“Path to Legalization for Undocumented Immigrants”
ajc.org
(accessed Feb. 9, 2016)
2. |
Immigration Reporter for “Why Citizenship Is Better for America Than Legal Status” website Jan. 31, 2014 | Former US Representative (R-OH) and Speaker of the House “Standards for Immigration Reform” wsj.com Jan. 20, 2014 |
3. |
So that means it won’t be a quick process but it will be a fair process. And it will lift these individuals out of the shadows and give them a chance to earn their way to a green card and eventually to citizenship.” 44th President of the United States Remarks at Del Sol High School in Las Vegas whitehouse.gov Jan. 29, 2013 | Attorney “Senator Ted Cruz’s Contradictory Position on Illegal Immigration” website Mar. 28, 2015 |
4. |
2016 Presidential Candidate “Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again” Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign website May 3, 2016 | 56th President of Mexico “Mexico Won’t Pay a Cent for Trump’s ‘Stupid Wall'” cnbc.com Feb. 8, 2016 |
5. |
Editorial Board “Immigration Has Nothing to Do with Driving Skills” website Sep. 7, 2015 | Connecticut State Representative (R) May 18, 2015 speech cthousegop.com May 18, 2015 |
6. |
Editorial Board “Obama’s Deportation Raids Are Ugly—and Right” website Jan. 14, 2016 | Editorial Board “The Deportation Deception: Our View” usatoday.com Mar. 6, 2016 |
7. |
Assistant Professor in Finance at Fairfield University “10 Ways Illegal Immigration Affects You Financially” Go Banking Rates website Nov. 16, 2015 | Senior Policy Analyst Senior Fellow State Tax Policy Director Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) “Undocumented Immigrants’ State and Local Tax Contributions” itep.org Feb. 2016 |
8. |
Retired Admiral, Former Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, and Senior US Military Representative to the United Nations “LYONS: The National Security Component of Immigration Reform” website Aug. 14, 2013 | “Terrorism and Illegal Immigration in the United States” Open Borders website (accessed Mar. 14, 2016) |
9. |
We don’t need to rely on complex statistical calculations to see the harm being done to some workers. Simply look at how employers have reacted. A decade ago, Crider Inc., a chicken processing plant in Georgia, was raided by immigration agents, and 75 percent of its workforce vanished over a single weekend. Shortly after, Crider placed an ad in the local newspaper announcing job openings at higher wages.” Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy at Harvard University “Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers” politico.com Sep./Oct. 2016 | International Business and Economics Correspondent at National Public Radio (NPR) “Debunking the Myth of the Job-Stealing Immigrant” nytimes.com Mar. 24, 2015 |
10. |
Over 53 percent of all investigated burglaries reported in California, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas are perpetrated by illegal aliens.” National Executive Committee Member of the Constitution Party “Illegal Alien Crime and Violence by the Numbers” Constitution Party website (accessed Feb. 27, 2017) | During the same period, FBI data indicate that the violent crime rate declined 48 percent—which included falling rates of aggravated assault, robbery, rape, and murder. Likewise, the property crime rate fell 41 percent, including declining rates of motor vehicle theft, larceny/robbery, and burglary.” Senior Researcher at the American Immigration Council Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at The George Washington University Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Irvine “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States” American Immigration Council website July 13, 2015 |
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Immigration has been a touchstone of the U.S. political debate for decades, as policymakers have weighed economic, security, and humanitarian concerns. However, Congress has continued to disagree on comprehensive immigration reform, effectively moving some major policy decisions into the executive and judicial branches of government and fueling debate in the halls of state and municipal governments.
Former President Donald Trump has put efforts to reshape asylum, border, and deportation policy at the center of his political movement. President Joe Biden had pledged to reverse Trump’s first-term actions and reform the system, but the end of pandemic-related border restrictions and a historic surge in migration have complicated his plans.
Immigrants composed an estimated 13.9 percent of the U.S. population in 2022, amounting to roughly 46 million people out of a total of almost 335 million, according to U.S. Census Bureau data released in April 2024. Together, immigrants and their U.S.-born children made up about 27 percent of U.S. inhabitants, per the Current Population Survey. Though the share of the population that is foreign born has steadily risen since 1970, when there were fewer than ten million immigrants in the country, recent figures still fall below the record high of 14.8 percent in 1890.
As of 2022, Mexico was the top country of origin for U.S. immigrants, with Mexicans constituting 23 percent of the total immigrant population. Other major countries of origin include India (6 percent); China, including Hong Kong and Macau (5 percent); and the Philippines (4 percent).
Undocumented immigration. The U.S. government estimated the undocumented population to be some eleven million people in 2022. This total represents a slight decrease from 11.8 million before the 2008 economic crisis [PDF], which led some immigrants to return to their home countries and discouraged others from coming to the United States. In fiscal year 2023 (FY 2023), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended nearly 2.5 million people trying to illegally cross the southern U.S. border, a record high.
Until 2013, almost all of those trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border were Mexican citizens, and most were individuals seeking work. Between 2013 and 2021, most immigrants came from Asia, particularly China and India. Mexico has since regained its status as the top country of origin, and Central Americans have made up an increasingly larger share of migrants at the southern U.S. border. Generally, they are coming not for work but to make asylum claims, and many of them are unaccompanied children. Some of these immigrants have different legal rights from Mexican nationals in the United States: Under a 2008 anti–human trafficking law, unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries have a right to a hearing before being deported to their home countries. The increase in Central American migration has strained the U.S. immigration system. At the end of FY 2023, there were nearly 2.8 million cases pending in immigration courts, the most on record.
Though many of the policies that aim to reduce unlawful immigration focus on enforcement at the border, individuals who arrive in the United States legally and overstay their visas comprise a significant portion of the undocumented population. A Center for Migration Studies report found that, between 2010 and 2018, individuals who overstayed their visas far outnumbered those who arrived by crossing the border illegally.
Legal immigration. The United States granted more than one million individuals [PDF] legal permanent residency in FY 2022, close to pre-pandemic levels. Some 58 percent of them were admitted on the basis of family reunification. Other categories included: employment-based preferences (27 percent), refugees (3 percent), diversity (4 percent), and asylees (5 percent). As of late 2023, more than four million applicants were on the State Department’s waiting list [PDF] for family- and employer-related immigrant visas, nearly a third of whom were from Mexico.
Hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals work legally in the United States under various types of nonimmigrant visas. In FY 2023, the United States granted more than 265,000 visas for high-skilled workers [PDF], known as H1B visas, and over 310,000 visas for temporary workers in agriculture and other industries, or H2A visas. H1B visas are capped at 85,000 per fiscal year, with exceptions for certain fields .
Immigrants made up 18.6 percent of the U.S. civilian workforce [PDF] in 2023, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, up from 18.1 percent the previous year. Compared to those born in the United States, greater shares of immigrants worked in service fields (21.8 percent of all foreign-born people); production, transportation, and material moving (15.2 percent); and natural resources, construction, and maintenance (13.8 percent).
