research paper on golden rule of interpretation of statutes

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The New Golden Rule—All That Glitters…

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The New Golden Rule—All That Glitters…, Statute Law Review , Volume 35, Issue 3, October 2014, Pages v–vii, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmu033

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The Golden Rule of statutory interpretation, according to which the courts begin—and wherever reasonably possible end—with the plain meaning of the words of the statute, has always been subject to a range of acknowledged exceptions. With those in mind, law students have always been taught to identify the range of materials to which the courts will have regard in determining the mischief or context of legislation. Nowadays it would be more tempting to give students a list of materials to which the courts will not have regard; except that since Pepper v. Hart it is not at all clear that there would be any items on the list.

Year on year the courts appear to expand both the range of materials to which they are happy to have regard in making decisions about interpretation and application and also the extent of the reliance that they are prepared to place on those materials.

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• Legal Fundaments

INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

• February 2021
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The Law of Interpretation

• William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs
• What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants  by  Mark Greenberg
• February 2017
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How should we interpret legal instruments? How do we identify the law they create? Current approaches largely fall into two broad camps. The standard picture of interpretation is focused on language, using various linguistic conventions to discover a document’s meaning or a drafter’s intent. Those who see language as less determinate take a more skeptical view, urging judges to make interpretive choices on policy grounds. Yet both approaches neglect the most important resource available: the already applicable rules of law.

Legal interpretation is neither a subfield of linguistics nor an exercise in policymaking. Rather, it is deeply shaped by preexisting legal rules. These rules tell us what legal materials to read and how to read them. Like other parts of the law, what we call “the law of interpretation” has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters — even if it isn’t ideal. We argue that legal interpretive rules are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system.

This Article thus reframes the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation, distinguishing purely linguistic questions from legal questions to which language offers no unique answer. It also has two concrete implications of note. It provides a framework for analyzing the canons of interpretation, determining whether they are legally valid and how much authority they bear. And it helps resolve debates over constitutional “interpretation” and “construction,” explaining how construction can go beyond the text but not beyond the law.

* Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.

We are grateful for comments from Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Amy Coney Barrett, Kathryn Bi, Saul Cornell, Ryan Doerfler, Oran Doyle, Richard Fallon, John Finnis, Sherif Girgis, Abbe Gluck, Mark Greenberg, James Grimmelmann, Cathy Hwang, Randy Kozel, Kurt Lash, Brian Leiter, Barbara Baum Levenbook, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Yair Listokin, Luca Marzorati, John McGinnis, Caleb Nelson, Will Ortman, Zach Price, Michael Rappaport, Richard Re, Amanda Schwoerke, Reva Siegel, Dale Smith, Larry Solan, Lawrence Solum, Asher Steinberg, Lee Strang, Gregg Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Kevin Walsh, and audiences at Georgetown University Law Center, Northwestern Law School, St. John’s University School of Law, the University of Illinois College of Law, the University of Notre Dame in London, the University of San Diego Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum, and the Volokh Conspiracy. We are also grateful for the always excellent research assistance of Kelly Holt. Support is provided in part by a gift to Duke University School of Law from the Eugene T. Bost, Jr., Research Professorship of The Cannon Charitable Trust No. 3 and in part by the Alumni Faculty Fund and SNR Denton Fund at the University of Chicago Law School.

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February 10, 2017

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LEXIS AND COMPANY

Search this blog, deciphering the golden rule of interpretation: a comprehensive guide.

In the intricate realm of legal interpretation, certain principles serve as guiding lights for courts to navigate through statutes and case laws. Among these guiding principles, the Golden Rule of Interpretation shines brightly, offering a nuanced approach to understanding the law and its application in diverse scenarios. In this extensive exploration, we unravel the intricacies of the Golden Rule, dissecting its origins, applications, and significance in the legal landscape.

1. Understanding the Golden Rule

A. definition and essence.

The Golden Rule of Interpretation is a fundamental principle employed by courts to interpret statutes and ascertain legislative intent. At its core, this rule allows for the departure from the literal meaning of statutory language when adhering strictly to such meaning would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the legislative purpose.

b. Evolution and Development

• Historical Roots: The origins of the Golden Rule can be traced back to English common law traditions, where courts grappled with the need for flexibility in statutory interpretation.
• Judicial Precedents: Landmark cases have contributed to the refinement and application of the Golden Rule, shaping its contours and establishing its importance in legal practice.

2. Application of the Golden Rule

A. principles and guidelines.

• Avoiding Absurdity: One of the primary objectives of the Golden Rule is to prevent absurd or unreasonable outcomes that may arise from a strict adherence to literal statutory language.
• Preserving Legislative Intent: Courts utilize the Golden Rule to ensure that statutory interpretation remains aligned with the underlying purpose and objectives intended by the legislature.

b. Illustrative Examples

• Contextual Analysis: The Golden Rule allows courts to consider the broader context, legislative history, and societal implications when interpreting statutes, enabling a more nuanced understanding of the law's intended effects.
• Balancing Act: Courts must strike a delicate balance between respecting the literal wording of statutes and interpreting them in a manner that promotes fairness, justice, and consistency.

3. Significance and Implications

A. flexibility and adaptability.

• Responsive to Change: The Golden Rule enables courts to adapt statutory interpretation to changing societal norms, technological advancements, and evolving legal landscapes.
• Promoting Equity: By prioritizing reason and justice over strict literalism, the Golden Rule fosters equitable outcomes and ensures that the law remains relevant and responsive to contemporary challenges.

b. Enhancing Judicial Reasoning

• Tool for Just Decision-Making: The Golden Rule serves as a valuable tool in the judicial arsenal, providing judges with the flexibility and discretion needed to arrive at fair and reasoned decisions.
• Promoting Legal Certainty: While the Golden Rule introduces an element of subjectivity into statutory interpretation, its application enhances legal certainty by ensuring that the law remains adaptable and responsive to real-world complexities.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Golden Rule of Interpretation stands as a pillar of legal reasoning, offering courts a pragmatic approach to deciphering statutory provisions. By striking a delicate balance between literalism and flexibility, the Golden Rule promotes fairness, equity, and justice in the application of the law. As courts continue to grapple with complex legal issues, the Golden Rule remains a steadfast companion, guiding judges in their quest for reasoned and principled decision-making.

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Important General Rules of Interpretation: A Study

18 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2016

Mukund Sarda

Bharati Vidyapeeth University - New Law College

Date Written: April 2, 2016

A Statute is the ‘will of the legislature’. The legislature will follow the procedure laid down or prescribed in the enactment of laws. If there is any procedural defect in the legislative process, it may be cured immediately by appropriate legislative action i.e., by amendment to the existing provision or inserting a new one in its place, without canvassing or challenging in the courts. Courts are under a duty to interpret the Statute irrespective of ambiguity or lack of clarity or otherwise, in order to discharge its basic duty of doing justice. In this process, the courts have attempted to find out the intention of the legislature from the words used in the four corners of the relevant provisions. The usual rule that is adhered to is nothing to be implied, which is inconsistent with the words used in expressing the intention of the legislature, as the words used in the Statute speak for the intention of the legislature. As explained in Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank’s Ltd., Case, the object of all interpretation of a Statute is to determine the intention of the law-maker from the language used to find out whether a particular case falls within the ambit of the intention so determined. Thus, the purpose of interpretation is to determine the intention of the legislature and in doing so, the Statute as a whole must be construed harmoniously by reading all the parts together. It follows that no part of it can be ignored or omitted in finding out the legislative intent. The courts have no power to vary the words of a Statue by following the maxim, “A verbis Legis non Est Recedendem” (you must not vary the words of a Statute). Lawyers and the courts are engaged in this exercise in a vast number of cases when the words used in the Statutes or expressions are ambiguous in order to resolve the inconsistencies or make the Statute workable as per the intent of the legislature. Salmond observed: “By interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed”. This function has to be performed by the judiciary for the purpose of applying the provision of the Statute to a case before it, as otherwise justice cannot be done justly or fairly and the litigants as consumers of law are bound to suffer. Statutes are therefore to be construed according to the intention of the legislature which made it. The duty of the court is “to act upon the true intention of the legislature”.

Keywords: Dr Mukund Sarda New law College Pune, Dr Mukund Sarda Bharati Vidyapeeth University, Bharati Vidyapeeth University Pune, Prof Dr Mukund Bhagirath Sarda

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Mukund Sarda (Contact Author)

Bharati vidyapeeth university - new law college ( email ).

Paud Road Erandwane Pune, 411038 India

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• Golden rules of interpretation

Golden rule of interpretation

This article is written by Sambit Rath , a B.A. LL.B. student of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. This article deals with the golden rule of interpretation, which is one of the rules of interpretation, along with its application in various case laws.

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar .

Table of Contents

Introduction

The judiciary in India plays a huge role in ensuring the just and fair treatment of the people. Its decisions affect people in more ways than one. This is the reason that only people with the required level of intellect and experience are chosen to be judges in courts. We are aware of the regular judgements of the courts where they decide upon cases involving statutory applications. Often, the wording of a particular Section of a statute is challenged and it is the duty of the court to either expand, restrict or modify the meaning of the term, in order to ensure justice in the case at hand. This power of the judiciary is essential to its function of interpreting laws made by the Parliament. Sometimes the intention of the lawmaker is ambiguous due to the usage of vague terms, and thus, it becomes necessary for someone to correct this mistake. To aid the judges in deciding whether a term must be interpreted in a different way and what should be that interpretation, the rules of interpretation were created by some great minds. In this article, we shall look into what exactly the rules of interpretation are and specifically talk about one of the main rules, i.e. the golden rule of interpretation.  

What are the Rules of Interpretation

As per Salmond, “interpretation is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of legislation through the medium of the authoritative form in which it is expressed.” The word ‘interpretation’ is derived from the Latin term “interpretari” which means to explain or understand. So when we say judges interpret the law, we mean judges try to ascertain the true meaning of the words used in a statute. 

It is important to note that judges do not get into the interpretation of statutes unless it is necessary. If the language of a provision is unambiguous and clear as to the intention of the maker, the courts do not try and modify it. Their duty to interpret arises only when the language of the provision is unclear, vague or ambiguous. To guide the judges in using this discretion appropriately, certain principles have been developed which we now refer to them as ‘rules of interpretation’.

The three rules of interpretation

There are three rules, the literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule. 

The Literal rule

The literal rule is the first rule of interpretation. According to this rule, the judge has to read the statute as it is and consider the literal meaning of what’s written. It basically means to extract the plain meaning of the text. This is why it is also called the ‘ plain meaning rule ’. The first step in interpreting anything is to read whatever is written as it is. The plain text of the statute can give an insight into the minds of its makers. In such cases, where the true meaning can be derived from the normal text of the statute, no modifications should be made. The end goal is to derive the one and only meaning of the text. Thus, this rule shall be applied when the language of a provision does not give rise to more than one meaning and is completely clear about what it deals with.

In the case of Duport Steel Ltd v. Sirs (1980) , Lord Diplock observed that where the meaning of the words in a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judges to invent ambiguities to give them an excuse for failing to apply the plain meaning to the case at hand because they presume it to be unjust.

The Mischief rule

This rule originated in Heydon’s case in 1584. It is also called Heydon’s rule as it was given by Lord Poke in that case. It is the rule of purposive construction as the purpose of the statute is most important while applying this rule. The focus of this rule is to cure the mischief, which means to prevent the misuse of provisions of a statute. As per this rule, the meaning of the statute should be interpreted in a way, where there is no room for mischief. If there has been an attempt to add mischief to a statute, then it must be weeded out using this rule.

Let’s understand this rule using an example.

In the year 1959, the Street Offences Act of the UK was enacted to prohibit prostitutes from soliciting on the roads to the passing public. After the enactment, the prostitutes started soliciting from their balconies and windows. As per Section 1(1) of the Act, it was an offence for an adult to solicit in a public place for the purpose of prostitution. The prostitutes were charged under this Section as their actions defeated the intention of the legislation. When this was challenged before the Court, it was found that the meaning of this Section was being misinterpreted and was being taken advantage of by the prostitutes. It applied the mischief rule of interpretation and stated that the intention of the Act was to prevent prostitution. Thus, it expanded the meaning of the word ‘street’ and included the balconies and windows of homes. 

The Golden rule

The golden rule is a deviation from the literal rule. It is used to modify the meaning of the absurd term to give it a useful and apt meaning to suit the context. It is discussed in depth below.

What is the Golden Rule of Interpretation

The golden rule of interpretation was propounded in the case of Grey v. Pearson by Lord Wensleydale in the year 1957. This is why it is also known as Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This rule is the modification of the literal rule. The golden rule modifies the language of the words in a statute to successfully interpret the actual meaning of the legislation. It takes into account the context in which the words are used so that justice can be done to the intention of the legislation. It is to be noted that the rule can be used only when the language of the statute is ambiguous or grammatically incorrect. Thus the judges need to be extremely careful with their interpretation and only exercise this power when it is absolutely necessary.  

The golden rule can be applied in a narrow or a broad sense:

• Narrow approach – This approach is taken when the words in the statute are capable of multiple interpretations. Through this approach, the judge is able to apply the meaning which is clear and properly portrays the true intention of the statute. This approach was used in the R v. Allen, (1872) case.
• Broad approach – This approach is taken when there exists only one possible interpretation of a word. In some cases, the meaning might cause absurdity. In order to avoid this problem, the judges can use this approach to modify the meaning of the word but this modification should be limited and shouldn’t deviate from the actual intention of the legislation. In Re. Sigsworth: Bedford v. Bedford (1954) , this approach was used.

The golden rule of interpretation is the second step after the literal rule. As we’ve discussed, the literal rule would apply only when the plain meaning of the word gives justice to the intention of the legislation. When the literal rule fails due to the existence of multiple meanings of a word in the statute, the golden rule is to be applied. 

Advantages of the Golden Rule

• An apparent advantage of the rule is that it allows the judge to modify the meaning of words to remove absurdity and apply the modified term effectively in the case at hand.
• When the literal rule of interpretation fails to achieve clarity, the golden rule steps in to help the court.
• It guides the judges in applying appropriate principles while interpreting the meaning of the statute. 
• It takes away the requirement of amending the legislation to make minute changes as the judges can do that for the Parliament. For example, in the R v. Allen case discussed above, the Court stepped in and closed the loopholes by applying the golden rule. The interpretation was in line with the original intention of the Parliament. Thus, no amendments were required.

Disadvantages of the Golden Rule

• The golden rule is restricted in its use as it can be used only when the literal rule leads to ambiguities in interpretation. Its use thus becomes limited and rare.
• It is unpredictable and lacks guidelines.
• One of the main disadvantages of the rule is that judges can twist the meaning of the words and change the law. This would cause a disbalance in the separation of powers.

Methods of application of the Golden Rule

Some scholars have tried to lay down ways by which the meaning of the statute is to be ascertained. 

Earl T. Crawford, in his book “ The Construction of Statutes ”, has written that the first source of interpretation should be sought from the words of the statute. After that, the meaning ascertained should be examined in the context and subject matter of the enactment. If the legislative intent is still unclear, the various external sources of assistance can be consulted. In this case, the external source of assistance shall be the rules of interpretation. 

Austin has also contributed to the vast literature on rules of interpretation. He has divided the interpretative process into three sub-processes:

• Finding the rule.
• Finding the intention of the legislature.
• Extending or restricting the statute to cover cases.

Similarly, De Sloovere recommended the following steps:

• Finding the right statutory provisions.
• Interpreting the statute in its technical sense.
• Applying the meaning to the case at hand.

In both the recommendations, the first step is to find the appropriate rule/provision and apply it to the case at hand. If the literal meaning of the statute is appropriate, it shall be applied. It is only when the meaning is absurd, that the golden rule of interpretation shall come into play. The court shall extend or restrict the statute using this rule to cover the case at hand and apply the modified meaning to come to a better judgement.

Views of eminent jurists on the Golden Rule of Interpretation

Through the years, eminent jurists have shared their thoughts about the golden rule of interpretation either through judgements or books. 

Justice Holmes had stated that a word is not a crystal, transparent or unchanged. It is the product of thought and has the ability to vary greatly in colour and content based on the surrounding circumstances and the time in which it is used. Wherever the meaning of the words is uncertain, there may be a requirement for the application of the golden rule. The court’s main purpose is to supply justice and to do that, proper interpretation has to be made. The literal rule should be used first but if it results in absurdity, the ordinary meaning of the word then may be modified to avoid that absurdity, but no further. 

Lord Moulton in the case of Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositor, (1912) emphasised the need for caution before applying the golden rule of interpretation. He stated that there exists a danger that the rule may lead to mere judicial criticism of the correctness of the Acts of legislature. We have to interpret the statutes based on the language used in them. Although the result of two conflicting interpretations may guide us in making a choice between them, we can be sure that the words used cannot be attributed to the conflicting interpretation by taking the Act as a whole and viewing it in the context of the existing State law at that time.

The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, (1976 ) stated that the rights of the public are paramount and are to be considered superior in comparison to individual rights. If the words of the statute are absurd in the context of the case, they should be considered repugnant in order to apply the golden rule of interpretation.

Important case laws related to the Golden Rule of Interpretation

State of punjab v. qaiser jehan begum (1963), facts of the case.

• The respondents were the owners of 55 bighas and 7 biswas of land in two villages.
• Their lands along with nearby lands were acquired by the appellant for his use.
• The respondents were not informed about the acquisition and were not present at the time of the award. 
• The Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 96 per acre but the respondents a year later contended the valuation of their lands. The senior subordinate judge rejected their application as it was already 6 months since the sale and was thus beyond the period of limitation as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 .

Issue of the case 

• Whether the limitation period starts from the day of sale or from the day of getting the knowledge of the award.

Judgement 

• The Supreme Court held that the parties must first come to know the award in order to make an application for reference under Section 18. The parties were not informed of the award by notice.
• Since the parties got to know of the award on a later date, the limitation period for Section 18 would start from this date and not the date on which the compensation was awarded.
• In this case, the Court applied the golden rule to modify the meaning of the provision to include the start of the limitation period from the date of receiving the notice of award.

Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar (1962)

Facts of the case .

• The appellant and his brother assaulted one person who suffered grievous injuries.
• The appellant and his brother were charged with Section 307 & Section 326 , and Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 respectively. 
• It was also found that the younger brother, 19, had no intention to cause hurt, and was thus, only charged with Section 324.
• The appellant contended that the younger brother’s age was under 21 at the date of the offence and thus Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be applied. 

Issue of the case

• Whether the age of the accused is to be determined on the date of the offence or the date of the guilty verdict.
• The Supreme Court in this case decided that the age of the younger brother was below 21 years of age and thus, Section 6 was applicable to him.
• The Court applied the golden rule to allow the accused to claim the benefit under Section 6 of the Act by stating that the determination of age for this Section should be done on the date of the guilty verdict and not the date of offence.

Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940)

• Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929 provided the machinery for the transfer of an old company to a new company. ‘Transfer’ includes transferring all property, rights, liabilities and duties of the former company to the new company.
• There existed a contract of service between the appellant, Tom Nokes and the old company.
• After the acquisition of the old company by the respondent, the transfer of all property, rights, liabilities and duties was done. The appellant continued to work in the old company without having knowledge of the acquisition. 
• When the appellant absented himself from work, he was held liable under Section 4 of the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 . 
• The respondent claimed that the transfer included the contract of service under the transfer of ‘property’. 
• Whether the transfer of property includes the contract of service that previously existed between the individual and the transferee company.
• The House of Lords held that the benefits of the contract entered into by the employee and the former company cannot be transferred without informing and obtaining the consent of the employee.
• The notice of the amalgamation by the transferor or transferee company to the appellant was essential. 
• It was also stated that while using the golden rule, the words must be given their ordinary meaning. If the legislature desired that workers could be transferred to the new company without their consent then it would have specifically mentioned it in the statute. But nothing of that sort could be found in the present case. Thus, the golden rule was used in this case to modify the meaning of the term ‘property’ by restricting it. Viscount Simon, L.C. presented his reasoning by stating that an interpretation should be avoided if it reduces the legislation to futility which would fail to achieve the purpose of the legislation. 

If the golden rule wouldn’t have been applied in this case, it would have led to injustice as it would take away the consent of the workers. This would negatively affect the workers who would be subject to frivolous penalties just like in this case.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company (1967)

• A transport vehicle belonging to the defendant was carrying a parcel of apples.
• While being checked by the authorities, it was found that the parcel contained opium. An invoice was shown to the authorities, which contained crates of apples as the only item.
• Eventually, the vehicle was impounded and the items carried by it confiscated.
• Section 11 of the Opium Act, 1878 provided that all the vehicles transporting contraband articles shall be impounded and articles confiscated. 
• The transport company contended that it had no knowledge of the opium present in their transport vehicle. 
• Whether the magistrate was bound by the words of Section 11 of the Opium Act, 1878 to confiscate the vehicle. 
• The High Court held that it was unjust to confiscate the truck of a person if he had no knowledge of the opium being carried on it.
• Since it is a penal statute, it should be construed in a way that no person who has not committed any offence, shall not be penalised.
• The word ‘shall’ in “shall be confiscated” should be interpreted as ‘may’ in the context of such cases. 

Thus, the obligation under Section 11 of the Act was removed using the golden rule of interpretation. Had the literal rule been followed in this case, it would’ve led to gross injustice as an innocent person would’ve been penalised. 

Lee v. Knapp (1967)

• The defendant was driving around the block in which his company’s office stood. The purpose was to demonstrate to the van driver that the new vehicle was easy to drive.
• During this demonstration, the van got into an accident with a parked vehicle.
• As per Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 , the driver of the vehicle shall stop and give his information and his car’s identification marks in case of an accident where damage has been done to another vehicle. 
• The defendant stopped but did not provide the details personally as was required by the Section.
• Whether the meaning of the word ‘stop’ included stopping for a reasonable period of time before leaving the place of the accident.

Judgement of the Court

• The court held that the driver did not stop for a reasonable period of time and make an attempt to look for the other car’s owner. 
• Also, the defendant not giving the details personally violated Section 77(1) of the Act.
• Here, the golden rule was applied to expand the meaning of ‘stop’ to include ‘search the victim’. Due to these reasons, the defendant was held liable under Section 77(1) of the Act.

Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Limited (1999)

• The claimant had a long-standing and stable homosexual relationship with the deceased, who was the original tenant of the flat.
• After the death of the tenant, the claimant sought a statutory tenancy as the spouse of the deceased.
• Whether a homosexual partner is eligible to get a statutory tenancy on the same grounds as a spouse in heterosexual marriage? 
• The Court held that the claim could not be made as a spouse of the deceased as homosexual partners did not come under the meaning of the word. The word spouse included ‘husband or wife’ of the deceased. 
• If the Parliament wanted to include same-sex partners, then it would have expressly stated it.
• But the Court stated that the meaning of the word ‘family’ could be extended to include same-sex partners. Thus the appeal was allowed.

In this case, the golden rule was applied to ensure justice for homosexuals when it came to rights related to family law. The Court ensured that it doesn’t cross the line and infringe upon the area of the legislature by using the literal rule.  

Criticism of the Golden Rule of Interpretation 

On the face of it, the golden rule of interpretation seems like a good alternative to the literal rule. But as per many, it has its shortcomings and sometimes these shortcomings might lead to tragic results.

The first point of criticism comes from the definition of the term ‘absurdity’. It is a vague concept. Also, what is absurd depends on the person interpreting it. This leads to a lack of uniformity while applying the already limited golden rule. Every judge is different and is bound to interpret things differently. The purpose of this rule is to bring uniformity by stating that interpretation of the provisions of a statute should not deviate from the intention of the legislation. This rule is to be applied when the literal interpretation of the text produces ambiguous or absurd results. This is where the problem lies. The absurdity clause to some extent eliminates the uniformity provided by the rule. 

Second, the literal, golden and mischief rules are called rules but are they really rule in the true sense of the word? Certainly not. It is totally based on the discretion of the judges. Although they’re called rules, none of them carries any authority independently. The judges can choose not to follow the ‘rules’ when the need clearly exists. Also, they’re all different solutions to the same problem. Thus, there is no hard and fast rule as to which one to apply in the case at hand.

Third, due to the culmination of the above-mentioned reasons, the golden rule acts as an excuse for the judge to deviate from the guidelines. It allows the judge to make exceptions that do not align well with the policy behind the Act but are based on the social and political views of the judge. So the bias of the judge can find a way to enter the scene through this power of interpretation. For example, let’s take the prostitution case that we discussed above. There is legislation banning the use of cigarettes in public similar to the prostitution case. A case arises before the Court and it has to now decide if the accused is guilty of violating a particular Section of the statute. Now, if the judge personally believes that smoking is not all that bad, he could restrict the meaning of ‘streets’ in this case. Thus, the application of the golden rule of interpretation is dependent on the wisdom and integrity of the judges.

Conclusion 

The golden rule of interpretation is one of the better ways to strike a balance between statutory intent and evolving societal needs. It was best described in the case of Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Limited, (1999), that there are areas of law where a clear demarcation lies between the judiciary and the legislature. When it comes to interpretation, the intention of the legislature should always be kept in mind. If a particular provision clearly mentions the parties concerned with it, the judiciary for the sake of socio-legal development expands its meaning unless the intention of the legislature says so. The judiciary cannot cross that line and perform the functions of the legislature.

Due to the possibility of errors in interpretation, the golden rule is not a perfect tool. It cannot always be used to eliminate absurdities in the plain meaning of the statute. Due to this, several jurists have come up with their own procedure of application of the rule to make it more efficient. The rule has been used and modified by judges in various cases for decades and it is still in use to this date as it has stood the test of time.  

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Is the golden rule better than the literal rule of interpretation.

Both the literal and the golden rules have specific applications and thus cannot be compared. The literal rule is used in most cases to extract the true meaning of the statute through the plain reading of the language. The golden rule, on the other hand, is used to modify the meaning of the provision if the literal meaning leads to absurdity in the case at hand.

Are the rules of interpretation followed compulsorily by the judges?

The rules of interpretation are not mandatory but discretionary. The judges can choose to apply whichever rule they feel is apt for the case at hand. They can also choose not to apply these rules at all. These rules exist for the sole purpose of guiding the courts to eliminate absurdity in statutes and arrive at a proper decision.

Why the golden rule of interpretation and construction is an important part of interpretation?

The golden rule of interpretation and construction is important because enables the judge to modify the meaning of terms that have an absurd or anomalous interpretation. Doing so ensures that the aptest meaning is applied to the case at hand and any kind of absurdity is removed.

Why is the golden rule of interpretation criticised?

The golden rule is sometimes criticised because it is unpredictable. It depends on the interpretation of the judge, which may differ from the views of other judges. The modified meaning might be apt for the present case but this may not be true for other cases.

What does uncertainty or absurdity mean in the context of the interpretation of statutes?

When the meaning of a term in the statute gives an unclear or vague outcome in the context of the case, then it would be called uncertain. Absurdity in the context of interpretation means that the meaning of the term leads to a completely different or opposite interpretation than what the statute intends to do.

• Introduction To Basic Rules of Interpretation of Statutes – Aishwarya Sandeep
• GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION AND CASES – Social Laws Today
• Critical Analysis of the Literal, Golden, and Mischief Rules (lawteacher.net)
• https://advocatespedia.com/GOLDEN_RULE

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The Golden rule of Interpretation

By Shraddha Agrawal

Editor’s Note: The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. The paper is a critique of the golden rule of interpretation along with relevant case laws.

INTRODUCTION

Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. [i] The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation.

According to Gray, [ii] the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has occasion  to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called ‘interpretation’. [iii]

The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers, [iv] and apply that to the facts of the case at hand. [v] An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided. [vi] Justice Chakravarti made two observations on his behalf in Badsha Mia v. Rajjab Ali : [vii]

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the legislature and in England, the rules of interpretation, developed there, can be relied on to aid the discovery because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into language, fashion their language with those very rules in view.

Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful whether, in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times, especially of the provincial legislature, the same assumption can always be made.

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is arrived at by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words, it regards only the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to the intention of the legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible according to the rules settled in this behalf. ‘Proper construction’ is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were self-contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of a statute. [viii]

According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in which the statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal meaning of the words used by the legislature.

A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to be expounded, according to the intent of them that made it. [ix] The object of interpretation is to find out the intention of the legislature.

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be construed so as to ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used. ‘The essence of the Law’, according to Salmond: [x]

Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless, in all ordinary cases, the courts must be content to accept the litera legis as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said.

Ita scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is to say, in all ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable.

Parke B in Becke v. Smith [xi] formulated the following well-known rule for the interpretation of statutes:

If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the function of legislators when we depart from, the ordinary meaning of the precise words used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from adherence to their literal meaning.

Burton J in Warburton v. Loveland , [xii] observed:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any expressed intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged so far as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson [xiii] and thereafter it is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden rule. His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the ‘golden rule’ in Matteson v. Hart .[xiv]

We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of construction, as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the Legislature their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope and intention of the statute, injustice, and absurdity would result from so construing them.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act.

In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in literal interpretation leads modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. When in construing a word literally, there exist variance with the intention of the legislature to be gathered from the subject or context of the statute, the language may be varied or modified in such a case, but no further. Ambiguity here means double meaning, a word’s expression capable of more than one meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is incompatible with other words or gives separate meaning when read with other parts of the statute.

The word ‘absurdity’ also means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a direct conflict or inconsistencies like one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A situation may be reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. [xv] In all such cases, the statute becomes equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or uncertain in nature. Whenever the meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is uncertain, it may be a case of departing from the plain grammatical meaning, and there may be a need for application of the golden rule. [xvi]

It is however reiterated in every concerned case [xvii] , that the province of the judge is a very different one of construing the language in which the legislature has finally expressed. If they undertake the other province, which belongs to the legislature who, have to endeavor to interpret the desire of the country, the courts are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide.

And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words have primary meaning in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be applied first. Words have a secondary meaning

LITERAL GOLDEN RULE

There are three fundamental rules [xviii] suggested in the English Cases:

Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of the section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the “mischief rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it was directed.” [xix]

For the application of the literal rule, a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [xx] The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.

In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar , [xxi] the Apex Court had held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible, the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits.”

In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal , [xxii] the Supreme Court said: “in order to get the true import of the statute, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the construing parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section as to take one word here and another there.”

Interpretative Process

Crawford has discussed the various ways by which the meaning of statutes is to be ascertained. [xxiii] He writes:

“The first source from which the legislative intent is to be sought is the words of the statute. Then an examination should be made of the context, and the subject matter and purpose of the enactment. After the exhaustion of all intrinsic aids, if the legislative intent is still obscure, it is proper for the court to consult the several extrinsic matters for further assistance. And during the consideration of the- various sources of assistance, further help may, of course, be found on the use of the numerous rules of construction.”

Austin divided the interpretative process into three sub-processes:

• finding the rule;
• finding the intention of the legislature; and
• extending or restricting the statute so discovered to cover cases which should be covered.

De Sloovere recommended the following steps:

• finding or choosing the proper statutory provisions;
• interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; and
• applying the meaning so found, to the case in hand.

According to Odgers [xxiv] there are three methods of judicial approach to the construction of a statute, namely, (a) the literal; (b) by employing the Golden Rule; and (c) by considering the mischief that the statute was designed to obviate or prevent. Vacher v. London Society of Compositors [xxv] is an example of the employment of all three methods approached. The question there was whether under Section 4(1), Trade Disputes Act 1906 , any tortuous act by trade unions was protected or only such tortuous acts as were committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.

The House of Lords took the former view and, in delivering their opinions, Lord Macnaughten adopted the Golden Rule from Grey v. Pearson [xxvi] Lord Atkinson followed the literal approach in the case of Cooke v. Charles A Vageler, [xxvii] while Lord Moulton discussed the history of the statute and applied the mischief method.

It is one of the well-established rules of construction that if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such a case best declaring the intention of the legislature. It is equally a well-settled principle of construction that where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, fiction or confusion into the working of the system. [xxviii]

APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE

If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [xxix] “We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. We should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to reasonably practical results.”

In this case [xxx] Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929, was in question. This provision provided machinery for the transfer of the undertaking (an old company) to a new company. Under the section, “transfer” includes all property, rights, liabilities and duties of the former company vest with the latter. An issue therefore was whether a contract of service previously existing between an individual and transferor company automatically becomes a contract between the individual and the latter company.

Hence, an action was taken against him; however, no notice was given to him about the proposed amalgamation either by the transferor or the transferee company. It was contended that the contract of service could fall under the term “property”. Rejecting the contention, the House of Lords held that the benefits of a contract entered into between the former company and the employee cannot be transferred (by X company to Y company) without the consent of the employee.

Notice of amalgamation by transferor or Transferee Company to the individual servant was essential. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary- meaning. If the legislature really desired that workmen should be transferred to a new company without their consent being obtained, plain words could be derived to express this intention.

As in the present case, neither the provision of law provides such a primary meaning as applicable to the transfer of personal service, and nor there is any overt act on the part of the transferor or the transferee company informing the worker as regards the amalgamation The contract did not exist between the appellant and the respondent and therefore the latter company cannot take any action against the employee regarding service.

In R. v. Sweden Lord Parker [xxxi] construed Section 1(1) of the poor Prisoners’ Defense Act, 1930 : “Any person committed for trial for an indictable offence shall be entitled to free legal aid in the preparation and conduct of his defense at the trial and to have solicitor and counsel assigned to him for that purpose.” The Court of Criminal appeal held that this section gave the right to an accused person once the certificate is granted to have a solicitor assigned for the purposes mentioned, but not a right that that solicitor or another should defend him at the trial.

The court observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person a right to have a solicitor at the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly refuse to have the solicitor assigned when he got advice which he did not like and go to others, and there would be no means whatever to prevent that, with the result that there might be added expense to the country, delays and abuse of the whole procedure.” Such an unreasonable intention of Parliament cannot be imputed.

In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India , [xxxii] a restricted construction was given to rule 11 (VI) of the Central Services (Classification, Appeal and Control) Rules, 1965. This Rule empowers imposition of “penalty of reduction to a lower time-scale pay, grade post or service.” The Supreme Court held that a person initially appointed to a higher post and grade of pay scale cannot be reduced to a lower grade or post. A wider construction if given to the provision, it may affect the recruitment policy itself for a person directly recruited to a higher post may not have the requisite qualification for the lower post.

Maxwell says [xxxiii] that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be seen in the area devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and construction to avoid inconvenience and injustice, and to prevent evasion He illustrated the application of the rule in various cases relating to criminal, civil, labour, revenue taxation and administration branches of law.

In Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe  (1964) AC 541 a Statute made it felony ‘to break from prison”. Held it would not apply to a prisoner who escaped while the prison was on fire. Since his act was, not to recover liberty, but to save his life. Similarly, a statute which made ‘an act’ criminal in unqualified terms was understood as not applying where the act done was excusable or justifiable on grounds generally recognized by law.

In Luke v. R.R.C [xxxiv] , Lord Reid said: “An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed a statute if there is some other construction available. Where to apply words literally would defeat the “obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result” we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. Though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges, but a problem may arise where more than one meaning arc available through the words of the statute, that meaning should be chosen which is reasonable and rational.”

In R. v. London Justices [xxxv] , Section 105 of the Highways Act, 1835, gave an appeal to ‘any person’ who though himself aggrieved by any order, conviction, judgment or determination of a justice under the Act. This was held not to apply to ‘an informant who complained of an acquittal’ on a charge of obstructing of the highway, for if it did, the person acquitted would be liable to be twice vexed for the same offence.

In Day v. Simpson [xxxvi] , it was held that the Theatres Act, 1843, which prohibited under a penalty the performance of plays without license, would extend to a performance where the players did not come on the stage, but acted m a chamber below it, their fingers being reflected by mirrors so as to appear to the spectators to be on the stage. To carryout effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined.

This manner of construction has two aspects; one is that the courts, mindful of the Mischief Rule will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net. The other is that the statute may be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions, thus defeating any shifts and contrivances, which parties may have devised in the hope of thereby falling outside the Act. When the courts find an attempt at concealment, they will, “brush away the cobweb varnish, and shrew the transactions in their true light.

Thus, in the name of justice or beneficial construction, the language of a statute cannot be narrowed down so as to permit one to escape from the purview of law. However, where the language itself is evasive and ambiguous, modification of it is permissible. [xxxvii]

In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd ., (1961) 1 WLR 92 held; “Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen.

In Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid: ‘Beneficial laws are addressed to practical people, and ought to be construed in the light of practical consideration, rather than a meticulous comparison of the language of their various provisions. If the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practical result.”  

INDIAN CASES

In India, there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears that even for the literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of the literal meaning of the provision, and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy, an uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning.

But when there is a possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature. [xxxviii]

In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore [xxxix] , the Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in Section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953, which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land.

The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp , [xl] Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided that “a driver causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident at the spot of the accident.

In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar [xli] in construing Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 , the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below 21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute.

This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.

In Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil, [xlii] Section 23 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, which permitted inclusion of the name in the electoral roll “till the last date for nomination” for an election in the concerned constituency, has been construed. Section 33(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 specifies that the nomination papers shall be presented between the hours of 11’O clock in the fore noon and 3’0 clock in the after noon. Reading these provisions together in the light of the object behind them, the Supreme Court construed the words “last date” in section 23 as “last hour of the last date” of nomination under Section 33(1) of the Act.

In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P., [xliii] Sales Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under Section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said provision.

Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy which has to decided not by the court but by Parliament itself.

In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh [xliv] the appellant argued that it was obligatory under Section 99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal to record names of all persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including parties and non-parties to the petition and that under the proviso, notice should be given to all persons named under Section 99(1)(a)(ii). He being a party to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh notice. Supreme Court said that such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and held that the proviso along with clause (b) thereto and the setting of the section pointed out that notice is contemplated only against non- parties to the petition.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE

Lord Moulten in Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositor [xlv] had explained the reasons for adopting caution before application of the golden rule of construction in these words: “There is a danger that it may generate into a mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the Acts of the legislature. We have to interpret statutes according to the language used therein, and though occasionally the respective consequences of two rival interpretations may guide us in our choice in between them, it can only be where, taking the Act as a whole and viewing it in connection with the existing state of law at the time of the passing of the Act, we can satisfy ourselves that the words cannot have been used in the sense the argument points.

“It may sometimes happen that laws made for the benefit of the public at large may come in the conflict of some individual interest or take away his legal right and cause injustice to him. That is to say, like public policy, absurdity, uncertainty or repugnance, are very unruly horses.

In State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money [ xlvi] , the Supreme Court said that “it is the duty of all courts of justice, to take care for the general good of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law. Referring earlier cases the court observed that absurdity should be understood in the same sense as repugnance that is to say something which would be as absurd with reference to the other words of the statute as to amount to repugnance

In Grundi v. Great Boulder Proprietary Cold Mines Ltd. , [xlvii] Lord Greene M.R. said,

“Although absurdity or non-absurdity of one conclusion as capered with another may be and very often is, of assistance to the court in choosing between two possible meanings of ambiguous words. The Golden Rule of Construction is a doctrine, which must be applied with great care, remembering that judges may be fallible in this question of absurdity and in any event it must not be applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning, which it cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used to re-write the language in a way different from that in which it was originally framed.”

Criticism of Golden Rule

The Golden Approach can be criticized:

The United Kingdom Law Commissions commented in their report that:

“There is a tendency in our systems, less evident in some recent decisions of the courts but still perceptible, to over emphasise the literal meaning of a provision (i.e. the meaning in the light of its immediate and obvious context) at the expense of the meaning to be derived from other possible contexts; the latter include the ‘mischief’ or general legislative purpose, as well as any international obligation of the United Kingdom, which underlie the provision”. [ xlviii]

They also stated that to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of words is to “assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship” [xlix] This was written in 1969 and in the light of more recent judicial developments, [l]  it seems that the courts have shifted somewhat from the literal approach. Zander [li]  contends that: “ The main principles of statutory interpretation-the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule-are all called rules, but this is plainly a misnomer (A misnomer is a term that suggests an interpretation known to be untrue).

They are not rules in any ordinary sense of the word since they all point to different solutions to the same problem. Nor is there any indication, either in the so-called rules or elsewhere, as to which to apply in any given situation. Each of them may be applied but need not be” Zander, in his more recent book, [lii] criticized the golden rule for being silent as to how the court should proceed if it does find an unacceptable absurdity

• It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis a lack of wider contextual understandings of “meanings.”
• The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve situations where difficult choices have to be made between several fairly plausible arguments, not situations where the words lead to obvious absurdities.
• The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic as pointed out by Professor Willis in his famous article, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (l938) l6 C.B. Rev.l. Willis at l3-l4:

What is an ‘absurdity’? When is the result of a particular interpretation so ‘absurd’ that a court will feel justified in departing from a ‘plain meaning’? There is the difficulty. ‘Absurdity’ is a concept no less vague and indefinite than plain meaning’: you cannot reconcile the cases upon it. It is infinitely more susceptible to the influence of personal prejudice.

The result is that in ultimate analysis the ‘golden rule’ does allow a court to make quite openly exceptions which are based not on the social policy behind the Act, not even on the total effect of the words used by the legislature, but purely on the social and political views of the men who happen to be sitting on the case …

What use do the courts make of the ‘golden rule’ today? Again the answer is the same – they use it as a device to achieve a desired result, in this case as a very last resort and only after all less blatant methods have failed. In those rare cases where the words in question are (a) narrow and precise, and (b) too ‘plain’ to be judicially held not plain, and yet to hold them applicable would shock the court’s sense of justice, the court will if it wishes to depart from their plain meaning, declare that to apply them literally to the facts of this case would result in an ‘absurdity’ of which the legislature could not be held guilty, and, invoking the ‘golden rule,’ will work out an implied exception. It was defined in  Grey v. Pearson “the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity”

The ‘Golden rule’ could, thus, be explained as follows:—

• It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided. [liii]
• The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually used. [liv]
• Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention [lv] and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. [lvi]

Formatted on March 2nd, 2019.

REFERENCES:

[i] State of Jammu and Kashmir v Thankur Ganga Singh [1960] 2 SCR 346, P 351, per Subba Rao J.

[ii] Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn, pp 176-78.

[iii] Salmond, Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh edn, p 152.

[iv] Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA & Anor (2002) 4 SCC 318.

[vi] State of Kerala & Ors v Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu (2001)9 SCC 673.

[vii] AIR 1946 Cal 348, p 353.

[viii] Romero v International Terminal Operating Co 358 US 354, 3 L Ed 2d 368, 375.

[ix] Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.

[x] Jurisprudence, eleventhedn, p 152.

[xi] (1836) 2 M&W 191, 195,6LJEx54, 150 ER724; Allen, Law in the Making, fourth edn, pp 402-03; Abbey v Dale, Jervis (1851) 20 LJCP 233, p 235; followed in State of Kerala v West Coast Planters MR 1958 Ker 41, p 43; Sirsilk Ltd v Govt ofAndhra Pradesh AIR 1960 AP 373, p 375.

[xii] (1929) 1 H&B IR 623, p 648:

[xiii] (1857) 6 HL 61, p 106,26 LJ Ch 473,p 481 Abbot v Middleton (1858) 11 ER 28 ,7 HLC 114 ,115 ,per Lord Wensleydale

[xiv] (1854) 23 LJCP 108 ,p 144

[xv]   T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Regachari, AIR 1969 SC 701: (1969) 3 SCR 65: (1969) 72 1TR 787 (SC)

[xvi] For example, Robert Wingram Crawford v. Richard Spooner. MIA 179 (PC)

[xvii] G.W Paton, Jurisprudence (1946), p294

[xviii] Ibid

[xix]  Paton, Text Book of Jurisprudence, 1946, p 188.

[xx] AIR 1955 SC 376

[xxi] 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 459

[xxii]  [1957] S.C.R. 754

[xxiii] Crawford, Statutory Construction, p 274.

[xxiv] Odgers, Construction of Deeds and Statutes, second edn, pp 289-90.

[xxv] [ 1913] AC 107, p 117, per Lord Macnaughten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Moulton.

[xxvi] (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, 26 LTCh 473.

[xxvii] [1901] AC 102, p 107.

[xxviii] Collector of Customs, Baroda v Digvijayasinhji Mills AIR 1961 SC 1549, p 1551; ShriRam v State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 674, p 678; quoted and relied on Markandey Singh, IPS v ML Bhanot, IPS (1988) 3 SCC 539.

[xxix] (1940) AC 1014: (1940) 3 AU ER 549 (HL). Maxwell explains thus, “Judges are not called upon to apply their opinions of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words, but where in construing general words, the meaning of which is not entirely plain there are adequate reasons for doubting whether the legislature could have been intending so wide an interpretation as would disregard fundamental principles, then we may be justified in adopting a narrower construction.”

[xxx] Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd 3 All ER 549 (HL).

[xxxi] (1964) 1 WLR 1454.

[xxxii] AIR 1988 SC 1979

[xxxiii] Maxwell ,Interpretation of Statutes,10th Edition ,1985 ,pp.43-45

[xxxiv]  (1963) AC 557

[xxxv] (1890) 25 QBD 357

[xxxvi] (1885) 34 LJMC 149

[xxxvii] Brazier v. Skipton Rock Co. Ltd. (1962) 1 WLR 1839.

[xxxviii] Kafaltiya A.B. ,Interpretatation of Statutes, Universal Law Publishing, 2008 ,pp 52

[xxxix]   AIR 1981 SC 1656

[xl]   (1966) 3 AH ER 961.

[xli] AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745

[xlii] AIR 1977 SC 2171

[xliii] AIR 1981 SC 1656

[xliv] AIR 1955 SC 850

[xlv]  [1912] UKHL 3; (1913) AC 107

[xlvi] [1976] 3 S.C.R. 160

[xlvii] 1948 1 All ER 21

[xlviii] “The Interpretation of Statutes”, (Law Com No 21) (Scot Law Com No 11), Report No 21, paragraph 80 (1969).

[xlix] Ibid ,at para 30

[l] Pepper v Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032.

[li] . The Law Making Process (2nd edition, 1985), 129

[lii] The Law Making Process (4th edition, 1994), 130

[liii] See the Speech of Lordship Wensleydab in Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61

[liv] Shamarac v. Parulkarv. Distt. Magistrate, Thana 1952 SCR 863.

[lv] Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer AIR 1989 SC 505.

[lvi] State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain AIR 1965 SC 1296.

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still confused that what’s the main / major difference between golden and heydon “s rule? cause in both the cases we are focusing on intention of parliament when a statue is capable of more than one meaning in plain reading since in heydon rule the mischeif is sought to be suppresed now the intention of parliament is also to supress mischief so how golden and heydon rule became different from each other.

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) (1876-77) L.R. 2 App Cas 743. ‘Absurdity’ is a strong word and its use suggests that the golden rule should be sparingly used. Judges cannot simply use the golden rule to get a different outcome. The judges cannot use it because the application of the literal rule would be unfair or harsh (See LNER v Berriman ). Under the golden rule, it falls to the judges to decide if a particular result would be absurd. Judges may differ in what is and is not absurd.               (1872) LR 1 CCR 367                                                          (1872) LR 1 CCR 367          and  of statutory interpretation       MAIL US NOW [email protected] CALL US NOW Our Company A comprehensive guide to interpretation of statutes. Interpretation is the process to determine the meaning of the statutes or other legal provision. Statutes are also known as legislative enactment or backbone of any legal system. These statutes are the primary source of most of the law jurisdictions. And statutes are play the vital role in regulation of all aspect of the society. The judiciary holds an essential responsibility of interpreting the existing statutes and laws. When courts administer justice in disputes they strictly adhere to the boundaries established by the framework, which includes various laws, statutes, the Constitution and delegated legislations. In nations, like India, the legal framework comprises a multitude of legislations and regulations. This interpretation of statues is challenging and complex but this is the most important part to ensuring that, law is applied fairly and uniformly. What is Interpretation of statutes? Interpretation of statutes is the backbone of our legal system. This is the process of determining the meaning of any law. This interpretation of statues is challenging and complex but this is the most important part to ensuring that, law is applied fairly and uniformly. Statutes are the primary source of most jurisdiction in law. It is a law enacted by a legislative body. Statutes play the most vital role in regulating all aspect of our legal system. But at the same time it can be quite complex, that time interpretation of statues comes in. What is Construction of Statutes? Statutory construction also referred as Interpretation of statutes. It is a fundamental legal processor. The use of Constructed of Statutes is to determining the meaning and application of statutes. It is also challenging and complex in task but it ensures that the law is applied uniformly and fairly. To understand a statute, courts use variety of tools and techniques. There are a set of principle and rules use to interpret the statutes. Court generally give the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutes, unless the statute is confusing or that meaning would lead to a wrong result. Sometimes courts may consider the legislative history of a statute like committee reports and debates to help to understand the statute’s meaning. Related books “ interpretation of statutes ” by n s bindra. “ Principles of Statutory Interpretation ” by Justice G P Singh Difference Between Interpretation and Construction Interpretation. Interpretation and construction form the principles in analysing statutes allowing courts to effectively apply and uphold the rule of law. Although these concepts are interconnected they serve purposes in comprehending and implementing statutes. Interpretation involves understanding and discerning the meaning of language as an art form. Lawmakers use words and phrases when drafting statutes to convey their intentions and establish rules. However due to language complexities and multifaceted nature of matters statutes may not always express their intended meaning with clarity. Consequently, courts play a role in interpreting language to uncover legislative intent. The objective of interpretation is to address questions about what the law states and what it was intended to achieve. It delves into context, purpose and objectives of the law to determine the intent, behind its wording. Judges meticulously analyse the wording, sentence structure and organization of the statute to understand its intended meaning. When it comes to the law construction focuses on how it’s applied to specific cases or situations. Once the court has understood the meaning of a statute the next step is to put that meaning into action, in real life scenarios. This is where construction comes into play. CONSTRUCTION Construction deals with implementing and enforcing the law. It involves adapting the language of statutes to address circumstances and determining how the law should be enforced in cases. Through construction courts decide how to put the law into practice in order to resolve disputes protect rights and ensure justice. The main difference between interpretation and construction lies in their scope and emphasis. Interpretation primarily aims at understanding and revealing intent while construction involves applying that intent to situations. Interpretation provides guidelines, for construction by establishing boundaries within which courts can consistently and fairly apply the law. In practice interpretation and construction are closely connected. The court’s interpretation of a statute influences how it constructs its rulings in cases. Hence, we can also safely assume that the outcomes of case laws will be a crucial part in interpreting future statutes. OBJECTIVES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES The goals and objectives which interpretation of statutes seeks to be achieved can be summarized as follows; 1. Understanding the intent of the legislators: The main goal of interpretation is to comprehend what the lawmakers intended when they made and passed a law. This involves analysing the language used in the statute taking into account its context and examining the circumstances surrounding its creation. 2. Achieving the purpose for which the statute was brought into force: Once we have determined the intent the next objective is to ensure that the statutes purpose is fulfilled. This means interpreting it in a way that aligns with the goals intended by lawmaker. 3. Protecting rights and freedoms: Statutory interpretation should also prioritize safeguarding individual’s rights and liberties. It entails interpreting laws in a manner that does not unreasonably infringe upon people’s rights and freedoms, but rather help them In addition, to these objectives there may be aims to certain cases. For example , a court might interpret a statute in a way that minimizes its impact, on the economy or promotes welfare. AIDS TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES Statutory interpretation can be a complex process due to inherent ambiguities and varying legislative intent. To aid in accurately understanding statutes, legal practitioners and courts rely on various tools known as “aids to interpretation.” There are statutory as well as non-statutory aids: – A) Statutory Aids: These include additional information provided within the statute itself, such as definitions, explanations, schedules, and other provisions. In State of W.B vs Anwar Khan, the court relied upon on the statutory aids within the legislation to determine the legislative intent and constitutionality of the WB Special Courts Act of 1950. Preambles: Introductory statements that precede a statute and provide context and background. In The State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata (2005), the Supreme Court of India relied on the preamble of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, to understand the law’s purpose and combat corruption. Marginal notes: Marginal notes are notes that are sometimes placed in the margins of statutes. These notes can provide helpful summaries of the key provisions of the statute. B) Non Statutory Aids: To interpret and understand laws there are non-statutory sources that can be consulted: 1. Legislative History: This includes records of debates committee reports, speeches made during parliament sessions and other related materials that led to the law’s enactment. 2. Dictionary Definitions: Standard dictionaries can be used to determine the meanings of words within a statute. For example, in R v. Harris (1836) the court relied on definitions to interpret the term “steal” as defined in the Theft Act 1968. 3. Case Law: Previous court decisions serve as precedents. Provide guidance for interpreting statutes ensuring consistency, in reasoning. In the landmark decision of Mahalaxmi Oils Mills, v. State of A.P. the SC observed how the term “tobacco” was defined in law by the lawmakers. Interpreting the law led the SC to state that tobacco encompassed all types of tobacco regardless of whether it was cured/uncured, produced or not as the stems and leaves of the tobacco plant. The Court concluded that this definition was comprehensive but did not include tobacco seeds. IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETATION The process of understanding the meaning of a law or legal provision is known as interpretation. It is an aspect of our system enabling courts and other bodies involved in adjudication to apply the law to specific cases and resolve legal disputes fairly. Interpretation plays a role, in preventing the exercise of power and ensuring that duties are fulfilled. If a statute is written in ambiguous language government officials may interpret it in ways that allow them to wield their powers arbitrarily. However when courts interpret statutes they can ensure fair application of the law while preventing abuse of power by government officials. Interpretation is also instrumental, in preventing crime and safeguarding welfare. If criminal statutes are interpreted narrowly they may not effectively deter crime. Conversely if they are interpreted broadly individual’s rights may be violated. Courts have a role to play in interpreting statutes in a manner that both prevents crime and safeguards individual rights. Lastly interpretation contributes to expediting the delivery of justice. If the courts struggle to promptly and accurately understand the law it can result in delays, within the proceedings. Such delays can have effects on both plaintiffs and defendants eroding trust in the judicial system. To guarantee justice courts should establish consistent guidelines, for interpreting the law. RULES OF INTERPRETATION There are so many rules of interpretation used in law. Literal Rule: This rule is the most basic rule in interpretation, which states that words, in a law should be given their ordinary and plain meaning unless it would lead to an absurd or unreasonable outcome. Golden Rule: Another rule is golden rule which is departure from the literal rule, which allows courts to modify the meaning of a law in order to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. However this rule is only applied when the literal meaning of the law is clear and unambiguous. Rule of Harmonious Construction: The rule suggests that laws should be interpreted in a way that aligns with laws to prevent conflicts between them. Mischief Rule: It permits courts to consider the problem or issue that a law was meant to address when interpreting it. This helps ensure that the law remains true, to its purpose. Purposive Approach: This rule focuses on understanding and interpreting laws based on their intended purpose. Ejusdem Generis Rule: It states that when general words follow a list of words they are limited to the category or class as those specific words. Noscitur a Sociis Rule: This rule states that meaning of a word or phrase can be determined by the context provided by surrounding words or phrases. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Rule: This rule suggests that mentioning one thing implies excluding another. Presumption of Consistency: The principle of consistency asserts that laws and legal documents are assumed to be, in agreement with each other. This assumption is made to prevent any contradictions between laws or different sections, within the law or document. Interpreting statutes is an intricate responsibility, within the system. It plays a role in enabling courts and other adjudicating bodies to apply the law to individual cases and resolve legal disputes. These guidelines are designed to ensure consistent application of the law maintain its relevance and effectiveness and uphold justice. In addition to these rules and principles lawyers also utilize external aids for interpretation. These aids assist lawyers in comprehending the meaning and purpose behind a statute allowing them to determine its interpretation. Interpreting statutes is undoubtedly complex but undeniably vital, within our system. 1. What is the interpretation of statutes? Interpretation is the process to determine the meaning of the statutes or other legal provision. Statutes are also known as legislative enactment or backbone of any legal system. This interpretation of statues is challenging and complex but this is the most important part to ensuring that, law is applied fairly and uniformly. 2. What are the two kinds of interpretation of statutes? Two kinds of interpretation of statutes are: Literal interpretation and Purposive interpretation 3. What is golden rule of interpretation? Golden rule of interpretation is, which allows courts to modify the meaning of a law in order to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. However this rule is only applied when the literal meaning of the law is clear and unambiguous. 4. What is the purpose of interpretation? i) To determine whether a particular conduct is prohibited by law ii) To determine whether a government agency acted lawfully 5. Who interprets the statutes? Statutes are interpreted by courts, including trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. 6. What is the famous case of interpretation of statutes? Mahalaxmi Oils Mills, v. State of A.P. the SC observed how the term “tobacco” was defined in law by the lawmakers. Interpreting the law led the SC to state that tobacco encompassed all types of tobacco regardless of whether it was cured/uncured, produced or not as the stems and leaves of the tobacco plant. The Court concluded that this definition was comprehensive but did not include tobacco seeds. Latest Blogs Enquiry Now Subscribe To Our Newsletter Sign up to get instant access to your free e-book You have subscribed successfully! Some error occured Please fill all the required * fields. We respect your privacy. We will never spam you. Golden Rule of Interpretation Golden rule argument is an argument made by a lawyer during a jury trial to ask the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim or the injured person and deliver the verdict that they would wish to receive if they were in that person’s position. one of the three basic three rule of interpretation, Construction is “Golden Rule”. the Golden Rule of interpretation can be said as the modification of Grammatical Rule of Interpretation. The Golden rule is also called the British rule of interpretation. it was originated in England in 1854 and it was coined by C.J. in the case of it is a form of statutory interpretation which allows a judge to depart from a normal meaning of the word in order to avoid an absurd result. According to Maxwell ,  “The golden rule is that words of Institute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning”. According to Gray , “ the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called interpretation” . As we know applying the bare letter of law sometimes may lead us to confusion and give us an absurd result, in order to overcome these kinds of results judges will give an opportunity to the lawyer to come up with a new interpretation to the law which will be more certain and accurate to the case. In the year 1857, for the first time, Lord Wesleyan propounded the golden rule of interpretation, in  Grey Vs. Pearson . Thereafter this rule has become famous by the name of Wensleydale’s Golden rule. The Golden Rule was used in  the R v Allen case  (1872) 2 ALL ER 641  In this the defendant was charged with bigamy (S.57 of offences against the person act 1861) which, under statutes states: ‘ whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty of an offence’ . This method of interpretation is also known as the compromise method between literal rule and the mischief rule. In the literal rule, judges will only use the word meaning nothing else, but sometimes this may be irrational and gives us unexpected results which will be unlikely to the legislator’s intention. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the meaning which is suitable in that particular case if the word only has only one meaning, but applying that would lead to a bad decision where the judge can apply that decision and arrive at a completely different meaning. This rule is used in two main situations: When the meaning of the word is too narrow. When the word itself has ambiguity or absurdity. For example:  Whenever you stand near the lift it will be written that ‘’Do not use lifts in case of fire.’’ if you consider it in a literal sense you should never use the lifts, this would be an absurd result because the intention of the person who put the sign is to prevent use of lift when there is live fire burning anywhere near the lift. When a son murdered his mother and committed suicide, now the court has to decide who will inherit the property is its mother’s family or the son’s descendants. The judgment came out in favour of the mother’s family, here what we have observed here is that the son never had the intention of making a profit by his crime, but now this judgment will be binding on all the lower courts. R v. Allen, 1872 The defendant was charged with an offence of bigamy under section 57 of ‘offence against person act 1861’. The statutes states “whoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of husband and wife is guilty of an offense.” Under the literal rule of interpretation of this section, the offense would be impossible to commit since the civil law will not recognize a second marriage as an attempt to marry in such circumstances would not be recognized as a valid marriage. Court applied the golden rule and held that the word marriage should be interpreted as ‘to go through a marriage ceremony.’ The defendant was convicted and held guilty. Adler v George case, 1964 Under section 3 of the ‘official secrets act,1920’ it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces in the vicinity of a prohibited area. Adler was arrested for obstructing forces whilst in a prohibited area. Under The Literal Rule, Adler was not in the vicinity of the area, he was in the area and so was not infringing the terms of the act. The Golden Rule was applied to extend the meaning of ‘vicinity’ and avoid the possible absurd outcome. Golden Rule of Interpretation in India: According to the Goleden Rule the Courts in order to find out the intention of the legislatures from the word used in the Statues, give the words their original and natural meaning. The Supreme Court applied The Golden “Rule of Interpretation in Golakanath’s Case AIR 1967 SC 1643, in this case Supreme Court applied the Golden Rule of interpretation held that the Parliament cannot amend the constitution affecting the provision under part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) of the constitution. In   Lee v. Knapp , (1967) 2 QB 442. section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that “a driver causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot of accident. In  Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar AIR 2003 P&H 135, in construing section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below 21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail. In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore 1988 RD 363 (SC) The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in Section 14 of the ‘U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953,which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless labourers”. Landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at the distribution of land to landless labourers who were vested in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of Act. Narrow Approach – This approach is applied when the word or phrases capable of more than one literal meaning. This allows the judge to apply the meaning which avoids the absurdity. Broad Approach – This approach is applied when there is only one literal meaning. But applying that one literal meaning would cause an absurdity. Under this approach the court will modify the meaning to avoid the absurdity. The modification shall be keeping in mind the intention of the Parliament making the law in question. The golden rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if the overall content of the document demands it. It states that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, then the court should look for another meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. ADVANTAGES OF GOLDEN RULE It allows the judge to choose the most sensible meaning where there is more than one meaning to the words in the Act or Statute. It respects the words of the parliament except in limited situations, the golden rule provides an escape route where there is a problem with using the literal meaning. It can also provide reasonable decisions in cases where the literal rule would lead to repugnant situations (this goes for the wider meaning) – This is present in the Re Sigsworth case in the case example, because allowing the son to benefit from his crime would have been unjust. A major advantage of the Golden Rule is that judge can technically change the law by changing the meaning of words in statues. They can, potentially infringing the separation of power between legal and legislature. Another main advantages of the Golden Rule is that drafting errors in status can be corrected immediately. This is seen in the R V Allen (1872 ) case where the loopholes were closed, the decision was in line with parliament’s intentions, and it gave a more just outcome. DISADVANTAGE OF GOLDEN RULE There is no real guidelines as to when it can be used It is very limited in it is use, so it is only used on rare occasions. It’s not always possible to predict whether courts will use the golden rule, making it hard for lawyers and people who are advising their clients. What seems to be absurd to one judge may not be to another so this means a case outcome is decided upon the judge, rather than the law The Golden Rule won’t be help if there is no absurdity in the statute. For example, in the case of  London and North Eastern Railway v. Berriman [1946] AC 278,  where the widow couldn’t get compensation because the wording of the statute didn’t allow for this circumstance. One of the biggest criticisms against the Golden Rule of Interpretation is the very limited scope for judges to interpret. Much like the Literal Rule, the golden rule lays that first priority shall always be given to the natural meaning of the statute and judges do not hold much of discretion or freedom in analyzing the meaning of provisions. The word “absurdity” is a vague concept and arises only in a few cases where it necessary for the court to apply the golden rule of interpretation. Golden rule suffers from the same problems which were faced by the Literal approach i.e. lack of wider contextual understanding of “meanings.” The majority of the cases contain tough scenarios where touch choices have to be made between many credible arguments, not scenarios in places where wordings of the legislation take you to obvious ambiguity. This infringes the separation of power among the wings of the government that is between judiciary and legislature. Here judges can technically change the law by changing the meaning of the words in the statute. This method can be used only when there is an absurdity in the statute. Only when some kind of absurdity or repugnancy is caused in pursuant to the literal meaning would the Judges be allowed to alter the natural meaning of the Statute. Absurdity is a term no less vague or ambiguous than the plain meaning of any statutory provision. Placing reliance on the applicability of the rule entirely upon vague, undefined and subjective concept defeats the purpose of the rule as its ultimate applicability depends on the social and political views of the judge. It is how the judge perceives the word absurdity upon which the entire applicability of the rule is depended. The usage of the Golden rule in today’s scenarios is that the court uses a tool to achieve the desired results. In the rare cases where the disputed wordings are either narrow or accurate and too plain to be held by the judges to be not accurate but make them applicable would and too plain to be held by the judges to be not accurate but make them applicable would original meaningful sense, hold that in making them applicable on the situations of the said case that would result in a ‘vague’ to which the law-making body cannot be made accountable, and, adducing the ‘golden rule,’ will work out an implied exception. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided. The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually used Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. There are no comments yet Leave a comment Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked * Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Rules of Interpretation of Statutes Subject-wise Law Notes Aishwarya Agrawal May 15, 2023 What is the Interpretation of Statutes? Interpretation of statutes refers to the process of understanding and giving meaning to the provisions and provisions of a law or statute. When laws are enacted by legislatures, they are often written in broad and general terms, which can lead to different interpretations and understandings. The role of statutory interpretation is to clarify the meaning and intention behind the statutory language. Rules of interpreting statutes are necessary because laws must be applied to specific cases and situations. It involves analysing the text of the statute, considering its purpose, examining the legislative history and applying established legal principles and rules of interpretation. The goal is to determine the legislative intent or the purpose the lawmakers sought to achieve when enacting the law. Courts, judges and legal professionals are primarily responsible for interpreting statutes when resolving disputes or applying the law in specific cases. Different rules of interpretation of Statutes may be employed, including textualism, which focuses on the plain meaning of the words in the statute or purposivism, which emphasises the legislative purpose and intent behind the law. Need for Rules of Interpretation of Statutes The interpretation of statutes is crucial for the legal system because it ensures consistency, predictability and fairness in applying the law. It helps establish legal precedents and principles that guide future cases and provides clarity to individuals, businesses and government entities regarding their rights, obligations and responsibilities under the law. Principles of Interpretation of Statutes The Courts play a vital role in interpreting statutes and assigning meaning to them in a manner that makes them practical and usable. However, the courts cannot exercise their interpretative function arbitrarily, as this would result in numerous interpretations and hinder the administration of equal justice. To ensure consistency, the Courts have developed certain principles and rules of interpretation of statutes over time, which have been applied by the Courts on various occasions. The rules of interpretation of statutes include the Literal Rule, the Mischief Rule, the Golden Rule and the Rule of Harmonious Construction . The Literal Rule of Interpretation of Statutes The fundamental principle of interpretation is to assign words their natural original and precise meaning, provided that the words are clear and take into account the purpose of the statute. This rule states that the provisions should be examined in their literal sense and given their natural effect. It is also referred to as the Plain Reading Rule, which means that the provisions should be read as they are without any addition or substitution of words during interpretation. The essence of the literal rule can be summarised as follows: “The focus should be on what the law says rather than what the law means.” However, even when giving such a literal interpretation, the overall purpose of the statute must be taken into consideration. As quoted by Viscount Haldane, “If the language used has a natural meaning, we cannot deviate from that meaning unless, when reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so.” In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308 , it was held that: “A literal construction should not be denied simply because complying with it may result in a penalty. The courts should not be overly eager to find ambiguities or obscurities in plain words.” To understand the literal rule, the following conditions must be considered: The statute must have a section for interpreting terms, where special meanings of the terms are provided (i.e., the definition sections). If the statute does not provide specific definitions, technical words should be given their ordinary technical meanings. Words should not be inserted through implications. Over time, words may undergo shifts in meaning. It should be recognised that words derive significance from their context. This rule somewhat restricts the interpretation process and makes it inflexible in its purest form. Additionally, criticism of this rule stems from the assumption that words have fixed meanings, which is erroneous, as a single word may have multiple meanings depending on the different contexts in which it is used. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation of Statutes The mischief rule focuses on determining the intention of lawmakers during the interpretation of statutes. It originated in the United Kingdom in the 16th century and was established in Heydon’s case. It was held that the primary aim of interpreting a statute should be to identify the “mischief and defect” that the statute intended to address and provide an effective remedy. This rule seeks to answer the question of what problem the previous law failed to cover, leading to the enactment of the statute in question. Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 CO REP outlined four points to be considered when interpreting a statute: What was the common law before the enactment of the statute? What was the “mischief and defect” that the common law did not address? What remedy did the parliament intend to provide to rectify the problem? What is the true reason behind the remedy? The use of this rule allows judges more flexibility in determining the lawmakers’ intent, rather than being strictly bound by the literal and golden rules of interpretation. However, this rule has been criticised on the grounds that it introduces uncertainty into the law and grants excessive power to unelected judges, which is seen as undemocratic. Moreover, it is considered outdated as the common law is no longer the primary source of law. The Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes The golden rule, also known as the “British Rule,” provides flexibility in the interpretation process by allowing deviation from the literal meaning of words to avoid absurd outcomes. In other words, this rule permits a judge to depart from the ordinary meaning of a word when interpreting it would lead to an unreasonable result. The golden rule serves as a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief rule. It generally gives words their plain and ordinary meaning but allows for deviations when adhering strictly to the literal meaning would lead to an irrational outcome contrary to legislative intent. In cases of homographs, where a word has multiple meanings, the judge can apply the most appropriate meaning. Similarly, if a word has only one meaning but using it would result in an unfavourable decision, the judge can assign a completely different meaning altogether. The golden rule can be applied in both a narrow and wide sense. Narrow use occurs when the rule is applied to ambiguous words. This is the most common application of the rule. Wide use occurs when the rule is employed to avoid outcomes that are contrary to public policy. Rule of Harmonious Construction The rule of harmonious construction is applied when there is a conflict between two or more statutes or different parts of the same statute. This rule states that, in the case of a conflict, the provisions should be interpreted in a way that harmonises them, giving effect to all provisions to the greatest extent possible. The rule is based on the premise that each statute has a purpose and should be read as a whole, with provisions interpreted consistently. Interpretation should not render any provision useless or use one provision to defeat others unless there is a way to reconcile the differences. In the case of CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers AIR 2002 SC 3941 , the Supreme Court stated: “Courts must avoid direct conflict between seemingly contradictory provisions and must interpret them in a way that harmonises them.” The rules of interpretation of statutes play a crucial role in ensuring the effective and consistent application of the law. The Literal Rule emphasises the plain meaning of words, while the Mischief Rule aims to discern the lawmakers’ intent by addressing the gaps in previous laws. The Golden Rule provides flexibility by allowing departure from the literal meaning to avoid absurd outcomes.  Finally, the Rule of Harmonious Construction harmonises conflicting provisions to give effect to the overall purpose of the statute. By employing these rules, courts strive to uphold the principles of fairness, justice and the proper functioning of the legal system. You might like Jurisprudence Notes, Case Laws and Study Materials What is the Prohibited Degree of Relationship? Motive, Preparation, and Previous or Subsequent Conduct under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Leave a reply cancel reply. Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked * Name  * Email  * Add Comment  * Post Comment 119 IMAGES Io S Research Paper Interpretation of Statutes Rules: Literal, Mischief, Golden Golden RULE OF Interpretation Golden Rule of Interpretation Interpretation of Statutes Rules of Interpretation of Statutes:- Literal Rule, Golden Rule and Mischief Rule lecture notes llb VIDEO Interpretation of Statutes in 1 Lecture Rules Of Interpretation Of Statutes MISCHIEF RULE Golden Rule of Interpretation INTRODUCTION Literal Rule COMMENTS PDF CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION The golden rule of Interpretation is the well-used principle for the interpretation of statutes but there has been criticism regarding its application. The word "absurdity" is a vague concept and arises only in a few cases where it necessary for the court to apply the golden rule of interpretation. Golden rule suffers from the same PDF General principles of statutory interpretation with special reference 3. Rules of interpretation I. Golden Rule of Interpretation Meaning & Origin of Golden Rule The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give New Golden Rule—All That Glitters… Extract. The Golden Rule of statutory interpretation, according to which the courts begin—and wherever reasonably possible end—with the plain meaning of the words of the statute, has always been subject to a range of acknowledged exceptions. With those in mind, law students have always been taught to identify the range of materials to which ... (PDF) 4.2 The rules of statutory interpretation In this part we will explore the number of rules developed by the courts to assist with the. interpretation of a statute. These are: the literal rule. the golden rule. the mischief rule. the ... (PDF) INTERPRETATION OF STATUES Interpretation means giving the best meaning to the words or expressions. used in the law because the will of the legislator is expressed in the form of law. The statute is the starting. point for ... Golden Rule of Interpretation by Ankit Kaushik :: SSRN Abstract. The golden rule of interpretation was then refined into what became known as the golden rule of interpretation. The literal rule places a focus on the literal meaning of the words used in legal language, whereas the golden rule interprets the words in such a way as to avoid the absurdities and anomalies that are associated with ... The Law of Interpretation Legal interpretation is neither a subfield of linguistics nor an exercise in policymaking. Rather, it is deeply shaped by preexisting legal rules. These rules tell us what legal materials to read and how to read them. Like other parts of the law, what we call "the law of interpretation" has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials ... Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes The golden rule of interpretation is an expansion or extension of the literal rule, allowing judges to deviate from the strict literal meaning of words to prevent absurd outcomes. According to the golden rule, when interpreting a statute, the Court must generally adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used. Deciphering the Golden Rule of Interpretation: A Comprehensive Guide The Golden Rule of Interpretation is a fundamental principle employed by courts to interpret statutes and ascertain legislative intent. At its core, this rule allows for the departure from the literal meaning of statutory language when adhering strictly to such meaning would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the legislative purpose. b. PDF Getting into Mischief: Reflections on Statutory Interpretation and the statutory interpretation. Although the mischief rule may be an appropriate tool for resolving statutory ambiguities, this Note argues that it should not be deployed if the meaning of a law is reasonably clear when read in its semantic and structural contexts. I. NTRODUCTION. Communication is complicated. Legal communication is no exception. An Overview on Rules of Interpretation with special reference to Golden The golden rule of interpretation is a variation of the literal rule of interpretation. While the literal rule focuses on the exact meaning of the words in legal language, the golden rule interprets the words to avoid absurdities and inconsistencies that may arise from a literal interpretation. The golden rule alters both the language and grammar of the words used in statutes and other ... Critical Analysis of Literal Rule of Interpretation Abstract. The Literal Rule of Interpretation is the oldest rule and is followed to date by the Judges across the globe. The rationale behind the Literal Rule is that it prevents courts from making biased decisions when the issue is relating to political matters. This rule also restricts the Courts from creating new laws through the ... Important General Rules of Interpretation: A Study Thus, the purpose of interpretation is to determine the intention of the legislature and in doing so, the Statute as a whole must be construed harmoniously by reading all the parts together. It follows that no part of it can be ignored or omitted in finding out the legislative intent. The courts have no power to vary the words of a Statue by ... PDF LITERALLY INTERPRETING THE LAW- A Literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule. Under this rule of interpretation the Courts interpret the statutes in a literal and ordinary sense. They interpret the words of the statute in a way that is used commonly by all. It is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical meaning. Golden rule of interpretation The golden rule is restricted in its use as it can be used only when the literal rule leads to ambiguities in interpretation. Its use thus becomes limited and rare. It is unpredictable and lacks guidelines. One of the main disadvantages of the rule is that judges can twist the meaning of the words and change the law. The Golden rule of Interpretation Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. [i] The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. PDF [ISSN 2581-5369] into five parts. In Part I, this paper deal with a brie. introduction of. the golden rule. Part II proceeds with the history and evolution of the g. lden rule and inPart III this paper will discuss the advantage and disadvantag. of golden ru. throws light on the application of golden rule of interpretation of statute in India and in. nterpreta. Critical Analysis of the Literal, Golden, and Mischief Rules Under The Literal Rule, Adler was not in the VICINITY of the area - he was IN the area - and so was not infringing the terms of the act. The Golden Rule was applied to extend the meaning of 'vicinity' and avoid the possible absurd outcome. The main advantage of The Golden Rule is that drafting errors in statutes can be corrected ... The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation Watch on. The golden rule was developed as a way of circumventing the strict approach of the literal rule. The judges should start by first applying the literal rule. The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied where an application of the literal rule would lead to an absurdity. The courts may then apply a secondary meaning. A Comprehensive Guide to Interpretation of Statutes Interpretation is the process to determine the meaning of the statutes or other legal provision. Statutes are also known as legislative enactment or backbone of any legal system. This interpretation of statues is challenging and complex but this is the most important part to ensuring that, law is applied fairly and uniformly. 2. The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation. The rules of interpretation are a guide for judges as to how they should go about interpreting what Parliament meant in statute and there are a list and a set order that judges will always start when using the rules. If the statute has been made by the European Parliament they can only apply the ... Golden Rule of Interpretation The Golden rule is also called the British rule of interpretation. it was originated in England. in 1854 and it was coined by C.J. in the case of it is a form of statutory interpretation which allows a judge to depart from a normal meaning of the word in order to avoid an absurd result. According to Maxwell, "The golden rule is that words of ... Rules of Interpretation of Statutes The rules of interpretation of statutes play a crucial role in ensuring the effective and consistent application of the law. The Literal Rule emphasises the plain meaning of words, while the Mischief Rule aims to discern the lawmakers' intent by addressing the gaps in previous laws. The Golden Rule provides flexibility by allowing departure ... essay homework paper phd project resume review study thesis