within the state.
• jurisdiction - Neff is neither a resident, nor was served while within the state. Service by publication may be valid for an
• proceeding, where the owner would be made aware of the suit due to their property being seized, but not for
• jurisdiction - the action was on the basis of a suit to receive payment owed, and did not relate directly to a property within the state.
• jurisdiction, as the Oregon property was not attached to the initial suit, but rather was added in after the suit happened - note that Neff did not even purchase the property until after the suit had concluded.
• Accordingly, the Oregon court did not have jurisdiction over the initial suit between Neff and his lawyer.
• Enforcement of a judgment without jurisdiction denies due process!
• Additionally, although judgments rendered by other states are entitled to full faith and credit, if that state did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment, it loses such entitlement.
• Short Summary
• Slide right/left for more/less details
• Full Case Text

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. . Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum

Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, . Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat

Energize your law school studying with LSD+ for only $19 per month. Join over 40,000 applicants who have used LSD to crush admissions and empower yourself to crush 1L and beyond. With LSD+, you’ll get immediate access to many nice things including:

• Full-access to over 50,000 case briefs
• LSD’s DeepDive tool to read the case at different levels of summarization
• Highlight-to-define to get easy to understand definitions in real time as you study
• Social learning with LSD community case high points
• Instantly brief over 6,000,000 cases with LSD’s cutting edge AI briefing tool
• 14-day free trial
• Data download

Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)

Help us make lsd better.

BlackPast is dedicated to providing a global audience with reliable and accurate information on the history of African America and of people of African ancestry around the world. We aim to promote greater understanding through this knowledge to generate constructive change in our society.

(1955) brown v. board of education ii.

May 31, 1955, Opinion and judgments announced

OPINION:  MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1] [2] These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date, n1 declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. There remains for consideration the manner in which relief is to be accorded.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

n1 347 U.S. 483; 347 U.S. 497. – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Because these cases arose under different local conditions and their disposition will involve a variety of local problems, we requested further argument on the question of relief. n2 In view of the nationwide importance of the decision, we invited the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education to present their views on that question. The parties, the United States, and the States of Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs and participated in the oral argument.

n2 Further argument was requested on the following questions, 347 U.S. 483, 495-496, n. 13, previously propounded by the Court:

“4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment

“(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or

“(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?

“5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b),

“(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;

“(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;

“(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;

“(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?” – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –

These presentations were informative and helpful to the Court in its consideration of the complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination. The presentations also demonstrated that substantial steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken, not only in some of the communities in which these cases arose, but in some of the states appearing as amici curiae, and in other states as well. Substantial progress has been made in the District of Columbia and in the communities in Kansas and Delaware involved in this litigation. The defendants in the cases coming to us from South Carolina and Virginia are awaiting the decision of this Court concerning relief.

[3] [4] Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts. n3

n3 The cases coming to us from Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia were originally heard by three-judge District Courts convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. These cases will accordingly be remanded to those three-judge courts. See Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350. – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – [5] [6] [7] In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies n4 and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. n5 These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.

n4 See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239.

n5 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330. – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –

[8] [9] [10] While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.

The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case — ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children — is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, opinion, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem necessary in light of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Do you find this information helpful? A small donation would help us keep this available to all. Forego a bottle of soda and donate its cost to us for the information you just learned, and feel good about helping to make it available to everyone.

BlackPast.org is a 501(c)(3) non-profit and our EIN is 26-1625373. Your donation is fully tax-deductible.

Cite this entry in APA format:

Source of the author's information:.

Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, May 31, 1955

Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. board of education case brief.

Brown v. Board of Education: Annotated

The 1954 Supreme Court decision, based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, declared that “separate but equal” has no place in education.

The US Supreme Court’s decision in the case known colloquially as Brown v. Board of Education found that the “[t]he ‘separate but equal ’ doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 US 537, has no place in the field of public education.” The Plessy case, decided in 1896, had found that the segregation laws which created “separate but equal” accommodations for Black Americans, specific to transportation but applicable generally, were not a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. Segregation in education had been challenged throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and rulings in a number coalesced to propel Brown to the level of the Supreme Court to address segregation in all public schools.

Weekly Newsletter

Get your fix of JSTOR Daily’s best stories in your inbox each Thursday.

Privacy Policy   Contact Us You may unsubscribe at any time by clicking on the provided link on any marketing message.

Below is an annotation of the opinion, with relevant scholarship covering the legal, social and education history leading up to and after the decision. As always, the supporting research is free to read and download.

The red J indicates free access to the linked research on JSTOR . ____________________________________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954) (USSC+)

Argued December 9, 1952

Reargued December 8, 1953

Decided May 17, 1954

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS*

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment —even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.

(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education.

(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.

(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities , even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal.

(e) The “separate but equal” doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 US 537, has no place in the field of public education.

(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 US 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case , the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment’s history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold . Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of “separate but equal” did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson , supra, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education , 175 US 528 , and Gong Lum v. Rice , 275 US 78 , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada , 305 US 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma , 332 US 631; Sweatt v. Painter , 339 US 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents , 339 US 637 . In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter , supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter , there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship . Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race , even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter , supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.” In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents , supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: “…his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.” Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law , for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system .