A February 2024 poll by Gallup showed that 28 percent of surveyed Americans considered immigration to be the top problem facing the United States. In a separate Gallup poll conducted that same month, the majority of respondents felt that illegal immigration was a “critical” threat to U.S. national security.
A Pew Research Center poll conducted in April found that some 60 percent of the registered voters surveyed believed that undocumented immigrants currently in the United States should be allowed to stay, with 36 percent of respondents saying that undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity to apply for citizenship. In addition, a large majority of Americans still consider immigration to be overall good for the country.
The most recent push for an immigration policy overhaul was in 2013, following a decade in which Congress debated numerous immigration reforms, some considered comprehensive and others piecemeal. (Comprehensive immigration reform refers to omnibus legislation that attempts to address the following issues: demand for high- and low-skilled labor, the legal status of the millions of undocumented immigrants living in the country, border security, and interior enforcement.) The last major legislation to make it through Congress was under President Ronald Reagan in 1986, when his administration granted legal amnesty to some three million undocumented residents; in 1990, President George H.W. Bush further expanded legal immigration by increasing the cap for immigrant visas from 270,000 to 700,000, though he lowered the quota to 675,000 after several years. In 2007, President George W. Bush worked with congressional Democrats to reach a compromise on a new comprehensive bill, but it ultimately failed to win enough support in the Senate.
President Barack Obama pressed hard for a comprehensive bill that would pair a path to legalization for undocumented residents with stronger border security provisions. The Democrat-led Senate passed this legislation in 2013, but the bill stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. Both Presidents Trump and Biden put forward their own plans, which were not seriously considered by Congress.
With legislation thwarted, Obama focused on executive action, a tactic that his successors continued. In 2012, his administration began a program known as DACA, or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals , which offered renewable, two-year deportation deferrals and work permits to undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States as children and had no criminal records.
Obama characterized the move as a “ stopgap measure ” and urged Congress to pass the DREAM Act , or Development Relief and Education for Alien Minors—legislation first introduced in 2001 that would have benefited many of the same people. Since then, more than 830,000 people have participated in DACA, and it’s estimated that almost 1.2 million more were eligible as of 2023. Obama attempted to extend similar benefits to undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and permanent residents through a program known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), but the Supreme Court effectively killed it in 2016.
In 2014, Obama also grappled with a surge of more than sixty thousand unaccompanied minors at the southern border, mostly from Central America. He directed $750 million in aid to the region to improve conditions there. Meanwhile, his administration faced criticism for its enforcement policies, including detaining children in poor conditions and overseeing the deportation of more people— approximately three million —than either the Bill Clinton or George W. Bush administrations had.
Immigration remains a signature issue for Trump. He blames previous administrations for failing to secure the southern border, and in his first term, he advocated for sharply reducing both legal and illegal immigration. He repeatedly used executive action to reshape asylum, deportation, and border policy.
Border security and enforcement . Trump vowed to expand the wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, which he claimed would stop drugs and gangs from entering the country. He was unsuccessful in securing funding from Congress, leading to a federal government shutdown in 2019 and a subsequent declaration of a national emergency , which allowed him to divert funds to build the wall.
Other enforcement measures under Trump included increasing border personnel; sending thousands of active-duty troops to the border; threatening Mexico with tariffs if it did not increase its own border enforcement; and attempting to cut federal funding to so-called sanctuary cities, or jurisdictions that refuse to enforce federal immigration directives.
Trump also ratcheted up previous administrations’ deterrence efforts. He implemented a zero-tolerance policy, under which authorities arrested and prosecuted everyone caught crossing the southern border without authorization. This caused thousands of family separations , since by law children must be held apart from parents facing criminal prosecution. (Presidents Bush and Obama likewise faced criticism for child detention, but they did not make separations a matter of policy.)
DACA . Trump sought to end DACA, calling it unconstitutional. The move spurred multiple legal challenges and, in June 2020, the Supreme Court blocked Trump’s plan . A December 2020 federal court ruling forced the Trump administration to resume accepting new applicants.
Travel bans and refugee cap . Trump aimed to sharply reduce the number of refugees and other immigrants granted legal entry into the United States. In 2017, he instituted a ban on immigration and travel from several Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Somalia, and Yemen. The original order was rejected by the courts, but the Supreme Court upheld a more limited version. Trump also lowered the cap on the number of refugees the United States accepts each year to less than fifteen thousand for FY 2021—the lowest figure in the history of the U.S. refugee program . Additionally, he ended temporary protected status (TPS)—a program that allows migrants from certain crisis-stricken nations to live and work in the United States for a limited period—for several countries.
Asylum policy . Trump implemented new restrictions on asylum seekers. In 2018, the administration began “metering” asylum applications, or only accepting a limited number [PDF] each day. The next year, it launched the Migrant Protection Protocols , also known as the “Remain in Mexico” program, which required asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their cases were processed in U.S. courts. At the same time, it sought “safe third country” agreements with several Latin American countries, which would have allowed U.S. authorities to send asylum seekers who traveled through those countries back there. Only an agreement with Guatemala was implemented before that country terminated it in 2021. Additionally, the Trump administration invoked Title 42, previously a rarely used public health law, to deny asylum on health-related grounds amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
Comprehensive reform effort . Like his immediate predecessors, Trump proposed broad immigration reform . His would have created a merit-based system to replace the current one, which prioritizes family reunification. It also included an expansion of the border wall and an employment verification system known as E-Verify, but it did not address the status of current undocumented residents. Congress ultimately did not take up the proposal.
Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, Biden campaigned on overturning almost all of Trump’s immigration policies. Since then, the Biden administration has reduced immigration enforcement within the United States, ended the travel bans, expanded green-card access for certain undocumented immigrants, and ended the controversial Title 42 policy, though it did initially maintain many pandemic-related restrictions. The administration also initially halted construction of the U.S.-Mexico border wall, though it has since moved forward with plans to build additional sections; expanded TPS protections; terminated the Remain in Mexico program (with Supreme Court approval); and raised the refugee cap to 125,000 for fiscal years 2022–24.
However, Biden’s efforts to undo Trump-era policies have been challenged by a historic influx of migrants at the southern border. The record surge in border crossings has prompted the administration to implement several new restrictions since 2023, including a so-called transit ban allowing the government to deny asylum to migrants who did not previously apply for protection in a third country. In addition, the administration can temporarily bar asylum requests when the number of illegal crossings exceeds a certain threshold; since the start of 2024, illegal crossings have slowed .
Meanwhile, Biden has worked with Latin American leaders to increase aid to refugee populations, improve border management, and better coordinate emergency responses, even as his own comprehensive immigration reform bill and other border security legislation have failed in Congress. His administration has also launched efforts to accelerate the reunification of migrant families, including by reinstating the Central American Minors (CAM) program, which reunites children in the so-called Northern Triangle countries with their parents in the United States, and by creating a family-reunification task force. Additionally, Biden has pledged to invest $4 billion to address the drivers of migration from Central America, and he has sought to revive DACA; the Department of Homeland Security continues to accept and process renewal requests amid ongoing legal challenges to the program.
