research articles on migrants

Click through the PLOS taxonomy to find articles in your field.

For more information about PLOS Subject Areas, click here .

Loading metrics

Open Access

Peer-reviewed

Research Article

The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990 to 2016

Roles Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

Affiliations Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Roles Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

Affiliation Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliations Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America, Yale School of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America, Yale School of Engineering and Applied Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America

• Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi, 
• Jonathan S. Feinstein, 
• Edward H. Kaplan

• Published: September 21, 2018
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193
• Reader Comments

We apply standard demographic principles of inflows and outflows to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, using the best available data, including some that have only recently become available. Our analysis covers the years 1990 to 2016. We develop an estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on parameter values that tend to underestimate undocumented immigrant inflows and overstate outflows; we also show the probability distribution for the number of undocumented immigrants based on simulating our model over parameter value ranges. Our conservative estimate is 16.7 million for 2016, nearly fifty percent higher than the most prominent current estimate of 11.3 million, which is based on survey data and thus different sources and methods. The mean estimate based on our simulation analysis is 22.1 million, essentially double the current widely accepted estimate. Our model predicts a similar trajectory of growth in the number of undocumented immigrants over the years of our analysis, but at a higher level. While our analysis delivers different results, we note that it is based on many assumptions. The most critical of these concern border apprehension rates and voluntary emigration rates of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. These rates are uncertain, especially in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, which is when—both based on our modeling and the very different survey data approach—the number of undocumented immigrants increases most significantly. Our results, while based on a number of assumptions and uncertainties, could help frame debates about policies whose consequences depend on the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States.

Citation: Fazel-Zarandi MM, Feinstein JS, Kaplan EH (2018) The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990 to 2016. PLoS ONE 13(9): e0201193. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193

Editor: Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert, Stanford University, UNITED STATES

Received: October 2, 2017; Accepted: July 10, 2018; Published: September 21, 2018

Copyright: © 2018 Fazel-Zarandi et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: All relevant data are within the paper, its Supporting Information file, and accompanying Excel spreadsheet.

Funding: The authors received no specific funding for this work.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Introduction

Immigration policy remains a hotly debated issue in the United States, with perhaps no aspect more controversial than how to address undocumented immigrants who do not have legal status. Policy debates about the amount of resources to devote to this issue, and the merits of alternative policies, including deportation, amnesty, and border control, depend critically on estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., which sets the scale of the issue. The most widely accepted estimate of this number currently is approximately 11.3 million [ 1 , 2 ]. This estimate is based on variants of the residual method [ 2 – 4 ]. In this method, the size of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States is set equal to the estimate of the total foreign-born population minus the legally resident foreign-born population. The total foreign-born population estimate is derived from surveys that ask respondents whether they were born outside of the United States (and whether they are American citizens), specifically either the American Community Survey or the Current Population Survey. The legally resident foreign-born population is estimated using administrative data on legal admissions.

An alternative approach to estimating the size of the undocumented population follows directly from basic demographic principles. Starting from a known population size at a given date, the population size at a future date equals the starting value plus the cumulative inflows minus the cumulative outflows. We employ this approach to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. for each year from 1990 to 2016, using the best available data and parameter values from the academic literature and government sources. Some of the information we use has been collected and made available only recently, so our approach is timely.

Our analysis has two main outputs. First, we generate what we call our conservative estimate, using parameter values that intentionally underestimate population inflows and overestimate population outflows, leading to estimates that will tend to underestimate the number of undocumented immigrants. Our conservative estimate for 2016 is 16.7 million, well above the estimate that is most widely accepted at present, which is for 2015 but should be comparable. Our model as well as most work in the literature indicates that the population size has been relatively stable since 2008; thus 2015 and 2016 are quite comparable. For our second step, recognizing that there is significant uncertainty about population flows, we simulate our model over a wide range of values for key parameters. These parameter values range from very conservative estimates to standard values in the literature. We sample values for each key parameter from uniform distributions over the ranges we establish. In our simulations, we also include Poisson population uncertainty conditional on parameter values, thus addressing the inherent variability in population flows. Our simulation results produce probability distributions over the number of undocumented immigrants for each year from 1990 to 2016. The results demonstrate that our conservative estimate falls towards the bottom of the probability distribution, at approximately the 2.5th percentile. The mean of the 2016 distribution is 22.1 million, which we take as the best overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on our modeling approach and current data. We also show the variability in our model based on the simulations for each year from 1990 through 2016.

The model works as follows (mathematical formulation, parameter values, and data sources underlying this model are detailed in the Supporting Information). For our conservative estimate we begin with a starting 1990 population of 3.5 million undocumented immigrants, in agreement with the standard estimate [ 1 ]. The estimate of 3.5 million undocumented immigrants in 1990 is based on applying the residual method (using the 1980 and 1990 censuses), described previously, which we argue systematically underestimates the population. Thus in assuming an initial population of 3.5 million, and centering our simulations around this value, we are almost certainly underestimating the size of the undocumented immigrant population at this date. In the simulations we assume that the starting population is drawn from a Poisson distribution with a mean of 3.5 million. It then follows that the population size at a future date equals the starting value plus the cumulative inflows minus the cumulative outflows.

Population inflows

Population inflows are decomposed into two streams: (I) undocumented immigrants who initially entered the country legally but have overstayed their visas; and (II) immigrants who have illegally crossed the border without being apprehended. We describe our approach for each source, explain the basis for our assumptions and why they are conservative, and list parameter ranges for the simulation.

(I) Visa overstays are estimated using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data for 2016, the first year for which visa overstays were comprehensively measured [ 5 ]. To apply this data in our context we also gather data for non-immigrant visas issued for all years from 1990 [ 6 ]. For our conservative estimate we assume that for each year the rate of overstays was equal to the 2016 rate. Calibration of our model shows that this assumption is in fact quite conservative. In particular, approximately 41% of undocumented immigrants based on the current survey data approach are visa overstayers [ 7 ], which translates to a visa overstay population of 4.6 million in 2015. Our model however predicts the number of overstayers to be less than this (even though our overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants is higher). That is, in our model most undocumented immigrants are not overstayers, and the model produces an estimate of the number of overstayers below the estimate produced in the conventional approach based on survey data. We compute that we would need to set the visa overstay rate above the DHS 2016 rate, specifically 1.1 times that rate, for our conservative estimate to generate as many overstayers as the 4.6 million in the 11.3 million estimate. Since many overstayers leave or adjust their status within a few months of their visa expiration date, we make a further conservative adjustment and count as overstayers only those individuals who have overstayed more than 1 year. For the simulation, we set the visa overstay rate equal to the 2016 rate multiplied by a uniform draw from the range [0.5,1.5]; consistent with the discussion above, this is a relatively conservative range.

(II) Illegal Border Crossers: We estimate illegal border crossers through application of the standard repeated trials (capture-recapture) model [ 8 – 10 ]. The model requires as inputs statistics on the total number of border apprehensions, the number of individuals apprehended more than once in a year (recidivist apprehensions), and estimates of the deterrence rate—the fraction of individuals who give up after being apprehended and do not attempt another crossing. Given these inputs, the repeated trials model generates estimates of: (i) the apprehension rate—the probability an individual is caught trying to cross the border; and (ii) the total number of individuals who are not apprehended (they may be caught one or more times but cross successfully on a later attempt) and enter the interior of the country illegally—the number of illegal border crossers in a year. We discuss data sources and potential weaknesses of this approach here; more information and mathematical details are provided in the Supporting Information.

DHS [ 10 , 11 ] provide figures for the total number of border apprehensions for every year in our timespan. They also provide information on the number of recidivist apprehensions and estimates of the deterrence rate for every year from 2005. Based on these figures and estimates they provide an estimate of the apprehension rate for each year from 2005 to 2015. Their estimate is 35% for 2005 and increases steadily, to above 50% by the end of the sample period. From their estimates we are able to derive directly estimates of the number of illegal border crossers for each of these years. For earlier years (1990 to 2004) we must make further assumptions. Our assumptions are about the apprehension and deterrence rates, since these have been addressed in the literature; in turn we are able to generate estimates of the number of illegal border crossers in earlier years based on these assumptions (see the Supporting Information for analytic details).

Most experts agree that the apprehension rate was significantly lower in earlier years [ 12 , 13 ]. A recent study [ 12 ] using data from the Mexican Migration Project estimates this rate for every year from 1990 to 2010; estimates in the 1990’s begin from the low twenties and range upwards to approximately 30%. A second study estimates the rate for 2003 at around 20% [ 13 ]. Given these estimates, and the general view that apprehension rates have risen, for our conservative estimate we assume that the apprehension rate in years 1990-2004 was equal to the average rate in years 2005-10 or 39%; this is well above the rates discussed in the literature for earlier years and thus tends to reduce our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants since it implies a larger fraction are apprehended at the border. For our simulation we assume a uniform distribution over the range [0.25,0.40] for the earlier years, still above the average rates in the literature for these years.

Additional facts support the view that the apprehension rate has increased in recent years. The number of border agents has increased dramatically over the timespan of our analysis [ 14 ], and the number of hours spent by border agents patrolling the immediate border area has increased by more than 300% between 1992- 2004 [ 15 ]. Further, new infrastructure (e.g., fences) and technologies (e.g., night vision equipment, sensors, and video imaging systems) were also introduced during this period [ 15 ]. Thus the apprehension rate we use for earlier years almost certainly overstates the actual apprehension rate and therefore underestimates the number of successful crossings. However, we note that these additional border resources may have been concentrated in certain locations and it remains a possibility that apprehension rates were higher in earlier years. We note finally that in using data only on Southern Border crossings we again are conservative in our approach, not accounting for illegal crossings along other borders.

Notwithstanding our view that we make conservative choices in setting up our model and parameter values, we acknowledge that border apprehension rates for the 1990’s are not based on as well-developed data sources as estimates for more recent years. Thus it remains a possibility that these rates are higher than we believe. One aspect of this uncertainty concerns deterrence. When deterrence is higher border crossings will fall. Most researchers believe deterrence has increased in recent years [ 8 , 12 ]. We note that reference [ 12 ] estimates that the probability of eventual entry after multiple attempts on a single trip in the 1990s is close to one, indicating almost no deterrence in the earlier period. One piece of evidence in support of this is data on the voluntary return rate, which refers to the percentage of individuals apprehended at the border who are released back to their home country without going through formal removal proceedings and not being subjected to further penalties. Voluntary returns are thus not “punished” and thus are less likely to be deterred from trying to cross the border in the future, compared with individuals who are subjected to stronger penalties. The voluntary return rate has fallen in recent years, from 98% between 2000 and 2004 to 84% between 2005 and 2010. Thus, at least based on this measure deterrence efforts have increased. However, this does not conclusively demonstrate that deterrence was lower in earlier years and it remains a possibility that it was higher, which would tend to reduce our estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants. In conclusion we note that although there is much uncertainty about the border apprehension rate, it would have to be very high, above 60% for earlier years, in order to generate estimates of the 2015 population of undocumented immigrants in the range of the current widely accepted estimate of just over 11 million (this is based on analyzing our model using the conservative estimate values for all other parameters). This seems implausible based on our reading of the literature.

Population outflows

Population outflows are broken into four categories: (I) voluntary emigration; (II) mortality; (III) deportation; and (IV) change of status from unauthorized to lawful.

(I) Voluntary emigration rates are the largest source of outflow and the most uncertain based on limited data availability. It is well accepted that voluntary emigration rates decline sharply with time spent in the country [ 16 ]; thus we employ separate emigration rates for those who have spent one year or less in the U.S., 2-10 years, or longer. We use the following values for our conservative estimate. First, for those who have spent one year or less we assume a voluntary emigration rate of 40%. This estimate is based on data for the first-year visa overstay exit rate (the fraction of overstayers who left the country within one year from the day their visa expired) for 2016 [ 17 ], which is in the lower thirty percent range (the rate for 2015 is similar). We note that the rate for visa overstayers is very likely a substantial overestimate for illegal border crossers, who are widely viewed as having a lower likelihood of exiting in the first year, especially in more recent years [ 12 ]. The 40% first-year emigration rate that we assume is well above the standard values in the literature [ 4 , 12 , 16 , 18 ], which range from 1% to 25%. Hence this assumption contributes to making our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants in the country a conservative one. For years 2-10 we assume a rate of 4% per year. This is the upper bound among estimates in the literature, which lie between 0.01 to 0.04 [ 4 , 16 , 18 ]. Lastly, for years 10 and above, published estimates of the emigration rate typically fall around 1%; we set this rate to 1% per year in line with these estimates. Note that given the extremely high 40% emigration rate that we assume for those who have only been in the country for one year or less, overall annual emigration rates in our model simulation are significantly higher than those found in the literature or government sources. To further enhance the conservatism of our model, we assume that all undocumented immigrants present at the beginning of 1990 have been here for only one year.

For our simulation analysis we divide first-year voluntary emigration into two categories, visa overstayers and illegal border crossers. For visa overstayers we assume the first-year rate falls in the range [.25,.50] (uniform) for each year; based on the discussion in the preceding paragraph and literature cited there, this is a relatively conservative range with midpoint 37.5% above nearly all accepted estimates. For illegal border crossers there is data indicating that first-year voluntary emigration rates vary across cohorts [ 12 ] (we are not aware of such data for visa overstayers). To incorporate this, we assume that a voluntary emigration rate is drawn for each cohort year from a uniform distribution that is specific to that cohort’s year of initial entry; the lower bound of this range is set by the numbers in [ 12 ] and the upper bound is set at 0.50. Again our assumptions here are conservative, since we use an accepted value in the literature as our lower bound and allow emigration rates to range to very high values. For years 2-10 and 10 and above we use the same distributions for overstayers and illegal border crossers. For years 2-10 we draw a value from the range [.01, .05], for which the mean value of 3% is relatively high and thus conservative; and for years 10 and above we draw a value from the range [.005,.02], thus centered slightly above the standard value in the literature. We note that the first-year rate is the most critical for our analysis.

An important issue is circular flow of migrants, which refers to individuals who enter the country, then exit temporarily and re-enter a short time later. There is limited numerical data for circular flow rates. However, it is logical and recognized in the literature [ 12 ] that when border apprehension rates are higher circular flow rates for border crossers tend to diminish: Given it will be more difficult to re-enter the country successfully later, illegal border crossers in the country will tend not to leave for temporary reasons. Thus this issue is important for illegal border crossers (but not likely to be as relevant for visa overstayers). Thus in our simulation we impose a negative correlation between the first-year emigration rate and the border apprehension rate for illegal border crossers; based on our own analysis for annual data from the best recent study [ 12 ] we use a correlation of -0.5 (see the Supporting Information for details). We note that this correlation does not substantially change the range or mean of our simulation results, but does reduce the variance.

(II) The mortality rate applied is the age-adjusted mortality rate reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [ 19 ]. For our conservative estimate we set this value at 0.7 percent, and for the simulation we draw a value from the range [0.5,1.0] percent. We view these values as conservative. Experts in the field argue that this rate overestimates mortality among undocumented immigrants [ 4 ]. To further check that our mortality rate assumptions are an overestimate and thus contribute to making our overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants conservative, we combined the age, gender, and country of birth distributions of undocumented immigrants reported in [ 2 , 20 ] with CDC mortality rates [ 19 ]. The resulting mortality rate is much lower than the mortality rate we assume (see the Supporting Information for details). We note that the mortality rate is low relative to the voluntary emigration rate, and thus a less important parameter for the calculation we make.

Lastly, (III) the annual number of deportations is taken directly from DHS annual statistics [ 11 , 21 ] for each year. (IV) The number of undocumented immigrants who change to legal status in each year is also taken directly from published data [ 4 , 11 ]. We include the number of deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) recipients as population outflows even though such individuals remain technically undocumented, which again serves to underestimate the size of the population.

Simulation methodology

Our simulation is designed to evaluate the range of outcomes the model produces, thus taking into account important sources of variability. There are two main sources of uncertainty: parameter uncertainty, and inherent population variability conditional upon a set of parameter values. We take both sources into account, but note that the first source is the main factor contributing to the variability of the population distribution in the model.

We address parameter uncertainty by establishing ranges for key parameters. As documented above, these key parameters are (i) the visa overstay rate; (ii) the border apprehension rate for individuals attempting to cross the border illegally; (iii) the voluntary emigration rate, which is set separately for illegal border crossers and visa overstayers for the first year and then jointly for years 2-10 and years 10 and above, and for which we establish a cohort-specific range for each annual cohort for the first-year rate for illegal border crossers; and (iv) the mortality rate. For each parameter, we establish a uniform distribution over the set range (and impose a negative correlation between the border apprehension rate and first-year voluntary emigration rate for illegal border crossers). Then, in each simulation run we sample a value for each parameter from its underlying distribution. All of the ranges for the parameter distributions have been specified in the preceding sections. We also sample a value for the initial population of undocumented immigrants in 1990 from a Poisson distribution with a mean of 3.5 million, the most widely accepted estimate of the population of undocumented immigrants as of that date. See the Supporting Information for further details.

To model inherent population uncertainty given a set of parameter values, we impose a Poisson structure on our model. Specifically, the population in a particular year, conditional on a set of parameter values, is represented as the sum of all individuals who have entered the country in previous years and have remained in the country from their year of arrival until the particular year in question. The number of entries (in Poisson terminology, arrivals) in any year is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean dependent upon the underlying parameter values governing apprehension probabilities and visa overstays for that year, while the probability that a new immigrant remains in the country from entry until the particular year in question is determined based on the parameters governing voluntary emigration, mortality, deportation and change-of-status rates. It follows (see the Supporting Information for mathematical details) that the number of individuals who enter the country in any given year and are still in the country at some future date will also follow a Poisson distribution. Further, the number of individuals who enter in any given year and remain in the country at a future time can be considered to be statistically independent given the underlying parameter values (see the Supporting Information for details). Thus, the population of undocumented immigrants in a particular year, which is the sum of those who have entered in past years and are still in the country in the particular year in question, also follows a Poisson distribution, for the sum of independent Poisson random variables is itself Poisson distributed.

We ran 1,000,000 trials simulating the model. For each trial we recorded the total number of undocumented immigrants predicted to be in the U.S. in each year from 1990 through 2016 for that trial.

Following suggestions made by the Academic Editor based on comments made by a reviewer, we performed an additional set of simulations making even more conservative assumptions about net inflows over the period 1990-98. This is the period for which there is significant uncertainty about net inflows of undocumented immigrants. Specifically, we calibrated the model such that the net inflows are half a million per year over this period (in line with the residual method’s estimates during this period) and computed the pooled number of undocumented immigrants at the end of 1998 based on this approach. We then simulated our model forward from that point using the same framework described above.

Fig 1 depicts our results for year 2016, the most recent year for which we are able to produce an estimate. The graph depicts the relative frequency of the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S.; it is a smoothed version of the histogram we generate based on simulating our model 1,000,000 times. The figure also shows our conservative estimate of 16.7 million in Red, and the most widely accepted estimate heretofore of 11.3 million in Blue on the far left. We note that this last estimate is for 2015, but should be comparable since both the estimates based on the survey approach and our modeling approach indicate that the number of undocumented immigrants has remained relatively constant in recent years. Finally, the mean estimate of 22.1 million is shown in black in the center of the distribution. It is clear from the Figure that based on the data we use, our assumptions, and our demographic model, the currently accepted estimate falls outside the range of likely values. And our conservative estimate is indeed conservative based on our modeling approach and parameter ranges, lying at approximately the 2.5th percentile of the probability distribution.

• PPT PowerPoint slide
• PNG larger image
• TIFF original image

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193.g001

Fig 2 displays our simulation results for each year from 1990 through 2016. Our conservative estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants for each year is shown in Red, the most widely accepted estimate (through 2015) is shown in Blue, and the mean value we estimate for each year is shown in Black. The results show that our model estimates follow a similar shaped trajectory as the widely accepted current estimates do, but grow faster and are well above those estimates for every year.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193.g002

The results of our analysis are clear: The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States is estimated to be substantially larger than has been appreciated at least in widely accepted previous estimates. Even an estimate based on what we view as conservative assumptions, in some cases unrealistically so, generates an estimate of 16.7 million, well above the conventional estimate of 11.3 million. The mean of our simulations, which range over more standard but still conservative parameter values, is 22.1 million, essentially twice the current widely accepted estimate; the ninety-five percent probability interval is [16.2,29.5].

Even for the scenario presuming net inflows of 0.5 million per year for 1990-98 our results still exceed the current estimates substantially. The mean estimate is 17.0 million with a 95% probability interval of 13.5 million to 21.1 million. The conservative estimate for this scenario is 14.0 million, still significantly above the widely accepted estimate of 11.3 million.

It is currently fairly widely accepted that there are approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. This estimate, derived from population surveys and legal immigration records, has formed the backdrop for the immigration policy debate in the United States. Using a different approach grounded in operational data, and demographic and mathematical modeling, we have arrived at higher estimates of the undocumented immigrant population.

A possible explanation for the discrepancy in these results is that the survey-based approach taken in [ 2 – 4 ] must surmount two challenges. First, it requires reaching a representative sample of all those born outside of the United States. Second, it requires accurate responses from survey respondents when asked where they were born, and whether they are American citizens. It is plausible that undocumented immigrants are more difficult to locate (and survey) than other foreign-born residents of the United States, and if contacted, undocumented immigrants might misreport their country of origin, citizenship, and/or number of household residents fearing the possible consequences of revealing their true status. Any of these circumstances would lead to underestimating the true number of undocumented immigrants.

Our approach, summarized above and detailed in the Supporting Information, is grounded in fundamental principles of demographic flows. The size of any population can be represented as its initial value plus cumulative inflows minus cumulative outflows. We have specialized this approach to the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, and have drawn upon previously unavailable data. From border apprehensions and visa overstays, it is possible to infer the number of new undocumented arrivals by reversing the flow: how many new arrivals are necessary in order to see the number of apprehensions and visa overstayers observed? Similarly, consideration of deportations, voluntary emigration, mortality and change-of-status enables one to infer the duration of stay in the country from the time of arrival. Together, this logic enables reconstructing the arrival and departure processes governing population inflows and outflows that result in the population of undocumented immigrants in the country.

In developing estimates we have attempted to utilize parameter values that understate inflows and overstate outflows. Our results are most sensitive to the assumptions we make about the probability of border apprehension and the voluntary emigration rates of undocumented immigrants leaving the United States. Further research could explore in greater detail the impact of assumptions about these parameters on estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants. To explore the uncertainty of our estimates we have conducted extension simulations over parameters, simulating 1 million different population trajectories; further research could widen the ranges of parameters and consider additional parameter uncertainty. Further research could also analyze inflows and outflows based on country of origin.

Our results lead us to the conclusion that the widely accepted estimate of 11.3 million undocumented immigrants in the United States is too small. Our model estimates indicate that the true number is likely to be larger, with an estimated ninety-five percent probability interval ranging from 16.2 to 29.5 million undocumented immigrants.

Supporting information

S1 file. supporting material..

Contains the mathematical model, parameter values, and data sources underlying the model.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193.s001

S2 File. Excel file.

The spreadsheet used to calculate the conservative estimate.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193.s002

• 1. Krogstad JM, Passel JS. 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the US. Pew Research Center, Washington, DC; 2017. Available from: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ .
• 2. Baker B, Rytina N. Estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States: January 2012. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC; 2013. Available from: https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/population-estimates/unauthorized-resident .
• 3. Passel JS. Measuring illegal immigration: How Pew Research Center counts unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC; 2016. Available from: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/20/measuring-illegal-immigration-how-pew-research-center-counts-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-u-s/ .
• View Article
• PubMed/NCBI
• Google Scholar
• 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report DHS Report; 2017. Available from: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/entryexit-overstay-report .
• 6. U.S. Department of State. Classes of Nonimmigrants Issued Visas; 1990-2016. Available from: https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html .
• 7. Passel JS. Modes of entry for the unauthorized migrant population. Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC; 2006. Available from: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-for-the-unauthorized-migrant-population/ .
• 10. Bailey JW, Burns SK, Eisler DF, Fletcher CC, Frazier TP, Gould BR, et al. Assessing Southern Border Security. Department of Homeland Security, Washington DC; 2016. Available from: https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/Border-Crossing-Stats-Report.pdf .
• 11. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics; 2016. Available from: https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook .
• 14. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Staffing Statistics; 1992-2016. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats .
• 15. Roberts B, Hanson G, Cornwell D, Borger S. An analysis of migrant smuggling costs along the southwest border. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC; 2010. Available from: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-wp.pdf
• 17. Visa Overstays: a gap in the nation’s border security. U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee Hearing, Washington, DC; 2017. Available from: https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/visa-overstays-gap-nations-border-security/
• 18. Bhaskar R, Arenas-Germosén B, Dick C. Demographic analysis 2010: Sensitivity analysis of the foreign-born migration component. US Census Bureau Population Division Working Paper 98; 2013. Available from: https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2013/demo/POP-twps0098.pdf .
• 20. Passel JS, Cohn D. A portrait of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Pew Research Center, Washington, DC; 2009. Available from: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/a-portrait-of-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/ .
• 21. Tracking Immigration and Customs Enforcement Removals. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., New York; 2017. Available from: http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/remove .

• Browse All Articles
• Newsletter Sign-Up

Immigration →

• 16 Aug 2024
• In Practice

Election 2024: What's at Stake for Business and the Workplace?

Immigration, climate change, health care, and personal freedoms are just a few of the issues that US presidential candidates—and voters—will spar over. Harvard Business School faculty members discuss the potential implications of these issues on businesses, and provide advice for maintaining civility at work.

• 06 Aug 2024

What the World Could Learn from America's Immigration Backlash—100 Years Ago

Immigration concerns are shaping elections around the world, but these fears have been around for centuries. Mining data from US history, Marco Tabellini explores how immigration has actually changed communities, and offers advice for policymakers trying to move forward.

• 06 Jun 2024
• Research & Ideas

How Younger Immigrants Gain an Edge in American Business

Immigrants often struggle to acquire both higher education and good jobs after migrating to a new country. A study by William Kerr finds that the age they arrive is key, with the teen years being ideal for achieving future success.

• 11 Apr 2024

Why Progress on Immigration Might Soften Labor Pains

Long-term labor shortages continue to stoke debates about immigration policy in the United States. We asked Harvard Business School faculty members to discuss what's at stake for companies facing talent needs, and the potential scenarios on the horizon.

• 08 May 2023

How Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Crushed Crowdfunding for Minority Entrepreneurs

When public anxiety about immigration surges, Black, Asian, and Hispanic inventors have a harder time raising funds for new ideas on Kickstarter, says research by William Kerr. What can platforms do to confront bias in entrepreneurial finance?

• 14 Feb 2023

Is Sweden Still 'Sweden'? A Liberal Utopia Grapples with an Identity Crisis

Changing political views and economic forces have threatened Sweden's image of liberal stability. Is it the end of the Scandinavian business-welfare model as we know it? In a case study, Debora Spar examines recent shifts in Sweden and what they mean for the country's future.

• 01 Nov 2022
• What Do You Think?

Why Aren’t Business Leaders More Vocal About Immigration Policy?

Immigration fuels the American economy, feeds the talent pool, and can directly affect company performance. And yet few executives and entrepreneurs have waded into the policy dialogue, says James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 30 Mar 2021
• Working Paper Summaries

Whose Job Is It Anyway? Co-Ethnic Hiring in New US Ventures

The impact of immigration has been particularly sharp in entrepreneurship, yet there is remarkably little evidence about how immigration in the workplace connects to the creation and scaling of new firms. The economic consequences of greater workplace and entrepreneurial diversity deserve closer attention.

• 11 Jan 2021

The Political Effects of Immigration: Culture or Economics?

This paper reviews and explains the growing literature focused on the political effects of immigration, and highlights fruitful avenues for future research. When compared to potential labor market competition and other economic forces, broadly defined cultural factors have a stronger political and social impact.

• 03 Nov 2020

An Executive Order Worth $100 Billion: The Impact of an Immigration Ban’s Announcement on Fortune 500 Firms’ Valuation

President Trump’s executive order restricting entry of temporary foreign workers to the United States negatively affected the valuation of 471 publicly traded Fortune 500 firms by an estimated $100 billion. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.

• 15 Jun 2020

The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States

Researchers test the relationship between historical immigration to the United States and political ideology today.

• 11 May 2020

Immigration Policies Threaten American Competitiveness

At this time of crisis, America risks signaling to global innovators and entrepreneurs that they have no future here, says William R. Kerr. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 21 Apr 2020

Changing In-group Boundaries: The Role of New Immigrant Waves in the US

How do new immigrants affect natives’ views of other minority groups? This work studies the evolution of group boundaries in the United States and indicates that whites living in states receiving more Mexican immigrants recategorize blacks as in-group members, because of the inflow of a new, “affectively” more distant group.

• 06 Apr 2020

Where Do Workers Go When the Robots Arrive?

Marco Tabellini and colleagues investigate where workers go after losing their jobs to automation and Chinese imports. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 17 Feb 2020

The Impact of Technology and Trade on Migration: Evidence from the US

Labor mobility can re-equilibrate local labor markets after an economic shock. Both robot adoption and Chinese import competition between 1990 and 2015 caused large declines in manufacturing employment across US local labor markets (commuting zones, CZs). However, only robots were associated with a decline in CZ population, which resulted from reduced in-migration rather than by increased out-migration.

• 01 Jan 2020

Why Not Open America's Doors to All the World’s Talent?

SUMMING UP: The H-1B visa program is exploited by some employers to replace high-paid talent, but that doesn't mean foreign workers should be shut out of working in the United States, according to many of James Heskett's readers. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 19 Jun 2019

Migrant Inventors and the Technological Advantage of Nations

This study provides robust econometric evidence for how immigrant inventors shape the innovation dynamics of their receiving countries. Countries receiving inventors from other nations that specialize in patenting particular technologies are more likely to have a significant increase in patent applications of the same technology.

• 08 Jun 2019

The Gift of Global Talent: Innovation Policy and the Economy

High-skilled workers in today’s knowledge-based economy are arguably the most important resource to the success of businesses, regions, and industries. This chapter pulls from Kerr’s book The Gift of Global Talent to examine the migration dynamics of high-skilled individuals. He argues that improving our knowledge of high-skilled migration can lead to better policy decisions.

• 07 Feb 2019

Immigrant Networking and Collaboration: Survey Evidence from CIC

This study compares United States-born and immigrant entrepreneurs’ use of networking opportunities provided by CIC, the former Cambridge Innovation Center. Immigrants clearly take more advantage of networking opportunities at CIC, especially around the exchange of advice. It remains to be seen whether this generates long-term performance advantages for immigrants.

• 01 Nov 2018

Forecasting Airport Transfer Passenger Flow Using Real-Time Data and Machine Learning

Passengers arriving at international hubs often endure delays, especially at immigration and security. This study of London’s Heathrow Airport develops a system to provide real-time information about transfer passengers’ journeys through the airport to better serve passengers, airlines, and their employees. It shows how advanced machine learning could be accessible to managers.

• Search Menu
• Sign in through your institution
• Advance articles
• Collections
• Editor's Choice
• Supplements
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access
• About Journal of Travel Medicine
• About the International Society of Travel Medicine
• Editorial Board
• Advertising and Corporate Services
• Journals Career Network
• Self-Archiving Policy
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

Article Contents

• < Previous

Definitions matter: migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

P Douglas, M Cetron, P Spiegel, Definitions matter: migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, Journal of Travel Medicine , Volume 26, Issue 2, 2019, taz005, https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taz005

• Permissions Icon Permissions

Migration, or movement of people, has been referred to as the third wave of globalization, following goods and capital. This phenomenon is growing in scope, complexity and impact. Human migration across borders is now at an all-time high, accounting for more than 258 million people or 3.4% of the population, a number that has doubled since 2000 1 and tripled since the 1970s. Human mobility is not, however, a new phenomenon. Migration has been constant in human history and has long been related to livelihoods, culture and disasters, with some of the earliest recordings demonstrated through petroglyphs in Azerbaijan, some 10 000 years old, depicting humans on the move. 2

But if migration is so old, why does the meaning of the term ‘migrant’ vary among groups as divergent from the public, practitioners, to policymakers and experts? More so, if migrants travel different pathways, with different social determinants that are inextricably linked to health, how important is it for health professionals to have a clear definition and understanding of what a migrant is?

While the term refugee is precisely defined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 3 and the 1967 Protocol, 3 migrants are a heterogeneous group with no international consensus. An immigrant is the term used for a person after arriving in the destination country, whereas emigrant is one who migrates away. Migrant is a more neutral term as it disregards the direction of movement and may include migration within or across borders. 4

Migrants can be defined in legal, administrative, research and statistical perspectives. They can be distinguished as to motives of those concerned such as economic, family reunion, or safety. Migration events can be defined in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence or duration of stay. 5 Different states refer to legal migration as regular, controlled or free migration.

Some migration terminology, adapted from IOM glossary on Migration and OECD, glossary of statistical terms

These technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants are informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, temporal and other factors. Moreover, the lack of agreed consensus of other migrant typologies such as short-term, circular, asylum seekers, irregular and transit migrants, as well as trafficked persons, has been highlighted as creating difficulties in the measurement of international migration. 8 The lack of consensus in definitions means that the public perception of states being flooded with asylum seekers (‘migrants’) in a world where national borders are disappearing, with transnational communities, vested only in economic interests and political populism, means the humanitarian aspects to migration are diluted.

As such, for health workers there is value in defining a migrant. First, it allows us to better understand migrant communities and migration patterns, limiting contradictory or misleading information, allowing comparability of migration statistics among countries and evidence-based programme and policymaking. The great diversity among migrants, from country of birth, migration patterns and reasons for migration as well as cultural, socio-economic status, educational, occupational and language backgrounds, has important underlying health risks and status.

Second, by having a clear understanding of the term migrant and its various categories, we can better address their safety and health. Concerns for migrants’ safety and rights have grown at the international level, demonstrated by the September 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 9 ; and the 2018 Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, which focuses on these two issues is an indicator of the heightened concerns regarding unsafe , disorderly and irregular migration.

Third, despite the adoption of the World Health Assembly Resolution on the Health of Migrants 10 and the recognition by the development community that health is central to sustainable development, health ministries have not been central to the debate on migration and development. A multi-sectoral participation in the global migration and development debate is required, including the participation of national ministries of health along with other sectors such as labour, social protection, immigration and law enforcement. The perception that ‘health’ should be siloed to health specialists, even though many of the causes and solutions to improve migrants’ health are found in other sectors, hampers the overall well-being of migrants

Migration touches all States and people in an era of transnationalism. Migration is intertwined with geopolitics, trade and cultural exchange and provides opportunities for States, businesses and communities to benefit enormously. Migration has helped improve people’s lives in both origin and destination countries and has offered opportunities for millions of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives abroad as well as contributing enormously to those societies. At this critical time in history, with increasing global migration, the highest level of forced migration in seven decades, in the context of the escalating divisive and xenophobic political discourse, rather than pursuing the globalization of indifference, as medical professionals we need to advocate and promote evidence-based discussions on migrant health issues. Through clearly understanding the term migrant and the various typologies, we are more likely to shape well-constructed solutions to meet the health and well-being needs of migrant populations, taking into consideration the circumstances and conditions of their journey and the reasons for movement.

Conflict of interest: None declared.

UNDP, Population Facts, Dec 2017 , http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationPopFacts20175.pdf

Cherry JF , Leppard TP . Experimental archaeology and the earliest seagoing: The limitations of inference . World Archaeol 2015 ; 47 : 740 – 55 .

Google Scholar

UN, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 189, 2545.

UN DESA, Recommendations on International Migration Statistics, 1998 .

de Beer J , Raymer J , van der Erf R , van Wissen L . Overcoming the problems of inconsistent international migration data: a new method applied to Europe . Eur J Popul 2010 ; 26 : 459 – 81 .

McAuliffe , M , and Ruhs (Eds), IOM, World Migration Report http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf

UN, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, United Nations, Treaty Series , Vol. 2220, p. 3; Doc. A/RES/45/158.

Economic Commission for Europe, Conference on European Statisticians, Measuring hard-to-count Migrant Populations, October 2012 www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.10/2012/WP_9_UNECE.pdf

UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, October 2016 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_1.pdf

WHO , WHA 61.17 Health of Migrants 2008 , pp. 43–45. http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/wha61-rec1/a61_rec1-en.pdf .

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• Recommend to your Library

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1708-8305
• Copyright © 2024 International Society of Travel Medicine
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Migration Research - Science topic

• Recruit researchers
• Join for free
• Login Email Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google Welcome back! Please log in. Email · Hint Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google No account? Sign up

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• HHS Author Manuscripts

Immigration to the United States: Recent Trends and Future Prospects +

Charles hirschman.

University of Washington

Almost 13 per cent of the American population is foreign born, and if the children of the foreign born are included, about 1 in 4 Americans can be counted as part of the recent immigrant community. Although there is lingering prejudice and popular fears of immigrants, there is growing evidence that, on balance, immigrants make a positive contribution to the American economy and society. There is little evidence that immigrants have an adverse impact on the wages and employment of native born Americans. Moreover, immigrants and their children are disproportionately represented in a broad variety of scientific and cultural fields.

1. Introduction

The United States is, once again, in the midst of an age of immigration. In 2010, there were 40 million foreign-born persons living in the United States ( Grieco et al. 2012 ). Of the 220 million international migrants in the world in 2010—defined as persons living outside their country of birth—almost one in five were residents in the United States ( UN Population Division 2013 ). An even larger number, upwards of 75 million persons in the United States—almost one quarter of the current resident American population— is part of the immigrant community, defined as foreign born and the children of the foreign born ( U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010 ). 1

In spite of lingering prejudice and discrimination against immigrants, most Americans are beginning to acknowledge the positive contributions of immigrants. These beliefs are partially rooted in the historical image of the United States as a ‘nation of immigrants.’ The story that America was populated by peoples seeking economic opportunity, fleeing injustice or oppression in their homeland, and hoping for a better life for their children has a strong grip on the American immigration. Moreover, there is a growing body of research that shows that most immigrants do assimilate to American society and that immigration has net positive impacts on the American economy, society, and culture.

In this paper, I survey the trends in immigration to the United States with a focus on the most recent period—the Post 1965 Wave of Immigration, named for the reforms in immigration law that were enacted in the late 1960s as part of the Civil Rights revolution. I also review recent research on the demographic, economic, social, and cultural impact of immigration on American society.

2. Trends in Immigration to the United States

Figure 1 shows the history of the absolute and relative levels of the foreign born population in the United States. The histogram—the solid bars—shows the numbers (in millions) of foreign born persons in the country from 1850 to 2012. The foreign born includes everyone who is born outside the United States, including students and workers residing here temporarily. This category also includes many undocumented immigrants—those residing in the country illegally. The curved line shows the ratio of foreign born persons to the total US population in each decennial census from 1850 to 2000 and the comparable figures for recent years from the American Community Survey.

Source: US Bureau of Census, Census of Population, 1850–2000 (in Gibson and Jung, 2006 ), and American Community Survey, 2010.

The absolute number of the foreign born population rose rapidly from the mid-19th century through the early decades of the 20th century—popularly known as the ‘Age of Mass Migration.’ With the cessation of large-scale immigration after 1924, the absolute numbers of foreign born declined to below 10 million by 1970. With the renewal of immigration in recent decades, the number of foreign born persons has risen dramatically and is currently around 40 million.

The visibility of the foreign born—at work, in schools, and in neighbourhoods—is measured by the proportion of foreign born to the total population, that is, the curved line in Figure 1 . It is to be noted that the contemporary presence of immigrants is actually less than it was in the early 20 th century. For most of the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, the foreign born constituted around 14 to 15 per cent of the American population. Then, during the middle decades of the 20 th century, the figure dropped precipitously to below 5 per cent in 1970. With the renewal of mass immigration after 1965, the percent foreign born is currently 13 per cent of the total population. While this figure is high relative to the period from 1950 to 1970, it is slightly below the proportion of foreign born for much of American history.

The ‘Post-1965 Immigration Wave,’ was named for the 1965 immigration law that repealed the ‘national origins quotas’ enacted in the 1920s. These quotas were considered discriminatory by the children and grandchildren of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, and the 1965 immigration legislation was part of the reforms of the Civil Rights era. The advocates of reform in the 1960s were not pushing for a major new wave of immigration; they expected a small increase in the number of arrivals from Italy, Greece, and a few other European countries, as families that were divided by the immigration restrictions of the 1920s were allowed to be reunited ( Reimrs 1985 : Chap. 3).

Family reunification and scarce occupational skills were the primary criteria for admission under the 1965 Act ( Keely 1979 ). The new preference system allowed highly skilled professionals, primarily doctors, nurses, and engineers from Asian countries, to immigrate and eventually to sponsor their families. About the same time, and largely independently of the 1965 Act, immigration from Latin America began to rise. Legal and undocumented migration from Mexico surged after a temporary farm worker programme, known as the Bracero Programme, ended in 1964 ( Massey, Durand and Malone 2002 ). There have also been major waves of immigration to the United States with the fall of regimes supported by American political and military interventions abroad, including Cuba, Vietnam, and Central America. Each of these streams of immigrant and refugee inflows has spawned secondary waves of immigration as family members have followed.

3. Characteristics of the Post-1965 Wave of Immigrants

Most of the immigrants who arrived from 1880 to 1920 during the Age of Mass Migration were from Southern and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Germany, Poland, and Russia. Many of these ‘new’ immigrants in the early 20 th century were considered to be distinctly different from the older stock of white Americans in terms of language, religion, and in their potential for assimilation into American society. Popular opposition to immigration in the early 20 th century led to the laws of the 1920s that sharply restricted immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. There were much smaller waves of immigration from China and Japan, but even stronger opposition ended Asian immigration in the late 19 th and early 20 th century.

When the doors to immigration were opened again in the years after 1965, only small numbers of Europeans arrived. The major regions of origin in the Post-1965 Wave of Immigration are Latin America and Asia. More than 11 million—about 30 per cent of all immigrants (foreign born)—are from Mexico, one of the nearest neighbours of the United States. Another 20 per cent of immigrants are from other countries in Latin America, with the largest numbers from Central America and the Caribbean. Migrants from Puerto Rico are domestic migrants, not immigrants, since Puerto Rico is an American territory and all Puerto Ricans are American citizens at birth.

About one quarter of the foreign-born are from Asia, and the relative share of Asian immigrants has risen in recent years. One of the hallmarks of contemporary Asian immigration is its diversity—almost every country in Asia is represented in the American immigrant population. The largest Asian immigrant communities in the U. S. are from China, India, and the Philippines, but there are also considerable numbers from Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

In the 1970s and 1980s, most ‘new immigrants’ settled in the West and East coast states, and a few other selected states, including Texas, Florida, and Illinois. About 40 per cent of all immigrants lived in California and New York. In the 1990s and 2000s, immigrants increasingly began settling in new destinations including smaller towns in the Midwest and Southeast. The majority of immigrants still live in California, New York, and other traditional destinations, but industries are attracting immigrant labour to many other regions. In addition to the high tech sectors and universities that attract highly skilled immigrants, less skilled immigrants are drawn to agriculture, food processing, and manufacturing industries that are often shunned by native born workers.

The distribution of education among recent immigrants to the United States is bimodal. The largest group of immigrants, particularly those from Mexico and Central America, has less education, on average, than the native-born American population. Less education, however, is not equivalent to unskilled labour. Many immigrants without a high school degree are able to work in the skilled construction industry, nursing homes caring for the elderly, and in the service sectors in restaurants, hotels, and gardening.

At the other end of the educational continuum are the highly educated immigrant streams from Taiwan, India, Iran, and many African countries. Almost half of Asian immigrants have a university degree compared to only a third of native born Americans. Many of these highly skilled immigrants fill key niches in the high tech sector, higher education, and many professional fields.

4. Popular Fears of Too Much Immigration

Existing alongside the pride of having immigrant grandparents (or great-grandparents) in the ‘nation of immigrants,’ many Americans fear that the United States has more immigrants than the country can absorb and assimilate. There are widespread popular beliefs that immigrants take jobs that would otherwise go to native born Americans and that the wages of native born workers are depressed by the presence of immigrant workers. Beyond the economic argument, many Americans also think that the presence of immigrants, especially large numbers of immigrants from ‘third world’ countries, are a threat to American values, culture, and institutions ( Bouvier 1992 ; Brimelow 1995 ; Huntington 2004 ). These sentiments have given rise to an anti-immigrant lobby that includes political leaders, TV and radio talk-show pundits, social movement organisations, including public interest organisations that publish reports and policy briefs, as well as unauthorised militia groups that patrol the U.S. Mexican border, such as the ‘Minutemen’.

Neither the presence of large numbers of immigrants nor the exaggerated claims about the negative impact of immigration are new phenomena. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin complained about the Germans in Pennsylvania and their reluctance to learn English ( Archdeacon 1983 : 20; Jones 1992 : 39–40). Based on a campaign of fear about the political dangers of unchecked immigration, primarily Irish Catholics, the ‘Know-Nothing’Party elected six governors, dominated several state legislatures, and sent a bloc of representatives to Congress in 1855. During World War I, Americans who wanted to retain their German-American identity were forced to be ‘100 percent Americans’ and to give up their language and culture ( Higham 1988 : Chap. 8).

In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, Chinese and Japanese migrants who worked as railroad and agricultural labourers were targeted by nativist groups who feared that Asian immigrants would harm the economic status of native workers and contaminate the ‘racial purity’ of the nation ( Hing 1993 : 22). The passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was the first major step toward a closed society. After the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, Japanese migrants became a new source of cheap labour on the West coast and Hawaii. Japanese immigration was targeted by the same groups that opposed Chinese immigrants.

Southern and Eastern European groups also faced an increasingly hostile context of reception as their numbers swelled at the turn of the twentieth century. A number of formal organisations sprang up among old line New England elites to campaign against the continued immigration of ‘undesirables’ from Europe ( Higham 1988 ; Jones 1992 : Chap. 9). After a long political struggle, Congress passed restrictive laws in the early 1920s that stopped almost all immigration except from Northwestern Europe.

5. Do Immigrants Assimilate into American Society?

In spite of the fears that immigrants are resistant to learning English and refuse to join the American mainstream, there is a large body of social science and historical research which concludes that immigrants have, by and large, assimilated to American society ( Alba 1990 , Alba and Nee 2003 ; Duncan and Duncan 1968 ; Lieberson 1980 ). This does not mean that assimilation was painless, automatic, or immediate. For the first generation of immigrants who arrived as adults, the processes of linguistic, cultural, and social change were painful and usually incomplete. Immigrants tend to settle in ethnic enclaves, prefer to speak their mother tongue, and gravitate to places of worship and social events that provide cultural continuity with their origins ( Handlin 1973 ; Portes and Rumbaut 2006 ). Many immigrants do learn English and find employment in the general economy, but few feel completely part of their new society. In the early decades of the 20 th century, evidence pointed to the slow and incomplete assimilation of the then ‘new’ immigrants ( Pagnini and Morgan 1990 ).

With the passage of time, and especially following the emergence of the second generation, there was unmistakable evidence of assimilation among the descendants of early 20 th century European immigrants. Acculturated through their attendance at American schools, the children of immigrants did not share the ambivalence of their immigrant parents. The second generation spoke fluent English and was eager to join the American mainstream. By all measures, including socio-economic status, residential mobility, and intermarriage, they left behind the ethnic world of their immigrant parents ( Alba and Nee 2003 ; Lieberson 1980 ). By the 1950s, patterns of suburbanisation broke down ethnic neighborhoods and intermarriage became more common ( Alba and Nee 2003 ; Lieberson and Waters 1988 ).

Although it is widely assumed that immigrants in the Post-1965 Immigration Wave are less likely to assimilate than those who arrived in the early 20 th century, there is growing evidence that the new immigrants, especially their children, are doing remarkably well ( Alba and Nee 2003 ; Kasinitz et al. 2008 ). On average, second generation immigrants are less likely to drop out of high school and more likely to attend college than the average native born American ( Hirschman 2001 ; White and Glick 2009 ). Intermarriage is also common: recent research estimates that one-third to one-half of second generation Hispanics and Asians marry outside of their community ( Duncan and Trejo 2007 ; Min and Kim 2009 ). The children of contemporary immigrants are on track for assimilation and upward mobility at about the same pace as the descendants of earlier waves of immigration from Europe.

6. The Impact of Immigration on America

There are widespread popular beliefs, including many influential voices within public policy circles, which argue that immigration is harmful to the economic welfare of the country, especially to native born Americans ( Borjas 1994 ; Bouvier 1992 ; Briggs 1984 ; Brimelow 1995 ). The central claim is that immigrants, because they are willing to work for lower wages, take jobs from native born American workers. Competition from immigrant workers is expected to depress wages, especially in the low-skilled labour market ( Borjas 1989 ). Finally, immigrants are thought to be an economic burden because they disproportionately receive public benefits, such as health care, schooling, and welfare without paying their fair share of taxes. These claims, however, are not supported by empirical evidence.

The definitive statement on the economic consequences of immigration was the 1997 report of the National Research Council (NRC) panel on the demographic and economic impacts of immigration, which drew on the theoretical and empirical research conducted by leading specialists in labour economics and public finance ( Smith and Edmonston 1997 ; 1998 , also see Card 1990 ; 2005 ). The major conclusion of the NRC report was that the net effects of immigration on the American economy were very modest. Immigration does expand labour supply and may increase competition for jobs and lower wages for native workers who are substitutes for immigrants, but immigration also expands total production (national income) and increases the incomes that accrue to native born workers who are complements to immigrants ( Smith and Edmondson 1997 : Chap. 4). Although some native born workers may compete for the same jobs as immigrants, many more may be complements to immigrants. This means that the arrival of unskilled immigrant labour may ‘push up’, rather than ‘push out’, many native born workers ( Haines 2000 : 202; Lieberson 1980 : Chap. 10). Moreover, many native born workers have direct or indirect income from capital through their savings, ownership of property, and as recipients of pension programmes.

The most likely reason for a lack of empirical support for the presumed negative impact of immigration is the questionable assumption that the only impact of additional workers (immigrants) on the labour market is through wage competition. The presence of immigrants has broader effects on economic growth, both locally and nationally, that leads to rising wage levels for native born workers. Among the potential mechanisms are increased national savings, entrepreneurship and small business development, a faster rate of inventive activity and technological innovation, and increasing economies of scale, both in the production and consumer markets ( Carter and Sutch 1999 ). There is a long-standing hypothesis in economic history that high levels of immigration stimulates economic growth by increasing demand for housing, urban development, and other amenities ( Easterlin 1968 ). A recent study found that immigration provided the necessary labour supply for the rapid growth of manufacturing during the American Industrial Revolution from 1880 to 1920 ( Hirschman and Mogford 2009 ).

Another major economic issue addressed by the 1997 NRC report was the impact of immigration on the governmental fiscal system—the balance between taxes paid and the value of government services received ( Clune 1998 ; Garvey and Espendshade 1998 ; Lee and Miller 1998 ; Smith and Edmonston 1997 : Chaps. 6 & 7). The NRC researchers report that the average native born household in New Jersey and California pays more in state and local taxes as a result of the presence of immigrants ( Smith and Edmonston 1997 : Chap. 6). These results are largely determined by the lower wages of immigrants and the demographic composition of immigrant households, which tend to be younger and have more children than the native born population. The largest component of local and state government budgets is schooling, and immigrant households, with more children per household than native born households, are disproportionately beneficiaries of state support for schooling.

Despite potential imbalances in the net transfer of revenues at the local and state level, an accounting of the federal fiscal system shows that immigrants (and their descendants) contribute more in taxes than they receive in benefits ( Smith and Edmonston 1997 : Chap. 7). Just as the age structure of immigrant households makes them disproportionately the beneficiaries of public education, the relative youth of immigrants also means they are less likely be beneficiaries of Social Security and Medicare (and Medicaid for many of the institutionalised elderly). Immigrants also help to relieve the per-capita fiscal burden of native born for the national debt, national security, and public goods, which are major federal expenditures that are only loosely tied to population size. An intergenerational accounting that counts the future taxes paid by the children of immigrants concludes that immigration helps, rather than hurts, the nation’s fiscal balance ( Lee and Miller 1998 ; Smith and Edmonston 1997 ; Chap. 7).

6.1 The Role of Immigration on the Advancement of Science, Technology and Higher Education

Scientific progress is a major source of modern economic growth, increasing longevity and other features of modern development that enhance the quality of life in the United States. It is frequently claimed that American economic development has been fostered by government investments in scientific and technological innovation in the industrial sector, as well as in universities and research institutes. How might immigration also affect scientific progress? Perhaps the most direct link is the migration of scientists from other countries and the high educational attainment of immigrants and their children.

Albert Einstein, perhaps the most eminent American scientist of the 20 th century, was a refugee from Nazi Germany. There are many other examples of distinguished scientists, researchers, academics, and entrepreneurs who arrived in the United States as students who pursued their talents in American universities and/or industry, including Enrico Fermi, Edward Teller, and Hans Bethe, the fathers of the atomic age, Elias Zerhouni, former director of the National Institutes of Health, and Andrew Grove, Jerry Yang, and Sergey Brin, the engineering entrepreneurs who led the American transition to the digital age. From 1990 to 2004, over one-third of US scientists who had received Nobel Prizes were foreign born ( Wulf 2006 ; also see Smith and Edmonston 1977 : 384–385).

The impact of immigration on the development of science in the United States is more than the story of a relatively open door for immigrants who are exceptionally talented scientists and engineers. Over the last four decades, American universities have played an important role in training immigrants and the children of immigrants to become scientists. Foreign students have become increasingly central to American higher education, particularly in graduate education in engineering and the sciences. After graduating with advanced degrees from American universities, many foreign students return to their home countries, but a significant share is attracted to employment opportunities in American universities, laboratories, and industries. Many of the foreign students who have become permanent residents or US citizens go on to make important contributions to the development of American science and engineering.

Several recent studies have found that foreign-born scientists and engineers are playing a critical role in in American universities, laboratories, and scientific industries ( Stephan and Levin 2007 ; Sana 2010 ). Foreign-born scientists and engineers are also over-represented among members of elected honorific societies such as the National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences, and among the authors of highly cited academic papers ( Stephan and Levin 2007 ). During the last decades of the twentieth century, immigrant entrepreneurs formed a significant contingent of all founders of US high-technology start-ups, particularly in Silicon Valley ( Saxenian 2001 ). One recent study estimates that one in four technology firms started in the United States between 1995 and 2005 was founded by at least one foreign-born entrepreneur ( Wadwha et al. 2007 ).

6.2 The Impact of Immigrants on the Evolution of American Institutions

All other things being equal, most societies, communities, organisations and cultures tend to resist change, especially from outside sources. The truism that ‘people prefer that which is familiar’ is reinforced by persons with authority, power, and status, who generally shape cultural expectations to revere conformity more than innovation. This pattern, an ‘ideal type’ to be sure, is especially common in traditional rural areas, among multi-generational families, and in religious and cultural organisations.

There are, of course, many exceptions to this pattern, especially during eras of rapid technological and social change, wartime, and other times of catastrophe. The simple proposition of cultural continuity helps to explain the generally conservative nature of intergenerational socialisation and the ubiquity of ethnocentrism—beliefs that value insiders and traditional culture more than outsiders. In traditional (and in many modern) societies, immigrants are feared because they might potentially challenge the existing social arrangements as well as familiar cultural patterns.

All things have not been equal during much of American history. The United States has received about 75 million immigrants since record-keeping began in 1820. This relatively open door was due to a confluence of interests, both external and internal. As modernisation spread throughout the Old World during the 18 th and 19 th centuries, the (relatively) open frontier beckoned the landless and others seeking economic betterment. These patterns culminated in the early 20 th century, when more than one million immigrants arrived annually—a level that is only being rivaled by contemporary levels of immigration. American economic and political institutions also gained from immigration. Immigrant settlement helped to secure the frontier as well as to provide labour for nation-building projects, including transportation networks of roads, canals, and railroads. During the era of industrialisation, immigrant labour provided a disproportionate share of workers for the dirty and dangerous jobs in mining and manufacturing ( Hirschman and Mogford 2009 ).

In spite of the national tradition of mass immigration, new arrivals have rarely received a welcome reception. The conservative backlash against immigrants has been a perennial theme of American history. During the Age of Mass Migration, the negative reaction against immigrants was not simply a response from the parochial masses, but also a project led by conservative intellectuals. Long before immigration restrictions were implemented in the 1920s, there was a particularly virulent campaign against the ‘new’ immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. Most of these immigrants were Catholics and Jews—religious and cultural traditions that were thought to be in conflict with the traditional ascendancy of white Protestants of English ancestry.

As most Northeastern and Midwestern cities became dominated by immigrants (both first and second generations) in the late 19 th century, many elite old-stock American families and communities created barriers to protect their ‘aristocratic’ status and privileges against newcomers ( Higham 1988 ). Residential areas became ‘restricted,’ college fraternities and sororities limited their membership, and many social clubs and societies only allowed those with the right pedigrees and connections to be admitted ( Baltzell 1964 ). Barriers to employment for minorities, especially Jews, were part of the culture of corporate law firms and elite professions ( Auerbach 1975 : Chap. 2). In the early 20 th century, many elite private universities were notorious for their quotas for Jewish students and their refusal to hire Jews and other minorities ( Baltzell 1964 : 336; Karabel 2006 ). In some cases, these quotas persisted until the 1960s.

Given this history, how were immigrants and their children able to make such impressive achievements to American science, arts, and culture? Part of the solution to this puzzle is that immigrants, and especially their children, were pulled into self-employment and new sectors of the economy where there was less discrimination. As noted above, prestigious organisations that celebrated tradition tended to be closed to outsiders. The early 20 th century was an era of rapid demographic, economic, and technological change. Rapid social change creates more flexibility and openness for outsiders to be absorbed into mainstream institutions.

The market for cultural and artistic performances was greatly expanded with the growth of cities in the early 20 th century. A significant share of the urban population, the potential consumers of art and culture, were of immigrant stock. The most important development of this era was the motion picture industry—a new form of the performing arts. In the 1920s, immigrant risk-takers, primarily Eastern European Jewish immigrants, transformed the fledgling motion picture industry with the development of large Hollywood studios. Although the new Hollywood moguls sought to create movies that appealed to mass audiences and ignored any hint of ethnicity or religion, their presence may have minimised traditional prejudices and discrimination among those who worked in Hollywood. Irving Howe characterised the openness of the performing arts (and sports) to talented outsiders:

… “the (entertainment industry) brushed aside claims of rank and looked only for the immediate promise of talent. Just as blacks would later turn to baseball and basketball knowing that here at least their skin color counted for less than their skills, so in the early 1900s, young Jews broke into vaudeville because here too, people asked not, who are you? but, what can you do?”

This openness is reinforced in fields and professions where talent and accomplishment are clearly recognised and visible, including professional sports and universities. Prior to World War II, competition was restricted in many institutions with barriers to admission and hiring. Professional baseball was closed to African Americans and elite universities restricted the admission of Jews and other minorities. In spite of these tendencies, many American institutions have become more open and meritocratic over the 20 th century. Baseball and other professional sports were integrated before most other institutions, including public school education. In recent decades, American professional sports have become more global, with a growing participation of talented international players. This trend is driven, in large part, by competition. Sports fans want winning teams, and large audiences increase revenues. The owners and management of sports teams respond to market pressures by recruitment of talented players from other countries. Similar processes are at work in universities and scientific organisations. More talented researchers generate more grants, more patents, and more commercial applications of scientific discoveries. The global search for talented graduate students and researchers by elite American universities and research organisations is driven by competitive pressures that have accelerated in recent decades. Other fields where merit is relatively easy to measure, such as in classical musical performance, have also become part of a global employment market.

There are similar competitive pressures in many American corporations and business for talented employees, but there are certainly wide variations depending on the pace of technological change, international market competition, and the ability to measure merit. Traditional manufacturing sectors of the economy, automobiles for example, may focus more on continuity, advertising, and efficiency than technological innovation. Other sectors, such as the electronic and computing industry are more at the forefront of technological innovation and international competition. It seems likely that these more competitive sectors, perhaps exemplified by Silicon Valley, would be the most meritocratic and willing to hire outsiders—immigrants and foreign students who have the necessary skills.

The same processes of competition certainly affected the development of Hollywood, Broadway, and many other American performing and cultural arts. Audience preferences may have tended toward familiar cultural content, but there was undoubtedly strong market pressure for ‘quality’, however defined. There was also considerable room for innovation in artistic and cultural performance in a pluralistic society with relatively few cultural touchstones. Immigrants and their children played important roles in the development of culture and art in 20 th century America, just as they have in science and academic institutions.

My contention is that the presence of immigrants and their offspring has helped to ‘push’ American institutions in the direction of increasing openness and meritocracy. This has not always been a smooth or conflict-free process. When Jewish students appeared in large numbers in leading American universities in the early 20 th century, they were deemed rate-busters who upset the traditional college student culture, which de-emphasised too much study or serious scholarly interests.

The growing number of talented Jewish students, mostly second generation immigrants, certainly raised the standards at universities that did not discriminate. As universities began to compete for faculty and graduate students during the post-World War II era, the quota restrictions eventually disappeared ( Karabel 2006 ). Elite colleges and universities still retain legacies of non-merit based admission systems, including programmes to privilege children of alumni. There is also evidence that Asian American students have not been admitted in numbers proportional to their test scores ( Espenshade and Chung 2005 ), but these current practices are only a shadow of those of earlier times. The point is not that universities are completely meritocratic, but that they have become more meritocratic with increasing competition and acceptance of talented ‘outsiders.’

Greater openness to hiring and promotion on the basis of merit has become an integral part of many American institutions in recent years. The reputation of the United States as a land of opportunity for those with ambition and ability—a theme in many Hollywood movies—made the country a beacon for prospective immigrants. In addition to raising the international stature of the United States, the participation of talented immigrants and their children has likely made American scientific and cultural institutions more successful.

7. Conclusions

Contemporary immigration to the United States, upwards of one million new arrivals per year, is not exceptional. In fact, the relative share of immigrants—about 13 per cent—is a bit lower than the 14 to 15 per cent that characterised much of American history prior to the 1920s. Absorbing large numbers of newcomers has costs as well as benefits. The costs are immediately apparent, but some of the benefits take longer to appear. Schools, hospitals, and social service agencies may have to arrange for translation services and other special programmes for immigrants. But most of the costs of these adjustments are paid by immigrants and their families. Immigrants have given up the familiarity of home in their quest for more rewarding careers and greater opportunities for their children. Immigrants must also contend with a receiving society that is ambivalent, and sometimes hostile, to their presence.

Contemporary immigrants do adapt and assimilate to American society—probably as fast as earlier waves of immigrants. Assimilation is not instantaneous, and, for adult immigrants, the process is never complete. But for their native born children, and for those who arrive in the United States as young children, assimilation is a natural process that reflects immersion in American schools and culture.

Immigrants and their children, however, are not the same as native born Americans. In addition to the many obvious characteristics, such as language, religion, and cuisine, they generally differ on social and educational characteristics. For the contemporary period, immigrants are over-represented both among college graduates and those with less than 12 years of schooling relative to native born Americans ( Portes and Rumbaut 2006 : Chap. 4). Immigrants are also not representative of the society from which they come ( Feliciano 2005a ; 2005b ; Model 2008 ). In contrast to popular images, immigrants are not drawn from the least successful ranks of their home societies, but are generally well above average in terms of their education and other skills.

Perhaps the most important contribution of immigrants is their children. Many immigrants have made enormous sacrifices for their children’s welfare, including the decision to settle in the United States. Immigrant parents often have to work in menial jobs, multiple jobs, and in occupations well below the status they would have earned if they had remained at home. These sacrifices have meaning because immigrant parents believe that their children will have better educational and occupational opportunities in the United States than in their homelands. Immigrant parents push their children to excel by reminding them of their own sacrifices.

These high expectations for the children of immigrants generally lead to high motivations for academic and worldly success ( Hao and Bonstead-Burns 1998 ). A large body of research shows that the children of immigrants do remarkably well in American schools. Holding constant their socio-economic status, the second generation obtains higher grades in school and above average results on standardised tests, is less likely to drop out of high school, and is more likely to go to college than the children of native born Americans ( Fuligni and Witknow 2004 ; Perreira, Harris and Lee 2006 ).

In addition to measures of socio-economic assimilation, immigrants and their children are over-represented in a broad range of rare achievements, including Nobel Prize winners, top scientists, American performing artists, and other contributors to the American creative arts. They have broadened our cultural outlook and sometimes, have even defined American culture through literature, music and art.

Compared with other societies, the United States is generally regarded as unusually competitive and places a high premium on progress and innovation. This dynamic characteristic may well arise from the presence of immigrants and on the evolution of American institutions and identity. The size and selectivity of the immigrant community means that immigrants (and/or their children) are competing for entry into colleges, jobs, and access to prestigious positions and institutions. Not all institutions have been open to outsiders on an equal footing with insiders. In particular, high status organisations often give preference to persons with the right connections and social pedigree. But institutions that opened their doors to talented outsiders—immigrants and their children—probably gained a competitive advantage. Over time, greater openness and meritocratic processes may have become a force that shaped the evolution of American institutions in the arts, sports, science, and some sectors of business. In turn, the participation of outsiders may have reinforced a distinctive American character and culture that values not ‘who are you?’ but, ‘what can you do?’

Because immigrants have to constantly work at learning the system, they are intensely curious about American culture. For the most talented, this leads to a level of creativity beyond the normal boundaries that has left its imprint on American music, theater, dance, film, and many other realms of artistic endeavour. Finally, American institutions – schools, universities, businesses, sports teams, and even symphony orchestras, are meritocratic and seek talent wherever they can find it. The United States is a competitive society that values progress and success. This dynamic characteristic has partly been created through the presence of immigrants, which has pushed the country to value skills and ability over social pedigree.

The fear of cultural conservatives is that immigrants will change American character and identity. Yet, the definition of American identity is elusive. Unlike many other societies, the United States does not have an identity tied to an ancient lineage. Given the two wars against the British in early American history (in 1776 and 1812), the founders of the new American republic did not make English origins the defining trait of American identity; rather it was acceptance of the Enlightenment ideas expressed in the founding documents of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights ( Gleason 1980 ; Vecoli 1966). Even though these ideals were belied by the continuing stain of slavery, a civic identity rather than ancestry has been the distinctive feature of American ‘ peoplehood ’ from the very start. This trait combined with jus soli (birthright citizenship) 2 has slowed, if not stopped, efforts to define Americans solely on the basis of ancestral origins. Another reason for the broad definition of American identity is that the overwhelming majority of the American population, including white Americans, is descended from 19 th and 20 th century immigrants. Demographic estimates suggest that less than one-third of the American population in the late 20 th century were descended from the 18 th century American population ( Edmonston and Passel 1994 : 61, Gibson 1992 ).

Yet, there have been recurrent struggles to redefine American identity in terms of ancestry. The first naturalisation law passed by Congress in 1790 limited citizenship to whites. The broadening of American citizenship to include African Americans, American Indians, and Asian immigrants were epic battles. The short-lived, but remarkably successful ‘Know-Nothing’ political movement called itself the American Party to highlight the ancestral origins of its adherents. In the late 19 th century, as new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were pouring in, some old stock Americans founded organisations such as the Sons of the American Revolution, Daughters of the American Revolution, and similar groups to celebrate their ancestral pedigrees and to distance themselves from recent immigrants. The national origin quotas of the 1920s were a clear victory for those who feared dilution of the white English Protestant composition of the American population. The current anti-immigrant sentiment also expresses a fear that American identity will be lost, yet it is unclear that a universal contemporary American identity exists. Although the English language is considered to be central, English Protestant ancestry is not emphasised. There is too much diversity, even within the white population, to focus on specific ancestral origins.

In an often quoted remark, Oscar Handlin, the famous historian, observed that after searching for the place of immigrants in American history, that immigrants are American history. The American experiment in nation building is, in large part, the story of how immigrants have been absorbed into American society and how immigrants have enlarged and transformed America. Immigrants settled the frontier; they participated in constructing canals, roads and railroads, and contributed significant manpower in many American wars. Immigrants provided much of the manufacturing labour for the American industrial revolution as well as a disproportionate share of the contemporary highly skilled scientists and engineers that are central to the modern electronic and biomedical economy. Most interestingly, immigrants and the children of immigrants have been among the most important creative artists who have shaped the development of the cultural arts, including movies, theatre, dance, and music.

Immigration is, perhaps, the most distinctive feature of American identity. Immigration has had a disproportionate effect on the demographic size, ethnic diversity, culture, and character of American society. Immigrants and their children have assimilated to America, but they have also shaped American institutions in ways that have allowed strangers to participate on a relatively open playing field.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the Malaysian Population and Family Development Board for the invitation to participate in the conference, the Malaysian American Commission for Educational Exchange for a Fulbright Fellowship to Malaysia, the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya for hosting me as a Visiting Fulbright Professor, and Associate Professor Tey Nai Peng for his advice on my conference paper.

+ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Migration, Urbanisation and Development at the University of Malaya, 8 July 2013.

1 The foreign-born refers to all persons who are born outside the United States or a United States territory. The Census Bureau defines the native born (the complement of the foreign born) as persons who are American citizens at birth. The terms foreign born and immigrants are used interchangeably here, but this is not technically true because many of the foreign born are in the United States as temporary workers or students.

2 The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution (adopted in 1868) defines citizenship as consisting of: “All persons born or naturalised in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have interpreted the citizenship clause to include the native born children of foreign nationals.

• Alba Richard. Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1990. [ Google Scholar ]
• Alba Richard, Nee Victor. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2003. [ Google Scholar ]
• Archdeacon Thomas J. Becoming American: An Ethnic History. New York: The Free Press; 1983. [ Google Scholar ]
• Auerbach Jerald. Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America. New York: Oxford; 1975. [ Google Scholar ]
• Baltzell E Digby. The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America. New York: Vintage Books; 1964. [ Google Scholar ]
• Borjas George J. Economic theory and international migration. International Migration Review. 1989; 23 (3):457–485. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Borjas George. The economics of immigration. Journal of Economic Literature. 1994; 32 :1667–1717. [ Google Scholar ]
• Briggs Vernon. Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1984. [ Google Scholar ]
• Brimelow Peter. Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster. New York: Random House; 1995. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bouvier Leon F. Peaceful Invasions. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; 1992. [ Google Scholar ]
• Card David. The impact of the Muriel Boatlift on the Miami labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 1990; 43 :245–257. [ Google Scholar ]
• Card David. Is the new immigration really so bad? Economic Journal. 2005; 115 :F300–F323. [ Google Scholar ]
• Carter Susan, Sutch Richard. Historical background to current immigration issues. In: Smith James P, Edmonston Barry., editors. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1999. pp. 289–366. [ Google Scholar ]
• Clune Michael S. The fiscal impacts of immigrants: A California case study. In: Smith James P, Edmonston Barry., editors. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Research Council; 1998. pp. 120–182. [ Google Scholar ]
• Duncan Beverly, Duncan Otis Dudley. Minorities and the process of stratification. American Sociological Review. 1968; 33 :356–364. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Duncan Brian, Trejo Stephen J. Ethnic identification, intermarriage, and unmeasured progress by Mexican Americans. In: Borjas George., editor. Mexican Immigration to the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2007. pp. 229–267. [ Google Scholar ]
• Edmonston Barry, Jeffrey Passel., editors. Immigration and Ethnicity: The Integration of America’s Newest Arrivals. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press; 1994. [ Google Scholar ]
• Easterlin Richard. Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American Experience. New York: Columbia University Press; 1968. [ Google Scholar ]
• Espenshade Thomas J, Chung Chang Y. The opportunity cost of admission preferences at elite universities. Social Science Quarterly. 2005; 86 (2):293–305. [ Google Scholar ]
• Feliciano Cynthia. Does selective migration matter” explaining ethnic disparities in educational attainment among immigrant children. International Migration Review. 2005a; 39 :841–871. [ Google Scholar ]
• Feliciano Cynthia. How do immigrants compare to those left behind? Demography. 2005b; 42 :131–152. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fuligni Andrew J, Witknow Melissa. The postsecondary educational progress of youth from immigrant families. Journal of Research on Adolescence. 2004; 14 :159–183. [ Google Scholar ]
• Garvey Deborah L, Espenshade Thomas J. Fiscal impacts of immigrant and native households: A New Jersey case study. In: Smith James P, Edmonston Barry., editors. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Research Council; 1998. pp. 66–119. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gibson Campbell. The contribution of immigration to the growth and ethnic diversity of the American population. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 1992; 136 :157–175. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gibson Campbell, Jung Kay. Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census; 2006. (Population Division Working Paper No. 81). [ Google Scholar ]
• Gleason Philip. American identity and Americanization. In: Thernstrom Stephen., editor. Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1980. pp. 31–58. [ Google Scholar ]
• Grieco Elizabeth M, Acosta Yesenia D, de la Cruz G Patricia, Gambino Christine, Gryn Thomas, Larsen Luke J, Trevelyan Edward N, Walters Nathan P. The Foreign Born Population of the United States. Washington, D.C: U.S. Bureau of the Census; 2012. (American Community Survey Reports, ACS-19). [ Google Scholar ]
• Handlin Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People. 2. Boston: Little Brown and Company; 1973. (orig pub 1951) [ Google Scholar ]
• Hao Lingxin, Bonstead-Bruns Melissa. Parent-child differences in educational expecations and the academic achievement of immigrant and native students. Sociology of Education. 1998; 71 :175–198. [ Google Scholar ]
• Haines Michael R. The population of the United States 1790–1920. In: Engerman Stanley L, Gallman Robert E., editors. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000. pp. 143–205. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hing Bill Ong. Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration Policy 1850–1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1993. [ Google Scholar ]
• Higham John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925. 2. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; 1988. (orig. pub. 1955) [ Google Scholar ]
• Hirschman Charles. The educational enrollment of immigrant youth: A test of the segmented-assimilation hypothesis. Demography. 2001; 38 :317–336. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hirschman Charles, Mogford Elizabeth. Immigration and the American industrial revolution from 180 to 1920. Social Science Research. 2009; 38 :897–920. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Howe Irving. World of Our Fathers: The Journey of Eastern European Jews to American and the Life They Founded and Made. New York: Simon and Schuster; 1976. [ Google Scholar ]
• Huntington Samuel L. Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster; 2004. [ Google Scholar ]
• Jones Madwyn Allen. American Immigration. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1992. (orig pub 1960) [ Google Scholar ]
• Karabel Jerome. The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. New York: Houghton Mifflin; 2006. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kasinitz Philip, Mollenkopf John H, Waters Mary C, Holdaway Jennifer. Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2008. [ Google Scholar ]
• Keely Charles. US Immigration: A Policy Analysis. New York: The Population Council; 1979. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lee Ronald D, Miller Timothy W. The current fiscal impact of immigrants and their descendents: beyond the immigrant household. In: Smith J, Edmonston B, editors. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Impacts of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1998. pp. 183–205. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lieberson Stanley. A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants Since 1880. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1980. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lieberson Stanley, Waters Mary. From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 1988. [ Google Scholar ]
• Massey Douglas S, Jorge Durand, Malone Noland J. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2002. [ Google Scholar ]
• Min Pyong Gap, Kim Chigon. Patterns of intermarriages and cross-generation in-marriages among native born Asian Americans. International Migration Review. 2009; 43 :447–470. [ Google Scholar ]
• Model Suzanne. West Indian Immigrants: A Black Success Story. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2008. [ Google Scholar ]
• Most Andrea. Making Americans: Jews and the Broadway Musical. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2004. [ Google Scholar ]
• Pagnini Deanna L, Morgan S Philip. Intermarriage and social distance Among U.S. immigrants at the turn of the century. American Journal of Sociology. 1990; 96 :405–432. [ Google Scholar ]
• Perreira Krista, Harris Kathleen Mullan, Lee Dohoon. Making it in America: High School Completion by Immigrant and Native Youth. Demography. 2006; 43 (3):511–536. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Portes Alejandro, Rumbaut Rubén. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third. Berkeley: University of California Press; 2006. [ Google Scholar ]
• Reimers David M. Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America. New York: Columbia University Press; 1985. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sana Mariano. Immigrants and Natives in U.S. science and engineering occuaptions, 1994–2006. Demography. 2010; 47 :801–820. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Saxenian AnnaLee. Silicon Valley’s new immigrant entrepreneurs. In: Cornelius Wayne, Espenshade Thomas J, Salehyan Idean., editors. The International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Demand, Supply, and Development Consequences in Sending and Receiving Countries. San Diego: Center for U S Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego; 2001. pp. 197–234. [ Google Scholar ]
• Smith James P, Barry Edmonston., editors. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1997. [ Google Scholar ]
• Smith James P, Barry Edmonston., editors. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Impacts of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1998. [ Google Scholar ]
• Stephan Paula E, Levin Sharon G. Foreign scholars in the US: Contributions and costs. In: Stephan Paula E, Ronald G., editors. Science and the University. Ehrenberg. Madison: University of Wisconsin; 2007. pp. 150–173. [ Google Scholar ]
• UN (United Nations) Population Division. Trends in International Migrant Stock, Table 1. 2013 Retrieved 7 October 2013 from: http://esa.un.org/unmigration/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals .
• U.S. Bureau of the Census. Foreign-Born Population of the United States Current Population Survey – March 2009 Detailed Tables (Table 4.1) 2010 Retrieved 26 August 2010 from http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/foreign/cps2009/T4.1.xls .
• Vecoli Rudolph. The significance of immigration in the formation of an American identity. The History Teacher. 1996; 30 :9–27. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wadhwa Vivek, Saxenian AnnaLee, Rissing Ben, Gereffi Gary. America’s Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Part I. Master of Management Program, DukeUniversity School of Information; UC Berkeley: 2007. Retrieved 30 August 2009 from: ( http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/Americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs_I.pdf ) [ Google Scholar ]
• White Michael, Glick Jennifer E. Achieving Anew: How New Immigrants Do in American Schools, Jobs, and Neighborhoods. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2009. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wulf William A. Foreign-born researchers are key to US prosperity and security. The National Academies in Focus. 2006 Winter-Spring; 6 Retrieved 30 August 2009 from http://www.infocusmagazine.org/6.1/president.html . [ Google Scholar ]

Advertisement

The Good and the Bad: Do Immigrants’ Positive and Negative Evaluations of Life After Migration Go Hand in Hand?

• Open access
• Published: 14 October 2022
• Volume 24 , pages 1091–1111, ( 2023 )

Cite this article

You have full access to this open access article

• Nella Geurts   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6252-3638 1 &
• Marcel Lubbers   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-6295-6356 2  

Research on migration and integration has informed us about the systemic inequalities and disadvantages that migrants face in the residence country. Less is known about migrants’ positive experiences, and whether these co-exist with negative experiences. This study’s contribution lies in exploring to what extent positive and negative evaluations go hand in hand and among whom in what way. By coding and analysing open-ended questions of the New Immigrants Survey, we explore this among 955 immigrants from Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and Turkey who have been in the Netherlands for around 5 years. Results illustrate that these migrants most often positively evaluate matters in the economic domain, whereas the domain that is most often negatively evaluated concerns (being apart from) family. Which positive and negative evaluations are mentioned simultaneously differs among migrants, where migrants from Spain more often combine a negative evaluation of the Dutch whether with a positive evaluation of the Dutch being friendly. Migrants with a temporary intention to stay are more likely to combine a positive evaluation of the economic domain with negative experiences in the integration domain. This study hereby illustrates that the current emphasis in migration research on “the bad” overlooks positive matters that migrants experience simultaneously.

Similar content being viewed by others

Happiness and Migration

Emigration, remittances, and the subjective well-being of those staying behind

Happiness Insights into Migration Policy and Choice Behavior of Immigrants

Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.

Introduction

Decennia of migration and integration studies have informed us about the key problems that immigrants encounter after migration to a new residence country (Alba & Foner, 2014 ; Diehl et al., 2016 ; Schunck, 2014 ). The socio-economic position of immigrants has been problematized since relatively many immigrants are unemployed, and if employed relatively often in the lower echelons of the labour market, with lower levels of labour market security and lower earnings than the native population (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010 ; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017 ; Kogan, 2004 ). Similarly, the social relations that immigrants develop have been problematized (Hao & Kawano, 2001 ; Martinovic et al., 2009 ). In the situation that immigrants are forced to or choose to live in neighbourhoods with large shares of co-ethnics and mainly engage with co-ethnics, it is thought they lack social resources that are relevant to be included in the residence country. These issues in the socio-economic and social domain are related to socio-cultural integration (Ersanili & Koopmans, 2010 ; Fokkema & De Haas, 2015 ). In this field of research, it is problematized that immigrants’ identification with the residence country may be limited and that certain core democratic or cultural values are not subscribed to by immigrants (Dollmann, 2021 ; Van Doorn et al., 2013 ; Verdier et al., 2012 ; Vollebergh et al., 2017 ). Media and politicians in Western Europe often stress these issues and incompatibilities surrounding migrants and most scientific research studies and reports on the systemic inequalities between immigrants and the native populations. It is however less well known whether immigrants themselves also perceive these matters as the main problems of life after immigration to the residence country. Mainly qualitative research has illustrated migrants’ “messy reality” and diverse experiences of integration and life in the residence country (Eijberts & Ghorashi, 2017 ; Erdal, 2013 ; Geurts et al., 2021 ), but insights in these experiences among larger groups of immigrants and thus the generalizability of these findings are lacking. This study offers these insights by taking an explorative approach in which (combinations of) migrants’ positive and negative evaluations of life after immigration are studied. In doing so, this study provides future directions for hypotheses on how the intersections of both negative and positive evaluations affect migrants’ integration processes in Western Europe.

Firstly, this paper provides evidence for the extent to which immigrants who lived for on average 5 years in the Netherlands perceive certain matters about their life in this residence country to be negative. We complement this perspective of what is “bad” about life in the residence country with the perspective of what is “good”, again from the immigrants’ own point of view. Even though the mirror of explanations of little success is the explanation of more success, most integration research less often explicitly focuses on what goes well. This study uses open-ended questions as part of a large-scale survey to obtain insight in what migrants themselves mention to be positive and negative evaluations of life in the residence country, which adds to our understanding of migrants’ lived experiences in Western Europe. Our first research question is therefore: To what extent and in what domains do recent immigrants have positive and negative experiences of life in the Netherlands?

Besides describing the good and the bad as experienced by immigrants, this paper will secondly address to what extent these positive and negative evaluations of life in the Netherlands co-exist. Immigrants who are positive about what immigration has brought them probably also face issues in the new country they live in. Immigrants who are negative about certain aspects of their life in the new country may be (more likely to be) positive on other aspects (Eijsberts & Ghorashi, 2015). Yet we do not know to what extent such positive and negative evaluations (in certain domains) go hand in hand since earlier research hardly addressed such positive and negative evaluations simultaneously. Our second research question therefore reads: To what extent do recent immigrants simultaneously have positive and negative experiences of life in the Netherlands? This study is, as far as we know, the first to acknowledge this possible interplay and “messy reality” using migrants’ own experiences through the use of large-scale data and in doing so is able to assess to what extent such simultaneous experiences are present across several social groups.

Finally, we study a set of possible individual drivers of such combinations of positive and negative experiences. Previous migration research highlights reasons for immigrants to migrate, from which we can derive potential positive experiences that migration will bring (Castles, 1998 ; Engbersen et al., 2013 ; Kanas & Steinmetz, 2021 ; Massey et al., 1993 ); economic migrants will try to improve their economic position; family migrants can be expected to be optimistic to be (re-)united with family; and immigrants who moved away from a country of which they disapprove of the political or cultural climate, or flee because they need protection, are expected to be more positive about the living situation in the new country. Next to migration motive, we expect variation among immigrants in the extent to which certain aspects of the good and the bad go hand in hand, for example, based on immigrants’ intention to stay (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011 ), educational level (Buzdugan & Halli, 2009 ) and gender (Ala-Mantila & Fleischmann, 2018 ). We acknowledge that this is just a selection of factors that may provide insights into what combinations on positive and negative experiences are most prominent. The research we conduct here is therefore mostly explorative, to see what combinations among whom are (more) likely to be experienced. As such, our final research question reads: To what extent are migration motive, intention to stay, origin country, educational level and gender related to experiencing certain negative and positive experiences of life simultaneously?

Based on answers to open-ended questions of what is perceived as positive and negative about life in the Netherlands among 955 immigrants from Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and Turkey, we thus provide evidence whether and how immigrants combine positive and negative evaluations of life after migration. Like many other immigration countries, the Netherlands has witnessed political and societal debate about the volume of migration and about problems that would concentrate among the immigrant population. Related to the origin countries included here, policy in specific focuses on abuses that labour migrants face in the Netherlands. Perhaps different from some other countries, where the dominant discourse may be that immigrants are needed to fill labour market shortages, the positive side of immigration is less often discussed in the Dutch context, which is illustrated by news articles on immigration often having a negative tone (Van Klingeren et al., 2015 ). The Netherlands is therefore a relevant context to explore and answer the three research questions among recent migrants, which will contribute to our understanding of the formative period after migration. Indeed, the biggest changes in immigrants’ lives in a new country arguably happen in the first years after migration (Diehl et al., 2016 ). In doing so, we moreover contribute to previous migration, integration and participation literature in two ways: we firstly argue for the need to acknowledge migrants’ simultaneous negative and positive evaluations of life after migration and explore to what extent this is the case. Secondly, we study to what extent there are differences in for whom certain negative and positive evaluations go hand in hand by exploring patterns across several key characteristics to contribute to our understanding of the interrelationship between these positive and negative evaluations of life after migration. An overview of these combinations can inform us on what hinders (or moderates) anticipated outcomes of such negative and/or positive evaluations.

Recent Migration and the Relation Between Origin and Residence Country

Migration has become more dynamic and transnational in the last decennia (Engbersen et al., 2013 ). The opportunities for contact with the country of origin, either in terms of contacts with friends and family or keeping updated of what is going on in the country of origin, expanded rapidly (Schunck, 2014 ). Still, the situational differences between origin and residence countries have a major impact on for who it is possible and likely to migrate, and based on what reason.

Traditionally, migration is considered to be a cost–benefit calculation (Borjas, 1994 ; Constant & Massey, 2003 ; Dustmann et al., 2010 ). Immigrants have expectations about improvement of their living situation by moving to a new residence country. For people who left the origin country to work elsewhere, this is most straightforward in economic terms. Contexts that do not offer (the preferred) employment and opportunities for sufficient earnings are push-factors. Migration may also be motived by expectations about better career opportunities elsewhere (Borjas, 1989 ). Migration from contexts with little labour opportunities to areas with little unemployment remains a major migration pattern. With increasing restrictions on labour market migration from immigrants outside the EU, it has been argued that study-migration may offer a new route (Luthra & Platt, 2017 ). However, study immigrants, mostly entering universities, have a rather different socio-economic outlook than the on average more low-skilled labour market entries from a large share of economic immigrants.

More recently, the migration literature has shown that because of the large variety of factors that play a role in migration decisions, an aspirations-capabilities perspective fits reality better (De Haas, 2011 ). From this perspective, it is more evident that migration will result in simultaneously positive and negative evaluations. The focus on immigrants’ agency in this model implies that immigrants may evaluate their experiences in the residence country differently, depending on the reasons that they provided for moving and accounting for immigrants’ relationships to the origin and residence country at the same time. All origin countries addressed in this study had a higher level of unemployment at the time, a lower GDP per capita and lower average earnings than the Netherlands. Moreover, Bulgaria, Poland and Spain are (and were already in 2013) members of the European Union, creating opportunities for free movement between these countries and the Netherlands. This is different for migrants from Turkey who have to apply for a visa, where economic reasons seldomly provided a permission for migration. Migration from Turkey is predominantly family-motivated. In the 1980s and 1990s, when recruitment of workers as arranged in the 1960s and 1970s was no longer needed in the Netherlands, migration was dominated by family-re-unification (Bayrakdar & Guveli, 2020 ). Also today, non-EU migration for reasons of labour has become increasingly difficult in many of the European countries and family-related migration takes up a large share of migration. Migrants who moved to the Netherlands in 2012/2013 from the origin countries we study here—Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and Turkey—were at the time not in a situation of conflict and did not qualify for a refugee status in the Netherlands. They are not likely to belong to the immense group of people worldwide, fleeing from conflict and repression. Next to asylum applications, immigrants may choose to work, study, join a family or partner in a new residence country and not stay in the origin country because they disapprove of the political or cultural situation in the country of origin.

Positive and Negative Evaluations of Domains of Integration

In the literature on integration, different domains are distinguished (Ager & Strang, 2008 ). Often these are summarized into economic, social and cultural domains of integration or participation (sometimes, political integration is defined as a fourth domain) (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003 ; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003 ; Schunck, 2014 ). In this literature immigrants’ positions in these domains are frequently compared to the position of natives (e.g. Heath et al., 2008 ; Heath & Li, 2017 ). From that comparison, it often follows that immigrants are less well-off economically (e.g. Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017 ; Li & Heath, 2020 ) are socially oriented predominantly to co-ethnics (e.g. Martinovic et al., 2009 ) and less culturally oriented to the residence country than natives (e.g. Ersanili & Koopmans, 2010 ). However, an important question is what a relevant group of comparison is (Tolsma et al., 2012 ). In the period just after migration, it seems more likely that immigrants compare their situation to their life before migration instead of (only) comparing it to the position of the native population in the residence country. Even when immigrants may be in disadvantaged positions according to the standards of the residence country, they still may perceive and evaluate their position in a positive way, for example, because it is an improvement compared to life in the origin country. We, therefore, argue it is key to bring in migrants’ perceptions, as it may paint a different picture than drawn in previous research comparing migrants to natives.

Studies have highlighted the huge diversity of outcomes in integration and participation brought about by a diverse set of factors, including individual-level characteristics of immigrants. Such individual drivers are likely to affect migrants’ (positive and negative) experiences in the residence country (Black et al., 2011 ; Hendriks, 2015 ; Nisic & Melzer, 2016 ). In this article, we explore to what extent these known key individual-level drivers of integration outcomes also affect the extent to which negative and positive evaluations of life after migration go hand in hand. Immigrants may be likely to focus their life, and thus experiences, on a domain that is linked to their migration motive, a driver that is expected to be strongly included in immigrants’ evaluation of their situation in the residence country. Immigrants who (mainly) migrated for work will be more likely to mention both positive and negative features of the work domain. Family migrants are expected to have positive and negative evaluations mostly of the social domain. Political migrants and those who wanted to stay in the Netherlands because they simply wanted to live there for a while are expected to mention positive and negative aspects of the socio-cultural aspects of life in the Netherlands.

Another known key driver of migrants’ integration processes is immigrants’ intention to stay (Chabé-Ferret et al., 2018 ; Geurts and Lubbers, 2017 ), which is often related to linear cost–benefit theories. The assumption is that immigrants who intend to stay make more investments in resources and capital relevant in the residence country (Chabé-Ferret et al., 2018 ). Immigrants whose intention is to stay longer in the residence country may be a select group of immigrants who have more positive experiences in the residence country (Adda, Dustman & Mestres, 2006 ; Wachter & Fleischmann, 2018 ). Immigrants who intend to stay may also be likely to ignore and downplay negative experiences. Migrants who are not willing to stay may be open to express positive experiences but at the same time, their negative evaluations may support their decision to leave as they intended to do. We moreover study gender and educational level differences in combinations people experience in positive and negative evaluations. Gender and level of education have been studied widely as key indicators of integration (e.g. Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017 ; Heath & Li, 2017 ). In cases where immigration follows a more traditional pattern where men move first and women join later, it may hold that women are more focused on the social domain and men on the economic domain. As for education, theories on the integration paradox have shown that higher-educated immigrants experience higher levels of (group) discrimination than lower-educated immigrants and are in general more aware and critical towards the residence country (Tolsma et al., 2012 ; Geurts et al., 2020 ). Therefore, when immigrants are asked to express themselves about what is negative about their life after immigration, higher-educated immigrants may more often mention spontaneously that discrimination is an issue or mention other negative evaluations, with less or no expression of positive evaluations. Where previous research has to a certain extent illustrated the role of such characteristics for experiences of life in the residence country, this study will explore whether these characteristics are related to combining certain positive and negative experiences simultaneously.

We analysed immigrants included in the fourth wave of the New Immigrants Survey (NIS2NL) survey data, conducted in early 2018, as this wave included open-ended questions on positive and negative experiences of life in the Netherlands. NIS2NL is specifically designed to analyse early integration processes after migration (Lubbers et al., 2018 ). This survey includes recent migrants from Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and Turkey who were registered as a new citizen of the Netherlands around 2012/2013. Footnote 1 Statistics Netherlands drew a random sample of immigrants from these countries from the Dutch municipality registers. In September 2013, this sample of migrants older than 18 years old was invited to participate in a written or online survey. Invitations and questionnaires were translated into the migrants’ mother tongue. Migrants were sampled within 18 months after their registration in a Dutch municipality. The first wave was collected in November 2013 and March 2014 (mean response rate of 32.3%), after which the second and third waves followed after about 15 months each (with a mean response rate of 58.7 and 68.2%, respectively). Respondents who took part in wave 3, who agreed to participate in another wave and were still living in the Netherlands according to statistics Netherlands were approached for the fourth wave in January 2018. This resulted in a sample of 996 migrants. The response rates for the fourth wave were 73.2% for migrants for Poland, 80.9% for migrants from Turkey, 83.3% for migrants from Bulgaria and 84.2% for migrants from Spain.

Any study on what immigrants experience as positive or negative in a setting in which they are surveyed has to acknowledge selection and temporality. In this study, immigrants who lived for over 5 years in the Netherlands are asked about their evaluations of life after immigration in the residence country. Those who are surveyed may be a selection of immigrants who are relatively positive about life after immigration because they did not leave the residence country in the first 5 years after immigration (as statistics from the Netherlands have shown that on average 50% of the immigrants return to the origin country or move elsewhere in a 5-year window). Still, these immigrants who are still in the residence country after 5 years can vary in their outlooks and experiences.

The dropout between the four waves of the NIS2NL survey will be selective as it is thus affected by return migration or migration elsewhere. With respect to dropouts between earlier waves, it appears that migrants who had a Dutch partner had a higher Dutch language proficiency, were employed, were highly educated, experienced less group discrimination or had a permanent intention to stay were less likely to dropout. This dropout between earlier waves is therefore selective, where a dropout could be interpreted as an indication of too many negative experiences/too little positive experiences in the residence country. In a way, this results in a sample in the fourth wave that represents the settling migrant population in the Netherlands, as the group that remains in the Netherlands is different from those who does not. Although this dropout is thus selective, we argue these are common selection processes which also apply to results of previous studies on integration processes among longer residing migrants.

Operationalization

Subjective evaluation of life in the netherlands.

This paper studies both the negative and positive experiences of migrants’ life in their residence country. We do so based on two open-ended items which were the final questions of the survey: “What are the positive aspects of your life in the Netherlands?” and “What are the negative aspects of your life in the Netherlands?”. Footnote 2 Respondents were able to share their answers in their own language of preference, answers were translated to Dutch.

For both items, we applied thematic open coding to cluster answer categories into a range of domains in life (Allahyari et al., 2017 ; Popping, 2015 ). Coding has been conducted by two researchers, coding each case by hand to contribute to the reliability of the coding. Most respondents provided one or two words to formulate their answer (e.g. on what is negative: “taxes”; “difficult language”; and “rain”). Subjects that tap into an overarching theme were later merged, e.g. work, income, costs of living and taxes were merged into the economic domain. Some domains were mentioned both on the positive and the negative side of life (such as issues surrounding family, the economic situation and the evaluation of Dutch people) whereas others did not (including climate and language matters). Table 1 offers an overview of the domains distinguished and the number of respondents in each domain. Appendix A1 and A2 present a more detailed overview of the distinguished domains, key words and which sub-domains are included in each respective category. If multiple answers (in different domains) were given, these answers were each categorized in the respective cluster, meaning that one respondent can be part of multiple domains distinguished. For example, if a respondent responded to the second open-ended item that one experiences Dutch people to be intolerant and that one’s labour market position does not match one’s expectations, this respondent is coded as having a negative experience in both the ‘Dutch people’ and the ‘economic’ domain.

Independent Variables of Interest

To understand to what extent there is variance among migrants with respect to whether certain positive and negative experiences go together, we include several characteristics that are used as predictors of interest. First, migrants’ highest obtained educational level attained in either one’s country of origin (measured on a country-specific scale), the Netherlands, or another country is included. All education items were standardized into the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) scale of 2011 (UNESCO, 2012), which ranges from (0) pre-primary education to (8) doctoral or equivalent. We included this linearly. We further included migrants’ gender being either (0) man or (1) woman. Next, we include migration motive (measured at wave 1), divided in line with previous research (Van Tubergen & Van de Werfhorst, 2007 ) into (1) economic, (2) family, (3) in education or (4) other or no specific reason. Finally, we included migrants’ intention to stay categorized into (1) temporary, (2) circular, (3) permanent and (4) do not know and the origin country.

Overall, missing values on these variables were limited (4.1% in total) and we therefore chose to listwise delete these respondents, resulting in a final sample of 955. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables included in this study are presented in Table 2 . To provide further insight in the sample, we presented additional descriptive statistics per origin group in Appendix A3.

Analysis and Results

Analytical strategy.

To inform our research questions, our analyses include three steps. The first two provide descriptive evidence, where the last step uses regression analyses to estimate relationships. In the first step, we show the shares of respondents that mention positive and negative experiences in the distinguished domains. To improve readability and ensure enough power in the multivariate analyses later on, only domains are presented that include more than 10% of the sample. Next, we are interested in the extent to which these negative and positive experiences in various domains go hand in hand. We therefore present the share of respondents that mentioned both a negative and a positive aspect of life in the Netherlands. Again, only those domains that include more than 10% of the sample are presented. Finally, in order to explore whether there are differences among migrants to what extent positive and negative experiences in the Netherlands are combined, we use logistic regression analyses where the outcome of interest are different combinations of positive and negative experiences in two domains. These multivariate logistic regression analyses allow for testing which individual factors relate to outcomes that are dichotomous (Sieben & Linssen, 2009 ), in this case combining certain negative and positive evaluations (= 1) or not (= 0). Table 4 presents the analyses on various combinations of domains that include more than 10% of the sample who expresses a specific combination of domains, which are the largest combinations of negative and positive domains present. Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix present similar analyses for different combinations of positive and negative evaluations as the outcome, presenting the analyses on combinations including less than 10 per cent of the sample, but more than 7.5%. Any effect that has a p value lower than 0.05 is considered statistically significant, the amount of stars illustrate the strength of significance. The various models presenting the results of these different outcomes are labelled as M1 to M19. In the Appendix, Tables A6 and A7 present the explained variance and the odds ratios for each effect in the respective models.

The Frequency of Positive and Negative Experiences

Figure  1 illustrates that more than 53% of the recent migrants in the Netherlands consider aspects in the economic domain as something positive. Almost 40% of the respondents mention experiences around having a better life in the Netherlands positively. The third most frequently mentioned domain concerns the Netherlands being well-organized, as mentioned by 30.1%. Domains that were evaluated positively as well, but mentioned less often are: Dutch people being friendly (25%), having opportunities in the Netherlands (21.8%), having family around (16.1%) and other reasons such as the infrastructure (16.4%).

Share of total number of respondents that mention positive (green bars) and/or negative experiences (orange bars) in certain domains ( N  = 955)

With respect to domains that are most frequently mentioned when sharing negative aspects of life in the Netherlands, missing family is mentioned most often (34.1%). Next, negative evaluations of the climate in the Netherlands are mentioned by 26.2% of the sample. Negative experiences in the economic domain are mentioned by 22% of the sample. Other domains that came to the fore, yet mentioned less often as the three domains discussed are: experiencing too much distance to the home country (19.3%), having issues with (learning the) language (14.5%), struggling with integration into the Dutch society (13%), experiencing Dutch people to be direct and rude (12.2%) and feeling lonely in the Netherlands (10.1%).

We moreover explored to what extent these patterns presented above differ across key individual drivers. For example, Fig.  2 presents the most frequently positive and negative domains mentioned for both men and women. Among various domains, there seem little differences between men and women in the extent to which experiences in certain domains are mentioned. Significant exceptions are the domain of family mentioned positively (among men: 10.9%, among women: 20.4%). Moreover, almost 34% of men mentioned the organized domain whereas this is the case for less than 28% of women. With respect to negative evaluations, there is only a significant difference between men and women in the frequency of mentioning matters in the family domain (among men: 27.7%, among women: 37.8%). In additional descriptive statistics, Figures A1 and A2 illustrate differences across migration motives and origin groups in the frequency of mentioning these positive and negative evaluations.

Share of men and women that mention positive (green bars) and/or negative experiences (orange bars) in certain domains ( N  = 955)

Which Positive and Negative Experiences Go Hand in Hand?

Next, we are interested in exploring to what extent negative and positive experiences of life in the Netherlands can be experienced simultaneously. In Table 3 , the share of respondents is presented based on mentioning a negative experience in a certain domain (ranging from the economic domain to experiencing distance to the home country) who also mentioned a positive experience in another domain. The positive domains mentioned are in line with the ones presented in Fig.  1 .

In general, Table 3 illustrates that negative and positive experiences go hand in hand among quite a share of the respondents. Results for example illustrate that among those who mentioned missing family as a negative aspect of life in the Netherlands, in most of the domains on the positive side, over 34% has mentioned that domain too. For example, 34.4% of those who considered missing family a negative aspect of life in the Netherlands mentioned the opportunities as something positive. The general pattern that arises thus suggests that positive and negative aspects of life in the Netherlands are present at the same time. Seemingly, some negatively evaluated domains are more likely to be combined with positive evaluations than others. It shows that among migrants who negatively evaluated the family and climate domain, around 30 to 40% also share positive evaluations in various domains. This contrasts the patterns among migrants who negatively evaluated domains of integration, loneliness and Dutch people as the share of those who also share positive evaluations only ranges from 10 to 20%.

Differences across domains that represent positive aspects of life in the Netherlands are seemingly small. Put differently, results do not show that mentioning the language domain negatively is more likely to go together with mentioning positive domain A versus positive domain B. Instead, we find that among those who consider language a negative aspect of life, the likelihood of mentioning a positive aspect is similar across all domains (ranging from 17.2% for the better life domain to 22.1% for the “other” domain). Whilst several negative and positive evaluations can thus be combined, results do not point towards certain domains being more likely to be mentioned at the same time.

Which Migrants are More Likely to Combine Certain Positive and Negative Experiences?

Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression analyses on the likelihood of mentioning both a negative and positive aspect of life in the Netherlands in certain domains. Table 4 presents the results of the largest combinations of categories (at least 10% of the sample). Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix present results of outcomes on combinations include less than 10, but more than 7.5% of the sample.

Table 4 shows that educational level is hardly associated with being more or less likely to mention a certain combination of positive and negative evaluations of life in the Netherlands. One exception is that higher-educated migrants are more likely to mention positive aspects in the organized domain and negative aspects with respect to family in the Netherlands (versus not being part of this combination). In addition, Table A4 suggests that higher-educated are more likely to combine negative experiences in the economic domain with positive experiences in for example the better life and Dutch people domains compared to not combining these experiences.

With respect to gender, we find no differences between men and women in the likelihood of combining certain positive and negative aspects of life in the Netherlands. In the appendix, results show that women are more likely than men to combine both positive and negative aspects in the domain of family as well as more likely to mention positive experiences with respect to opportunities yet negative experiences in the family domain, compared to not having mentioned both experiences.

Respondents’ migration motive mainly illustrates differences between those with an economic migration motive and those with a family migration motive. Compared to migrants with an economic motive, those with a family migration motive are less likely to mention positive and negative aspects in the economic domain versus not mentioning both, as well as being less likely to experience positive aspects in the organized domain and negative aspects in the climate domain (compared to not combining both). Results in the appendix moreover show that migrants with a family motive, versus an economic motive, are less likely to mention positive aspects of Dutch people and negative aspects in the economic domain as well as less likely to mention positive aspects in the organized domain and negative aspects in the economic domain. Seemingly, migrants with an economic motive are thus more likely to experience negative aspects in the economic domain and at the same time experience positive aspects in other domains. The appendix moreover shows that compared to migrants with an economic motive, those with an education motive are more likely to mention positive aspects in the economic domain and simultaneously mention negative aspects in the integration and Dutch people domain (compared to not mentioning both of these domains). This finding again underlines that those with an economic migration motive are more likely to experience negative aspects in the economic domain and combine it with positive experiences in other domains.

Looking at migrants’ intention to stay, results show that migrants with a temporary intention to stay, compared to having a permanent intention to stay, are more likely to indicate positive experiences in the economic domain combined with negative experiences in the climate domain as well as the domain of experiencing distance to the home country (versus not combining these experiences). In the appendix, findings underline that those with a temporary intention to stay are more likely than those with a permanent intention to stay to mention positive aspects in the economic domain and negative aspects in the integration domain (compared to not mentioning both evaluations). Yet, those with a temporary intention to stay are less likely to combine negative aspects in the economic domain with negative experiences in the language domain (compared to not combining these domains). Finally, those with a circular intention to stay are less likely than those with a permanent intention to combine a positive experience in the better life domain with a negative aspect in the economic domain (versus not combining them).

Finally, we find various significant differences across origin groups. In Table 4 , results show that compared to migrants from Poland, migrants from Turkey, Bulgaria and Spain are more likely to experience positive experiences in the better life domain and negative experiences in the climate domain as well as mention positive aspects in the organized domain and negative experiences in the climate domain. Moreover, migrants from Poland are less likely to combine positive experiences in the economic domain with negative experiences in the distance to the home country domain compared to migrants from Turkey, Bulgaria and Spain. Seemingly, the negative experiences in the domain of the weather in the Netherlands play a major role among especially migrants from Spain as when changing the reference category to Spain, all other origin groups are significantly less likely to be included in a combination where the climate is evaluated negatively.

Conclusion and Discussion

Decennia of scientific research on migration and integration have given insights in migrants’ diverse issues associated with life after migration and the disadvantages migrants face compared to native populations. These insights are key for our current understanding of how immigrants’ fare in residence countries. Moving beyond objective indicators and comparisons, this study contributes to this understanding by putting migrants’ perspective first (De Haas, 2011 ). This helps us to get a better understanding in what may counterbalance migrants’ negative outcomes after immigration, what the reference for comparison is and how positive outcomes may still go together with critical assessment of what does not go right. Next to “the bad” such as experienced inequalities, disadvantages and discrimination, this study thus questioned to what extent “the good” can be experienced by migrants at the same time. In doing so, we stressed migrants’ lived experiences of the messy reality including both negative and positive evaluations of domains in life in the residence country, which provides a more comprehensive picture of migrants’ daily life than when emphasizing “the bad” only, which has been stressed in qualitative research earlier (Eijsberts & Ghorashi, 2017; Erdal, 2013 ). Based on open answers in a survey among 955 immigrants, this study has offered three insights with respect to this question: which positive and negative evaluations are shared by migrants themselves, to what extent positive and negative evaluations in certain domains are mentioned simultaneously and for whom it is more likely to mention certain negative and positive evaluations simultaneously. In this final step, we analysed to what extent these patterns vary across migrants’ migration motive, intention to stay, origin country, gender and educational level which are seen as key indicators of various domains of participation (e.g. Ala-Mantila & Fleischmann, 2018 ; Buzdugan & Halli, 2009 ; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011 ; Fokkema & De Haas, 2015 ; Kanas & Steinmetz, 2021 ; Wachter & Fleischmann, 2018 ).

First, our results illustrate that when asked about life in the Netherlands, a majority of migrants share negative and positive evaluations in a range of domains, from matters related to one’s economic position and family to matters of integration and the climate in the residence country. The range of negative evaluations that is shared tap into the main domains of integration that are often studied using objective indicators, such as migrants’ economic position and opportunities, (the lack of) social relationships and cultural integration such as language acquisition (Ager & Strang, 2008 ). Perhaps notably missing in both the positive and negative evaluations mentioned is political participation, which may be explained by the recent migration status which limit opportunities for such participation.

Second, we found that a large share of migrants reports both negative and positive evaluations of life in the Netherlands. Interestingly enough, results did not suggest that specific domains that were negatively evaluated were more easily or more likely combined with specific domains that were positively evaluated. In general, evaluating a certain domain as negative is combined with a positive evaluation of a number of domains, all to around the same extent. Yet, results did suggest that those who shared negative evaluations in the domain of family and climate combine these relatively often with positive evaluations (of any domains). This differs from those who negatively evaluated domains of integration, loneliness and Dutch people, of whom the share of migrants mentioning any positively evaluated matter was substantively lower. Put differently, certain negative experiences (such as issues related to integration and the native population) are more difficult to go together with positive experiences in the residence country than others.

Finally, the extent to which positive and negative evaluations are combined differs among migrants. Especially migration motive, intention to stay and origin country play a part in which domains positive and negative evaluations are experienced at the same time. With respect to migrants’ motive, we for example find that migrants with a study motive are more likely to combine a positive evaluation of the economic domain with a negative evaluation of integration and Dutch people than migrants with an economic migration motive. Compared to those with a permanent intention to stay, migrants with a temporary intention to stay are more likely to evaluate the economic domain more positively and combine it with a negative evaluation of the climate, the distance to the home country and the integration process. We also found various differences across origin groups. These are partly related to the dominant migration motives or demographics that characterize immigrants from specific origins, but are also clearly linked to specific origin country characteristics: the climate, how life is organized, the labour market and the socio-political situation. For example, migrants from Spain were more likely to combine negative evaluations of the climate with positive evaluations of other domains compared to other origin groups. Seemingly such individual drivers, which also cover origin country to residence country relations and differences, are important for which and to what extent negative and positive evaluations are experienced at the same time. These findings build on previous research illustrating that such individual-level explanations matter for experiences of life in the residence country in general (e.g. Diehl et al., 2016 ; Kanas & Steinmetz, 2021 ; Wachter & Fleischmann, 2018 ), to which our study adds that these drivers can affect how various experiences are combined simultaneously as well.

The observation that migrants have various positive and negative evaluations of life in the residence country at the same time benefits from further exploration in future research. Respondents were in general rather brief in the open answers. This might have been due to the fact that these open-ended questions were the final questions of a longer standardized questionnaire. A survey targeting a large group of immigrants developed to collect answers to open-ended questions and experimenting with stimulation to fill out the questions may be an interesting tool to get better insights in the phenomena, providing respondents with the opportunity to express their initial thoughts in a first question and to stimulate them to think further on the topic in follow-up questions. The more quantitative approach taken in this study builds on previous qualitative research (Eijberts & Ghorashi, 2017 ) and offers the opportunity to make generalizations of these experiences and analyse among whom certain experiences are more likely, based on text analyses. The theme extraction performed can be further developed by adding automated cluster techniques, which is in particular interesting to generate combinations of positive and negative answers, when much and different sources of text need to be analysed (Allahyari et al., 2017 ; Jackson & Trochim, 2002 ). In addition, answering these research questions benefits from examination across other migrant groups who are for example longer-established in the residence country are part of the second generation or who have obtained refugee status. Supposedly, the type, amount and combinations of negative and positive matters experienced will change over time and these are likely to differ between those who were born in the residence country and those who were not.

Another interesting avenue for future research would be to study the consequences of experiencing certain negative and positive matters in the residence country simultaneously, as it may inform the understanding of migrants’ behaviour and choices that are difficult to fully grasp by studying “the bad” alone. For example, previous research has posed questions on why certain migrants stay put with a job when it does not match their educational qualifications or why some migrants do not report discrimination. By acknowledging the positive matters that migrants experience at the same time, such questions may be (better) understood. Deciding to stay in spite of experiencing discrimination or being overeducated for a job can for example be explained by migrants experiencing a general improvement in circumstances compared to life in the origin country. As such, this study yields and poses new hypotheses on the importance of “the good” and “the bad” and how this relates to various outcomes of migrants’ integration and participation in the residence country. Future studies could explore these hypotheses on several behavioural outcomes.

Altogether, this study has illustrated that besides negative experiences, migrants mention a range of positively evaluated matters of life in the residence country simultaneously. This informs previous migration research studying mainly the disadvantages and issues migrants face after immigration. Such studies would profit from the inclusion of migrants’ lived reality that consists of various negative and positive experiences at the same time. Although migrants’ negative experiences such as facing discrimination or experiencing employment issues should be studied and understood, this study illustrates that such an emphasis on only “the bad” veils various positive experiences that can be experienced at the same time. Acknowledging “the good” in addition to “the bad” therefore draws a more comprehensive picture of migrants’ experiences and relatedly may inform understanding migrants’ behaviour and choices to act and react in a certain way. This study sheds light on these matters by illustrating that positive and negative evaluations of life in the residence country often go hand in hand. For future quantitative research, these positive experiences may be the relevant moderators to understand various outcomes for immigrants, in particular in these dynamic years right after migration. Addressing the positive and negative conjointly thus increases our understanding of migrants’ experiences, choices and behaviour.

At the time of data collection, ethical approval was not necessary for such a non-interventional study.

Unfortunately, migrants from Turkey were shown the question on positive evaluations twice instead of the question on negative evaluations. Many still shared negative experiences as they assumed this was the intention. Additional analyses without these respondents illustrated that the presented patterns and conclusions remain similar. For reasons of power and interest, we present the analyses with migrants from Turkey included.

Adda, J., Dustmann, C., & Mestres, J. (2006). A dynamic model of return migration. Essays on Temporary Migration, 3 , 13–45.

Google Scholar  

Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. Journal of refugee studies , 21 (2), 166–191.

Ala-Mantila, M., & Fleischmann, F. (2018). Gender differences in labour market integration trajectories of recently arrived migrants in the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44 (11), 1818–1840.

Article   Google Scholar  

Alba, R., & Foner, N. (2014). Comparing immigrant integration in North America and Western Europe: How much do the grand narratives tell us? International Migration Review, 48 , S263–S291.

Allahyari, M., Pouriyeh, S., Assefi, M., Safaei, S., Trippe, E. D., Gutierrez, J. B., & Kochut, K. (2017). A brief survey of text mining: Classification, clustering and extraction techniques. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.02919 .

Bayrakdar, S., & Guveli, A. (2020). Understanding the benefits of migration: Multigenerational transmission, gender and educational outcomes of Turks in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 47 (13), 1–22.

Black, R., Bennett, S. R., Thomas, S. M., & Beddington, J. R. (2011). Migration as adaptation. Nature, 478 (7370), 447–449.

Borjas, G. J. (1989). Economic theory and international migration. International migration review , 23 (3), 457–485.

Borjas, G. J. (1994). The economics of immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (4), 1667–1717.

Buzdugan, R., & Halli, S. S. (2009). Labor market experiences of Canadian immigrants with focus on foreign education and experience. International Migration Review, 43 (2), 366–386.

Castles, S. (1998). The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world . Macmillan International Higher Education.

Chabé-Ferret, B., Machado, J., & Wahba, J. (2018). Remigration intentions and migrants’ behavior. Regional Science and Urban Economics,  68 , 56–72.

Constant, A., & Massey, D. S. (2003). Self-selection, earnings, and out-migration: A longitudinal study of immigrants to Germany. Journal of Population Economics, 16 (4), 631–653.

De Haas, H., & Fokkema, T. (2011). The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions. Demographic Research, 25 , 755–782.

De Haas, H. (2011). The Determinants of International Migration: Conceptualizing Policy, Origin and Destination Effects . IMI Working Paper No 32. Oxford: International Migration Institute.

Diehl, C., Lubbers, M., Mühlau, P., & Platt, L. (2016). Starting out: New migrants’ socio-cultural integration trajectories in four European destinations. Ethnicities , 16 (2), 157–179.

Dollmann, J. (2021). The political integration of immigrants: How pre- and postmigration contexts matter. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 14 , 381–400. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-021-00867-5

Dustmann, C., Glitz, A., & Vogel, T. (2010). Employment, wages, and the economic cycle: Differences between immigrants and natives. European Economic Review, 54 (1), 1–17.

Eijberts, M., & Ghorashi, H. (2017). Biographies and the doubleness of inclusion and exclusion. Social Identities, 23 (2), 163–178.

Engbersen, G., Leerkes, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Snel, E., & Burgers, J. (2013). A typology of labour migration. On the differential attachments of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39 (6), 959–981.

Erdal, M. B. (2013). Migrant transnationalism and multi-layered integration: Norwegian-Pakistani migrants’ own reflections. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39 (6), 983–999.

Ersanilli, E., & Koopmans, R. (2010). Rewarding integration? Citizenship regulations and the socio-cultural integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36 (5), 773–791.

Entzinger, H., & Biezeveld, R. (2003). Benchmarking in immigrant integration . Rotterdam: European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations.

Fleischmann, F., & Dronkers, J. (2010). Unemployment among immigrants in European labour markets: An analysis of origin and destination effects. Work, Employment and Society, 24 (2), 337–354.

Fokkema, T., & De Haas, H. (2015). Pre-and post-migration determinants of socio-cultural integration of African immigrants in Italy and Spain. International Migration, 53 (6), 3–26.

Geurts, N., & Lubbers, M. (2017). Dynamics in intention to stay and changes in language proficiency of recent migrants in the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 43 (7), 1045–1060.

Geurts, N., Lubbers, M., & Spierings, N. (2020). Structural position and relative deprivation among recent migrants: A longitudinal take on the integration paradox. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 46 (9), 1828–1848.

Geurts, N., Davids, T., & Spierings, N. (2021). The lived experience of an integration paradox: why high-skilled migrants from Turkey experience little national belonging in the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 47 (1), 69–87.

Gorodzeisky, A., & Semyonov, M. (2017). Labor force participation, unemployment and occupational attainment among immigrants in West European countries. PLoS ONE, 12 (5), e0176856.

Hao, L., & Kawano, Y. (2001). Immigrants’ welfare use and opportunity for contact with co-ethnics. Demography, 38 (3), 375–389.

Heath, A., & Li, Y. (2017). The socio-economic integration of ethnic minorities. Social Inclusion , 5 (1), 1–4.

Heath, A. F., Rothon, C., & Kilpi, E. (2008). The second generation in Western Europe: Education, unemployment, and occupational attainment. Annual Review of Sociology, 34 , 211–235.

Hendriks, M. (2015). The happiness of international migrants: A review of research findings. Migration Studies, 3 (3), 343–369.

Jackson, K. M., & Trochim, W. M. (2002). Concept mapping as an alternative approach for the analysis of open-ended survey responses. Organizational Research Methods, 5 (4), 307–336.

Kanas, A., & Steinmetz, S. (2021). Economic outcomes of immigrants with different migration motives: The role of labour market policies. European Sociological Review, 37 (3), 449–464.

Kogan, I. (2004). Last hired, first fired? The unemployment dynamics of male immigrants in Germany. European Sociological Review, 20 (5), 445–461.

Li, Y., & Heath, A. (2020). Persisting disadvantages: a study of labour market dynamics of ethnic unemployment and earnings in the UK (2009–2015). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 46 (5), 857–878.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., Fleischmann, F., & Maliepaard, M. (2018). The new immigrant survey–the Netherlands (NIS2NL). The codebook of a four wave panel study . NWO-Middengroot, file, (420-004).

Luthra, R. R., & Platt, L. (2017). The changing face of Pakistani migration to the United Kingdom. AAPI Nexus: Policy, Practice and Community, 15 (1–2), 15–56.

Martinovic, B., Van Tubergen, F., & Maas, I. (2009). Changes in immigrants’ social integration during the stay in the host country: The case of non-western immigrants in the Netherlands. Social Science Research, 38 (4), 870–882.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. Population and Development Review , 19 (3), 431–466.

Nisic, N., & Melzer, S. M. (2016). Explaining gender inequalities that follow couple migration. Journal of Marriage and Family, 78 (4), 1063–1082.

Phalet, K., & Swyngedouw, M. (2003). Measuring immigrant integration: The case of Belgium. Studi Emigrazione , 40 (152), 773–804.

Popping, R. (2015). Analyzing open-ended questions by means of text analysis procedures. Bulletin of Sociological Methodology/bulletin De Méthodologie Sociologique, 128 (1), 23–39.

Schunck, R. (2014). Immigrant integration. In R. Schunck (Ed.), Transnational activities and immigrant integration in Germany (pp. 9–42). Springer.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Sieben, I., & Linssen, L. (2009). Logistische regressie analyse: een handleiding. Retrieved from www.ru.nl/publish/pages/771745/logistischeregressie.pdf . Accessed 12 Oct 2022.

Tolsma, J., Lubbers, M., & Gijsberts, M. (2012). Education and cultural integration among ethnic minorities and natives in the Netherlands: A test of the integration paradox. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 38 (5), 793–813.

Van Doorn, M., Scheepers, P., & Dagevos, J. (2013). Explaining the integration paradox among small immigrant groups in the Netherlands. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 14 (2), 381–400.

Van Klingeren, M., Boomgaarden, H. G., Vliegenthart, R., & De Vreese, C. H. (2015). Real world is not enough: The media as an additional source of negative attitudes toward immigration, comparing Denmark and the Netherlands. European Sociological Review , 31 (3), 268–283.

Van Tubergen, F., & Van De Werfhorst, H. (2007). Postimmigration investments in education: a study of immigrants in the Netherlands. Demography , 44 (4), 883–898.

Verdier, T., Manning, A., Bisin, A., & Algan, Y. (2012). Cultural integration of immigrants in Europe . Oxford University Press.

Vollebergh, W., Veenman, J., & Hagendoorn, L. (2017). Integrating immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural versus socio-economic integration. Routledge.

Wachter, G., & Fleischmann, F. (2018). Settlement intentions and immigrant integration: The case of recently arrived EU-immigrants in the Netherlands. International Migration, 56 (4), 154–171.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Department of Sociology, Radboud University, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

Nella Geurts

Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science/ERCOMER, Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands

Marcel Lubbers

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nella Geurts .

Additional information

Publisher's note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary Information

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary file1 (DOCX 50 KB)

Rights and permissions.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ .

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Geurts, N., Lubbers, M. The Good and the Bad: Do Immigrants’ Positive and Negative Evaluations of Life After Migration Go Hand in Hand?. Int. Migration & Integration 24 , 1091–1111 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-022-00993-8

Download citation

Accepted : 28 September 2022

Published : 14 October 2022

Issue Date : September 2023

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-022-00993-8

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Migrants’ perceptions
• Discrimination
• Integration
• Find a journal
• Publish with us
• Track your research

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• 20 June 2018
• Update 21 June 2018

Migrants and refugees are good for economies

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Refugees and migrants searching for safe havens and opportunities benefit their host nations’ economies within five years of arrival, suggests an analysis of 30 years of data from 15 countries in Western Europe.

Access options

Access Nature and 54 other Nature Portfolio journals

Get Nature+, our best-value online-access subscription

24,99 € / 30 days

cancel any time

Subscribe to this journal

Receive 51 print issues and online access

185,98 € per year

only 3,65 € per issue

Rent or buy this article

Prices vary by article type

Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05507-0

Updates & Corrections

Update 21 June 2018 : The graphic ‘The economics of migration’ was added to this story.

d’Albis, H., Boubtane, E. & Coulibaly, D. Sci. Adv. 4 , eaaq0883 (2018).

Article   Google Scholar  

Download references

Reprints and permissions

Related Articles

Data on movements of refugees and migrants are flawed

Carbon pricing reduces emissions

News & Views 24 JUL 24

Megastudy shows that reminders boost vaccination but adding free rides does not

Article 26 JUN 24

Extending the Sustainable Development Goals to 2050 — a road map

Comment 17 JUN 24

Faculty Positions & Postdocs at Institute of Physics (IOP), Chinese Academy of Sciences

IOP is the leading research institute in China in condensed matter physics and related fields. Through the steadfast efforts of generations of scie...

Beijing, China

Institute of Physics (IOP), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

FACULTY POSITION IN THE MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF REPRODUCTION

Dallas, Texas (US)

The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UT Southwestern Medical Center)

FACULTY RECRUITING IN GENE REGULATION

Permanent researcher positions for materials science.

NIMS (Tsukuba, Japan) invites international applications from researchers who can conduct research in materials science.

Tsukuba, Ibaraki (JP)

National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)

Osaka University Immunology Frontier Research Center Postdoctoral Researcher

IFReC, Osaka University in Japan offers Advanced Postdoc Positions for Immunology, Cell Biology, Bioinformatics and Bioimaging.

Suita Campus, Osaka University in Osaka, Japan

Immunology Frontier Research Center, Osaka University

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies

• Skip to main content
• Keyboard shortcuts for audio player

The immigrant population in the U.S. is climbing again, setting a record last year

Ukrainian refugees enter the El Chaparral border crossing between Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego in April 2022. The foreign-born share of the U.S. population, which had been roughly flat since 2017, rose to nearly 14% last year. Patrick T. Fallon/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Ukrainian refugees enter the El Chaparral border crossing between Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego in April 2022. The foreign-born share of the U.S. population, which had been roughly flat since 2017, rose to nearly 14% last year.

The immigrant population in the U.S. is growing again.

The number of people born somewhere else climbed by nearly a million last year, reaching a record high of just over 46 million, according to new estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau.

The increase isn't huge for a country the size of the U.S. But it's significant, as growth had slowed sharply in recent years because of Trump administration policies and the pandemic.

"The foreign-born population zoomed up," said William Frey, a demographer at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "The gain in 2022 was as big as the previous four years put together."

The foreign-born share of the U.S. population, which had been roughly flat since 2017, rose to nearly 14% last year.

Experts say the renewed growth coincides with a gradual reboot of legal immigration, like processing visas and vetting refugees, which had all ground to a halt during COVID.

The Biden administration has also opened the country's doors to tens of thousands of people fleeing from Afghanistan and Ukraine. Meanwhile, the administration has struggled to respond to a record-setting influx of migrants from Central and South America arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border.

"The immigration system is functioning a little better," said Jeffrey Passel, a senior demographer at the Pew Research Center in Washington, D.C. "We're letting people in. We didn't let many people in for a while. So that's part of it."

"Some of it is people we've admitted, and some of it is people we haven't admitted," Passel said.

The survey estimates include immigrants who are living in the U.S. legally, as well as those who are not.

The data show big gains in the number of immigrants from Latin America and Asia last year, Frey said. And he notes that a substantial number of new arrivals had college or post-college degrees.

"This image about immigrants coming in, that they're low-skilled and need to have a lot of government support, is not necessarily supported by a lot of these data. Because there are a lot of immigrants coming who are well-educated and can contribute a lot to the labor force," Frey said.

At the state level, Florida saw by far the largest increase in its foreign-born population. The Sunshine State added more than 200,000 immigrants last year, according to the annual Census Bureau estimate known as the American Community Survey. That was more than twice as many as Georgia, the state with the second-largest growth.

"I love it here," said Nimota Salami of Clarkston, Georgia. She was born in Nigeria, and had been living in Chicago until she moved to Georgia last year.

Salami says she was pleasantly surprised by the diversity she found in DeKalb County, just outside Atlanta, as well as the support for the catering and food business she started, Royal Nigerian Foods.

"The weather is very, very friendly," Salami said. "And moving here to Georgia opened me to so many things because I'm able to market my products very well."

Immigrants made up 10.7% of the population in Georgia last year, according to NPR's analysis of the Census data, a gain of nearly .7% compared with 2021. Other states that saw substantial gains in the share of immigrants included Maryland (.8%), New Jersey (.5%) and Iowa (.5%).

Gabriela Rivera has lived in Iowa since 1988, when she migrated with her mother from Mexico City. Rivera says the family chose Iowa because her mother already had family in the area — the same explanation she frequently hears from new arrivals.

"I think for a lot, it's just that they already have a support system," said Rivera, who now lives in Coralville, near Iowa City. "I know of other immigrants who have come here from another state, you know in the south, Texas, California, New Mexico, because someone was already here in Iowa and told them to come."

Rivera says she knows a lot more doctors, lawyers and teachers who are immigrants. And as the Spanish-speaking community has grown, she says, so has the availability of previously hard to find items like rosaries, soccer team memorabilia, and even her favorite food from back in Mexico: cactus leaves.

"That's something I grew up eating in my area in Mexico," Rivera said. "And now it's really easy to get it. Somebody is selling it at the store."

NPR's Nicholas McMillan and Tirzah Christopher, and Iowa Public Radio's Zachary Oren Smith contributed to this story.

• Census Bureau
• asylum seekers
• Afghan refugees
• U.S.-Mexico border

• Today's news
• Reviews and deals
• Climate change
• 2024 election
• Newsletters
• Fall allergies
• Health news
• Mental health
• Sexual health
• Family health
• So mini ways
• Unapologetically
• Buying guides
• Labor Day sales

Entertainment

• How to Watch
• My watchlist
• Stock market
• Biden economy
• Personal finance
• Stocks: most active
• Stocks: gainers
• Stocks: losers
• Trending tickers
• World indices
• US Treasury bonds
• Top mutual funds
• Highest open interest
• Highest implied volatility
• Currency converter
• Basic materials
• Communication services
• Consumer cyclical
• Consumer defensive
• Financial services
• Industrials
• Real estate
• Mutual funds
• Credit cards
• Balance transfer cards
• Cash back cards
• Rewards cards
• Travel cards
• Online checking
• High-yield savings
• Money market
• Home equity loan
• Personal loans
• Student loans
• Options pit
• Fantasy football
• Pro Pick 'Em
• College Pick 'Em
• Fantasy baseball
• Fantasy hockey
• Fantasy basketball
• Download the app
• Daily fantasy
• Scores and schedules
• GameChannel
• World Baseball Classic
• Premier League
• CONCACAF League
• Champions League
• Motorsports
• Horse racing

New on Yahoo

• Privacy Dashboard

Two years after migrants began to arrive, many have settled in Chicago even as some continue to struggle

Since Texas Gov. Greg Abbott began busing migrants to Chicago in August 2022, asylum-seekers have transformed the fabric of the city and beyond.

More than 47,200 — mostly from Venezuela — have passed through Chicagoland and tens of thousands have settled here. Local officials have opened up over 20 buildings to temporarily house them and spent hundreds of millions of dollars. They’ve watched their hospitals, schools and food pantries fill with record numbers of people.

Abbott did not produce the migrant crisis over the past two years, but he magnified it, forcing Democrats to reshape their party’s thinking about welcoming immigration promises.

Today, driven by a June executive order issued by President Joe Biden, buses are no longer arriving in Chicago at the same rates as in 2023. The crisis that officials have long grappled with is entering a new phase. Migrants have lived through four seasons in the city. They’re moving into neighborhoods. Some are even coming to the city on their own, hearing it’s a good place to live.

“Our job is creating long-term community connections for these families,” said Matt DeMatteo, executive director and pastor at New Life Centers, a nonprofit organization helping migrants in collaboration with the city and state. “A beautiful tapestry of spaces and places.”

Indeed, while some migrants have found stability through jobs and a community, many others are still trying to survive as they live in challenging conditions, and struggle to find work and go to school. Out of hundreds of migrants interviewed over the past two years, the Tribune has followed up with five to see how their lives have unfolded in the City of Big Shoulders.

Marilieser Gil-Blanco

Marilieser Gil-Blanco says he wouldn’t be alive now if he hadn’t come to the U.S.

While on his journey from Venezuela last summer with his pregnant wife and daughter, the 24-year-old became paralyzed from the chest down due to a rare condition called transverse myelitis, inflammation of the spinal cord. Like many migrants, he has leaned heavily on volunteers and medical resources in Chicago since he arrived. For months, caretaking fell solely on the shoulders of his partner, Genesis Chacón. She had to look after a newborn and a 4-year-old while changing his diapers and flipping him over in bed.

After the Tribune reported their story in February , the family received over $80,000 through a GoFundMe page set up by volunteers. However, the money proved challenging to manage between family members. Then pressure rose in March when Gil-Blanco found out Chacón, 23, was dating someone else. “We started fighting. It got really bad, and in front of our girls,” he said.

Taking care of Gil-Blanco and the children was hard for Chacón, said Emily Wheeler, program manager for the Faith Community Initiative, who has been helping the family.

“In April, she called us and told us she refused to live with (him) anymore, that she was taking the girls and leaving,” Wheeler said.

Chacón used her portion of the money to move to a hotel room. She eventually came back after Gil-Blanco said it would be better for their daughters if she were there. They moved to a different apartment in July.

Gil-Blanco can’t bring himself to schedule an appointment for therapy treatments at Cook County Hospital, which has seen at least 34,800 migrants like Gil-Blanco through 121,000 visits to its health centers and hospitals. Gil-Blanco often sinks into a deep depression, he said. He has regular dreams that he can walk again. He wishes he could do so many things that he can’t.

On a recent weekday, he sat on a mattress in his new house in the Grand Crossing neighborhood and watched his eldest daughter Mila run around him, her curls bouncing.

“I’ve felt alone,” he said. “But my strength comes from my daughters. I want to see them grow up here.”

Betzabeth Bracho

Betzabeth Bracho, 34, slept on an air mattress at the Calumet District (5th) police station for seven months before moving into a migrant shelter and then an apartment with her husband, Carlos Ramírez, a former police officer in Venezuela. In June, Bracho said she and Ramírez fled Venezuela because her husband opposed the government under the country’s far-left president, Nicolás Maduro. Bracho said police officers at the station didn’t know that Carlos had also been an officer in his home country.

The couple has come a long way since the Tribune first met them in June last year, when they were eating donated food and using a bucket to shower in the police station bathroom. Bracho works at a nail salon now, and they live in an apartment with several other migrants. But she misses her life in Venezuela. She said she was studying to be a preschool teacher.

“We’re not here because we want to be,” she said.

Bracho and Ramírez left their two sons — ages 9 and 12 — in Venezuela with family. She calls them every day.

Following Maduro’s claim of victory in July’s election, which led to surging protests across Venezuela, Bracho said she’s now concerned about her children’s safety. “We’ve been talking about how we’re going to take them from Venezuela and bring them to Colombia, or maybe even here,” she said. In early August, Bracho went to a demonstration in the Loop to protest what many have described as one of the worst moments in the country in over a decade of decline. She wore a shirt on which she had painted “Free Venezuela” in red, yellow and blue.

Yamile Pérez

Last November, Yamile Pérez, 28, took the first steps so that her daughter Keinymar Ávila, a tiny 8-year-old with microcephaly — a condition where a baby’s head is smaller than normal causing seizures, developmental delays and intellectual disability — would be able to go to school . Pérez had traveled thousands of miles for better opportunities for her daughter.

But Keinymar never went. And this year on the first day of classes, she stayed home, battling a 104-degree fever and bedbug bites on her arms and legs.

Pérez blames her daughter’s health on the crumbing apartment in the South Shore neighborhood where they are living.

She says she has tried to wash everything and spray all surfaces. She can’t throw out her clothes and furniture because she doesn’t have money to replace them. On a visit to the apartment in early August, the Tribune saw bedbugs crawling on the Keinymar’s mattress.

Neither Pérez nor her husband have permits to work legally. A workshop run by the federal, state and local governments, working in conjunction with the shelter system has helped more than 8,700 migrants submit applications for permits. But Pérez didn’t know about it, and with the odd jobs she’s picked up, she can’t afford to move to another apartment.

“I just want to be in a place where my daughter is protected,” she said.

Several other migrant families live in the building, she said, and when they shower, water from the upstairs pipes runs down the walls in her bathroom. It’s so bad that even doctors don’t want to do home visits.

“I’ve told the landlord a lot of times that I have a child with special needs,” Pérez said. “They know they need to fix the house.”

Lori Wyatt, who helps manage the property , said exterminators have tried treating Pérez’s apartment multiple times. They’ve instructed her to bag or get rid of her bedding. “Once you have an infestation like that, it’s just really hard,” Wyatt said.

Pérez said she would return to Venezuela or move to another state if it weren’t for Keinymar’s condition and the network of support she’s built here. While Pérez and her husband work painting and cleaning jobs during the day, she often relies on friends to help at home.

“My little girl is always at risk of having a seizure,” she said.

Her saving grace has been the community of other migrants who live in the same apartment building, especially the children. Her 9-year-old son, Keinar, likes to play in the backyard with them.

A victim of abuse

Two months after she was sexually abused while looking for an apartment in the Roseland neighborhood, a Venezuelan woman — whose name is being withheld because she is a victim — said she was attacked and robbed. She said her immigration papers and valuables were stolen near her home about a month ago.

The two back-to-back incidents have crippled her with fear. While her husband works, she spends most of her time inside their home in the Austin neighborhood. Her sons run around the apartment revving engines on their invisible motorcycles.

The first attack happened at the beginning of summer. Eager to leave the shelter where they were staying, the woman had found an apartment listing on Facebook for a room in the Roseland neighborhood.

As she walked behind Roseland Community Hospital, trying to find the apartment, a man approached her and offered to help. She refused, but he proceeded to back her into an alley, and groped, bit and tore at her clothes, all while her child watched and screamed in a stroller.

“The only thing I could do at that moment was grab (my son). (My son) held on to me and wouldn’t let go,” the woman recalled to the Tribune in July.

Her second attack happened a couple of weeks ago when she was at a birthday party at a friend’s house, she said. She went to a corner store across the street to buy some extra food when a man came after her for her wallet, she said. “I started screaming. I thought it was the same attacker,” she said. The woman has received no answers from detectives after she filed a police report in early August. “What will it take for the detectives to pursue my case?” she asked through tears. “Do I need to be raped and killed?”

Angélica Beltrán

On Monday, Angélica Beltrán, 45, and her son, Engerberth Morales, took a photo in front of the Bean. A week earlier, she threw a party for his ninth birthday. She had a cake with white and green frosting and more than 20 kids were there, all people they’d met since arriving in Chicago last July.

It was a far cry from when the Tribune first met Beltrán and her son, Engerberth, earlier this year, as he cried on his way to school. The family was part of a state housing program that provided $53 million to move migrants into over 6,000 homes, according to data provided by a state spokeswoman.

Although Beltrán expressed gratitude to the state for helping her with six months of rental payments, in their rush to leave the migrant shelter, they had moved to an apartment in Englewood that was too small, and the block felt unsafe.

Recently, they’ve moved into a different apartment in Englewood, where the family has more space and the block is quieter.

Beltrán and her husband, from Venezuela, received work permits several months ago by claiming temporary protected legal status, which allows people from certain countries to live and work in the United States.

The couple has found jobs at restaurants on the South Side. They’re able to make rental payments and are saving up for a car.

Beltrán’s biggest worry now, she said, is enrolling Engerberth in school. He still can’t read. Last year, he stopped going to school because he was embarrassed he didn’t speak English. She had wanted to enroll him in a bilingual school, but there wasn’t one nearby.

“It’s just hard for me to talk to people,” he said.

As of April 12 this year, Chicago Public Schools estimates it has served a total of 9,800 new arrival students. CPS has increased the number of teachers who are certified as bilingual, English as a Second Language or both by nearly 40% since 2018. Still, thousands of kids who have moved to new neighborhoods are adjusting to schools with few Spanish-speaking classmates. Last year, Beltrán knew the transition from their country hadn’t been easy for Engerberth, so she didn’t push him to go to school. But this year, she planned to try again.

Yoel Guerra

On a baseball diamond on a warm summer night in the Little Village neighborhood, Yoel Guerra stood in a circle with his teammates as they held hands and prayed. The 16-year-old from Venezuela said he likes Little Village Summer Softball because it’s different from baseball for his school or for his Cubs traveling team. Thursday nights in the summer, he plays with people of all ages, including his stepdad.

Guerra’s family of seven lives nearby, and his little siblings sit on the sidelines of their games. They’ll snack on Cheetos and run around on the fields nearby. For Guerra, who has been playing baseball since he was 4, the game has become a refuge and a reminder of home . It’s a place to unwind and focus on one thing.

Guerra is not just joyful when he plays baseball but is naturally gifted. His coaches think he has a chance of playing in college. Knowing that, this year he’s focusing on his grades. He’s also focusing on Farragut Career Academy’s team goals. They moved up divisions after winning their conference last year and they want to win again. “I love the community here,” Guerra said. Each day, Guerra said baseball — his country’s most popular sport — gives him something to look forward to and people to look up to in the U.S.

Chicago Tribune’s Joe Mahr contributed.

• Election 2024
• Entertainment
• Newsletters
• Photography
• AP Buyline Personal Finance
• AP Buyline Shopping
• Press Releases
• Israel-Hamas War
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Global elections
• Asia Pacific
• Latin America
• Middle East
• Election results
• Google trends
• AP & Elections
• U.S. Open Tennis
• Paralympic Games
• College football
• Auto Racing
• Movie reviews
• Book reviews
• Financial Markets
• Business Highlights
• Financial wellness
• Artificial Intelligence
• Social Media

US border policy spurred migrant camps hundreds of miles away in Mexico’s capital

FILE - An aerial view of a migrant tent encampment set up on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Dec. 26, 2023. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

Venezuelan migrant Eliezer López spreads his arms in celebration after securing an appointment to seek asylum through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s mobile app, CBP One, at a migrant tent encampment in Mexico City, Friday, July 5, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

A Central American youth carries plastic containers as she goes to fetch water at a migrant tent encampment set up on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Monday, July 8, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

Venezuelan migrant Hector Magallanes, who has been waiting months for a CBP One appointment, has set up a task force to oversee security and infrastructure at a migrant tent encampment on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Monday, July 8, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - A Venezuelan migrant prepares chicken and rice to sell, at a migrant tent encampment on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, July 31, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

FILE - Venezuelan migrant Ali Gomez uses a bucket turned upside down to hold a compact mirror as he shaves sitting on a rail, at a migrant tent encampment set up along the Vallejo train tracks, in Mexico City, July 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

FILE - Venezuelan migrant Osdeigly Granadillo hangs her clothes to dry at a migrant tent encampment set up on the perimeters surrounding the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, July 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

FILE - Clothes are laid out to dry in a courtyard at a migrant tent encampment set up on the perimeters surrounding the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, July 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

FILE - A Venezuelan migrant bathes her child at a migrant tent encampment set up on the perimeters surrounding the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, July 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

Central America migrant children play on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Monday, July 8, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - Haitian migrants camp out at the Giordano Bruno plaza in the Juarez neighborhood of Mexico City, May 18, 2023. Federal immigration authorities cleared the tent encampment two weeks later, one of the largest in the city’s downtown. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

City workers dismantled an abandoned makeshift camp that was known as “Little Haiti” in the Tláhuac borough of Mexico City, Friday, July 5, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - Venezuelan migrant Cristo Perez sits in the sun at a migrant camp on the perimeters of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, July 31, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

A Colombian migrant child plays with plastic construction toys at a migrant tent encampment set up on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church Mexico City, Monday, July 8, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

A Venezuelan migrant shaves a fellow migrant at a tent encampment set up on the perimeters surrounding the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Monday, July 8, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - Migrants gather at a tent encampment set up on the plaza of the Santa Cruz y La Soledad Catholic parish church, in La Merced neighborhood of Mexico City, Dec. 26, 2023. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

Migrant Carolina Arriaga stands in a migrant tent encampment in Mexico City, Thursday, June 27, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

Venezuelan migrant Alí Gómez holds a dish containing tamales and beans at a migrant tent encampment set up along the Vallejo train tracks, in Mexico City, Thursday, July 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - Framed by clothing hanging to dry, Venezuelan migrants sit on a sofa at a tent encampment set up near the North Bus Station in Mexico City, June 27, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

A young migrant washes a dish after heavy rains at a tent encampment set up along the Vallejo train tracks, in Mexico City, Thursday, July 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)

FILE - Young Brazilian migrants play in a tent encampment set up by migrants near the North Bus Station in Mexico City, June 27, 2024. (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte, File)

Migrants build makeshift life in Mexico City while waiting for US asylum

• Copy Link copied

MEXICO CITY (AP) — “That’s it, dude! Done!” exclaimed Eliezer López as he jumped up and down, throwing his arms to the sky and drawing a sign of the cross across his chest. His joy was so contagious, his friends started to emerge from nearby tents to celebrate with him.

López, a 20-year-old Venezuelan migrant in Mexico City, had reason to rejoice: after several frustrating attempts, he was able to secure an appointment to seek asylum in the U.S.

He is one of thousands of migrants whose U.S.-bound journey has landed them in the Mexican capital, the southernmost point until recently from which migrants can register to request an appointment to seek asylum through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s mobile app known as CBP One.

Since June, when the Biden administration announced significant restrictions on migrants seeking asylum, the app became one of the only ways to request asylum at the Southwest border.

This U.S. asylum policy and its geographic limits are a driving force behind the emergence of migrant encampments throughout the Mexican capital where thousands of migrants wait weeks — even months — in limbo, living in crowded, makeshift camps with poor sanitation and grim living conditions.

From point of transit to temporary destination

Historically, Mexico City has not been a stop for northbound migrants. They try to cross the country quickly to reach the northern border. But the delays in securing an appointment, coupled with the danger that plagues cartel-controlled northern Mexico border cities and the increased crackdown by Mexican authorities on migrants have combined to turn Mexico City from a point of transit to a temporary destination for thousands.

Some migrant camps have been dismantled by immigration authorities or abandoned over time. Others, like the one where López has lived for the past few months, remain.

Like López, many migrants have opted to wait for their appointment in the somewhat safer capital, but Mexico City presents its own challenges.

Shelter capacity is limited, and unlike large U.S. cities like Chicago and New York, which rushed last winter to find housing for arriving migrants, in Mexico City, they are mainly left to their own devices.

Andrew Bahena, coordinator of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, or CHIRLA, said that up until late 2023 many migrants were contained in southern Mexican cities like Tapachula, near the border with Guatemala. Many tried to disguise their location to defeat CBP One’s geographic limits, but when U.S. authorities took notice, more migrants began aiming for Mexico City to make their appointments from there, he said.

As a result, there has been an increase in the migrant population living in the Mexico City camps.

“We talk about this as border externalization and it’s something the United States and Mexico have been jointly implementing for years,” said Bahena. “The CBP One app is probably one of the best examples of that today.”

“These folks are asylum seekers, they’re not homeless people living in Mexico,” he added.

A maze of tents and tarps

When López first arrived in Mexico City at the end of April, he thought about renting a room only to realize it was not an option.

He earned 450 pesos ($23) a day working three times a week at a market. Rent was 3,000 pesos a week ($157) per person to share a room with strangers, an arrangement that has become commonplace in Mexican cities with migrant populations.

“The camp is like a refuge,” said López. Migrants can share space with people they know, avoid the curfews and strict rules of shelters and potentially stay longer if necessary.

The camps are a maze of tents and tarps. Some call their space “ranchito,” or small ranch, assembled from wood, cardboard, plastic sheets, blankets and whatever they can find to protect them from the chilly mountain air and intense summer rains that pound the city.

At another camp in La Merced neighborhood, hundreds of blue, yellow and red tents fill a plaza in front of a church. It’s one of the capital’s largest camps and just a 20-minute walk from the city center.

“This is a place where up to 2,000 migrants have been living in the last year,” said Bahena. ”About 40% are children.”

Migrants in La Merced have organized themselves, building an impromptu pump that moves water from the public system and distributes it on a fixed schedule, with every tent receiving four buckets of water every day.

“At the beginning there were a lot of problems, lots of trash and people in Mexico didn’t like that,” said Héctor Javier Magallanes, a Venezuelan migrant, who has been waiting nine months for a CBP One appointment. “We made sure to fix those problems little by little.”

As more migrants kept arriving at the camp, he set up a task force of 15 people to oversee security and infrastructure.

Despite efforts to keep the camp clean and organized, residents haven’t been able to avoid outbreaks of illnesses, exacerbated by drastic weather changes.

Keilin Mendoza, a 27-year-old Honduran migrant, said her kids constantly get colds, especially her 1-year-old daughter.

“She’s the one that worries me the most, because she takes the longest to recover,” she said. Mendoza has tried accessing the free medical attention from humanitarian organizations at the camp, but resources are limited.

Israel Resendiz, coordinator of Doctors Without Borders’ mobile team, said the uncertainty of life in the camps weighs heavily on migrants’ mental health. “It’s not the same when a person waiting for their appointment (...) can get a hotel, rent a room or have money for food. The majority of people don’t have these resources.”

The secretary of inclusion and social welfare and the secretary of the interior in Mexico City didn’t respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press about the camps. Press representatives of Clara Brugada, the incoming mayor of Mexico City, said the issue must first be discussed at the federal level.

Meanwhile, tensions between camp residents and neighbors have increased, sometimes leading to mass evictions of the camps.

In late April, neighbors from the trendy and central Juárez neighborhood blocked some of the city’s busiest streets, chanting, “The street is not a shelter!”

Eduardo Ramírez, one of the protest organizers, said it’s the government’s job to “help these poor people that come from their countries in search of something better and have the bad luck of traveling through Mexico.”

“They sleep on the streets because the government has abandoned them,” he said.

In a camp hosting about 200 families in the northern neighborhood of Vallejo, tensions — and fear — run rampant.

“One day they threw chlorinated water on a kid and hot water on another,” recalled 50-year-old Salvadoran Sonia Rodríguez, a resident of the camp.

Despite making her “ranchito” as dignified as possible — she has a grill for cooking, bunk beds and a television — her gaze turns somber when she remembers she’s been living for 10 months in an improvised camp that is not her home, without her things, far from her normal life. ___

Follow AP’s coverage of Latin America and the Caribbean at https://apnews.com/hub/latin-america

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

Read our research on:

Full Topic List

Regions & Countries

• Publications
• Our Methods
• Short Reads
• Tools & Resources

Read Our Research On:

• Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden

Publics divided on immigrants’ willingness to adopt host country’s customs

Table of contents.

• Acknowledgments
• Methodology
• Appendix A: References
• Appendix B: Demographic tables

Majorities of publics in top migrant destination countries say immigrants strengthen their countries, according to a 2018 Pew Research Center survey of 18 countries that host half of the world’s migrants.

In 10 of the countries surveyed, majorities view immigrants as a strength rather than a burden. Among them are some of the largest migrant receiving countries in the world: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Australia (each hosting more than 7 million immigrants in 2017).

By contrast, majorities in five countries surveyed – Hungary, Greece, South Africa, Russia and Israel – see immigrants as a burden to their countries. With the exception of Russia, these countries each have fewer than 5 million immigrants.

Meanwhile, public opinion on the impact of immigrants is divided in the Netherlands. In Italy and Poland, more say immigrants are a burden, while substantial shares in these countries do not lean one way or the other (31% and 20% respectively).

Countries surveyed hold half of the world’s migrants

The 18 nations surveyed contain more than half (51%) of the world’s migrant population, or some 127 million people, according to United Nations and U.S. Census Bureau estimates.

Countries with some of the world’s largest immigrant populations were surveyed, including more traditional destinations like the United States, Canada and Australia that have seen waves of immigrants arrive since at least the 19th century . Also surveyed were more recent destination countries in the European Union such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece, all of which experienced immigration waves after World War II .

Japan and Israel were also surveyed. Japan is making efforts to attract more migrants due to its aging population. Israel has been a destination for immigrants since it enacted its 1950 Law of Return for Jewish people worldwide. Russia was surveyed since it has one of the world’s largest foreign-born populations. At the same time, South Africa continues to be a top destination country for many Africans.

Also included in the survey were some newer destinations. Mexico, for example, has become an increasingly important destination and transit country for migrants fleeing violence from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Similarly, Hungary became an important transit country for migrants entering Europe during the refugee surge that peaked in 2015. And although Poland for many years was a country of emigration, it has seen a recent wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe .

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are top immigrant destinations that were not surveyed. Pew Research Center does not have a history of conducting surveys in these countries.

In the U.S., the nation with the world’s largest number of immigrants , six-in-ten adults (59%) say immigrants make the country stronger because of their work and talents, while one-third (34%) say immigrants are a burden because they take jobs and social benefits. Views about immigrants have shifted in the U.S. since the 1990s, when most Americans said immigrants were a burden to the country.

Meanwhile, in six European Union countries surveyed, public opinion about the impact of immigrants has changed since 2014. That was the last time the Center asked European publics this question. It was also before hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers arrived on Europe’s shores in 2015. In Greece, Germany and Italy, three countries that experienced high volumes of arrivals, the share of adults saying immigrants make their countries stronger dropped significantly.

By contrast, public opinion shifted in the opposite direction in France, the UK and Spain, countries surveyed that received fewer asylum seekers in 2015. In all three countries in 2018, majorities said immigrants made their countries stronger, up from about half who said the same in 2014. 1

While majorities in many of the 18 countries surveyed see immigrants as a strength, this opinion is not equally shared across all groups within countries. In most countries surveyed, those on the left of the ideological spectrum are more positive about immigration’s impact on their country than those on the right. Similarly, in many countries surveyed, those with higher levels of education, younger adults, and those with higher incomes are more likely to say immigrants make their countries stronger because of their work and talents. (See Appendix B for group breakdowns .)

Also, in all countries surveyed, those saying they want fewer immigrants arriving in their countries are less likely to view immigrants as making their countries stronger.

Publics split on immigrants’ willingness to adopt their societies’ customs and way of life

Attitudes are mixed on immigrants’ willingness to adopt the destination country’s customs or wanting to be distinct from its society. A median of 49% among countries surveyed say immigrants want to be distinct from the host country’s society, while a median of 45% say immigrants want to adopt the host country’s customs and way of life.

In six destination countries – Japan, Mexico, South Africa, the U.S., France and Sweden – publics are more likely to say immigrants want to adopt the host country’s customs and way of life than say immigrants want to be distinct.

Japan is an outlier: A large majority of the public (75%) says immigrants want to adopt the country’s customs and way of life. This country, whose aging population and low birth rate make immigration relevant for its population growth, has recently changed its policies to attract more foreigners. Views about immigrant integration in Japan could be linked to the low number of immigrants the country hosts and that many immigrants in Japan are ethnically Japanese .

By contrast, in eight destination countries – Hungary, Russia, Greece, Italy, Germany, Poland, Israel and Australia – more people say immigrants want to be distinct than say they are willing to adopt the host country’s customs. Majorities hold this view in Hungary, Russia, Greece, Italy and Germany. In addition, sizable shares of people in most of these countries refused to choose one option or the other when asked this question.

In many countries surveyed, younger adults, those with higher levels of education and those on the left of the political spectrum are generally more likely to say immigrants are adopting the country’s customs and way of life (see Appendix B for group breakdowns ).

Publics are less concerned about immigrant crime than the risk they pose for terrorism

In recent years, security concerns about immigration have become part of the public debate in many countries. Some of these concerns are about crime and immigration, while others are about terrorism and immigration.

Immigrants and crime

In several immigrant destination countries, large majorities say immigrants are not more to blame for crime than other groups. This is the case in Canada, the U.S., France and the UK. Among other countries surveyed, only in South Africa, Sweden and Greece do majorities believe that immigrants are more to blame for crime than other groups.

In the Netherlands, Japan, Israel and Germany, opinions are split on the impact of immigrants on crime. In four other countries where views were mixed, substantial shares refused to choose either of the two statements offered – Italy (26%), Hungary (17%), Poland (15%) and Russia (14%).

In countries where majorities see immigrants as a strength, majorities also tend to say immigrants are not more to blame for crime. Notable exceptions are Germany and Sweden, where majorities say that immigrants strengthen their countries, but pluralities of adults say that immigrants carry more responsibility for crime.

Immigrants and terrorism

Publics across top migrant destination countries are split on whether or not immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries.

In six countries, majorities believe immigrants do not increase the risk of terrorism in the host country. These include all surveyed countries in North America (Mexico, Canada and the U.S.), as well as South Africa and Japan. Publics in France and Spain, two European countries that were not at the center of the 2015 refugee crisis, also hold this view.

By contrast, majorities in seven European nations – Hungary, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Russia, Germany and the Netherlands – believe immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries.

Views on the topic are divided in the UK, Australia and Israel. In Poland, half (52%) of the public says immigrants increase the risk of terrorism, while 28% say they do not increase the risk of terrorism. But a substantial share in Poland (19%) also refused to respond one way or the other.

CORRECTION (May 2, 2019): The original data for South Africa was incorrect in the chart, “Majorities in many European migrant destinations think immigrants increase risk of terrorism.” These numbers have been switched to correctly show that 32% of South Africans say immigrants do not increase the risk of terrorism and 62% say immigrants increase the risk of terrorism.

Majorities in many countries think immigrants in the country illegally should be deported

Majorities in most immigrant destination countries surveyed support the deportation of people who are in their countries illegally.

In seven of the 10 EU countries surveyed, majorities support the deportation of immigrants living in their country illegally. In 2007, between 1.7 million and 3.2 million unauthorized, or irregular, migrants were estimated to be living in the 10 EU countries surveyed. The number of asylum seeker applications has increased following the 2015 refugee surge. Since then, the number of rejected asylum applications has increased substantially. Many of these rejected asylum seekers may continue to reside illegally in Europe.

Similarly, majorities in Russia, South Africa, Australia and Japan also support deporting immigrants living in those countries illegally.

In the U.S., public opinion is divided on the issue. About half (46%) of the public supports deporting immigrants residing there illegally, while the other half (47%) opposes their deportation. 2 The Center estimates 10.7 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the U.S. in 2016, which represented less than a quarter (23.7%) of the U.S. immigrant population. The number of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. has been falling since 2007 and is now at levels last seen in 2004.

In Mexico, fewer than half (43%) say they support the deportation of immigrants living there illegally. In recent years, Mexico has experienced an increasing number of migrants entering the country without authorization from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Mexico has historically been a migrant-sending country: About 12 million people born in Mexico live outside the country, nearly all in the U.S. Among those in the U.S., nearly half are unauthorized immigrants.

In most countries surveyed, those on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely to support deportation. Similarly, older people in several countries surveyed are more likely to support the deportation of immigrants living illegally in their countries (See Appendix B ).

Immigrants are foreign-born individuals living outside their country of birth, regardless of their citizenship. Refugees and asylum seekers are a subgroup within this broader population. The terms “immigrants” and “migrants” are used interchangeably in this report.

The terms “ asylum seekers ,” “ asylum applicants ” and “ refugees ”  are used interchangeably throughout this report and refer to individuals who have applied for asylum. Seeking asylum does not mean applicants will necessarily be permitted to stay in the country where they have submitted an application.

“ European Union ” in this report refers to the 28 nation-states that form the European Union (EU). At the time of the Pew Research Center’s Spring 2018 global survey, the UK was still part of the European Union.

• The survey question was not asked in other countries in 2014. ↩
• When the Center asked about this issue in the U.S. in a different way, a significantly lower share – 20% – said “undocumented immigrants should not be allowed to stay in the country legally,” while a large majority (79%) said “there should be a way for them to stay in the country legally, if certain requirements are met.” ↩

Sign up for our weekly newsletter

Fresh data delivery Saturday mornings

Sign up for The Briefing

Weekly updates on the world of news & information

• Immigration & Migration
• Immigration Attitudes

The Religious Composition of the World’s Migrants

Religious composition of the world’s migrants, 1990-2020, how the origins of america’s immigrants have changed since 1850, what the data says about immigrants in the u.s., facts on u.s. immigrants, 2018, most popular, report materials.

• Summary of findings: (French | Français)
• Summary of findings: (German | Deutsch)
• Summary of findings: (Italian | Italiano)
• Summary of findings: (Japanese)
• Summary of findings: (Spanish | Español)
• Spring 2018 Survey Data

901 E St. NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 USA (+1) 202-419-4300 | Main (+1) 202-857-8562 | Fax (+1) 202-419-4372 |  Media Inquiries

Research Topics

• Email Newsletters

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

© 2024 Pew Research Center