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson , this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal . Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity . On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question—the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.

It is so ordered.

* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. , on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9–10, 1952, reargued December 7–8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al. , on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7–8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al. , on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

[Transcript available from the National Archives: https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/brown-v-board-of-education ]

Support JSTOR Daily! Join our new membership program on Patreon today.

JSTOR is a digital library for scholars, researchers, and students. JSTOR Daily readers can access the original research behind our articles for free on JSTOR.

Get Our Newsletter

More stories.

• Voting in American Politics: A Syllabus

• Preserving History at the Digital Transgender Archive with Portico

• Genesis of the Modern American Right

How a Rice Economy Toppled the Shogun

Recent posts.

• How Pentecostalism Shaped Rock ’n’ Roll
• Raccoons in the Laboratory

Support JSTOR Daily

Sign up for our weekly newsletter.

You are using an outdated browser no longer supported by Oyez. Please upgrade your browser to improve your experience.

Library of Congress

Exhibitions.

• Ask a Librarian
• Digital Collections
• Library Catalogs

• Exhibitions Home
• Current Exhibitions
• All Exhibitions
• Loan Procedures for Institutions
• Special Presentations

Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand” Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas

Three lawyers confer at the Supreme Court, 1953. Gelatin silver print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (98)

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its legal offspring, the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, developed a systematic attack against the doctrine of “separate but equal.” The campaign started at the graduate and professional educational levels. The attack culminated in five separate cases gathered together under the name of one of them— Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.

Kenneth B. Clark's “Doll Test” Notebook

During the 1940s, psychologists Kenneth Bancroft Clark and his wife, Mamie Phipps Clark designed a test to study the psychological effects of segregation on black children. In 1950 Kenneth Clark wrote a paper for the White House Mid-Century Conference on Children and Youth summarizing this research and related work that attracted the attention of Robert Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Carter believed that Clark's findings could be effectively used in court to show that segregation damaged the personality development of black children. On Carter's recommendation, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund engaged Clark to provide expert social science testimony in the Briggs , Davis , and Delaware cases. Clark also co-authored a summation of the social science testimony delivered during the trials that was endorsed by thirty-five leading social scientists. The Supreme Court specifically cited Clark's 1950 paper in the Brown decision.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Notebook recording data concerning the “Doll Test,” 1940–1941. Kenneth B. Clark Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (61)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#objobj61

Dr. Kenneth Clark Conducting the “Doll Test”

In the “doll test,” psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark used four plastic, diaper-clad dolls, identical except for color. They showed the dolls to black children between the ages of three and seven and asked them questions to determine racial perception and preference. Almost all of the children readily identified the race of the dolls. However, when asked which they preferred, the majority selected the white doll and attributed positive characteristics to it. The Clarks also gave the children outline drawings of a boy and girl and asked them to color the figures the same color as themselves. Many of the children with dark complexions colored the figures with a white or yellow crayon. The Clarks concluded that “prejudice, discrimination, and segregation” caused black children to develop a sense of inferiority and self-hatred. This photograph was taken by Gordon Parks for a 1947 issue of Ebony magazine.

Gordon Parks, photographer. Dr. Kenneth Clark conducting the “Doll Test” with a young male child , 1947. Gelatin silver print. Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (62)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj62

Reading Lesson in Washington, D.C.

As the nation's capital became more and more populated by blacks in the first half of the twentieth century, the schools in District of Columbia became more segregated. During World War II, there was no new construction of schools and the few that existed were extremely overcrowded. After the war, new construction started but did not meet the needs of the District's populace. Many black students were attending schools in shifts while many of the white schools sat nearly empty. This condition eventually led to the Bolling v. Sharpe case, one of the five included in the Brown v. Board of Education decision.

Marjory Collins. Reading lesson in African American elementary school in Washington, D.C. , 1942. Gelatin silver print. FSA-OWI Photograph Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (57C)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj57C

Kenneth B. Clark's “Doll Test” Data Sheet

The Clarks used printed data sheets to record the children's responses during the “doll test,” as well as general observations. This data sheet lists the nine questions that were routinely asked. The letters “B” and “W” denote “black” and “white.” The abbreviations “LB” and “DB” denote “light brown” and “dark brown” complexions. The data reveals that Mark A., a black boy age four with a dark brown complexion, prefers the white doll and selects the white doll as the one that looks like him.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Sample Doll Test data sheet, n.d. Kenneth B. Clark Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (64)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj64

Briggs v . Elliott (South Carolina)

In 1949, the state NAACP in South Carolina sought twenty local residents in Clarendon County to sign a petition for equal education. The petition turned into a lawsuit and first name on the list was Harry Briggs. In preparation for the Briggs case, attorney Robert Carter returned to Columbia University to confer with Psychologist Otto Klineberg, who was known for his research on black students' IQ scores. He sought Klineberg's advice on the use of social science testimony in the pending trial to show the psychological damage segregation caused in black children. Klineberg recommended Kenneth Clark. Clark became the Legal Defense Fund's principal expert witness. He also agreed to assist the Legal Defense Fund 's lawyers in the preparation of briefs and recruit other prominent social scientists to testify. This document records the depositions of two expert witnesses who participated in Briggs v . Elliott : David Krech, a social psychology professor at the University of California; and Helen Trager, a lecturer at Vassar College.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial of Clarendon County School Case Direct Examination by Robert L. Carter , May 29, 1951. Transcript. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (57)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj57

Bolling v. Sharpe, (Washington D.C.)

Spottswood Thomas Bolling v. C. Melvin Sharpe, was one of the five school desegregation cases that comprised Brown . Because the District of Columbia was not a state but federal territory, the Fourteenth Amendment arguments used in the other cases did not apply. Therefore, the lawyers argued for “Due Process Clause” of the Fifth Amendment, which guaranteed equal protection of the law. The Consolidated Parents Group initiated a boycott of the black High School in Washington. D.C., which was overcrowded and dilapidated. In 1948, Charles H. Houston was hired to represent them in a law suit to make black schools more equal to white schools when Houston's health began to fail. He recommended James Nabrit as his replacement. Nabrit was joined by fellow attorney, George E. C. Hayes in presenting arguments for the District of Columbia case.

U. S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1954 Term. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Law Library , Library of Congress (57B)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj57B

Brief of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs in Brown

In June 1950, shortly after the Sweatt , McLaurin , and Henderson victories, Thurgood Marshall convened a conference of the NAACP's board of directors and affiliated attorneys to determine the next step in the legal campaign. After several days of debate, Marshall decided to shift the focus from the inequality of separate black schools to a full assault on segregation. The NAACP immediately instituted lawsuits concerning segregated public schools in Southern and border states. Brown v. Board of Education was filed in the U.S. District Court in Topeka, Kansas, in February 1951 and litigated concurrently with Briggs v. Elliot in South Carolina. Oliver Brown, one of thirteen plaintiffs, had agreed to participate on behalf of his seven-year-old daughter Linda, who had to walk six blocks to board a school bus that drove her to the all-black Monroe School a mile away.

Brief of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs (Charles E. Bledsoe, Charles Scott, Robert L. Carter, Jack Greenberg, and Thurgood Marshall) in the case of Oliver Brown, . . .delivered in the United States Court for the District of Kansas , June 1951. Brief of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs (Charles E. Bledsoe, Charles Scott, Robert L. Carter, Jack Greenberg, and Thurgood Marshall) in the case of Oliver Brown, . . .delivered in the United States Court for the District of Kansas, June 1951. Page 2. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (54) Courtesy of the NAACP //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/images/br0054p2s.jpg

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj54

Finding of Fact for the Case of Oliver Brown

On June 25, 1951, Robert Carter and Jack Greenberg argued the Brown case before a three judge panel in district court in Kansas. They were assisted by local NAACP attorneys Charles Bledsoe and brothers John and Charles Scott. As in Briggs , the testimony of social scientists was central to the case. The Court found “no willful, intentional or substantial discrimination” in Topeka's schools. However, presiding Judge Walter A. Huxman appended nine “Findings of Fact” to the opinion. Fact VIII endorsed the psychological premise that segregation had a detrimental effect on black children. This was the windfall the NAACP needed to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Briggs and Brown were the first cases to reach the Court; three others followed. The Court decided to bundle all five cases and scheduled a hearing for December 9, 1952.

Opinion and Finding of Fact for the case of Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of Education Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al. Delivered in the United States Court for the District of Kansas , 1951. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (55) Courtesy of the NAACP

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj55

Gebhart v. Belton; Gebhart v. Bulah (Delaware)

In 1950 Louis Redding filed a lawsuit on behalf of Sarah Bulah to admit her daughter Shirley to a nearby white elementary school, after the Delaware Board of Education refused to allow her to board an all-white school bus that drove pass their home. In 1951, Redding filed a second suit on behalf of Ethel Belton and nine other plaintiffs, whose children were barred from attending the all-white high school in their community. That fall, Thurgood Marshall sent Jack Greenberg to Wilmington to work with Redding on the litigation. Greenberg drafted this meticulous trial memorandum the week before the hearing. In it he provides a schedule of witnesses, instructions on deposing the witnesses, and the questions to be posed. Among the witnesses listed are psychologists Kenneth Clark and Otto Klineberg.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Trial Memorandum from Jack Greenberg concerning the Wilmington school case, October 11, 1951. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (58)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj58

A Court Rules: Equalization, Not Integration

Spurred by a student strike, blacks in Prince Edward County, Virginia, called a lower federal court's attention to the demonstrably unequal facilities in the county's segregated high schools. As this “Final Decree” in Davis v. County School Board shows, they convinced the U.S. District Court that facilities for blacks were “not substantially equal” to those for whites. The Court ordered the two systems to be made equal. However, it did not abolish segregation. Therefore, the plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court heard their case along with Brown v. Board .

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Final Decree, [1952]. Typed memorandum. Kenneth Clark Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (59)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj59

Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Board , 1953

The Supreme Court did not render a judgement after the initial oral arguments in Brown v. Board . Instead, the Court submitted a list of five questions for counsel to discuss at a rehearing that convened on December 7, 1953. The questions pertained to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the relation between the views of the Amendment framers' intent to “abolish segregation in public schools.” The questions also addressed what remedies to be used in the event the Court ruled segregation in public schools unconstitutional. After assessing the questions, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund assembled a team of experts, including John A. Davis, a professor of political science at Lincoln University, Mabel Smythe, an economist, and psychologist Kenneth Clark, and scholars John Hope Franklin, C. Vann Woodward, and Horace Mann Bond, to conduct research during the summer.

Brief for Appellants in the cases of Brown v. Board of Education: Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of Education, Kansas et al.; . . . in the United States Supreme Court-October Term, 1953 . Washington: GPO, 1953. Pamphlet. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (73) Courtesy of the NAACP

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj73

Eisenhower and Davis

As President (1953–1961), Dwight David Eisenhower took decisive action to enforce court rulings eliminating racial segregation. He would not, however, endorse the Brown decision or condemn segregation as morally wrong. John W. Davis, who had been the Democratic Party's unsuccessful candidate for president in 1924, was the lead counsel in the South's effort to uphold the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine of “separate but equal” in arguments before the Supreme Court in 1953. The two men are shown meeting in New York in October 1952, shortly before Davis would endorse Eisenhower for president. Thurgood Marshall in later years would say of Davis, “He was a good man . . . who believed segregation was a good thing.”

Ike with John W. Davis at the Herald Trib Forum 10/21 , 1952. Photograph. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (73A)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj73A

Waiting for Courtroom Seats

This photograph shows interested members of the public waiting in line outside the Supreme Court for a chance to obtain one of the 50 seats allotted to hear the second round of arguments in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case. The case involved four states (Kansas, Virginia, Delaware and South Carolina) and the District of Columbia. Among an impressive array of legal representation for the plaintiffs was Thurgood Marshall serving as chief council for the NAACP. The opposing side was led by John W. Davis, one time Democratic presidential candidate and expert on constitutional law.

Waiting for courtroom seats , 1953. Gelatin silver print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (74) Digital ID# cph 3c13498

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj74

Three Lawyers Confer at the Supreme Court

In preparation for the Brown court case the three lead lawyers gathered to discuss their final strategy. Pictured ( left to right )are Harold P. Boulware, ( Briggs case), Thurgood Marshall, ( Briggs case), and Spottswood W. Robinson III ( Davis case). The lawyers said that the Brown case hoped to end the “separate but equal” doctrine of the earlier Plessy decision and make it illegal to continue segregation in public schools.

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj98

The Warren Court

Pictured in this photograph are nine members of the Supreme Court that decided Brown v. Board of Education . Seated in the front row ( from left ) Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, Earl Warren, Stanley Reed, and William O. Douglas. In the back row are Tom Clark, Robert H. Jackson, Harold Burton, Sherman Minton. The photograph was taken late in 1953, after President Dwight D. Eisenhower had nominated Warren to the Court, but before the U.S. Senate had confirmed him as Chief Justice.

U. S. Supreme Court Justices , 1953. Photograph. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (102)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj102

Brown Attorneys After the Decision

Three lawyers, Thurgood Marshall ( center ), chief counsel for the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund and lead attorney on the Briggs case, with George E. C. Hayes ( left ) and James M. Nabrit ( right ), attorneys for Bolling case, standing on the steps of the Supreme Court congratulating each other after the court ruling that segregation was unconstitutional.

George E. C. Hayes, Thurgood Marshall, and James M. Nabrit congratulating each other , 1954. Gelatin silver print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (99) [Dig ID # cph 3c11236]

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj99

“Segregation in Schools is Outlawed”

The case that gave the Brown v. Board of Education decision its name originated in a Federal District Court in Topeka, Kansas. The Russell Daily News , serving the city and county of Russell, Kansas, announced the decision with a banner headline and two front page stories. On the day of the decision, this evening newspaper carried United Press reports from Washington, D.C., and from Topeka, along with the ruling and the Kansas Attorney General's statement of intention to comply.

The Russell Daily News (Russell, Kansas), Monday, May 17, 1954. Historic Events Newspaper Collection, Serial and Government Publications Division , Library of Congress (84)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj84

Humiliation and Inferiority

William T. Coleman assisted Thurgood Marshall with the planning and execution of the Brown litigation. Member of the NAACP Legal Committee, Coleman's stellar academic record at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law School paved his way to the Supreme Court, where he became the first African American clerk in 1948. Coleman wrote this memorandum for Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1949. Agreeing with Coleman's contention that segregation was unconstitutional because it was an humiliating sign of inferiority, Frankfurter commented: “That it is such has been candidly acknowledged by numerous accounts & adjudications in those States where segregation is enforced. Only self conscious superiority or inability to slip into the other fellow's skin can fail to appreciate that.”

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj48

Warren Works For Unanimity

Realizing that overturning school segregation in the South might entail a degree of social upheaval, Chief Justice Warren carefully engineered a unanimous vote, one without dissents or separate concurring opinions. Assigning the two opinions—one for state schools, one for federal—to himself, he circulated two draft memoranda with opinions to his colleagues. He proposed to put off the tricky question of implementation until later. He also set forth his idea that “opinions should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory.”

Earl Warren to members of the Court, May 7, 1954. Typed memorandum. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (80)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj80

“A Beautiful Job”

Early in May 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren circulated draft opinions for the school desegregation cases to his colleagues on the Court. Associate Justice William O. Douglas responded enthusiastically in this handwritten note: “I do not think I would change a single word in the memoranda you gave me this morning. The two draft opinions meet my idea exactly. You have done a beautiful job.”

William Douglas to Earl Warren, May 11, 1954. Holograph letter. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (81A)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj81A

“A Great Day for America”

Associate Justice Harold H. Burton sent this note to Chief Justice Earl Warren on the day that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board was announced. He said, “Today I believe has been a great day for America and the Court. . . . I cherish the privilege of sharing in this.” In a tribute to Warren's judicial statesmanship, Burton added, “To you goes the credit for the character of the opinions which produced the all important unanimity. Congratulations.”

Harold H. Burton to Earl Warren, May 17, 1954. Holograph letter. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (82)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj82

Frankfurter's Congratulations to Warren

Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, who had worked to achieve a definitive repudiation of segregation by the Supreme Court, sent this note to Chief Justice Warren on the day that the decision in Brown v. Board was publicly announced—a day that Frankfurter said would “live in glory.” Frankfurter added that the Court's role was also distinguished by “the course of deliberation which brought about the result.”

Felix Frankfurter to Earl Warren, May 17, 1954. Holograph letter. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (82B)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj82B

Warren's Reading Copy of the Brown Opinion, 1954

Chief Justice Earl Warren's reading copy of Brown is annotated in his hand. Warren announced the opinion in the names of each justice, an unprecedented occurrence. The drama was heightened by the widespread prediction that the Court would be divided on the issue. Warren reminded himself to emphasize the decision's unanimity with a marginal notation, “unanimously,” which departed from the printed reading copy to declare, “Therefore, we unanimously hold. . . .” In his memoirs, Warren recalled the moment with genuine warmth. “When the word 'unanimously' was spoken, a wave of emotion swept the room; no words or intentional movement, yet a distinct emotional manifestation that defies description.” “Unanimously” was not incorporated into the published version of the opinion, and thus exists only in this manuscript.

Earl Warren's reading copy of Brown opinion, May 17, 1954. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (83)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj83

Celebration of the Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court's decision on the Brown v. Board of Education case in 1954 marked a culmination in a plan the NAACP had put into action more than forty years earlier—the end to racial inequality. African American parents throughout the country like Mrs. Hunt, shown here, explained to their children why this was an important moment in history.

Mrs. Nettie Hunt and daughter Nikie on the steps of the Supreme Court, 1954 . Gelatin silver print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (97) Digital ID # cph 3c27042

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj97

Segregation Ruling Explained to the Press

Chief counsel for the NAACP Thurgood Marshall spoke to the press in New York City on May 31 after the Supreme Court decreed an end to public school segregation as soon as feasible. At the news conference in New York City, Marshall told reporters “. . .the law had been made crystal clear” and added, “Southerners are just as law abiding as anyone else, once the law is made clear.” He was speaking after Brown II , the court's second opinion in the Brown case, which ordered the implementation of the original ruling in a “prompt and reasonable” start towards desegregation.

Thurgood Marshall explains segregation ruling to the press , 1955. Gelatin silver print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (104)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj104

Congratulatory Telegram on Brown Decision

The NAACP's affiliation with the philanthropic Stokes family began with J. G. Phelps Stokes, one of the organization's founders. At the time of the Brown decision, Anson Phelps Stokes was president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a charitable trust that sponsored black schools and educational projects. Stokes became familiar with the racial politics of the South through his work with the Tuskegee Institute. This telegram celebrates the consensus of the Southern justices and urges the NAACP to “heartily support the court decision postponing implementing orders so that these wonderful new[s] gains may be safe guarded with minimum disturbances in a difficult situation. . . .”

Anson Phelps Stokes to Channing Tobias, Chairman of the NAACP, offering congratulations on the NAACP's victory in Brown v. Board of Education . Telegram. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (96) Courtesy of the NAACP

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj96

Congratulatory Letter on the Brown Decision

William Patterson was an attorney and former Executive Secretary of the International Labor Defense (ILD), an organization dedicated to protecting the rights of racial minorities, political radicals, and the working class. In 1931, the ILD competed with the NAACP for the right to represent the “Scottsboro Boys,” nine black men convicted of raping two white women. The NAACP lost the bid because it lacked a full-time legal staff spurring Walter White, then head of the NAACP, to hire Charles H. Houston and set up a legal department. In this letter Patterson, head of the Civil Rights Congress, a leftist organization, attributes opposition to the Brown decision to “the demoralizing effect of segregated schools on white youth. It has made bigots out of millions who have not learned in their separate schools that there are no superior people.”

William L. Patterson, Executive Secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, to Walter White congratulating White on the NAACP's victory in Brown v. Board of Education , May 17, 1954. Typed letter. NAACP Records, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (95) Courtesy of the NAACP

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj95

An African American Response

The multi-faceted African American response to the decision was articulated throughout the black press and in editorials published in official publications of national black organizations. Founded in 1910, The Crisis magazine, shown here, is the official organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In response to the decision, a special issue of The Crisis was printed to include the complete text of the Supreme Court decision, a history of the five school cases, excerpts from the nation's press on segregation ruling, and the text of the “Atlanta Declaration,” the official NAACP response and program of action for implementing the decision.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. The Crisis magazine: A Record of the Darker Races. Volume 61, no. 6 (June–July, 1954). General Collections , Library of Congress (92)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj92

Conferring at the Supreme Court

In 1929 Louis L. Redding, a graduate of Brown University and Harvard Law School, became the first African American attorney in Delaware—the only one for more than twenty years. He devoted his practice to civil rights law and served as the counsel for the NAACP Delaware branch. In 1949 Redding won the landmark Parker case, which resulted in the desegregation of the University of Delaware. In1951, Redding and Greenberg tried two cases in Delaware's Chancery Court: Bulah v. Gebhart and Belton v. Gebhart, which respectively concerned elementary school and high school. On April 1, 1952, Judge Collins Seitz ordered the immediate admission of black students to Delaware's white public schools, but the local state-run-school board appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj111

Frankfurter's Draft Decree in Brown II , 1955

After the Brown opinion was announced, the Court heard additional arguments during the following term on the decree for implementing the ruling. In a draft, prepared by Felix Frankfurter, which Warren subsequently adopted, Frankfurter inserted “with all deliberate speed” in place of “forthwith,” which Thurgood Marshall had suggested to achieve an accelerated desegregation timetable. Frankfurter wanted to anchor the decree in an established doctrine, and his endorsement of it sought to advance a consensus held by the entire court. The justices thought that the decree should provide for flexible enforcement, appeal to established principles, and suggest some basic ground rules for judges of the lower courts. When it became clear that opponents of desegregation were using the doctrine to delay and avoid compliance with Brown , the Court began to express reservations about the phrase.

Felix Frankfurter's draft decree in Brown II, April 8, 1955. //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/images/br0107p2s.jpg

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj107

Topeka School Map

In response to requests from two Justices during the oral arguments of the implementation phase of Brown v. Board , Kansas Attorney General Harold Fatzer provided the Court with this map of the Topeka public school districts along with 1956 enrollment estimates by race. Although almost all of the schools shown were either overwhelmingly white or completely black, Fatzer argued that Topeka had not deliberately gerrymandered the districts so as to concentrate black pupils into a few districts. Also shown is a key to the map, representing the placement of students in the districts.

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Raymond F. Tilzey. The Elementary School District Boundaries for the City of Topeka 1955–1956 . Printed Map. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (109)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj109

Southern White Liberal Reaction

Many white Southern liberals welcomed the moderate and incremental approach of the Brown implementation decree. Ralph McGill, the influential editor of the Atlanta Constitution , wrote in praise of the Court's decision to have local school boards, in conjunction with Southern court judges, formulate and execute desegregation orders. Certain that “the problem of desegregation had to be solved at the local level,” he told Chief Justice Warren that the Court's ruling was “one of the great statesman-like decisions of all time,” exceeding all previous decisions “in wisdom and clarity.”

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Ralph McGill to Earl Warren, June 1, 1955. Typed letter. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (113A)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj113A

Adverse Reactions to Brown

Challenges to legal and social institutions implicit in the Brown decision led to adverse reactions in both Northern and Southern states. U.S. Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff forwarded to Chief Justice Warren this letter from an official of the New York chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution. The official attributed the impetus behind the Court's action to “the worldwide Communist conspiracy” and claimed that the NAACP had been financed by “a Communist front.”

The Library of Congress does not have permission to show this image online. Lee Hagood to Simon Sobeloff, September 29, 1955. Typed letter. Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (116A)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj116A

Thurgood Marshall

After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on May 17, 1954, and May 31, 1955, desegregating schools, Thurgood Marshall (1908–1994), was featured on the cover of Time magazine, on September 19, 1955. Born in Baltimore, Maryland, Marshall graduated with honors from Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. His exclusion from the University of Maryland's Law School due to racial discrimination, marked a turning point in his life. As a result, he attended the Howard University Law School, and graduated first in his class in 1933. Early in his career he traveled throughout the South and argued thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court, winning twenty-nine. Charles H. Houston persuaded him to leave private law practice and join the NAACP legal staff in New York, where he remained from 1936 until 1961. In 1939, Marshall became the first director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Marshall as Solicitor General in 1965 and nominated him to a seat on the United States Supreme Court in 1967 from which he retired in 1991.

Time magazine, September 19, 1955. Cover. General Collections , Library of Congress (115) Courtesy of Time-Life Pictures, Getty Images

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj115

Barnard Elementary, Washington, D. C.

This image of an integrated classroom in the previously all white Barnard Elementary School in Washington, D.C., shows how the District's Board of Education attempted to act quickly to carry out the Supreme Court decision to integrate schools in the area. However, it did take longer for the junior and senior high schools to integrate.

Thomas J. O'Halloran. School integration, Barnard School, Washington, D.C. , 1955. Gelatin silver print. U.S. News & World Report Magazine Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (202)

Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html#obj202

Back to top

Connect with the Library

All ways to connect

Subscribe & Comment

• RSS & E-Mail

Download & Play

• iTunesU (external link)

About | Press | Jobs | Donate Inspector General | Legal | Accessibility | External Link Disclaimer | USA.gov

Brown v. Board of Education

• May 16, 1954

No related resources

Introduction

In various periods of U.S. history, governmentally sanctioned racial segregation in schools was common in both southern and northern states. The practice was subjected to increasingly serious challenges in the first half of the twentieth century as the NAACP, via the efforts of a group of attorneys trained by Charles Hamilton Houston and eventually led by Thurgood Marshall , won a string of antisegregation victories in a series of carefully crafted constitutional challenges. Those efforts culminated in the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas .

In deciding Brown , the Supreme Court consolidated four cases brought from four different states that raised the same constitutional question. In the lead case, plaintiff Oliver Brown filed suit as representative of a class of thirteen plaintiffs, parents of black children who had been prevented from enrolling in schools that district policy reserved for white students. Their contention was that the school districts’ racial segregation policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In one of the most significant rulings in its history, the Court unanimously agreed with the plaintiffs. The ruling aroused predictable controversy at the time (see Southern Manifesto ), but the Court’s decision to invalidate governmentally mandated racial segregation in public schools is now almost universally regarded as an exemplary act of judicial courage and justice. Even so, controversy persists concerning the unorthodox reasoning the Court presented in support of its conclusion, because the Court relied on questionable psychological studies rather than constitutional history, judicial precedent, or elemental principles of right.

Source: 347 U.S. 483 (1954); available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/483%26gt .

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN 1 delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson . 2 Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. . . .

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. . . .

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter , in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.” In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents , the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: “. . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.” 3

Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson , this finding is amply supported by modern authority. . . . 4

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .

• 1. Chief Justice Earl Warren (1891–1974).
• 2. Plessy v. Ferguson.
• 3. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). The decisions in these cases were announced on the same day.
• 4. In support of this claim, the Court cited in footnote 11 to its ruling various studies from social science fields, including, most controversially, the famous “doll” study by the psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, “Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development,” Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950.

Observations on Massive Retaliation

The justices’ view on brown v. board of education, see our list of programs.

Conversation-based seminars for collegial PD, one-day and multi-day seminars, graduate credit seminars (MA degree), online and in-person.

Check out our collection of primary source readers

Coming soon! World War I & the 1920s!

Milestone Documents

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Citation: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , Opinion; May 17, 1954; Records of the Supreme Court of the United States; Record Group 267; National Archives.

View All Pages in the National Archives Catalog

View Transcript

In this milestone decision, the Supreme Court ruled that separating children in public schools on the basis of race was unconstitutional. It signaled the end of legalized racial segregation in the schools of the United States, overruling the "separate but equal" principle set forth in the 1896  Plessy v. Ferguson  case.

On May 17, 1954, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous ruling in the landmark civil rights case  Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas . State-sanctioned segregation of public schools was a violation of the 14th amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. This historic decision marked the end of the "separate but equal" precedent set by the Supreme Court nearly 60 years earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson and served as a catalyst for the expanding civil rights movement during the decade of the 1950s.

Arguments were to be heard during the next term to determine just how the ruling would be imposed. Just over one year later, on May 31, 1955, Warren read the Court's unanimous decision, now referred to as Brown II , instructing the states to begin desegregation plans "with all deliberate speed."

Despite two unanimous decisions and careful, if vague, wording, there was considerable resistance to the Supreme Court's ruling in  Brown v. Board of Education . In addition to the obvious disapproving segregationists were some constitutional scholars who felt that the decision went against legal tradition by relying heavily on data supplied by social scientists rather than precedent or established law. Supporters of judicial restraint believed the Court had overstepped its constitutional powers by essentially writing new law.

However, minority groups and members of the civil rights movement were buoyed by the  Brown  decision even without specific directions for implementation. Proponents of judicial activism believed the Supreme Court had appropriately used its position to adapt the basis of the Constitution to address new problems in new times. The Warren Court stayed this course for the next 15 years, deciding cases that significantly affected not only race relations, but also the administration of criminal justice, the operation of the political process, and the separation of church and state.

Teach with this document.

Previous Document Next Document

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (USSC+)

Argued December 9, 1952

Reargued December 8, 1953

Decided May 17, 1954

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS*

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.

(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education.

(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.

(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal.

(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537, has no place in the field of public education.

(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson , supra, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education , 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice , 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada , 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma , 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents , 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter , supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter , there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter , supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents , supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson , this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.

It is so ordered.

* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. , on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al. , on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al. , on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

• Find a Lawyer
• Ask a Lawyer
• Research the Law
• Law Schools
• Laws & Regs
• Newsletters
• Justia Connect
• Pro Membership
• Basic Membership
• Justia Lawyer Directory
• Platinum Placements
• Gold Placements
• Justia Elevate
• Justia Amplify
• PPC Management
• Google Business Profile
• Social Media
• Justia Onward Blog

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)

The task of implementing programs to achieve desegregation in public schools belongs to the schools themselves.

After the Brown I decision, which ruled that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court sought an additional set of arguments on what remedies would be appropriate. This presented a notable challenge because the cases stemmed from many different regions of the U.S. with distinctive conditions and problems. The Court acknowledged that all of the federal, state, and local laws that condoned segregation must be altered.

• Earl Warren (Author)
• Hugo Lafayette Black
• Stanley Forman Reed
• Felix Frankfurter
• William Orville Douglas
• Tom C. Clark
• Sherman Minton
• Harold Hitz Burton
• John Marshall Harlan II

The courts that are most closely situated to local conditions are best equipped to consider whether the schools are acting in good faith when they are applying the constitutional mandate. Any further hearings can most easily be conducted in those courts, which should consider the need to reconcile public and private interests as well as the importance of practical flexibility in determining what remedies may be appropriate. In all areas, however, the school systems must start pursuing full racial integration promptly. The amount of time needed to achieve the goals of Brown I is unclear, and the time period may need to be extended, but the schools will be responsible for proving to the courts that an extension is needed and is compliant in good faith with the Constitution. Some of the practical issues that courts may need to take into account include facilities, transportation systems, changes to school district and local laws, and any proposals made by the school districts. During the shift toward integration, the courts will retain authority over the project. The lower courts must enter order orders that are consistent with this opinion and that further the goal of providing children access to public schools on a race-neutral basis.

The Supreme Court used this decision to delegate the responsibilities of implementing Brown I. Several decades later, many observers would argue that these efforts either failed or produced only short-term results that were eroded. White flight and other phenomena have led to the re-segregation of public schools in many areas, often in situations where there may be no discriminatory intent.

U.S. Supreme Court

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

Reargued on the question of relief April 11-14, 1955

Opinion and judgments announced May 31, 1955*

349 U.S. 294

1. Racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, 347 U. S. 347 U.S. 483, 347 U. S. 497 , and all provisions of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. P. 349 U. S. 298 .

2. The judgments below (except that in the Delaware case) are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. P. 349 U. S. 301 .

(a) School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving the varied local school problems which may require solution in fully implementing the governing constitutional principles. P. 349 U. S. 299 .

(b) Courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. P. 349 U. S. 299 .

(c) Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. P. 349 U. S. 299 .

(d) In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles -- characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping remedies and a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

Page 349 U. S. 295

(e) At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

(f) Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination in a systematic and effective manner of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles enunciated in 347 U. S. 347 U.S. 483, 347 U. S. 497 ; but the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

(g) While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with the ruling of this Court. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

(h) Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

(i) The burden rests on the defendants to establish that additional time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. P. 349 U. S. 300 .

(j) The courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. Pp. 349 U. S. 300 -301.

(k) The courts will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. P. 349 U. S. 301 .

(l) During the period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. P. 349 U. S. 301 .

3. The judgment in the Delaware case, ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children, is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated by this Court in its opinion, 347 U. S. 347 U.S. 483, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem necessary in the light of this opinion. P. 349 U. S. 301 .

98 F. Supp. 797 , 103 F. Supp. 920 , 103 F. Supp. 337 and judgment in No. 4, reversed and remanded.

91 A.2d 137 , affirmed and remanded.

Page 349 U. S. 298

• Opinions & Dissents
• Copy Citation

Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox!

• Bankruptcy Lawyers
• Business Lawyers
• Criminal Lawyers
• Employment Lawyers
• Estate Planning Lawyers
• Family Lawyers
• Personal Injury Lawyers
• Estate Planning
• Personal Injury
• Business Formation
• Business Operations
• Intellectual Property
• International Trade
• Real Estate
• Financial Aid
• Course Outlines
• Law Journals
• US Constitution
• Regulations
• Supreme Court
• Circuit Courts
• District Courts
• Dockets & Filings
• State Constitutions
• State Codes
• State Case Law
• Legal Blogs
• Business Forms
• Product Recalls
• Justia Connect Membership
• Justia Premium Placements
• Justia Elevate (SEO, Websites)
• Justia Amplify (PPC, GBP)
• Testimonials

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

PLUS: Hundreds of law school topic-related videos from The Understanding Law Video Lecture Series ™ :

Choose Your Subscription:

Purchase By Course

• INCLUDED Civil Procedure
• INCLUDED Constitutional Law
• INCLUDED Contracts Law
• INCLUDED Criminal Law
• INCLUDED Property Law
• INCLUDED Torts Law
• $67 Civil Procedure ( Learn More )
• $87 Constitutional Law ( Learn More )
• $67 Contract Law ( Learn More )
• $67 Criminal Law ( Learn More )
• $67 Property Law ( Learn More )
• $67 Torts Law ( Learn More )

Have an Account? Login! OR Register and Purchase Now!

Register and Subscribe Now

Please wait verifying...

• Forgot your password?

Add to Library

Brown v. Board of Education (I)

Brief fact summary., synopsis of rule of law., discussion..

Create New Group