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States vary widely in how they treat unauthorized immigrants. Some, including California and Massachusetts, allow undocumented immigrants to apply for drivers’ licenses, receive in-state tuition at universities, and obtain other benefits. At the other end of the spectrum are states such as Texas, where the legislature passed a law [PDF] mandating that local governments and law enforcement agencies cooperate with federal immigration officers.
The federal government is generally responsible for enforcing immigration laws, but it delegates some immigration-related duties to state and local law enforcement. However, the degree to which local officials are obliged to cooperate with federal authorities is a subject of intense debate: dozens of counties across thirteen states are home to so-called sanctuary cities that limit cooperation with immigration enforcement.
The degree to which local officials are obliged to cooperate with federal authorities is a subject of intense debate.
President Trump decried these sanctuary jurisdictions and reinstated a controversial Obama-era program known as Secure Communities, in which the FBI shares fingerprints of suspects collected by state and local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities. Under the program, state and local agencies also hand over individuals presumed to be in the country illegally. Biden terminated the program shortly after taking office.
A range of court rulings during the Trump era increased pressure on states. In 2018, the Justice Department launched a lawsuit against California over sanctuary jurisdictions, which was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court. It filed similar suits against New Jersey and Washington, and a federal court ruled in 2020 that the Trump administration could withhold federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions, including New York City. Under Biden, the Justice Department reversed this stance, leading the Supreme Court to dismiss several pending cases .
The ongoing border crisis has driven increasing controversy over local responses. After Trump called on states to deploy National Guard contingents to the southern border, several governors refused. Others, including Texas’s Greg Abbott, embraced Trump’s views, continuing to expand the border wall and seeking to boost the role of state and local law enforcement in carrying out federal immigration policy. In the Biden era, Abbott has sought to impose stronger enforcement at the Texas-Mexico border despite federal opposition. The governor signed a law in December 2023 making it a state crime to cross the border into Texas illegally and authorizing law enforcement to arrest and deport migrants. The bill remains on hold amid legal challenges; several other states are attempting to enact similar legislation.
This CFR Backgrounder explains who is responsible for securing the U.S. border.
This timeline traces changes to U.S. postwar immigration policy.
The Washington Post ’s Eduardo Porter and Youyou Zhou argue that the United States’ efforts to limit immigration a century ago actually helped diversify the country .
In this CFR webinar, experts discuss how immigration is shaping political conversations ahead of the 2024 presidential election.
On this episode of The President’s Inbox , the American Immigration Council’s Dara Lind breaks down the situation at the southern border .
The Migration Policy Institute’s Muzaffar Chishti, Kathleen Bush-Joseph, and Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh look at Biden’s immigration record at his term’s three-year mark.
Emily Lieberman, Nathalie Bussemaker, Samuel Parmer, and Danielle Renwick contributed to this Backgrounder. Will Merrow created the graphics.
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As time progresses, more and more people from different countries come into the United States. They help combating demographic issues, resolve worker shortages and help the economy by participating in a number of fields. However, some people fear that they may cause crime in America, deprive native-born residents of job opportunities and put the country in debt. In the following text, I will review both the supportive and the opposing side and add my own opinion.
It is important to mention how immigrants tend to affect the economy of the country. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, they are quite dedicated employees and represent over a third of America’s workforce in certain fields. The immigrants’ presence helps resolve worker shortages and issues that could have otherwise severely damaged the country’s economy. By residing in the country, they assist the senior part of the population by outnumbering retirees and supporting the trust funds of Medicare and Social Security (Sherman et al., 15 August 2019). Children of said immigrants may benefit not only their households, but America’s economy in general.
Immigrants have had a positive effect on working spaces in America. According to the statistics received from the US Bureau of Labor, the participation of foreigners in the workforce was 3.4 percent higher than for native residents. Immigrants had a higher employment rate as well, which was 3.6 percent higher than among locals (Sherman et al. 15 August 2019). The former partake in jobs that have a crucial impact on US economy and communities. Although immigrants without undergraduate degrees tend to be the main focus of this phenomenon, they represent a significant amount of employees in some industries. Employers will face dire consequences if foreigners will no longer have the chance to come to America or stay there.
Yet another important advantage is that immigrants improve the situation in specific fields. The decreased growth rates among the native-born part of America’s population leads to the conclusion that immigrant families contribute to its increase (Sherman et al. 15 August 2019). The recent data received from the Census Bureau states that immigrant-fronted households account for almost 40 percent of household growth. This creates quite a promising future for the housing industry.
At times, families of immigrants who work in jobs with low salaries require financial aid. Programs similar to SNAP and Medicaid assist them in such cases, just like they do with many other US residents. Most foreign-born US residents who receive aid from such programs tend to either be employed themselves or married to a person who works. Nearly 77 percent of those who get financial aid either worked or were married to an employee (Sherman et al., 15 August 2019). This is known as a common feature among low wage workers.
It is necessary to emphasize that the immigrants who receive aid from such programs eventually have higher employment rates. According to data from the years 1999 to 2015, most of the foreign born citizens who benefit from such programs were employed most of the time (Sherman et al., 15 August 2019). The received data reviewed by CBPP demonstrates the connection between financial aid and employment during any year.
Currently, most Western countries, including the US, are experiencing a demographic problem caused by a low birth rate and a large amount of retired citizens. This issue leads to a spike in the dependency ratio, which may severely damage the economy (Pettinger, 14 November 2020). Immigration is the easiest and most useful way of combatting this situation, for it helps fill the country with a significant number of young workers who contribute to government finances and increase the amount of workforce.
Immigrants may also have a positive effect on the demand of the service and goods area. They are known for being one of the causes of GDP growth (Pettinger, 14 November 2020). Even at the beginning of the 20 th century, immigration has lead to the fast rate of growth. Said economic growth was measured to be over four percent. This adds to the large list of the positive effects foreign-born residents have on US economy.
Unfortunately, there are some negative views related to this aspect. Some people fear that immigration may lead to the decrease in average job wages and job opportunities (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). As mentioned before, many immigrants without college degrees usually partake in occupations with low salaries. This, in turn, raises concern that employers will no longer create vacancies with decent wages. According to George Borjas’ research, the increase in population has negatively affected salaries in Miami. However, findings that responded to the research have implied that the professor may have changed whom he had surveyed. This leads to the possible conclusion that the discoveries are somewhat biased. Moreover, there are researches that invalidate those fears, since the smallest immigration surplus ignores the positive contributions caused by immigrants.
Some people fear that immigration may lead to a spike in violent crimes. This concern has been around for over a few centuries in America (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). However, as multiple findings from the years 1896, 1909, 1931 and more recent ones have shown, this is not true. According to statistics, Texas’ crime rate was mostly caused by native residents, as opposed to both legal and illegal immigrants (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). The following years have witnessed an even larger decrease in crime among immigrants compared to US-born residents.
The people opposed to immigration fear that their presence may lead to government debt and budget issues. They justify it by stating that foreigners tend to take more from the government than the amount they give to tax revenue (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). In a way, the people opposed to immigration imply that foreign-born US residents seek nothing but benefit, without wanting to be useful to their country of residence. Fortunately, there is some data that can debunk this viewpoint.
What invalidates this fear is that recent findings have shown that immigrants have an almost non-existent effect on the government budget. The model provided by the National Academics of Sciences in their survey related to economics and immigration has demonstrated that native-born US residents are more likely to poorly affect government than foreign born citizens (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). There are two groups of immigrants that may negatively affect the economy: high school dropouts under 25 and highly educated citizens over 64. However, said negative effect is rather minimal, almost nonexistent.
There is a quite common misconception in the list of anti-immigration arguments, which claims that it is easy to move to the United States. In reality, this is false, for the process may take decades. This caused a rather low flow of immigration compared to other OECD countries (Nowrasteh, 2 May, 2018). Another reason for this situation is that other countries are significantly more open to legal immigration. This, perhaps, could explain the existence of illegal immigrants in the United States as well.
Having reviewed the data, I have come to the conclusion that most of the arguments against immigration are either based on negative biases or misinformation. There are many studies that debunk the negative views on that issue and reviewing them has made me certain about my support of immigration. Foreign-born citizens are just as valid as native-born citizens are, and their existence needs to be destigmatized. That way, a brighter future for immigration in the US can be created.
Nowrasteh, Alex. “The 14 Most Common Arguments against Immigration and Why They’re Wrong. Cato Institute 2.5. 2018.” (2019).
Pettinger, Tejvan. “ Pros and Cons of Immigration ”. EconomicsHelp., 2020
Sherman, Arloc, et al. “ Immigrants Contribute Greatly to US Economy, Despite Administration’s Public Charge Rule Rationale .”Center on Budget and Policy Priorities., 2019.
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Illegal immigration is defined as the act of crossing a national border without permission with the purpose of living full-time in a new nation. When discussing the topic of illegal immigration, every country deals with these border crossings to some extent.
In North America, however, the primary topic involving illegal immigration involves unauthorized border crossings from Mexico into the United States.
There is a benefit to illegal immigration from an ethical standpoint. Opening one’s borders to allow people to have the chance to start a new life for themselves is a morally correct position. Although some will always take advantage of an open borders policy, the benefits to society by having welcoming arms will outweigh the negatives that come from bad actors.
The disadvantage of illegal immigration is that, by definition, it is a legally incorrect course of action to take. There are legal methods of immigration available in most nations today. Skipping that legal process de-emphasizes the costs and sacrifices that many households make to start a new life for themselves that does follow the law.
Here are some more of the key pros and cons of illegal immigration to discuss.
1. It provides local economies with a boost. Illegal immigrants might cross the border without permission, but they can still contribute to local society. Many of these immigrants find work in cash-under-the-table positions that are needed, but not often worked, by those with citizenship or a legal immigration status. Increases in production create improvements in living standards and that eventually helps everyone find more success.
2. It creates more diversity within the culture. Diversity can provide a number of positive impacts to a society. It allows the society to grow because there are new ideas, perspectives, and cultures contributing to it. It offers everyone the chance to experience higher levels of growth because there is more access to information. Illegal immigrants combine their knowledge and skills to that of everyone else to create a stronger, responsive, and more productive outlook.
3. It reduces the costs of deportation. The vast majority of illegal immigrants break no other laws beyond their initial unpermitted border crossing. Deporting illegal immigrants is a costly venture. In FY 2016, ICE spent $3.2 billion to identity illegal immigrants, arrest them, detain them, and then remove them from the United States. They handled 240,000 of the 450,000 deportations which took place that year. Each deportation conducted by ICE cost an average of $10,854 per illegal immigrant deported. Stopping just 100 deportations could save $1 million.
4. Most illegal immigrants have established residency. In the United States, as of 2012, about 60% of the population that immigrated to the country illegally has been present for at least 10 years. At the same time, the illegal population that has been in the U.S. for less than five years has dropped from about 40% to less than 20% in the from 2004-2012. One in three undocumented immigrants above the age of 15 lives with a child that is a U.S. citizen. About one in three undocumented immigrants even own their own homes and pay property taxes.
5. It eliminates the cost of child care for legal children, but illegal parents. About 4 million children in the United States have citizenship, but their parents do not. If the government deports these parents, then it falls onto the government to care for them if there are no legal family members involved. Children who have their parents deported become withdrawn, anxious, and may suffer from depression. The cost of foster care per child averages about $160 per day. Multiply that figure by 4 million and that’s a cost that can be eliminated if illegal immigration was transitioned to legal immigration.
1. Many illegal immigrants fit into a less-educated, lower-income demographic. The fiscal impact of illegal immigration is generally based on the taxes they pay minus the costs they create. A net increase in the economy can occur when immigrants are more-educated and have a higher income level. Many illegal immigrants do not fit into that category, which means they create a net fiscal drain for many communities.
2. Illegal immigration creates an ongoing security threat. Illegal immigration provides the means and opportunity for terrorism to exist. It presents opportunities for crime. A vast majority of illegal immigrants may follow all the laws, but not all of the do. Yet criminal aliens make up 27% of the total population of federal prisoners, despite the fact that they are an estimated 9% of the total adult population in the United States. In 2003, more than 55,000 illegal immigrants had been arrested nearly 460,000 times, while committing nearly 700,000 criminal offenses.
3. It changes employment dynamics. A free market economy relies on supply and demand for pricing and wages. If there is a lack of skilled labor available to a market, then wages go up. If there is a lot of the same product, then the price for that product goes down. When illegal immigration is present, the job market is suddenly given more workers than it would normally have if those who crossed illegally were not present. More workers correlate to depressed wages, which ultimately means the value of work is priced lower.
4. Illegal immigration can lead to overcrowding. Illegal immigration can change the population dynamics of a community very rapidly. In California, about 50% of the students starting school are either immigrants or a child of immigrants. With the added capacity of these students, nearly 15% of schools in the U.S. exceed their capacity by at least 6%, and sometimes as much as 25%.
The pros and cons of illegal immigration are variable based on each community. Some can take on more illegal immigrants without issue, while others struggle with those who are already present. Without a meaningful dialogue, this issue will remain unresolved. That is the purpose of these key points – to start the conversation.
The bottom line.
How it affects job growth and wages
Daniel has 10+ years of experience reporting on investments and personal finance for outlets like AARP Bulletin and Exceptional magazine, in addition to being a column writer for Fatherly.
Immigration reform refers to the effort to make changes to the policy that governs the entry of immigrants into the United States. It can be a contentious issue for many Americans and one that has not yet been resolved by their political leaders.
The Trump administration reduced the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., a group that totaled roughly 10.5 million people in 2017, according to the Pew Research Center. While former President Trump cited an array of reasons for this action, from human trafficking concerns to abstract population caps—“our country is full,” he announced in April 2019—his argument was always largely an economic one.
The thinking of former President Trump and his supporters set up one of the biggest ideological battlefronts of the 2020 presidential election.
Senators Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, Kamala Harris , and Cory Booker all advocated downgrading illegal border crossings to a civil offense. Even President Joe Biden, who served as vice president when close to three million undocumented immigrants were deported, was quick to play up their positive contributions to society.
So who’s right and who’s wrong when it comes to undocumented workers and the economy? We’ll look beyond the heated rhetoric and explain what researchers from both sides of the political spectrum have to say.
Trump’s hard line on undocumented immigrants was wrapped in the assumption that those immigrants take jobs from American citizens.
On the surface, this seems a pretty logical conclusion for a cohort that represents nearly 11 million people. But immigration advocates said this argument ignores the dynamic nature of the job market .
First, it’s important to recognize that immigrants aren’t just workers—they’re also consumers who buy goods and services. Some researchers believe mass deportation would therefore shrink overall economic output.
An analysis by New American Economy, a bipartisan research and advocacy organization focused on immigration policy, concluded that such a policy would result in a $1.6 trillion reduction in GDP.
What’s more, undocumented workers often take low-skill jobs in which American citizens have little interest, including those in labor-intensive fields such as agriculture and forestry. Another NAE report found that low-skilled immigrants were 18% more likely to work in jobs that required unusual hours than their U.S.-born counterparts.
Because birthrates are dropping in the U.S.—the average American woman in 2021 was having 1.7 children, according to The World Bank—some experts say immigrants can help fill a hole in the labor market that will ultimately boost the economy.
“The future growth prospects of the U.S. economy are severely constrained by a lack of working-age population growth,” the Conference Board's non-partisan Committee for Economic Development (CED) wrote in a 2018 policy brief.
Because roughly half of the immigrants from Latin America are between the ages of 18 and 35, the U.S. doesn’t have to shoulder the cost of their schooling. Bringing in even 100,000 of these immigrants annually would represent an injection of human capital that would otherwise cost us $47 billion in education and childcare costs, says the CED.
Immigration reform helped ramp up deportations, secured funds for a longer border wall, and suspended the entry of most new immigrants because of COVID-19.
One of the claims you’ll often hear amnesty critics say is that allowing more workers to compete for American jobs will suppress wages for existing employees.
The basic rules of supply and demand would seem to support that claim. When the number of workers goes up, the amount companies have to pay presumably goes down.
However, a number of studies have shown that the impact on wages among low-skilled workers is relatively modest. Most put it at less than 1%. Researchers Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri actually found that in the long run, increased immigration had a very small positive impact, 0.6%, on the wages of native-born Americans.
But even if pay for these jobs were to decrease, that might not be the case in every field. Supporters of immigration reform say that the availability of more workers is a boon for businesses, which benefit from lower production costs .
This theoretically strengthens demand for high-skill jobs that don’t face as much competition from undocumented workers, such as managers and accountants. Therefore, reform could presumably boost wages, at least marginally, for jobs that require a college degree.
According to one analysis, the fiscal impacts of immigrants are generally positive at the federal level when projected over a future time horizon of 75 years.
One of the most contentious concerns is over the effect that illegal immigration has on government coffers.
A path to citizenship for workers who are already in the country means many of them would contribute federal and state income taxes for the first time. But they would also have access to a range of benefits to which they’re currently locked out—education at public schools, Medicaid , nutrition assistance, and the earned income tax credit .
In 2017, researchers Robert Rector and Jamie Bryan Hall of the right-leaning Heritage Foundation analyzed the Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment (RAISE) Act, which would limit the number of visas given to low-skilled workers.
They suggested that immigrants without a high school degree—the typical level from Latin America is a 10th-grade education—receive, on average, $4 in government benefits for every $1 they contribute in taxes.
Rector and Hall concluded that the 4.7 million low-skilled immigrants estimated to enter the U.S. in the next decade would be a net drag on the Treasury of $1.9 trillion.
But a 2016 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report paints a very different picture. Using data from 1994-2013, the authors agreed that first-generation immigrants cost the government more on a per-capita basis than citizens born in the U.S., based on their lower earning power.
However, the NAS found that their children are actually less of a drag on the federal and local budgets than their peers. That’s because second-generation immigrants exhibited “slightly higher educational achievement, as well as their higher wages and salaries.” As a result, they pay more in taxes.
There’s also some evidence that immigrants help bolster Social Security, which retiring Baby Boomers are pressuring with withdrawals. Back in 2013, Chief Actuary Stephen Goss of the Social Security Administration and other researchers estimated that roughly 1.8 million immigrants used a Social Security card that did not match their name to gain employment in 2010.
The result? These individuals tended to pay far more into the system than they pulled out in benefits. At the time, Goss asserted that undocumented residents kicked $13 billion into Social Security through payroll taxes, but only gained $1 billion in benefit payments.
Former President Trump repeatedly drove home the idea that Honduran and Mexican immigrants take jobs away from U.S. citizens and suppress their pay. “We are proposing an immigration plan that puts the jobs, wages, and safety of American workers first,” Trump said on May 16, 2019, at a White House event announcing a new visa program that would limit Latino recipients.
Broadly speaking, a good immigration policy could be one that secures U.S. borders yet welcomes immigrants with an achievable path to legal residency and citizenship. It could support the nation's security and prosperity while strengthening its future by admitting people from around the world.
According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, there were 2.2 million illegal border crossings, not including those at official checkpoints, just at the U.S.-Mexico border.
This can be a primary point of contention among U.S. politicians. Some argue that undocumented immigrants are a severe drain on U.S. resources and threaten the financial lives of Americans. Others demonstrate that they often take lower paying jobs that are going unfilled, contribute to the economy as consumers and taxpayers, and support social welfare programs. Their children tend to go on to contribute to the U.S. economy more substantially.
Former President Trump energized his Republican base with his get-tough approach to immigration, arguing that unlawful residents are an unmitigated drain on the American economy.
However, those who cross into the U.S. without documentation also lower costs for their employers and represent a sizable consumer group. Indeed, some research indicates that they actually create more job opportunities than they take.
While some studies have shown that illegal immigration suppresses wages in low-skill segments of the workforce, the effect over time, if any, appears to be minimal.
And while first-generation immigrants may cost the government more than native-born workers because of their lower incomes, many pay far more into Social Security than they receive. They also add younger workers to the nation's aging labor force.
Pew Research Center. " Key findings about U.S. immigrants ."
AP. " 'Our country is full': Trump says migrants straining system ."
The Washington Post. " Where 2020 Democrats stand on Immigration ."
New American Economy. " Undocumented Immigrants ."
New American Economy. " Immigrants Substantially More Likely to Work Nights and Weekends than U.S.-Born, New Study Finds ."
The World Bank. " Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - United States ."
Committee for Economic Development. " The Power of More Foreign-Born Workers ."
Committee for Economic Development. " The Power of More Foreign-Born Workers ," Introduction.
Whitehouse.gov. " Proclamation Suspending Entry of Immigrants Who Present Risk to the U.S. Labor Market During the Economic Recovery Following the COVID-19 Outbreak ."
NBER Working Paper Series. " Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the Empirics ," Abstract.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine. " New Report Assesses the Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration ."
The Heritage Foundation. " Trump-Endorsed Immigration Bill Would Save Taxpayers Trillions ."
Social Security Administration. " Actuarial Note Number 151: Effects of Unauthorized Immigration on the Actuarial Status of the Social Security Trust Funds ."
WhiteHouse.gov. " Remarks by President Trump on Modernizing Our Immigration System for a Stronger America ."
New York Times. " Why Illegal Border Crossings Are at Sustained Highs ."
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Global migration: causes and consequences.
International migration is a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. An initial decision to leave one’s country of birth may be made by the individual or the family unit, and this decision may reflect a desire to reconnect with friends and family who have already moved abroad, a need to diversify the family’s access to financial capital, a demand to increase wages, or a belief that conditions abroad will provide social and/or political benefits not available in the homeland. Once the individual has decided to move abroad, the next decision is the choice of destination. Standard explanations of destination choice have focused on the physical costs associated with moving—moving shorter distances is often less expensive than moving to a destination farther away; these explanations have recently been modified to include other social, political, familial, and cultural dimensions as part of the transaction cost associated with migrating. Arrival in a host country does not mean that an émigré’s relationship with their homeland is over. Migrant networks are an engine of global economic integration—expatriates help expand trade and investment flows, they transmit skills and knowledge back to their homelands, and they remit financial and human capital. Aware of the value of their external populations, home countries have developed a range of policies that enable them to “harness” their diasporas.
The steady growth of international labor migration is an important, yet underappreciated, aspect of globalization. 1 In 1970 , just 78 million people, or about 2.1% of the global population, lived outside their country of birth. By 1990 , that number had nearly doubled to more than 150 million people, or about 2.8% of the global population (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Despite the growth of populist political parties and restrictionist movements in key destination countries, the growth in global migration shows no signs of slowing down, with nearly 250 million people living outside their country of birth as of 2015 . While 34% of all global migrants live in industrialized countries (with the United States and Germany leading the way), 38% of all global migration occurs between developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ).
Identifying the causes and consequences of international labor migration is essential to our broader understanding of globalization. Scholars across diverse academic fields, including economics, political science, sociology, law, and demography, have attempted to explain why individuals voluntarily leave their homelands. The dominant thread in the labor migration literature is influenced by microeconomics, which posits that individuals contemplating migration are rational, utility-maximizing actors who carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of leaving their country of origin (e.g., Borjas, 1989 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Grogger & Hanson, 2011 ). The act of migration, from this perspective, is typically conceptualized as an investment from which a migrant expects to receive some benefit, whether it be in the form of increased income, political freedom, or enhanced social ties (Schultz, 1961 ; Sjaastad, 1962 ; Collier & Hoeffler, 2014 ).
In this article we go beyond the treatment of migration as a single decision and conceive of it as a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. We identify factors that are relevant at different stages in the migration process and highlight how and when certain factors interact with others during the migration process. Economic factors such as the wage differential between origin and destination countries, for example, may be the driving factor behind someone’s initial decision to migrate (Borjas, 1989 ). But when choosing a specific destination, economic factors may be conditioned by political or social conditions in that destination (Fitzgerald, Leblang, & Teets, 2014 ). Each stage or decision point has distinguishing features that are important in determining how (potential) migrants respond to the driving forces identified by scholars.
This is certainly not a theoretical innovation; migration has long been conceived of as a multi-step process, and scholars often identify the stage or decision point to which their argument best applies. However, most interdisciplinary syntheses of the literature on international labor migration do not provide a systematic treatment of this defining feature, instead organizing theoretical and empirical contributions by field of study, unit or level of analysis, or theoretical tradition (e.g., Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; European Asylum Support Office, 2016 ). Such approaches are undoubtedly valuable in their own right. Our decision to organize this discussion by stage allows us to understand this as a process, rather than as a set of discrete events. As a result, we conceptualize international labor migration as three stages or decision points: (a) the decision to migrate or to remain at home, (b) the choice of destination, and (c) the manner by which expatriates re-engage—or choose not to re-engage—with their country of origin once abroad. We also use these decision points to highlight a number of potential new directions for future research in this still-evolving field.
Figure 1. Global migration intentions by educational attainment, 2008–2017.
The massive growth in international labor migration in the age of globalization is remarkable, but the fact remains that over 95% of the world’s population never leave their country of origin (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Figure 1 shows the percentage of people who expressed an intention to move abroad between 2008 and 2017 by educational attainment, according to data from the Gallup World Poll. Over this time period, it appears that those who were highly educated expressed intent to migrate in greater numbers than those who had less than a college education, although these two groups have converged in recent years. What is most striking, however, is that a vast majority of people, regardless of educational attainment, expressed no desire to move abroad. Even though absolute flows of migrants have grown at a near-exponential rate, relative to their non-migrating counterparts, they remain a small minority. What factors are important in determining who decides to migrate and who decides to remain at home? 2
Neoclassical economic models posit that the primary driving factor behind migration is the expected difference in wages (discounted future income streams) between origin and destination countries (Sjaastad, 1962 ; Borjas, 1989 ; Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007 ). All else equal, when the wage gap, minus the costs associated with moving between origin and destination, is high, these models predict large flows of labor migrants. In equilibrium, as more individuals move from origin to destination countries, the wage differential narrows, which in turn leads to zero net migration (Lewis, 1954 ; Harris & Todaro, 1970 ). Traditional models predict a negative monotonic relationship between the wage gap and the number of migrants (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962 ). However, the predictions of neoclassical models are not well supported by the empirical record. Empirical evidence shows that, at least in a cross-section, the relationship between economic development and migration is more akin to an inverted U. For countries with low levels of per capita income, we observe little migration due to a liquidity constraint: at this end of the income distribution, individuals do not have sufficient resources to cover even minor costs associated with moving abroad. Increasing income helps to decrease this constraint, and consequently we observe increased levels of emigration as incomes rise (de Haas, 2007 ). This effect, however, is not monotonic: as countries reach middle-income status, declining wage differentials lead to flattening rates of emigration, and then decreasing rates as countries enter later stages of economic development. 3
Some research explains this curvilinear relationship by focusing on the interaction between emigration incentives and constraints : for example, increased income initially makes migration more affordable (reduces constraints), but also simultaneously reduces the relative economic benefits of migrating as the wage differential narrows (as potential migrants now have the financial capacity to enhance local amenities) (Dao, Docquier, Parsons, & Peri, 2016 ). The theoretical underpinnings of this interaction, however, are not without controversy. Clemens identifies several classes of theory that attempt to explain this curvilinear relationship—a relationship that has been referred to in the literature as the mobility transition (Clemens, 2014 ). These theories include: demographic changes resulting from development that also favor emigration up to a point (Easterlin, 1961 ; Tomaske, 1971 ), the loosening of credit restraints on would-be migrants (Vanderkamp, 1971 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ), a breakdown of information barriers via the building of transnational social networks (Epstein, 2008 ), structural economic changes in the development process that result in worker dislocation (Zelinsky, 1971 ; Massey, 1988 ), the dynamics of economic inequality and relative deprivation (Stark, 1984 ; Stark & Yitzhaki, 1988 ; Stark & Taylor, 1991 ), and changing immigration policies in destination countries toward increasingly wealthy countries (Clemens, 2014 ). While each of these play some role in the mobility transition curve, Dao et al. ( 2016 ) run an empirical horse race between numerous explanations and find that changing skill composition resulting from economic development is the most substantively important driver. Economic development is correlated with an increase in a country’s level of education; an increase in the level of education, in turn, is correlated with increased emigration. However, traditional explanations involving microeconomic drivers such as income, credit constraints, and economic inequality remain important factors (Dao et al., 2016 ). The diversity of explanations offered for the mobility transition curve indicates that while most research agrees the inverted-U relationship is an accurate empirical portrayal of the relationship between development and migration, little theoretical agreement exists on what drives this relationship. Complicating this disagreement is the difficulty of empirically disentangling highly correlated factors such as income, skill composition, and demographic trends in order to identify robust causal relationships.
While there is a scholarly consensus around the mobility transition and the role of economic conditions, emerging research suggests that the political environment in the origin country may also be salient. We do not refer here to forced migration, such as in the case of those who leave because they are fleeing political persecution or violent conflict. Rather, we focus on political conditions in the homeland that influence a potential migrant’s decision to emigrate voluntarily. Interpretations of how, and the extent to which, political conditions in origin countries (independent of economic conditions) influence the decision to migrate have been heavily influenced by Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” framework (Hirschman, 1970 , 1978 ). Hirschman argues that the opportunity to exit—to exit a firm, an organization, or a country—places pressure on the local authorities; voting with one’s feet forces organizations to reassess their operations.
When applied to the politics of emigration, Hirschman’s framework generates two different hypotheses. On the one hand, politicians may allow, encourage, or force the emigration of groups that oppose the regime as a political safety valve of sorts. This provides the government with a mechanism with which to manage potential political challengers by encouraging their exit. On the other hand, politicians—especially those in autocracies—may actively work to prevent exit because they fear the emigration of economic elites, the highly skilled, and others who have resources vital to the survival of the regime. 4
A small number of studies investigate how local-level, rather than national, political circumstances affect a potential migrant’s calculus. The limited empirical evidence currently available suggests that local conditions are substantively important determinants of the emigration decision. When individuals are highly satisfied with local amenities such as their own standard of living, quality of public services, and overall sense of physical security, they express far less intention to migrate compared with highly dissatisfied individuals (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ). Furthermore, availability of public transport and access to better education facilities decreases the propensity to express an intention to emigrate (Cazzuffi & Modrego, 2018 ). This relationship holds across all levels of wealth and economic development, and there is some evidence that satisfaction with local amenities matters as much as, or even more than, income or wealth (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ).
Political corruption, on both national and local levels, also has substantively important effects on potential migrants, especially those who are highly skilled. Broadly defined as the use of public office for political gain, political corruption operates as both a direct and an indirect factor promoting emigration. 5 Firstly, corruption may have a direct effect on the desire to emigrate in that it can decrease the political and economic power of an individual, leading to a lower standard of living and poorer quality of life in origin countries. If the reduction in life satisfaction resulting from corruption is sufficiently high—either by itself or in combination with other “push” factors—then the exit option becomes more attractive (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). Secondly, corruption also operates through indirect channels that influence other push factors. Given the large literature on how political corruption influences a number of development outcomes, it is conceivable that corruption affects the decision-making process of a potential migrant through its negative effect on social spending, education, and public health (Mo, 2001 ; Mauro, 1998 ; Gupta, Davoodi, & Thigonson, 2001 ).
The combination of its direct and indirect impacts means that corruption could be a significant part of a migrant’s decision-making process. At present there is limited work exploring this question, and the research does not yield a consensus. Some scholars argue that political corruption has no substantive effect on total bilateral migration, but that it does encourage migration among the highly skilled (Dimant, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2013 ). This is the case, the argument goes, because corruption causes the greatest relative harm to the utility of those who have invested in human capital, who migrate to escape the negative effect on their fixed investment. In contrast, others find that a high level of corruption does increase emigration at the aggregate level (Poprawe, 2015 ). More nuanced arguments take into account the intensity of corruption: low to moderate levels of corruption lead to increased emigration of all groups, and especially of the highly skilled. But at high levels of corruption, emigration begins to decrease, indicating that intense corruption can act as a mobility constraint (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). All of these existing accounts, however, employ state-level measures of corruption by non-governmental organizations, such as those produced by Transparency International. Scholars have yet to harness micro-level survey data to explore the influence of personal corruption perception on the individual’s decision-making process.
Given that an individual has decided to emigrate, the next decision point is to choose a destination country. Advanced industrial democracies, such as those in the OECD, are major migrant-receiving countries, but so are Russia and several Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2016 ). A country’s constellation of political, economic, and social attributes is crucial to understanding an emigrant’s choice of destination. Potential migrants weigh all of these factors simultaneously when choosing a destination: will the destination allow political rights for the migrant and their children, is access to the labor market possible, and does the destination provide an opportunity for reunification with friends and family? In this section we focus on the non-economic factors that draw migrants to certain countries over others. In addition, we emphasize how skill level adds layers of complexity to a migrant’s calculus.
As noted earlier, traditional neoclassical models and their extensions place wage differentials and associated economic variables at the heart of a migrant’s choice. Gravity models posit that migrants choose a destination country based on their expected income—which itself is a function of the wage rate and the probability of finding employment in the destination—less the costs associated with moving (Ravenstein, 1885 ; Todaro, 1969 ; Borjas, 1989 ). A rigid focus on economic factors, however, blinds us to the empirical reality that a destination country’s political environment influences what destination a migrant chooses (Borjas, 1989 ). A country’s legal and political rights structure for migrants, as well as its level of tolerance for newcomers, is critical to migrants discriminating between an array of potential destinations. Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets ( 2014 ) argue, for example, that states with restrictive citizenship policies and strong radical right anti-immigrant parties will receive fewer migrants, while states with relatively liberal citizenship requirements and weak radical right political movements will receive more migrants. In the rational actor framework, migrants seek countries with hospitable political environments to maximize both their political representation in government and their access to labor market opportunities as a result of citizenship rights and social acceptance (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).
Using a broad sample of origin countries and 18 destination countries, they find that relative restrictiveness of citizenship policies and level of domestic support for the radical right are substantively important determinants of global migratory flows. Further, they find that these political variables condition a migrant’s choice of destination: the relative importance of economic factors such as the unemployment rate or the wage differential diminishes as a destination country’s political environment becomes more open for migrants. In other words, when migrants are choosing a destination country, political considerations may trump economic ones—a finding that is an important amendment to the primarily economics-focused calculus of the initial stage of the immigration decision.
However, prior to choosing and entering a destination country, a migrant must also navigate a country’s immigration policy—the regulation of both migrant entry and the rights and status of current migrants. While it is often assumed that a relatively more restrictive immigration policy deters entry, and vice versa, a lack of quantitative data has limited the ability of scholars to confirm this intuition cross-nationally. Money ( 1999 ) emphasizes that the policy output of immigration politics does not necessarily correlate with the outcome of international migrant flows. There are a number of unanswered questions in this field, including: is immigration policy a meaningful determinant of global flows of migration? Do certain kinds of immigration policies matter more than others? How does immigration policy interact with other political and economic factors, such as unemployment and social networks?
Only a handful of studies analyze whether or not immigration policy is a significant determinant of the size and character of migratory flows. Perhaps the most prominent answer to this question is the “gap hypothesis,” which posits that immigration rates continue to increase despite increasingly restrictive immigration policies in advanced countries (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004 ). Some subsequent work seems to grant support to the gap hypothesis, indicating that immigration policy may not be a relevant factor and that national sovereignty as it relates to dictating migrant inflows has eroded significantly (Sassen, 1996 ; Castles, 2004 ). The gap hypothesis is not without its critics, with other scholars arguing that the existing empirical evidence actually lends it little or no support (Messina, 2007 ).
A more recent body of literature does indicate that immigration policy matters. Brücker and Schröder ( 2011 ), for example, find that immigration policies built to attract highly skilled migrants lead to higher admittance rates. They also show that diffusion processes cause neighboring countries to implement similar policy measures. Ortega and Peri ( 2013 ), in contrast to the gap hypothesis literature, find that restrictive immigration policy indeed reduces migrant inflows. But immigration policy can also have unintended effects on international migration: when entry requirements increase, migrant inflows decrease, but migrant outflows also decrease (Czaika & de Haas, 2016 ). This indicates that restrictive immigration policy may also lead to reduced circular migrant flows and encourage long-term settlement in destination countries.
Disaggregating immigration policy into its different components provides a clearer picture of how immigration policy may matter, and whether certain components matter more than others. Immigration policy is composed of both external and internal regulations. External regulations refer to policies that control migrant entry, such as eligibility requirements for migrants and additional conditions of entry. Internal regulations refer to policies that apply to migrants who have already gained status in the country, such as the security of a migrant’s legal status and the rights they are afforded. Helbling and Leblang ( 2017 ), using a comprehensive data set of bilateral migrant flows and the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) data set, find that, in general, external regulations prove slightly more important in understanding migrant inflows (Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2017 ). This indicates that potential migrants focus more on how to cross borders, and less on the security of their status and rights once they settle. They do find, however, that both external and internal components of immigration are substantively important to international migrant flows.
The effects of policy, however, cannot be understood in isolation from other drivers of migration. Firstly, poor economic conditions and restrictive immigration policy are mutually reinforcing: when the unemployment rate is elevated, restrictive policies are more effective in deterring migrant flows. An increase in policy effectiveness in poor economic conditions suggests that states care more about deterring immigration when the economy is performing poorly. Secondly, a destination country’s restrictive immigration policy is more effective when migrants come from origin countries that have a common colonial heritage. This suggests that cultural similarities and migrant networks help to spread information about the immigration policy environment in the destination country. Social networks prove to be crucial in determining how much migrants know about the immigration policies of destination countries, regardless of other cultural factors such as colonial heritage or common language (Helbling & Leblang, 2017 ). In summary, more recent work supports the idea that immigration policy of destination countries exerts a significant influence on both the size and character of international migration flows. Much work remains to be done in terms of understanding the nuances of specific immigration policy components, the effect of policy change over time, and through what mechanisms immigration policy operates.
None of this should be taken to suggest that only political and economic considerations matter when a potential migrant contemplates a potential destination; perhaps one of the biggest contributions to the study of bilateral migration is the role played by transnational social networks. Migrating is a risky undertaking, and to minimize that risk, migrants are more likely to move to destinations where they can “readily tap into networks of co-ethnics” (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 , p. 410). Dense networks of co-ethnics not only help provide information about economic opportunities, but also serve as a social safety net which, in turn, helps decrease the risks associated with migration, including, but not limited to, finding housing and integrating into a new community (Massey, 1988 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Portes, 1995 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; Faist, 2000 ; Sassen, 1995 ; Light, Bernard, & Kim, 1999 ). Having a transnational network of family members is quite important to destination choice; if a destination country has an immigration policy that emphasizes family reunification, migrants can use their familial connections to gain economically valuable permanent resident or citizenship status more easily than in other countries (Massey et al., 1993 , p. 450; Helbing & Leblang, 2017 ). When the migrant is comparing potential destinations, countries in which that migrant has a strong social network will be heavily favored in a cost–benefit analysis.
Note, however, that even outside of a strict rational actor framework with perfect information, transnational social networks still may be quite salient to destination choice. An interesting alternative hypothesis for the patterns we observe draws on theories from financial market behavior which focus on herding. Migrants choosing a destination observe the decisions of their co-ethnics who previously migrated and assume that those decisions were based on a relevant set of information, such as job opportunities or social tolerance of migrants. New migrants then choose the same destination as their co-ethnics not based on actual exchanges of valuable information, but based solely on the assumption that previous migration decisions were based on rational calculation (Epstein & Gang, 2006 ; Epstein, 2008 ). This is a classic example of herding, and the existing empirical evidence on the importance of transnational social networks cannot invalidate this alternative hypothesis. One could also explain social network effects through the lens of cumulative causation or feedback loops: the initial existence of connections in destination countries makes the act of migration less risky and attracts additional co-ethnics. This further expands migrant networks in a destination, further decreasing risk for future waves of migrants, and so on (Massey, 1990 ; Fussel & Massey, 2004 ; Fussel, 2010 ).
No matter the pathway by which social networks operate, the empirical evidence indicates that they are one of the most important determinants of destination choice. Potential migrants from Mexico, for example, who are able to tap into existing networks in the United States face lower direct, opportunity, and psychological costs of international migration (Massey & Garcia España, 1987 ). This same relationship holds in the European context; a study of Bulgarian and Italian migrants indicates that those with “social capital” in a destination community are more likely to migrate and to choose that particular destination (Haug, 2008 ). