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The International Security Program , the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy , the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy , and regional programs analyze the threats and opportunities shaping global security.

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A Threat Like No Other: Russia-North Korea Military Cooperation

The military relationship between Russia and North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine has grave implications for European, Indo-Pacific, and U.S. homeland security.

Commentary by Victor Cha — June 17, 2024

The Untapped Market for Impact Investing in Ukraine

Critical Questions by Kateryna Bondar — June 14, 2024

A Reimagined G7

Commentary by Victor Cha and John J. Hamre — June 14, 2024

Understanding the Growing Collaboration Between Russia and Iran

Transcript — June 12, 2024

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CSIS-DAPA 2024: The Potential for Expanding Defense Cooperation within the ROK-U.S. Alliance

Join the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group for CSIS-DAPA 2024: The Potential for Expanding Defense Cooperation within the ROK-U.S. Alliance which will feature keynotes from ROK DAPA Minister Seok, JongGun and U.S. ASA(ALT) Hon. Douglas R. Bush.

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The State of Russia's Defense Industry After Two Years of War and Sanctions

Join the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program for a conversation about the current state of the Russian defense industry under sanctions.

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Max and Donatienne discuss the results from the European Parliament elections, a bold move by French President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve parliament and call snap elections, before turning to a conversation with Lieutenant General Michiel van der Laan, the Director General of the EU Military Staff, for a conversation on the EU’s evolving role in defense policy and military affairs.

Recently, the Lebanese government developed a plan to deport Syrian refugees who were not registered with the United Nations, which accounts for almost half of all refugees in Lebanon. Although Lebanon’s sovereignty is important, so are its humanitarian obligations and its role in regional security. A new Analysis from the CSIS Middle East Program.

In this episode, we discuss our biggest takeaways from the AI agenda at the G7 Leaders' Summit, the details of the Apple-OpenAI partnership announcement, and why Saudi Aramco's investment in Zhipu AI represents a groundbreaking moment in China-Saudi Arabia relations.

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The new geopolitics of fragility: Russia, China, and the mounting challenge for peacebuilding

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Bruce jones and bruce jones senior fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology @brucebrookings alexandre marc alexandre marc member - institute for integrated transitions, former chief specialist fragility, conflict and violence - world bank.

October 2021

Executive Summary

During the Cold War, the conflicts of the “Third World” were viewed by the superpowers as a terrain for competition, often in the form of proxy wars that turned those countries into some of the great killing fields of modern history. Then, for the two decades that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, wars in every region in the world declined, by every measure. Notwithstanding the current focus on the failures of U.S.-led wars in the wider Middle East, this decline in levels of war was in large part due to successful efforts at peacebuilding, led by the Western nations. Now, that progress is at risk. The West faces stiff competition for influence in development policy in general, and in fragile states specifically. Competing investments from foreign interests in fragile states can undermine countries’ long term economic and financial sustainability, while ill-conceived security support arrangements can weaken the governance of the security and justice sector in these countries. All while mounting tensions at the United Nations Security Council and other global and regional institutions reduce or impede the international community’s ability to prevent the escalations of conflict and support accountability.

There’s long been competition at the regional level in fragile states, but as fragility has spread across the Middle East, that dynamic has brought in more influential, more capable regional actors — like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. What’s more, Russia and China have increased their engagement both at the global policy level and in specific fragile states. These countries, and the West, all adopt different strategies and approaches based on their capabilities and strategic economic and security interests — often, in deep contradiction with one another. The core of Russia’s strategy in these cases is disruption; China has a more elaborate strategy that defined by longer-term economic and security interests. It is vital for China to open market and investments opportunities while building up its security in the Pacific, and to ensure secure trading routes. Beijing puts considerable resources behind its strategy, as the very ambitious Belt and Road Initiative illustrates. Countries like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have more regional ambitions that are connected to their own security, ideological views, and economic opportunism. In the Indo-Pacific, Japan, Australia, and increasingly India are also playing an active role in fragile states, in part to try to fence off China’s ambitions.

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This dynamic creates a huge risk for fragile states, as they become an arena for geopolitical competition. Many of the careful and progressive approaches to peace building and improvement of governance and accountability that the West has elaborated over the last two decades are very much put into question by this situation. The relatively weak commitment of the West for implementing fragility-specific approaches is also part of the problem. Western nations need to rapidly mobilize to address these risks that could easily increase fragility and create more conflicts. They should put concerted pressure within multilateral institutions for the “new” powers to improve the quality and accountability of their interventions. And the West should improve its own coordination and effectiveness, and back strong multilateral partnerships — with the involvement of regional powers where they are willing to collaborate. The alternative is to be pulled back into full-blown proxy wars, at great human cost.

This report is being released after the swift fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban in August marked an inglorious end to 20 years of American presence in that country. Events there may feel like a metaphor for a wider phenomenon of shifting Western attention away from fragile states; they should also serve as a cautionary tale.

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Research: When Geopolitical Risk Rises, Innovation Stalls

• Vivek Astvansh,
• Wesley Deng,
• Adnan Habib

An analysis of more than 4,600 U.S. companies suggests that the negative impact can persist for three to five years.

The impact of geopolitical conflict on global trade and security is clear. But how do rising geopolitical risk levels affect corporate innovation? The authors cross-referenced data from 4,625 U.S. companies over 32 years with a global index of geopolitical risk to quantify the link between geopolitics and innovation. At a high level, their analysis suggests that geopolitical risk has a substantial stifling effect on private sector innovation, in particular for companies with substantial exposure to foreign markets, and that that negative impact can persist for three to five years after the initial conflict. In light of these findings, the authors offer strategies to help companies minimize the impact of geopolitical risk on their own innovation, but argue that ultimately, the only way to address the underlying issue is for political and business leaders (alongside other key players, such as lawmakers and media platforms) to work together to reduce global tensions and build a more peaceful — and innovative — future.

Geopolitical risk — that is, the wide array of risks associated with any sort of conflict or tension between states — has a clear impact on global trade, security, and political relations. But how does it affect innovation in the private sector?

• VA Vivek Astvansh is an associate professor of quantitative marketing and analytics at McGill University’s Desautels Faculty of Management and an adjunct associate professor at Indiana University’s Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering.
• WD Wesley Deng is a finance professor at the business school of the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He studies how short selling affects corporate performance and managerial decisions.
• AH Adnan Habib is a doctoral student in finance at the Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, University of Tasmania, Australia. He studies geopolitical risk and the spillover of stock volatility from a company to its suppliers and customers.

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The Battle for the Black Sea Is Not Over

Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia

Matthew Boyse is a senior fellow with Hudson Institute ’ s Center on Europe and Eurasia.

CEO, New Strategy Center, Bucharest

Senior Fellow, New Strategy Center, Bucharest

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.

Listen to Event Audio

As Russia scores localized gains on land, Ukrainian forces have achieved major successes in the Black Sea Region (BSR). The Ukrainians have sunk or damaged some one-third of the Black Sea Fleet, forced Moscow to move naval assets away from occupied Crimea, and put Russia on the defensive. These successes challenge the narrative that Russia’s war against Ukraine is a stalemate and demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to preserve its identity, sovereignty, and independence.

Ukraine’s gains are real and strategically significant, but the Battle for the Black Sea is not over. Major Russian land, sea, and air assets remain in Crimea and in the BSR, and Moscow is using them to continue its quest to subordinate Ukraine. The war will be won or lost on land and in the air.

If Russia wins or ends the war on its terms, the interests of all Black Sea littoral states will be negatively affected. But so too will those of the United States, Europe, and the West more broadly. The US has a major interest in a free and open Black Sea and a peaceful, stable, and prosperous BSR.

Join Hudson for an event to present the results of an in-depth study written by a US–Romanian–Ukrainian team: Hudson Senior Fellow Matt Boyse, New Strategy Center CEO George Scutaru, New Strategy Center Senior Fellow Dr. Antonia Colibasanu, and New Geopolitics Research Network Director Mykhailo Samus.

Read the study, The Battle for the Black Sea Is Not Over , here.

Event Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.

John Walters:

Good morning. I’m John Walters, president and CEO of Hudson Institute. On behalf of all my colleagues here and our board chair Sarah Stern, welcome to Hudson, and to this event with this distinguished panel. Also want to welcome al those who are joining us virtually. We appreciate the fact that we can have a larger audience, and we hope that more people understand the work that’s going to be discussed here today.

The Black Sea has been much in the news lately. It is a dynamic theater in Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Russia has been advancing on land extremely slowly and at vast cost to human and material, it has been retreating in the Black Sea. As you know, this region is key to not only, the Black Sea, to the war in Ukraine, but to the many nations in the entire region. It has been dominated by Russia since it took Crimea and eastern Donbass in 2014. At that time, millions of people were closely watching developments, and subsequently have seen that the land domain in Ukraine has been the focus of attention. But it should also be a focus of attention, the maritime domaine, in and around Ukraine. Because, as I said, the Black Sea and the Black Sea region is decisive to not only the region, but to trade that goes beyond the region and affects the world.

Today I have the pleasure of introducing Hudson’s latest study, a joint effort between Americans, Romanians, and Ukrainians entitled the Battle for the Black Sea Is Not Over. Hudson is pleased to have partnered with a great team of experts from Romania; Romania’s leading think tank, the New Strategy Center; and the New Geopolitics Research Center in Ukraine. And guiding us through this event is Hudson’s very own Luke Coffey, who needs no introduction and who has himself written extensively on the Black Sea and issues of the region, and the War in Ukraine in the past. It’s my job not to stand between you and the experts, so I’m going to turn the floor over to Luke.

Luke Coffey:

Thanks, John. Thank you, John, for those introductory remarks, and I want to echo John’s thanks to those who came out in person today for this event, and for those viewing online, for this very timely and important launch of a fantastically researched and detailed report entitled, “The Battle for the Black Sea Is Not Over.” The Black Sea probably doesn’t get the focus and attention it deserves here in the US, certainly in the US, but I think it’s probably the same amongst other capitals, certainly in Western Europe.

One way to remedy this, in my opinion, is to, when you look at a map of Europe, have the Black Sea in the middle and then look at everything that’s around the Black Sea. Often as schoolkids growing up, at least certainly for me in the ‘80s and ‘90s, when you had a map of Europe, the Black Sea was the bottom right-hand corner and then it only showed part of the Black Sea. So you never really got an appreciation of the geography.

Another way to do it, and a more detailed and thorough way of understanding the importance of the Black Sea is to read a 100-page report like we have today that lists everything that needs to be done, by chapter and verse. And that’s what we’re here today doing is launching this report. I’m going to quickly introduce the speakers and then they will speak, offering some opening remarks in the order that I introduce them, and then I will facilitate a discussion afterwards.

The first speaker today is Matt Boyse. He is my colleague here at Hudson, a senior fellow in the Europe Center here, and had a very distinguished career in the US State Department. He’ll be followed by George Scutaru, who’s the CEO of the New Strategy Center, based in Bucharest, as John said, the finest think tank in Romania. He will be followed by his colleague Antonia Colibasanu, who is a senior fellow at the New Strategy Center in Bucharest. And then we should also mention another important author for this report, who couldn’t make it today, and that’s Mykhailo Samus, who is based in Ukraine, and he is with the New Geopolitics Research Network, and he’s the director of that institute. So I will turn it over to my colleague Matt for some opening remarks, and then we’ll go to George and Antonia.

Matthew Boyse:

Thank you, Luke, and thank you, everyone. Thank you, George and Antonia for joining us and Mykhailo for joining us remotely. So you might ask, “Well, why another Black Sea report?” Because the Black Sea is actually kind of a hot topic. I mean, yesterday there was a major conference in Sofia on this very subject, and the Secretary of State of the United States actually spoke to the conference. Today, this afternoon, there’s another conference at George Washington University on Georgia and the Black Sea. So if you start looking around, there’s an awful lot that’s been written, so why another one?

And I don’t want to repeat the sort of old German joke about, everything has been said, but not by us. But actually, there is, [foreign language] it’s more a question of, we actually think we have something interesting and new to say here, which is the reason . . . is we were in Bucharest last summer, and George and I were talking about this, and we were identifying what was not being talked about as far as the Black Sea was concerned.

First of all, this whole question of militarization. Now, of course, we know after 2014, and the illegal annexation of Crimea, the whole geopolitical situation in the Black Sea region changed. But had anybody really gone through the whole question of militarization, all the details? The concept was relatively well-understood, but had anybody gone through all these details? And you can read all about it in gory detail, which . . . Wait a second, where’s our slide? Ah, there we go, yeah. If you just download the QR code, you can see this study here. Unfortunately it’s 100 pages, because it goes into enormous detail, but there is an executive summary that’s much shorter, so if you don’t have the patience to read it all.

So we go through this whole question of exactly how was the Black Sea militarized, and what Russian assets are now on Crimea, for example, which our Ukrainian colleague was responsible for putting all this together. So you have this militarization of the Black Sea issue, and also the geopolitical changes that accompany all this. And it has basically turned the Black Sea, that old Greek phrase about [Greek 00:07:47] or inhospitable sea. Because it used to be, I mean, until 2014, the Black Sea was fairly free and open in terms of, ships would fly and all this sort of stuff. It wasn’t as militarized as it is now. And so you had this, I mean, the Russians were obviously interfering in Ukraine, they were interfering in Georgia, they were interfering in Moldova. So there was malign Russian activity, but the maritime domain was relatively free and open until 2014. So the whole geopolitical situation changed.

And then we started encountering these two narratives, and narrative number one was the extent to which Black Sea was turning into a Russian lake, quote-unquote, or not, and then this whole question more recently, beginning mostly last fall, was along the lines of is Ukraine winning the Battle of the Black Sea? Which of course is a true statement in terms of the maritime domain. I mean, if you look at the data, 30 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet, which is either destroyed, or damaged, or has moved away from the western part of the Black Sea and has moved to Novorossiysk et cetera, and it’s no longer finein areas it used to fine. So you have these two narratives, we’re going to discuss those two narratives.

And then sort of the other idea was to remind the policy community of the other side of the coin, which is that narrative is, Ukraine is winning the sea domain, and the maritime domain, but there’s a lot of Russian assets left on Crimea, and an awful lot of maritime assets, and air, and et cetera, as it’s left that people also need to remember. And then you also have this whole question of sort of spelling out the geopolitical significance of what happens if Russia were to win the war? Because this is actually negative for all the Black Sea electoral states, it would be negative for NATO, and of course, it has implications for the United States, so to remind people of that.

And then, of course, to remind people, again, that Putin moves not only when the West shows weakness, but also when the West shows neglect. And unfortunately, what Luke was saying about the Black Sea being in the lower right-hand corner of a lot of people’s mental map was also present for quite some time, and which was yet another one of the sort of data points that caused Putin to think, “Okay, people are not really focusing on this area, and I can . . . It’s maybe more of a green light.” And then of course last fall we had this question that the assistant secretary of state presented his Black Sea strategy to the Congress. It was a State Department-only document, we have the fuller whole of government, this document is supposed to be blessed this year, and so we wanted to also kind of weigh in on that as well, and then we also, we’re presenting an action plan.

And so these were sort of the concepts behind why yet another . . . “Don’t we have enough Black Sea security studies already?” Well, no we don’t, because some of these issues were not covered, or it’s important to continue sort of updating this as time marches on. The three main takeaways are basically, number one, the battle for the Black Sea, because, look, you’ve written on this, and a lot of people have written on it on what’s happening in the maritime domain, which of course is all totally, completely accurate. But we wanted to basically draw sort of a connection between the maritime domain and the land domain and the air domain. And then the conclusion was, basically, that the battle for the Black Sea is not over, however well things are going on the maritime domain, but the other two domains are going to be very important as well. So it’s not over.

Number two, as Ukraine goes, so goes the Black Sea region as a whole. Because if, for example, Russia were to consolidate its control over the northern littoral of the Black Sea, and of course, prevail in its war against Ukraine, this would have very significant geopolitical consequences, not only for the littoral states, but also for NATO, and, of course, for the United States as well. And then you have the third point being, and this is also an important point, by a former ambassador of Bulgaria to Washington, who once, in a conversation with me, said, “What happens in the Black Sea does not stay in the Black Sea.” And so that being the third kind of takeaway from this.

So these were sort of why we did this in the first place. Maybe I’ll just stop here and we can go into some of the conclusions a little bit later.

Yeah, great. Thanks, Matt. George?

George Scutaru:

Thank you very much. First of all, I want to express my deep gratitude to Matt, to Peter Rough, and the Hudson team, for this cooperation. Also to [inaudible] Group, because [inaudible] supports this study and New Strategy work. And also I say hello to my dear friend Mykhailo Samus, he is in Kiev now, he’s our nonresident expert and director of New Geopolitics Research Networks.

Why the Black Sea matters, I think this is the main question. And it’s necessary to understand that Black Sea means connectivity. It is between, middle corridor in Europe. Three Seas Initiative, and Black Sea is the core, the middle of this initiative. It is the connective with the Balkans, Middle East, North Africa. Black Sea represents a platform for Russia to project its interests to Middle East, North Africa, to Balkans. And also, Black Sea means energy. A lot of transit routes, but also Black Sea has enormous oil resources. And by the way, Romania will become, in 2027, the largest gas producer in EU, and will have capacity to cut this Russian malign influence in the regional countries, providing other gas not from Russia.

But also, Black Sea means a battlefield for Russian hybrid activities. And if you have a large-scale invasion in Ukraine at the same time you have a large scale hybrid warfare against Republic of Moldova from Russian side. And also, we have in the Black Sea a new dangers to freedom of navigation. Mines, electronic warfare activities, they’re trying to jamming communication and signals of vessels. And also, Black Sea means food securities for global world, because Russia, Ukraine, and Romania are providing cereals, grain, to many African and Asian countries, and for instance show some stability with Egypt depends on the grain provided from this region.

But when we are speaking about Black Sea, we’re thinking about the War in Ukraine. And I know that a lot of people even now in DC consider that, okay, it’s better to froze the conflict. Please have in mind that this conflict represents the second episode of a war started in 2014 with annexation of Crimea. And after the annexation of Crimea we had a break during eight years, and Putin restart the war. And this ceasefire or this conflict frozen, will not be a peace for long years. Because Putin will come back. Putin wants to destroy Ukraine, and first of all, it’s necessary to understand that if he wants to destroy Ukraine, first of all, he wants to cut the exit of Ukraine to the sea, and to occupy entirely throughout. And for Romania, this is the biggest nightmare, to see again Russia on our border, on the Danube mouth, and even on the Prut River. Because I’m pretty sure that Russia will occupy Republic of Moldova if they have possibility to enter and to occupy Odessa.

And for us, it’s important for us to have a freedom, independent Ukraine, and to support Ukraine to resist, to hold the line. And by the way, dear friends, today, it’s very difficult for them to resist. Even they are so brave and courageous, it’s impossible to resist without ammunitions. They are spending now less than 2000 round of ammunitions per day comparing to Russians’ 10,000 per day. And they are suffering, they are dying, because we can’t ensure them enough ammunitions, enough weaponaries, and please have in mind that this pressure, it’s increasing, increasing, day by day from Russian side. And if Ukrainian front will collapse, we’ll see Russia on the border of Romania. Russia will occupy Republic of Moldova.

And Russia will challenge American leadership not only in Ukraine, but please have in mind that now we have a gang of bad countries, with North Korea, with Russia, with Iran, supported by China, and if we lose this war in Ukraine, that means that first of all, the American leadership will get a huge question mark, because Russia will show to China, to Iran, and to North Korea, that a country with a GDP similar to Italy has the possibility to win a war against Ukraine, but a war against United States, against NATO, and EU.

Great, George. George alluded to some of the possible scenarios, especially some of the more worst-case scenarios that could result in a Russian victory in Ukraine. But if you want a very sobering read, there’s a couple of chapters in the report that lays out these possible scenarios in alarming detail. And the scenarios you outline in this report are not inconceivable. They’re very real, and they should serve as a wake-up call for policymakers and lawmakers as they debate how we should assist Ukraine in this conflict. So I highly recommend you check out those sections in this report. Antonia?

Antonia Colibasanu:

I feel like I have to say a few words of why another report about the Black Sea. On my part, the why was related to my field of work. I’m a geopolitical analyst, and I’ve started working on the Black Sea, I will not say how many years ago, because that is not good, but basically, the borderlands have been my preoccupation since my years at Stratfor, and then as I evolved into a geoeconomic analyst, the Black Sea has also evolved into a very interesting place on Earth, and I will underline Earth. Speaking about the map’s look, I think that we should take into account that we are actually living on a globe, which is pretty exciting if you think about the location of the Black Sea on the globe. It is a connector when we are in peacetime, and it is a geopolitical node, which is not really nice when conflicts start.

So for the geoeconomic field, we actually have a two-purposes sea. One is that of coming together, corridors, trade routes, you name it. Cultures, civilizations, the Middle East meets Asia and Europe. But also, we have major powers that need to go south, that is Russia. We have connector powers like Turkey that need to balance off other major powers. And we also have the West, that has always played a role in shaping up the Black Sea, in shaping up the Eastern Mediterranean, in shaping up Eurasia.

And bottom line, the Black Sea is currently talking about challenges, and I have here two experts that are good at making lists of risks and challenges. And I am too, but I decided that for this report, I’m going to focus on opportunities. So bottom line, I am looking, and I was looking, and while doing the research for this one, first, why is it important for the US to look at the Black Sea, to consider the Black Sea on the globe beyond the risk of Russia. Second, what can we do to make it better for us all, and transform the risk into an opportunity as the business management calls for us to do?

So first, why should the US be interested beyond the fact that the US is interested in keeping Europe out of war? And currently we have a war at the very front line of Europe, with Romania being on the front of this war. And therefore, the risk of Europe entering the war is not something that we should neglect.

Second, why should the US be interested, considering the opportunities? Well, first of all, the northern corridor is less used, even if it is somewhat used. And we will likely have to go into peace-building actions after the kinetic war in Ukraine is over. Which means that that northern corridor, which transports Asian stuff into Europe and European stuff into Asia, is not going to serve very much. Therefore we have a Black Sea that supports the transfer of goods, and services, and influence, from Asia into Europe, from Asia into the Mediterranean, from Europe into the Mediterranean, and a connector to something called the Red Sea, a very interesting spot of today’s world, which is likely going to stay interesting because that’s its job. But beyond the interestingness of the Red Sea, we also have the corridors that are being shaped by Russia, north-south, and obviously, the South China Sea challenges that are affecting the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea proper, with the Black Sea being that node that transfers the software that goes with every corridor that will be supported into being built up.

What do I mean by that? Well, with new corridors being built up, and shadow shipping being the norm for Russia and its allies, we also have a new software in insurance, in banking, in anything that might have to do with security of shipping, which is something that the US should not forget. Because the US is very much interested in the oceans. This country borders two oceans. And with the tendencies that we are seeing considering this new software, I think we should be very much aware and very much on to doing what the US and the West knows how to do best: transforming this new software into our software, making sure that it is us that keep the comparative advantage.

Finally, the big challenge that we have is also keeping that transatlantic link together. And this too is an opportunity. We are seeing countries that we have never thought, in Romania, I’m a Romanian, to look east and consider that the Black Sea and Ukraine are actually on that map, are actually on that globe, and we actually have challenges. Countries like Germany and France who thought that peace is a given, they have realized that peaceful life is not a given. Something that we, the US, the West, Romania, other countries, allied partners in the region, need to take as an opportunity to discuss with them, to make certain that we keep that alliance formed so that we transform all these challenges into opportunities, and keep the comparative advantage in anything and everything we do.

This was my goal, at least, to transfer. I do invite you to go over the report. I know there is a lot to read. It’s like putting together notes from conferences, and dinners, and stuff, which is interesting, right? Because you get to meet people and you get to meet ideas when you meet people, and those are interesting. Those are in there as well. There is a lot of research being done on key elements related to the military domain. And there is also a lot of thinking done on how challenges could transform themselves into opportunity, and a plan of action, which I think is the key part of this report. What should we do on the three main pillars of geopolitics? Now, I have to take pride in that. Politics, economics, and military, so all of that is in there, and I invite you to check the report online and read it.

Great. One quick observation I would like to make, if I may, in addition to all these important geopolitical and geographical reasons why the Black Sea is important, one thing I notice in my research over the years on the Black Sea is that the countries of the Black Sea, obviously other than Russia, are dependable partners and allies for the United States, and in fact, during the last five or six years of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, the five friendly countries of the Black Sea for the United States contributed one-third of all forces in Afghanistan, just the five littoral countries around the Black Sea, one-third. So this, you put your money where your mouth is and you step up to the plate when needed, so that’s also important, in addition to the geographical and geopolitical reasons of the Black Sea.

Matt, a quick question to you. In the report, when it comes to the United States and the Black Sea strategy that was produced by the State Department last October, you write about this report, or someone wrote about this report, I’m going to guess it could’ve been you, “The strategy’s recommendations also rely too heavily on descriptions of well-known issues, came with few additional resources, and failed to provide a clear roadmap for implementation.” Which I agree-

Yes, that was me.

Yeah, I thought so. I agree with all that. So what needs to be done to correct that?

Yeah, I hope that the impression has settled in about, this is not just an area of the world that is far away from everything, kind of peripheral, and clamoring for US attention when there are really priorities elsewhere. I mean, there are other priorities elsewhere, obviously, major priorities elsewhere, but this is not something that I think we can ignore, because of all of the way in which it fits into so many different sectors. The Caucasus, the near east, the Mediterranean, not to mention the Eurasian landmass, and of course our core commitment to NATO. We sort of, Black Sea strategy at the end of the previous administration, which my group did, and then of course the clock ran out, and so it takes a while sometimes for new administrations to figure out what they want to do.

So finally two and a half years later they came up with their strategy, which is kind of a strategy, but more of a description of well-known things. Which it’s always better to have a strategy, even if it doesn’t say a lot, than no strategy. So kudos in that respect, it was a bit late, rather modest, and very few resources of any kind. And so, I mean, one would have hoped for a bit more ambition, but the fact is that there is now one. And the fact that the secretary spoke at this conference in Sofia yesterday, I was flabbergasted. Because it hasn’t been really up on his list of priorities. And even though his comments were rather limited and not a lot, the fact that he actually spoke on it is a good thing.

And of course, we’re hoping that the department will read this and then incorporate some of our ideas into the whole of government approach, which is supposed to be drafted this year. Because the State Department strategy, however important it may be, doesn’t reflect the totality of the interests that weigh into the Black Sea region, because it really needs to be a whole of government approach rather than just one institution.

Now, the administration hasn’t, to my knowledge, at least, it hasn’t been very visible in how it’s implementing the strategy that it initiated back last October. Maybe there is stuff going on there that isn’t very visible. I think it’s very useful to have these to actually demonstrate to the people who are watching that, yes, this is actually a live thing. It’s not another strategy. And the fact that the secretary spoke on it yesterday is a very good thing, but it requires more than that. It requires the countries of the region to see that the United States is doing more than it did before. And of course, there are some good stories in the region. But the more visible this is, the better it is, because the sense of, “It’s off there, it’s not in Brussels or Berlin or in Paris, not in Western Europe, it’s somewhere else,” that message is something that is not a . . . It has to be NATO finally has made the eastern flank more coherent in terms . . . Because for such a long time it was focused more on the northeastern corridor, which of course is totally important. But it was sort of the disparity of resources between the northeastern sector and the southeastern sector was rather significant.

Now, that’s been corrected to a large extent, so we have one flank, one presence. So you have that kind of more coherent approach to the eastern flank, finally, which is good, but it needs more resources, it needs more visible attention, it needs more signs that this is actually not just a document, but actually it’s a living, breathing approach to a geopolitically incredibly important area. Because this area will remain contested as long as Russia is there. On Crimea, it will be unstable. The vast potential of the region will not be realized. It has enormous potential that it will not grow into what it could be, especially if developments in Ukraine go south, and it will just be sort of a . . . This will have reverberations far beyond the region. So maybe I’ll just stop there.

Yeah. The fact that this push, this initiative to force the State Department to development a Black Sea strategy originated in the US Congress is a good observation for our European friends and partners to appreciate how influential the US legislative branch can be in making US foreign policy, which is a lot different from many parliamentary democracies in Europe. I do believe in the US presidential system of government, Congress has more influence on foreign policymaking, and this is a good example of that, perhaps. George, you lead the most influential, effective think tank in Romania, you are here as a Romanian. But there are other countries around the Black Sea as well that the US and Romania has to work with. Turkiye, Georgia, Bulgaria, obviously Ukraine, but their views have been represented in the report. Throughout the research and the writing of your report, how did you factor in and how do you see the role of these other countries around the Black Sea in bringing about a safe and stable region?

First of all, I think that it’s impossible to discuss about security in the Black Sea without Turkey. And it’s necessary to engage Turkey in all these projects related to the Black Sea. And Turkey is important not because of Montreaux Convention. Today, Black Sea’s closed, and we can’t receive other navy support from non-river countries, from US, UK, or other NATO countries because of these restrictions of Montreaux Convention. But in the same time, it’s necessary to have in mind that Black Sea has two entrances: Turkish Straits, in the east, and Danube. And it’s necessary to use more Danube potential.

And we proved last year, and started with 2022 when Russia broke Odessa ports, and entire export of Ukraine has moved to Danube ports. At the time, Romania ensure 70 percent of entire Ukrainian transit. We started in March 2022 with 300,000 tons of goods transit through Romania, and in October last year, we reached the level of three million tons. It was a huge effortment by Romania, we invest more than $150 million to improve logistic capacity. And we prove that how useful is Danube. And you can create together, in this area, with Romanian ports, Galați, and Brăila, and Moldovan ports, Giurgiulești and Reni and Izmail, Ukrainian ports, a huge hub. Very useful, including for the reconstruction process of Ukraine.

And also, it’s important because other challenge for us is representing by mines. And it’s a huge danger for freedom of navigation. And Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey established an initiative to work together against mine threats, which was an agreement signed by these three NATO countries, and we have to wait for the approval of Turkish Parliament, but this approval will come very soon. And in three months, this initiative will start, and it’s good. Because, as I mentioned, we can use this framework also to protect our energy-critical infrastructure. In Romanian EEZ, we’ll start to build up, next year, the most important projects. From Neptun Deep we’ll exploit more than 100 billion cubic meters of gas, to assure entire consumption of Romania, but also to help Bulgaria and Moldova to decrease the pressure from Russian side. And on the other hand, we expect a lot of Russian hybrid activities. And it’s necessary to work together with Turks and Bulgarians to protect better our critical infrastructure. And this initiative, focused now only on mines, I think you can extend the framework, and also to try to protect, first of all, with Turks, because they have also a very good and rich perimeter in their EEZ, Sakarya, with a lot of resources of gas, and you can protect together with Turks our Neptun Deep perimeter and their Sakarya perimeter.

And last but not the least, I think that all three countries play an important role to support Ukraine. Romania as a transit, first of all, because we assure, as I mentioned, 70 percent of Ukrainian export must transit these countries. Bulgaria has a very important role to support with ammunition Ukraine. And Turkey also has an important role to support Ukraine. For instance, they open a Baykar factory on Ukraine, and they will build more than 120 Baykar drones. And also what it’s important to understand, this asymmetry. One of the lesson learned of this war in Ukraine up to now, despite the huge consumption of ammunition, is the asymmetric approach against Russian fleet.

And why there? Because we discuss a lot about drones. I want to offer you a copy of Ukrainian MAGURA V5 drone. By the way, it’s made from same material like a real drone. And this drone, with this drone Ukrainians destroy more than one-quarter of entire Russian fleet in the Black Sea. It’s very incredible how country without fleet has capacity, using these asymmetric tools, like sea drones or aerial drones, and to hit and destroy one-quarter of Russia fleet. This is a gift coming from our Ukrainian friends to you, and to put on your desk, and remember how effective are Ukrainian drones, and how important is to support Ukraine to win the war.

Well, thank you very much for that. My two young sons will love playing with this in the swimming pool this summer, I have to get a little fleet for them I think. No, thank you, George, sincerely. Antonia, I want to pose the same question to you that I posed to Matt, but switch it. Instead of what should the US be doing more of, what are some practical things Europe, however you want to define it, institutional Europe, geographical Europe, what can Europe be doing more of in the Black Sea? And then we have time for a couple of questions from the audience. We do have a microphone somewhere. If you’re interested, catch my eye, and then I’ll come to you after Antonia.

Sure. So first of all, there is a problem of definition there.

That’s why I left it broad, for you to interpret.

Right. If we take Europe as European Union, I would say that the European Union is the most important donor on everything that was not military aid for Ukraine. Considering statistics at the end of 2023, that is. That being said, there is a lot and has been a lot of investment in infrastructure that the EU has helped with, together with the nation-states that were directly involved in building up that infrastructure. For instance, Romania, we have made a lot of effort to basically invest and rapidly allow the transit, as George pointed out, and that was not something that we have done without the EU support. It is actually through the EU funding that we have been able to do this rapidly.

Besides that, there is that Europe that is part of NATO. And that Europe that is part of NATO and the EU is now challenged by the hybrid warfare that Russia is conducting on it. Because if there is something that we need to remember about this conflict in Ukraine is that Russia is not at war with Ukraine proper, or not only with Ukraine proper. It is at war with the West, and it is primarily at war with Europe, with which it started the conflict years ago, after the Cold War ended, and after Russia started to implement its strategy with respect to energy in particular, and making Europe dependent on energy.

So what can Europe do? Well, making use of what it has. Energy resources and critical resources, rare minerals. There are discussions now in the European Union to modify part of the legislation that allows investment into rare minerals, some of them to be found also in the Black Sea area in Romania, for instance. And obviously, some of the energy resources also found in the area, the Black Sea.

However, Europe is weak on its military domain. So it can do a lot of things related to easing up the frameworks that allow for opportunities to be sought, because of this conflict, or due to this conflict, arising to that point of making the European countries more attractive for investment, and also getting back to that attractiveness that got us in the Eastern Bloc integrated into the European Union in the first place, the reason that the Cold War was won, if you like.

And besides that, the European Union, European states, European whatever, especially those that are members of NATO, need to build up their military. I think that they have realized that. There are some European states that are now drafting their own Black Sea strategy, France is one of them. At the same time, I believe that Germany is pretty much pushing forward with building up the military industry. I’m not very certain that I am feeling very confident with only Germany doing that in Europe, for reasons that have to do with my job. Geopolitics have a lot to do with history. But considering that we are allies, and that the containment line, the front line is now in between the Baltic and the Black Sea primarily, I think that the flank, the western flank needs to be really supported in terms of making sure that it is resilient, and that it stabilizes itself economically and socially with regards to Russian techniques and strategies. We are in an election year in Europe as well. And making sure that there is support for the long-time buildup of the military power there, for a good flank.

So we have time for two. The gentleman there, and then, I’m sorry, the one in front. You know what? We’ll take all three together and then we’ll wrap up. So the gentleman here, the gentleman here in the blue, and then the gentleman in the back, if you could please state your name and any relevant affiliation, and keep it like a pithy question so we can be mindful of the time, thank you.

Greg Scarlatoiu:

Thank you. Greg Scarlatoiu, US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, [foreign language]. Thank you for your presentations. You mentioned, President Scutaru and DR. Colibasanu, two very important areas, fossil energy and agriculture. What is the current state of Romania’s arms and ammunition industry, another great area of potential? It took a big hit after the Cold War, it has recovered to a certain point. It’s somehow lagging behind Bulgaria and Serbia. To what extent is the industry vertically integrated at home? Do Romanian producers have to depend on imports of propellant and everything else that’s needed? So is this regarded as a potential area of growth, and is there a national strategy, a national vision? The other area would be Romania as a hub of reconstruction and development in Ukraine, in addition to being a very important point of transit. Is there a coherent national strategy addressing that? Thank you.

Great. And then we’ll take the . . . 

Ah, good morning. [foreign language] Antonio, George, good to see you again. I’m Chris Orr, previously senior defense editor for 19FortyFive, now I’m dual-hatted as a military aviation writer for simpleflying.com, as well as publisher of the Patreon page D’Orr-senal of Democracy. As you may recall, a few weeks ago I published an article on the Romanian Air Force, talk about their transition from the hopelessly obsolescent 1950s-vintage MiG-21 Fishbed fighter jet to the fourth-generation F-16 and the fifth-generation F-35. So I was wondering if you have any insights on as to how that transition is coming along, how well the Romanian Air Force pilots are making the adjustment, and are they happy with the change? Thank you. [foreign language].

And then the gentleman in the back.

Audience Member:

I work a lot on Moldova, and just today the Moldovan government announced they’re going to hold presidential elections on October 20th, and there’s also going to be a referendum about Moldova’s EU aspirations on the same day. Given Romania’s historical relationship with Moldova, including being the same country a couple of times, how can Romania and, by extension, the rest of the European Union help Moldova in the coming months leading up to the elections and beyond? Thank you.

Great. So we’ll go in order, you can answer as you like, or don’t answer at all. We have ammunition manufacturing capability in Romania, reconstruction efforts that could be originated in Romania for Ukraine, future of the Romanian Air Force, and Moldova. I’ll just go, George, you want to go first, since a lot of the focus on your area?

Yeah. About reconstruction, Romania could represent an important half of the reconstruction [inaudible 00:49:43] as part of Ukraine. As I mentioned, it can create in the south and eastern parts of Romania, a huge hub, together, of logistic, first of all, together with Moldovans and Ukrainians. And I think that Romania also has proximity, as I mentioned, to southern part of Ukraine, one of the most affected regions part of Ukraine by the war. But in the same time, you have energy. And you want to produce cement for material constructions, it’s necessary to have access to a predictable and long-term energy sources. And Romania will have a lot of gas, as I mentioned, starting 2027, Romania will be the largest gas producer in EU, because we’ll start to exploit our gas reserves from economic exclusive zone of Romania.

Regarding ammunitions, in that, we have to enhance our capacity to produce ammunitions, and Rheinmetall, German company Rheinmetall, decide to invest in Romania, will be one of the biggest powder plants in Europe, in, I think, in one and a half, two years. But in my opinion, why it’s so important. Sir, if you have a ceasefire, it will be just a break. Putin will restart the war. And it’s necessary to be prepared for a longer war in Ukraine, and it’s necessary to support and to enhance our support to Ukraine. This is the reality. At the moment, Russia is producing more ammunition than US and EU together. And this is the reality. It’s necessary to enhance our production of ammunition, especially because we are very close to this war.

And regarding your questions, it was a huge transition and amazing transition for MiG-21 to F-16. Now we receive two new squadrons of F-16 from Norway, but the biggest step for Romanian Air Force is represented by F-35. The most important decision by Romanian parliament two, three months ago was the decision to approve the acquisition of 32 F-35 airplane. It’s an important contract for American industry. $6.5 billion. And I think that together with Poland, Romania and Czech Republic also, Romania, these three countries will have an important number of F-35, and represent the core of NATO deterrence on the eastern flank.

Indeed, we count a lot on F-16 and F-35 as a deterrence too against Russia. It takes time to build up all this infrastructure necessary to use F-35 airplanes, and for this reason we modernize our air bases. We invest, for instance, $300 million to modernize Campia Turzii Air Base, where we have deployed F-35. Also Romania has started an amazing project to modernize Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, where you have now 5500 American soldiers. When we’re finished this project, MK base will be the largest in Europe. Romania invest $3.5 billion. We invest a lot, and host nation support, to assure necessary conditions and to have an important number of American soldiers, first of all, but we have also more than 1000 French soldiers on our soil, to have an important deterrent and robust deterrent instrument. Because we failed to deter Russians in 2014, many countries in Europe preferred to feed the beast, with our goodwill and money for cheaper gas. And we know the result of this kind of policy. Now we have, again, a war in Ukraine. And it’s necessary to be prepared, and Romania is doing a lot to invest in defense capabilities.

Regarding Moldova, I think that, as I mentioned, you have a full-scale warfare, hybrid warfare against Republic of Moldova. In November, we’ll have presidential elections, and please, because many people watching to Transnistria, but please have in mind the Gagauzia. Recently, two weeks ago, the Gagauzian governator, is a lady, is visit Russia. She met President Putin, and Putin wants to provide a lot of help, not for Gagauzi people, but, frankly speaking, to undermine and to destabilize Republic of Moldova. We will support them, EU provide a lot of support money together with the US, EU has provide $300 million to balance Moldova’s budget, to help them to overlap the problem of prices for energy, and Romania provided oil, wood, gas, money to support them to hold the line against Russian pressure. The pressure is huge, but it’s important for all us to understand that we have to continue to support Moldova. So together, with [inaudible 00:56:02] and with Brussels, with Brussels, and really in Bucharest, we are doing a lot together to support them.

Thanks, George. I think those were very comprehensive answers to all of those questions. Antonia and Matt, do you have anything you want to add, any final remarks before we wrap up today?

I think that if I start, we might not get to lunch. So probably I’ll sit here and just not say much more.

I don’t have much to add on the Moldova side, I defer to my Romanian colleague, which is always so great to have. When you’re talking about the Black Sea, you really need to work with Romanians, because they really know so much about this. But I would just add that the centrality of Crimea to all this. Because I mean, this real estate is profoundly important from a geopolitical standpoint. And it’s, I mean, if you look at, for example, all the . . . Because the narrative is that the Russian fleet is no longer there in quite the same way it was before, et cetera, but the study goes into an awful lot of detail about the Russian assets that are still there, and the extent to which that actually provides this kind of, it’s bit of a cliché, but this unsinkable aircraft carrier, and the extent to how important it is for Ukraine to, if it wishes to retain its sovereignty within its internationally-recognized borders, Crimea is a massive issue. And I mean, you have now, the Russians building grand lines of communication to connect mainland Russia to Ukraine in the event that something happens with the Kerch Bridge.

You have, I mean, the A2AD bubble that’s . . . It’s sometimes thought that, “Well, that’s being degraded by . . . The Ukrainians are degrading it.” Well, yes, they’ve had some successes there, but there’s an awful lot left. You have the whole EEZ, and that is now, Russia dominates that. It’s not as though many will contest that. You have the jamming activities that the Russians have been on with regard to Bulgarian assets. And then you have this whole, I mean, the Russians even downed an MQ-9 drone last March, a US drone, it wasn’t much there. So the point is that there’s an awful lot of military assets that are still left in Crimea, and while the maritime domain is going in the right direction, that area is of enormous military significance still. And so you have this ability to squeeze Ukraine, and the grain corridors might be open right now, but military people say that Russia can still take that stuff out if they wish to do so, they just haven’t chosen to do so.

So I mean, there’s a positive narrative on there, which is all very good. But then if you focus on what Russia still has there and what it could choose to do in the future, especially if the land domain starts going in the wrong direction, that’s when you start to worry about the long-term geopolitical direction of that whole region, because it’s all connected. It’s not just sea, it’s not just water, it’s also the whole area around it and the effect that that has.

So anyway, and of course you add the whole, the Russians are building a base in occupied Abkhazia, which of course is further away from Novorossiysk, so that Russian fleet that’s been moved to Novorossiysk is no longer quite as vulnerable, and that supports a longer-term project. But the fact is that’s out there, and so all these things together, I think they merit a bit more attention than people have been paying, and because of the implications of what happens if the land domain goes south. And that’s what people need to be thinking about, the plan of action that we have, there’s all sorts of ideas which I won’t go into here, you can look it up in gory detail in the study by downloading the QR code in the tab behind us. But it’s been a pleasure working with you, I think we sort of, the combination of Romania and Ukraine, now we just need to think about this more from a Bulgarian and from a Turkish standpoint, and of course the Georgian standpoint, and we’ll have it completely covered.

Absolutely. Well, George and Antonia, thank you so much for flying over here to be part of this in person. I know we value the friendship that we have on a personal level, but also on an institutional level, between Hudson Institute and the New Strategy Center. We really value that engagement and relationship as well, so thank you so much. Thank you, again, to our viewers, both in-person and online. You can find this fantastic report by scanning this QR code, which is very technical for us here at the . . . for me personally, but if you know how to do that, go ahead. Or you can go to hudson.org and find this report and many other fantastic reports on the Black Sea or the greater Black Sea region, all at your disposal. So thank you so much, and until next time.

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 4, 2024

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

March 4, 2024, 6:15pm ET  

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on March 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.  

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev promoted Russia’s extensive territorial objectives that expand deep into Ukraine’s territory.  Medvedev gave a lecture on March 4 called “Geographical and Strategic Borders” at the Russian World Youth Festival, a Kremlin-organized event that includes attendees from more than 100 foreign countries, during which he claimed that “Ukraine is, of course, Russia.”[1] Russian forces currently occupy the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, but Medvedev defined all the territories on the left bank of the Dnipro River and many territories on the right bank of the Dnipro River as “integral” to Russia’s “strategic historical borders.”[2] Russian forces currently do not occupy any territory in right-bank Ukraine. Medvedev spoke against the backdrop of a hypothetical English-language map of Eastern Europe that he originally posted on his Telegram channel in July 2022.[3] The map depicts parts of western Ukraine under Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian control — furthering the recently reignited Kremlin narrative that eastern European states have “territorial disputes” in western Ukraine that is aimed at spoiling Ukraine‘s relationships with its western neighbors.[4] The map shows Ukraine existing as a rump state only within the borders of Kyiv Oblast and the rest of modern-day Ukraine as part of Russia — well beyond the areas that Russian forces currently occupy, and the four oblasts Russia has illegally annexed.[5] The fact that Medvedev reused a map from 2022 underscores that the Kremlin’s maximalist territorial objectives have remained unchanged since the beginning months of the war.

Medvedev argued that the influence of sovereign great powers, like Russia, extends beyond their geographic borders, catering to a wider maximalist ideological interpretation of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). Medvedev repeated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s previous statement that “Russia’s borders do not end anywhere.”[6] Medvedev alleged that a state’s strategic borders, which he differentiated from a state’s geographical borders, directly depend on “how strong and sovereign” the state and its authorities are.[7] Medvedev claimed that the more “powerful” a state is, the “further its strategic frontiers extend beyond its state borders” and the larger the state’s sphere of “economic, political, and socio-cultural influence.”[8] Putin made similar remarks recently that suggested that he views weaker states that are unable to unilaterally impose their will upon others, such as Ukraine, as having a truncated sovereignty.[9] Medvedev claimed on February 22 that Russia “probably” must seize and occupy Kyiv City, which he labelled an historically “Russian” city, at some point in the future.[10] Medvedev’s February 22 and March 4 statements suggest that the existence of a Ukrainian rump state in Kyiv Oblast — even after a hypothetical Russian-led negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine — may be temporary and subject to future Russian attacks.[11] Medvedev also did not specify to where Russia’s “strategic” borders would extend should Russia’s “geographic” borders expand as shown in the hypothetical map he presented. The map is notably a conservative depiction of possible Russian territorial claims, given Putin’s recent geographic definition of Russkiy Mir encompassing the former Russian Empire, which includes parts of Poland, Romania, Finland, and Moldova.[12]

Medvedev indicated that Russia is more interested in subjugating Ukraine’s people than taking its territory.  Medvedev claimed that Russia’s “enemies constantly insist that Russia’s main goal is to seize Ukrainian lands” but, as the “riches” of Ukraine’s lands, such as wheat, steel, gas, and coal are “almost absent,” the main value that Russia seeks from its occupation of Ukraine is through controlling its people.[13] Medvedev also claimed that the concept of a sovereign Ukrainian state and the concept of a Ukrainian national identity that is not Russian must “disappear forever.”[14] ISW continues to document how Russian authorities are repeatedly engaging in large-scale and deliberate ethnic cleansing campaigns and systematically working to eliminate Ukrainian language, culture, history, and ethnicity in areas of Ukraine that Russia occupies.[15]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unknown actors detonated explosives and severely damaged a Russian railway bridge over the Chapaevka River near Chapaevsk, Samara Oblast on March 4.  The GUR reported that Russia uses the railway to transport military cargo, particularly ammunition produced at a joint-stock company in Chapaevsk.[16] Kremlin newswire  TASS  reported that the explosion delayed five trains and that Russian authorities suspended traffic across the bridge, but later opened one railway track.[17] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that it opened a criminal investigation into the explosion but did not speculate on the actor responsible for the explosion.[18] Some Russian milbloggers blamed Ukrainian forces for the explosion on the railway bridge.[19]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly awarded a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and Spetsnaz - affiliated Russian milblogger, likely as part of the Kremlin’s longstanding efforts to co-opt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin.  Russian milblogger channel  Rusich Army  (also known as  Archangel Spetsnaza)  claimed on March 4 that Putin awarded the channel’s anonymous head the Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class for his efforts in supporting the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20]  Rusich  is the second Russian milblogger that has received a federal award for his activities as such (Putin awarded  Rybar  founder Mikhail Zvinchuk with the same award on November 16, 2023, likely after co-opting him).[21] The  Rusich  Telegram channel has over one million followers as of March 4 and is well connected among other prominent Russian ultranationalist voices, including the  Rybar  Telegram channel and Russian state TV propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.[22] ISW previously assessed that  Rybar’ s public award was designed to incentivize other Russian milbloggers to offer their loyalty to the Kremlin in exchange for awards and accolades.[23]  Rusich ’s award demonstrates to other milbloggers that the Kremlin is actively willing to publicly praise milbloggers who embrace Kremlin messaging — and suppress negative reporting about Russia’s military performance in Ukraine — as the Kremlin continues to encourage self-censorship efforts in the Russian information space.

Kremlin-awarded milbloggers remain a minority in the Russian information space, however, and some milbloggers actively clash with state propagandists despite the Kremlin’s consolidation of the information space. Pro–Wagner Group Russian milbloggers strongly criticized Russian state propagandist and Solovyov-affiliate Boris Yakemenko on March 4 for disparaging deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and for accusing Russian milbloggers of failing to contribute to the Kremlin’s war effort in late February 2024.[24] Other Russian milbloggers, including deceased milblogger Andrei “Murz” Morozov, who lost faith in the Russian command due to its censorship efforts, regularly clashed with Solovyov and other information-space voices whom these milbloggers deemed as liars or otherwise unreliable.[25] The Kremlin will likely continue to tighten control over some milbloggers by coercing some critical milbloggers into self-censorship and awarding those who are loyal to the Kremlin as it seeks to consolidate control over the Russian information space.

The Russian government reportedly hid data on recipients of social support services in 2022, likely to obfuscate casualties suffered in the first year of the war in Ukraine or to cover up the government’s inability to pay promised social support to vulnerable populations.  Russian opposition outlet  Verstka  investigated the Russian Unified State Information System for Social Security (EGISSO) and reported on March 4 that EGISSO has hidden the data on recipients of social benefits in 2022.[26]  Verstka  noted that that some of the hidden data contain information that could reveal the scale of losses in Ukraine, such as indicators about “widows of military personnel who died during military service” and “citizens who were wounded, concussed, injured, and mutilated while performing military duties.” The EGISSO may have hidden this information to prevent social discontent arising around reports of Russian casualties in Ukraine and decided only to share this information in 2023 and 2024 when the Kremlin line on Russian losses has consolidated somewhat to eliminate social shocks. The Kremlin may have also hidden 2022 social services data to cover its issues in providing promised social support measures to various individuals, particularly those impacted by the first year of the war.

The Kremlin is continuing efforts to ensure high voter turnout in the upcoming presidential election to present the guise of legitimacy and widespread popular support among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic electorate.  Russian opposition outlet  Meduza  reported on March 4 that the Russian presidential administration is concerned about meeting its intended 70 to 80 percent voter turnout mark in March 2024 because there is a widespread sentiment in Russia that the election has already been decided and that Russians have generally accepted that Putin has already won again.[27]  Meduza  stated that the Kremlin hopes to obtain this voter turnout by mobilizing the domestic electorate affiliated with the Russian government, particularly employees of the public sector, state corporations, and companies loyal to the Russian government, as well as their families. United Russia employees, for example, are required to bring at least 10 people (family members, friends, and acquaintances) to polling stations.  Meduza  noted that the requirements of these employees decrease proportionately to their proximity to the Kremlin; for example, employees of large corporations only have to bring two people to polling stations.  Meduza  reported that there is no enforcement mechanism for the requirements but that the Kremlin is trying to encourage voting using electronic voting methods and QR codes to make voting more convenient. ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin’s election preparations are intended to cast the election as completely legitimate and widely popular with strong voter turnout.

Russian authorities continue to exploit the leaked recording of German military officers discussing the theoretical provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine to deter Western military aid provisions to Ukraine.  The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the German Ambassador to Moscow on March 4 in response to the leaked recording.[28] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on March 3 that the leaked recording is part of the “information war” that that Russian President Vladimir Putin is waging against the West in order to undermine Western unity and resolve in supporting Ukraine.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev promoted Russia’s extensive territorial objectives that expand deep into Ukraine’s territory.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unknown actors detonated explosives and severely damaged a Russian railway bridge over the Chapaevka River near Chapaevsk, Samara Oblast on March 4.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly awarded a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and Spetsnaz - affiliated Russian milblogger, likely as part of the Kremlin’s longstanding efforts to co-opt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin.
• The Russian government reportedly hid data on recipients of social support services in 2022, likely to obfuscate casualties suffered in the first year of the war in Ukraine or to cover up the government’s inability to pay promised social support to vulnerable populations.
• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to ensure high voter turnout in the upcoming presidential election to present the guise of legitimacy and widespread popular support among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic electorate.
• Russian authorities continue to exploit the leaked recording of German military officers discussing the theoretical provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine to deter Western military aid provisions to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• A Russian news aggregator claimed on March 4 that Russian forces replaced Storm-Z convict units with Storm-V units, a mechanism for distributing convicts into the regular Russian military as opposed to keeping them siloed within convict-only units, as was the case with Storm-Z formations.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Limited positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske.[30] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yampolivka (west of Kreminna) and Terny, but noted that while Russian forces hold the initiative in this direction, they are unable to translate small tactical gains into serious operational successes.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Su-34 bombers are conducting FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction using universal planning and correction modules (UMPC) on FAB bombs.[32] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]), the “GORB” detachment, and the “Sever-V” volunteer brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are operating south of Kreminna.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 4. Geolocated footage published on March 3 shows that Russian forces advanced into central Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing in western Ivanivske and that Russian forces are attempting to cut Ukrainian logistics lines that run into Ivanivske from the north.[35] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Niu York and Novoselivka.[36] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are attempting to transfer unspecified elements of motorized rifle regiments, Airborne Forces (VDV), and Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) formations to the Bohdanivka area.[37]

Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued fighting in the area on March 4. Geolocated footage published on March 4 shows that Russian forces advanced in a windbreak south of Orlivka (west of Avdiivka) near the Orlivka-Tonenke road (west of Avdiivka).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 3 that Russian forces advanced up to 450 meters deep along a 900-meter-wide front in the direction of Tonenke, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have captured most of the settlement but that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in northwestern Tonenke.[39] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the claimed Russian advances in Tonenke. Positional fighting continued west of Avdiivka near Berdychi, Orlivka, and Tonenke and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[40] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting near Berdychi.[41]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of the city on March 4. Geolocated footage published on March 4 shows that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) advanced into central Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only maintain positions in western Novomykhailivka and that fighting continues in the area.[43] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda.[44] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to operate near Krasnohorivka.[45]

Positional fighting continued in western Donetsk Oblast and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in these areas. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements in western Donetsk Oblast near Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar) and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to clear seized Ukrainian trenches due to Ukrainian mines.[48]Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the South Ossetian “Alania” volunteer battalion are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[49] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[50]

The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 4 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky.[51]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 4 that Russian forces are using Kh-31P anti-radar missiles more frequently in strike series to search for Ukrainian air defense systems and radar systems and detect vulnerabilities in Ukrainian air defense pathways.[52] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have somewhat increased their use of Kh-31P missiles after Ukraine‘s downing of a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft on February 23 and Russian forces are suffering from an increased inability to conduct glide bomb strikes in southern Ukraine due to Ukraine’s increased shoot-downs of Russian bombers. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 4 that Russian forces have not used any A-50 aircraft in Rostov Oblast or over the Sea of Azov for the seventh day in a row out of fear of losing another high-value aerial asset.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian news aggregator claimed on March 4 that Russian forces replaced the Storm-Z project — a project that generated specialized “Storm-Z” convict units — with the Storm-V project — a new mechanism for distributing convicts into existing units within the regular Russian military.[54] The news aggregator claimed that the Storm-V project eliminates the legal grey areas that Storm-Z convicts had to navigate to receive official pardons for their crimes. The news aggregator also implied that convicts serving in the Russian military through the Storm-V project are expected to serve in the military for longer than six months — the original service duration for a Storm-Z convict — in order to receive a pardon. The news aggregator claimed that the dissolution of Storm-Z convict units, which the Russian military used to conduct “high risk” assault operations, means that regular Russian units staffed with mobilized personnel and contract servicemen ( kontraktniki ) will now conduct similar assault operations.

Russian opposition outlet  Vazhnye Istorii  reported that Russian Railways Security Service Head Viktor Shendrik funds the “Hispaniola” private military company (PMC).[55]  Vazhnye Istorii  reported that the “Hispaniola” PMC, composed of “football hooligan” sports fans and extremists, is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled “Redut” PMC.  Vazhnye Istorii  reported that Russian oligarchs Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, whose businesses contract with Russian Railways, are interested in forming their own PMCs modeled after the “Hispaniola” PMC.

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts  (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

Ukraine continues efforts to build out its domestic defense industrial base (DIB) by increasing investments in technology and joint weapons production. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on March 3 that the Ukrainian defense innovation platform Brave1 has funded 173 grants totaling over $3 million to Ukrainian technology developers working on robotic platforms and drone developments.[56] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on March 4 that the Ukrainian government has allocated 40 billion hryvnia ($1 billion) for the purchase of drones to support Ukraine’s goal of producing one million drones in 2024.[57] Shmyhal noted that Ukraine intends to spend 50 percent of funds on the domestic purchase of weapons, specifically focusing on electronic warfare (EW) systems.[58] Shmyhal additionally stated that Ukraine has concluded five agreements with Western arms manufacturers on the joint production of weapons and intends to pursue “dozens” of such contracts throughout the year.[59]

Argentina reportedly transferred two Mi-171E helicopters to Ukraine. The  Financial Times (FT)  reported on March 1 that Argentinian president Javier Milei donated “two Russian-built military helicopters” to Ukraine.[60] Argentina first considered transferring the helicopters, specified as Mi-171E helicopters, to Ukraine in mid-December 2023.[61] Milei plans to organize a summit on “Latin America support” for Ukraine in 2024.[62]

Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military support. Czech Director General for Defense Policy and Strategy told  Bloomberg  on March 1 that the Czech Republic’s initiative to source weapons for Ukraine from outside the EU could send the first batch of artillery shells acquired through the initiative to Ukraine “within weeks.”[63] French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on February 29 that France has ordered 100 loitering munitions for Ukraine from the Delair drone manufacturer.[64] The French Armed Forces Ministry also reported on March 4 that France has delivered over 2.6 billion euros ($2.8 billion) in military aid to Ukraine and trained over 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers between February 24, 2022 and December 31, 2023.[65] Belgium is also reportedly prepared to use 1.7 billion euros ($1.8 billion) in frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s defensive needs.[66]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian officials continued to misrepresent NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises as threatening to Russia, despite the exercises’ defensive nature in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt threats to NATO members. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed that Russia is monitoring the Nordic Response 24 exercise (part of the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercise) in northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway, because NATO is conducting the exercises near Russia’s border.[67]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his recent comments about “essentially” freezing Armenia’s participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[68] The milblogger claimed that Pashinyan is provoking Russia, which could lead to “dire consequences.”

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger continues to highlight Russia and India’s defense cooperation, likely in response to recent reports that India seeks to distance itself from Russia.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian companies likely continue to assist Russian businesses in sanctions evasions schemes likely in support of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy stated on March 4 that the Belarusian enterprises, such as the Belarusian Metallurgical Plant and Minsk Motor Plant, are sending products to large enterprises in Vladimir Oblast allegedly for import substitution projects following Western sanctions on Russia.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/234755 ; https://ria dot ru/20230405/festival-1863338323.html ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202304050024

[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/20147127

[3] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2024/03/04/22474304.shtml ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/150

[4] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2024/03/04/22474304.shtml ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2023

[5] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2024/03/04/22474304.shtml

[6] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/03/04/medvedev-ochertil-granitsy-rossii-kotorye-shire-geograficheskih-on-privel-v-primer-territorii-po-oboim-beregam-dnepra/

[7] https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/5701566/ ; https://ria dot ru/20240304/medvedev-1931035007.html

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/20147051

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022224

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022224

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023

[13] https://ria dot ru/20240304/ukraina-1931047308.html

[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/234755

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied

[16] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3549

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/234705 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/234706 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/234777

[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/234833

[19] https://t.me/rybar/57849 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45346

[20] https://t.me/rusich_army/13475

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023

[22] https://t.me/rusich_army/13477; https://t.me/rusich_army/13478;

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023

[24] https://t.me/grey_zone/22235; https://t.me/AlexCarrier/5899; https://t.me/astramilitarum/35271; https://t.me/grey_zone/22233; https://t.me/grey_zone/22234; https://t.me/Los_Morpheus/124; https://t.me/astramilitarum/35269; https://t.me/yakemenko/14064

[25] https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3377; https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3495 ; https://t.me/Topaz_Penetrator/9335 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/22046 ;

[26] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4226; http://egisso dot ru/#/statistics/recipients

[27] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/03/04/rossiyane-sovsem-ne-interesuyutsya-vyborami-kak-zhe-obespechit-yavku-70-80

[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/234707 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/234722 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/234723

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1764560799379452084; https://t.me/wargonzo/18548; https://t.me/wargonzo/18549; https://t.me/dva_majors/35749

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/18548; https://t.me/wargonzo/18549

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/36268

[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63119; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63127

[34] https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1764462541114077320; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1764462544658272626; https://youtu.be/zG--AuVQgoA?si=HnwoTqAbXEdlWo6x;

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/35749; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7937; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7925; https://t.me/wargonzo/18548

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36271; https://t.me/dva_majors/35749; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7937; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7925; https://t.me/wargonzo/18548

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/03/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-u-mezhah-sela-ivanivske-jdut-zhorstki-boyi-illya-yevlash/

[38] https://t.me/PUMBAZSU19/162; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4643

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63110; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7942

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol; https://t.me/mod_russia/36271; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63110; https://t.me/dva_majors/35749; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7924; https://t.me/wargonzo/18548; https://t.me/wargonzo/18549; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115324; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7942

[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63110 (Berdychi)

[42] https://t.me/voenacher/61952 ; https://x.com/AMK_Playz/status/1764465617745387830?s=20 ; https://x.com/AMK_Playz/status/1764467167494549985?s=20

[43] https://t.me/rybar/57836; https://twitter.com/Majakovsk73/status/1764440557328155016; https://t.me/rybar/57839; https://t.me/voin_dv/7338

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/11881 (Krasnohorivka)

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oTkL46eJqE9w5zDgDtBxmwao6vFwiA1akdgwtwMArsT24KAbLVDdapcAfLnfeokAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Tg4RdV2v2cBCgFdrRduMBv81if8uafossGEQSFaZzF27zvyrqkk7A7GNN3YNf7uYl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35749 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35807 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7940 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7932 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18549 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7944

[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/35807 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7944

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/7341 (38th Brigade) ; https://t.me/batalyon15/3941 (Alania Battalion)

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/35781 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35806

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyP9Bn25zoZNxRPbW2VQvnsvdcLgvPNdAupzxRT4ukHgk9fEeoFQg8pU1h74zn3ol

[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/04/cze-yak-rozvidka-boyem-nataliya-gumenyuk-rozpovila-navishho-rf-vykorystovuye-rakety-h-31p/

[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/04/yurij-ignat-rozpoviv-pro-somyj-den-bez-vorozhyh-a-50-bilya-ukrayiny/

[54] https://readovka dot space/storm-z ; https://t.me/readovkaru/6026

[55] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2024/03/04/espaniola/index.html

[56] https://suspilne dot media/697262-brave1-vze-vidiliv-3-miljoni-na-oboronni-innovacii-fedorov/

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/04/uryad-vydilyv-majzhe-40-mlrd-grn-na-prydbannya-bezpilotnykiv/; https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/7102

[58] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/7102

[59] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3835394-ukraina-razom-iz-zahidnimi-virobnikami-zbroi-stvorila-pat-spilnih-pidpriemstv-premer.html

[60] https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/argentyna-peredala-ukrayini-dva-gelikoptery-my-171e-financial-times/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/4d789837-0408-4513-a0d7-0d6ce5a8c740

[61] https://www.pucara dot org/post/la-fuerza-a%C3%A9rea-argentina-donar%C3%A1-a-ucrania-los-dos-mi-171e

[62] https://www.ft.com/content/4d789837-0408-4513-a0d7-0d6ce5a8c740

[63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-01/ukraine-to-get-155mm-artillery-shells-found-in-czech-led-scouring-of-stockpiles?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&cmpId=google

[64] https://twitter.com/SebLecornu/status/1763297648663040200?t=5jUTf4WLRF-Em1u6s7Mo_Q&s=19

[65] https://www.defense.gouv dot fr/actualites/ukraine-france-dresse-bilan-equipements-militaires-livres ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-frantsiyi-rozpovily-skilky-zbroyi-nadaly-ukrayini/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3835371-francia-z-pocatku-povnomasstabnoi-vijni-peredala-ukraini-vijskovu-tehniku-na-ponad-25-milarda.html

[66] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/belgiya-gotova-zaluchyty-rosijski-aktyvy-dlya-finansuvannya-ozbroyennya-dlya-ukrayiny-shmygal/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I519b4dLnyc

[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/234733

[68] https://t.me/rybar/57856 ; https://t.me/rybar/57857

[69] https://t.me/rybar/57855 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724

[70] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/krutoj-belarus-i-vladimirskaja-oblast-pokazyvajut-kak-mozhno-protivodejstvovat-sanktsijam-619354-2024/

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Geopolitics through the lens of the us consumer.

Insights from the UBS Global Consumer and Retail Conference

At the UBS Global Consumer and Retail Conference in New York City, panelists explored the interplay between geopolitics, economics, and technology through the lens of the consumer.

Views from:  Admiral Jonathan Greenert ,   US Navy (ret.), and  Jonathan Pingle , Managing Director, Chief US Economist, UBS. Moderated by  Peter Grom , Executive Director, Research – US Consumer Staples, UBS.

2024 elections - a potential turning point?

Investors are increasingly concerned by the elevated issuance of US Treasuries, driven by escalating US debt-to-GDP levels.

“We are at a juncture where choices have become increasingly tough,” said Jonathan Pingle, adding “Debt-to-GDP is at 100% and gains from a shrinking defense budget to fund other priorities have been exhausted.” 

This directly affects the United States’ global leadership capability and spotlights the importance of the upcoming election’s role in addressing these obstacles - the outcome of which could shift future economic priorities. 

An evolving Geopolitical landscape

Outside of the United States, Admiral Greenert believes there are nations which conflict with Western economic objectives. Global tensions and notable trade disruptions are outgrowths of this development. Pingle echoed this sentiment and said, “concerns around oil prices, global trade, and the war in Ukraine” have led to volatility in the financial market.

How will technology and the rise of AI shape geopolitics?

Potential future flashpoints could center around breakthrough in AI, enhanced cyberattacks or new weaponry creation.

Greenert believes AI could allow simplification of processes, quicker analysis and language barrier breakdown, enabling speed-to-market for businesses and in turn boosting the world economy.

On the flipside, a security or military advantage could go unchecked, and potential breakthrough in autonomous weapon systems could also pose a threat. Pingle believes that if AI is paired with robotics, it can be enormously beneficial. That combination could allow the US to come out of the low productivity regime it has been in since 2003. 

While these changes would cause labor market disruptions, they also open up room to re-allocate and upskill the workforce.

With AI there is a tremendous opportunity for education to be grasped and moved up

US Consumer outlook 2024-2025

Switching gears, the US consumer outlook seems to be pointing towards a divergent economic landscape. There are rising delinquency rates in auto and credit while asset valuation continues to grow rapidly. Although the question remains, ‘How long can this continue?’. 

Pingle also believes the US dollar’s role as a global reserve currency will likely endure.

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• The system shaped by Western-inspired institutions, trade, and security regimes is fraying as post-Cold War international cooperation gives way to increasingly acrimonious competition.
• CEOs can prepare for uncertainty by hardwiring geopolitical decisions into their investment decisions, strategic plans, and operating models.
• A dedicated geopolitics team supported by data and analytics and a robust system for monitoring geopolitical events can shift a company’s posture from reactive to proactive.

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International Business

/ article, geopolitical risk is rising. here’s how ceos can prepare..

By  Marc Gilbert and  Nikolaus Lang

Key Takeaways

For the ceo.

Why this article is a must-read for CEOs.

For the better part of three decades, CEOs have been operating in an historical anomaly. From 1990 through the late 2010s, economies, cultures, and populations were steadily integrating, propelled by an international order where globalization was chic, supply chains just-in-time, and geopolitical considerations a faint blip on most corporate radars.

The system shaped by Western-inspired institutions, trade, and security regimes is fraying, with post-Cold War international cooperation giving way to increasingly acrimonious competition. Some believe this signals a return to a bipolar world order in which nations fall in line with one of two superpowers—Cold War 2.0, in other words. That view is far too narrow. If anything, current momentum points toward a multipolar world, where dynamic middle powers assert their influence through multiple blocs, regimes, and regional groupings.

The evolution of BRICS this year from five to ten members is the latest indication that the march toward multipolarity is accelerating. Meanwhile, the velocity of geopolitically driven business disruptions is increasing, from the war in Ukraine to spiraling military confrontations in the Middle East. And with pivotal elections approaching in the US and Europe, the potential for further disruptions is significant.

A more fragmented world undoubtedly presents businesses with a great deal of uncertainty—and tremendous risks. But CEOs don’t have to leave their companies at the mercy of geopolitical events.

How CEOs Can Build an Effective Geopolitical Capability

Large multinational corporations, as well as those that depend on the free flow of goods and services beyond their borders, need to treat geopolitical risk with the same urgency as digitization, AI, and the climate crisis. They need to pressure-test investment decisions and business plans against possible disruptions by developing capabilities that strengthen geopolitical agility and resilience. If those capabilities are robust, they can even turn geopolitics into a strategic advantage.

Put simply, CEOs need to develop a “geopolitical muscle”—and fast.

The Risks of Merely Reacting to Geopolitical Disruptions

The future hasn’t been this uncertain in decades, and CEOs who approach geopolitical risks reactively rather than proactively do so at their peril. Look no further than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the months leading up to the war, the prevailing view among most experts was that the Russian military buildup on the Ukraine border was unlikely to tip into a full-blown crisis. Even so, it was a plausible scenario—and when Russia did in fact invade, many CEOs found themselves and their teams scrambling to ensure the safety of staff, find alternative supply chains for critical commodities, and comply with Western sanctions.

A rough proxy for the prevalence of reactive geopolitical postures among major corporations is the number of mentions “Ukraine” garnered on earnings calls before and after the war started. In the second quarter of 2021, amid news reports of Russian troops and tanks mobilizing on the border, “Ukraine” was mentioned in less than 1% of the more than 4,500 earnings calls analyzed by BCG. That percentage held steady through the fourth quarter of 2021, despite the estimated number of Russian troops soaring past 100,000. By contrast, during the first quarter of 2022, when the war began, Ukraine was mentioned in 19% of earnings calls, climbing to 36% in the following quarter. (See Exhibit 1.)

Hoping for the best is not a strategy. As recent events have driven home, CEOs need to build a capability—an organizational muscle for surveying potential geopolitical disruptions and planning for them, whatever the future brings.

Four Scenarios for the 2030s

Companies that develop a geopolitical muscle are prepared for uncertainty, hardwiring geopolitical considerations into their investment decisions, strategic planning, and operating models. They have a dedicated team focused on geopolitics that utilizes a range of data and analytics to design proactive strategies for mitigating risks and unlocking opportunities. And they build robust systems for monitoring national, regional, and global events for key developments that trigger fast, decisive action when they surface.

Foundational to this capability is establishing a broad but plausible set of scenarios for how the geopolitical landscape could evolve in the coming years. BCG has developed four such scenarios for exploring where the world might stand in the 2030s. (See Exhibit 2.) That horizon is sufficiently beyond the typical two-to-three-year corporate planning cycle, when most capital spending decisions are already locked in, but not so far in the future that it renders the scenarios purely theoretical.

It’s important to note that these are not meant to be predictive or to suggest a limited set of four outcomes. Rather, they are informed frameworks for gauging where global momentum is heading in the medium term—which in turn can help CEOs and their senior leadership teams gain a sense of grounding in an increasingly unpredictable world.

In scenario one, back to the future , the world’s major powers have once again come to embrace the benefits of greater cross-border cooperation and minimal military conflict. Free trade and multilateral institutions are dominant, enabling constructive collaboration on global issues such as the climate crisis.

Scenario two, proliferation of regional conflicts , is characterized by the spread of focused military conflicts with limited major-power involvement. Global institutions struggle for relevance in this scenario; supply chains are havoc stricken, and there is an increased risk of commodity price volatility.

In scenario three, multipolar rivalry , several blocs and groups of countries coexist in a rebalanced global dynamic where major powers avoid direct conflict, norms and institutions differ among blocs, and trade lanes align to new political and economic structures.

Scenario four, global escalation , is the most chilling. In this scenario, economic and military confrontations take place in multiple locations with deep involvement from major powers. Global institutions are crippled, the risk of cyber attacks and AI weaponization is substantial, and disruptions to the world economy are significant.

Currently, scenario three—multipolar rivalry—has the greatest momentum behind it. But that could change at any point. Amid the war in Gaza, for instance, Iran-backed Houthis have attacked ships in the Red Sea, a vital choke point of global commerce. And with the decades-long shadow conflict between Iran and Israel having escalated to direct military engagement, there could be further consequences for trade and other underlying variables that define the global business environment.

What Shapes the Scenarios

The four scenarios described above are shaped by a core set of seven variables. These include geopolitical relations, strength of institutions, trade and supply chains, financial stability, resources and sustainability, technology and productivity, and the policy environment.

One variable that has kept many CEOs awake at night in recent years is trade and supply chains. The snarls created by the COVID-19 pandemic over 2020 and early 2021 alone cost businesses an estimated 6% and 10% of their revenues, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. The dynamics that will likely shape how trade and supply chains behave going forward include the current state of trading relations between nations, the interconnectedness of supply chains and markets, active support for national reshoring initiatives, and the emergence of regional industrial hubs.

Under scenario one—back to the future—trade would scale new heights as international cooperation becomes fashionable again, and barriers, such as punitive tariffs, recede. The Global South would benefit, with African nations increasing their share of global supply chains, while fewer military conflicts would keep trade-thwarting sanctions in check.

Contrast that with scenario four, global escalation . CEOs would be navigating a world in which global trade plummets and supply chains localize.

As they gain greater clarity on how goods and services could flow in the 2030s, CEOs and their teams can build buffers against potential fallout on their business operations and even zero in on nascent opportunities that less geopolitically savvy companies might miss. And this is just one variable. When all seven are viewed together, CEOs and their teams can start to get a comprehensive view of what macro conditions might be in the 2030s under different scenarios.

Exploring Macro KPIs

Core macro KPIs include GDP growth, inflation, oil prices, global trade , foreign direct investment, the global warming trajectory, international migration, and global inequality.

Take inflation as an example. Under scenario one (back to the future) price pressures revert to lower, prepandemic levels as free trade proliferates and supply chains run smoothly, giving companies greater latitude to pursue the lowest cost production options. Under scenario four (global escalation) inflation is sharply higher than prepandemic levels as trade barriers and conflict upend supply chains and energy markets, dramatically elevating the cost of doing business. Viewed through scenario three (multipolar rivalry) inflation is slightly elevated from prepandemic levels as greater fragmentation introduces more friction into global trade.

Though the differences for inflation and other macro KPIs can seem minor from one scenario to another, each harbors different shocks and shifts that could translate into lost access to key markets or an opening to new ones. Supply chains and core businesses could be jeopardized or turbocharged. Promising new business lines could evaporate or materialize. Access to talented employees could broaden or be restricted.

Companies are already thinking about, if not undertaking, measures to shore up business plans and operations against an increasingly fragmenting global business environment. Many are geographically diversifying critical supply chains and manufacturing activities and establishing distinct entities to operate in different blocs. They are also navigating price volatility more nimbly and bolstering risk and cybersecurity capabilities.

Building geopolitical muscle is another key “no-regret move” for CEOs. This is not a task to be outsourced. CEOs need to mount a real capability that lives inside their organization to monitor geopolitical events, strategically plan for critical shifts, and ensure key tools remain up to date. They also need to establish a structure for initiating action quickly when events warrant. Here’s how to do it.

Tailor scenarios and develop signposts. Monitoring emerging shifts in the geopolitical landscape is foundational for establishing a proactive posture. Companies can start by tailoring the four scenarios to their specific industry and context to gain the best-informed perspective of how an individual company’s business operating environment could evolve in the years ahead. Utilizing data and analytics, including from third parties, they can then develop a set of “signposts” that serve as an early warning system that a business-critical change is afoot.

Some signposts can be tuned to obvious developments, such as military movements. Others can be aimed at more subtle ones, such as a policymaker stepping down or a new legislative effort taking shape. Some will be industry-specific, while others may appear to be so but create ripple effects beyond that industry. For example, US legislation aimed at reshoring semiconductor production is highly relevant for chip makers as well as manufacturers that use chips.

Plan your response. Once the signposts are established, companies can draft detailed plans for how to respond when one appears. The insights and expertise of a dedicated geopolitics team will likely determine how effective those plans will be. The optimal size of the team will vary depending on a company’s geopolitical exposure ; for many multinationals, it could be a handful or two of dedicated specialists, supported by a dozen or more regional and functional leaders across the organization.

What matters most is the collective expertise the team brings to the table—for example, international relations and global policy, supply chain and risk management, and other relevant disciplines. Companies can also complement their internal expertise with select external experts on certain topics or regions.

Remain vigilant. Signposts and scenarios need to be refreshed at least every two years or after a major incident. While the changes captured may be minor, it is important to ensure these tools remain fit-for-purpose at all times. Signposts also must be monitored vigilantly.

Structure to initiate action quickly. When a signpost appears, companies need to be organized in a way that ensures the information moves swiftly up the chain of command into the hands of senior decision makers. When events are fast and fluid, a CEO may not have the luxury of time when making tough calls, like redesigning a supply chain, selling off a valuable asset, or immediately relocating staff to a less risky environment.

A company’s geopolitical muscle is not built overnight. It takes commitment, dedication, and effort to strengthen and maintain. And it can entail additional costs. But CEOs need to weigh the potentially greater costs should a geopolitical risk become a business-disrupting reality.

The authors wish to thank Alan Iny, Kasey Maggard, and Michael McAdoo for their contributions to this article.

Managing Director & Senior Partner

Managing Director & Senior Partner; Global Leader, BCG Henderson Institute; Global Vice Chair, Global Advantage Practice

ABOUT BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP

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Our diverse, global teams bring deep industry and functional expertise and a range of perspectives that question the status quo and spark change. BCG delivers solutions through leading-edge management consulting, technology and design, and corporate and digital ventures. We work in a uniquely collaborative model across the firm and throughout all levels of the client organization, fueled by the goal of helping our clients thrive and enabling them to make the world a better place.

© Boston Consulting Group 2024. All rights reserved.

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June 17, 2024

This article has been reviewed according to Science X's editorial process and policies . Editors have highlighted the following attributes while ensuring the content's credibility:

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reputable news agency

Nuclear arms more prominent amid geopolitical tensions: Researchers

by Johannes LEDEL

The role of atomic weapons has become more prominent and nuclear states are modernizing arsenals as geopolitical relations deteriorate, researchers said Monday, urging world leaders to "step back and reflect".

Diplomatic efforts to control nuclear arms also suffered major setbacks amid strained international relations over the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said in its annual yearbook.

"We have not seen nuclear weapons playing such a prominent role in international relations since the Cold War," Wilfred Wan, director of SIPRI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, said in a statement.

The research institute noted that in February 2023 Russia announced it was suspending participation in the 2010 New START treaty—"the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces".

SIPRI also noted that Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border in May.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has upped his nuclear rhetoric since the Ukraine conflict began, warning in his address to the nation in February there was a "real" risk of nuclear war.

In addition, an informal agreement between the United States and Iran reached in June 2023 was upended after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October, SIPRI said.

'Extremely concerning'

According to SIPRI, the world's nine nuclear-armed states also "continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023".

The nine countries are the United States, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.

In January, of the estimated 12,121 nuclear warheads around the world about 9,585 were in stockpiles for potential use, according to SIPRI.

Around 2,100 were kept in a state of "high operational alert" on ballistic missiles.

Nearly all of these warheads belong to Russia and the United States—which together possess almost 90 percent of all nuclear weapons —but China was for the first time believed to have some warheads on high operational alert.

"While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as Cold War-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably we continue to see year-on-year increases in the number of operational nuclear warheads," SIPRI director Dan Smith said.

He added that this trend would likely continue and "probably accelerate" in the coming years, describing it as "extremely concerning."

Researchers also stressed the "continuing deterioration of global security over the past year", as the impact from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza could be seen in "almost every aspect" of issues relating to armaments and international security.

"We are now in one of the most dangerous periods in human history," Smith said, urging the world's great powers to "step back and reflect. Preferably together."

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Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now

(Stockholm, 17 June 2024) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches its annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament and international security. Key findings of  SIPRI Yearbook 2024 are that the number and types of nuclear weapons in development have increased as states deepen their reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Read this press release in Catalan ( PDF ), French ( PDF ), Spanish ( PDF ) or Swedish ( PDF ).

Click here to download the sample chapter of SIPRI Yearbook 2024 on world nuclear forces.

Nuclear arsenals being strengthened around the world

The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.

Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12 121 warheads in January 2024, about 9585 were in military stockpiles for potential use (see the table below). An estimated 3904 of those warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft— 60 more than in January 2023 —and the rest were in central storage. Around 2100 of the deployed warheads were kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but for the first time China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert. 

‘While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as cold war-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably we continue to see year-on-year increases in the number of operational nuclear warheads,’ said SIPRI Director Dan Smith. ‘This trend seems likely to continue and probably accelerate in the coming years and is extremely concerning.’

India, Pakistan and North Korea are all pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something Russia, France, the UK, the USA and—more recently—China already have. This would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.

Russia and the USA together possess almost  90 per cent of all nuclear weapons . The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e. useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2023, although Russia is estimated to have deployed around 36 more warheads with operational forces than in January 2023. Transparency regarding nuclear forces has declined in both countries in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and debates around nuclear-sharing arrangements have increased in saliency. 

Notably, there were several public claims made in 2023 that Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, although there is no conclusive visual evidence that the actual deployment of warheads has taken place. 

In addition to their military stockpiles, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1200 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling. 

SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China ’s nuclear arsenal increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to keep growing. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade, although its stockpile of nuclear warheads is still expected to remain much smaller than the stockpiles of either of those two countries.

‘China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country,’ said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). ‘But in nearly all of the nuclear-armed states there are either plans or a significant push to increase nuclear forces.’ 

Although the UK  is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2023, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future as a result of the British government’s announcement in 2021 that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.

In 2023 France continued its programmes to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile, as well as to refurbish and upgrade existing systems.

India  slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2023. Both India and Pakistan continued to develop new types of nuclear delivery system in 2023. While Pakistan remains the main focus of India’s nuclear deterrent, India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets throughout China.

North Korea continues to prioritize its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to reach a total of up to 90 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2023. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2023, it appears to have carried out its first test of a short-range ballistic missile from a rudimentary silo. It also completed the development of at least two types of land-attack cruise missile (LACM) designed to deliver nuclear weapons. 

‘Like several other nuclear-armed states, North Korea is putting new emphasis on developing its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons,’ said Matt Korda, Associate Researcher with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Senior Research Fellow for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. ‘Accordingly, there is a growing concern that North Korea might intend to use these weapons very early in a conflict.’

Israel —which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons—is also believed to be modernizing its nuclear arsenal and appears to be upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.

Tensions over Ukraine and Gaza wars further weaken nuclear diplomacy

Nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy suffered more major setbacks in 2023. In February 2023 Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. As a countermeasure, the USA has also suspended sharing and publication of treaty data.

In November Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing ‘an imbalance’ with the USA, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996. However, Russia confirmed that it would remain a signatory and would continue to participate in the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Meanwhile, Russia has continued to make threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the context of Western support for Ukraine. In May 2024 Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border. 

‘We have not seen nuclear weapons playing such a prominent role in international relations since the cold war,’ said Wilfred Wan, Director of SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. ‘It is hard to believe that barely two years have passed since the leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.’

An informal agreement reached between Iran and the USA in June 2023 seemed to temporarily  de-escalate tensions between the two countries, which had intensified over Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October upended the agreement, with proxy attacks by Iran-backed groups on US forces in Iraq and Syria apparently ending Iranian–US diplomatic efforts. The war also undermined efforts to engage Israel in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

More positively, the June 2023 visit to Beijing by the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, seems to have increased space for dialogue between China and the USA on a range of issues, potentially including arms control. Later in the year the two sides agreed to resume military-to-military communication.

Global security and stability in increasing peril 

The 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses the continuing deterioration of global security over the past year. The impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to armaments, disarmament and international security examined in the Yearbook. Beyond these two wars—which took centre stage in global news reporting, diplomatic energy and discussion of international politics alike—armed conflicts were active in another 50 states in 2023. Fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan saw millions of people displaced, and conflict flared up again in Myanmar in the final months of 2023. Armed criminal gangs were a major security concern in some Central and South American states, notably leading to the effective collapse of the state in Haiti during 2023 and into 2024. 

‘We are now in one of the most dangerous periods in human history,’ said Dan Smith, SIPRI Director. ‘There are numerous sources of instability—political rivalries, economic inequalities, ecological disruption, an accelerating arms race. The abyss is beckoning and it is time for the great powers to step back and reflect. Preferably together.’

In addition to the usual detailed coverage of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, the SIPRI Yearbook presents data and analysis on developments in world military expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, multilateral peace operations, armed conflicts and more. Special sections in SIPRI Yearbook 2024  explore the role of Russian private military and security companies in conflicts; efforts to reduce the peace and security risks related to artificial intelligence, outer space and cyberspace; and issues around the protection of civilians in the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.

For editors

The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of cutting-edge information and analysis on developments in armaments, disarmament and international security. Three major  SIPRI Yearbook 2024 data sets were pre-launched in  2023–24: total arms sales by the top 100 arms-producing companies (December 2023), international arms transfers (March 2024) and world military expenditure (April 2024). The SIPRI Yearbook is published by Oxford University Press. Learn more at www.sipriyearbook.org .

For information or interview requests contact Mimmi Shen ( [email protected] , +46 76 628 61 33) or Stephanie Blenckner ( [email protected] , +46 8 655 97 47).

• Press release (Catalan)
• Press release (French)
• Press release (Spanish)
• Press release (Swedish)

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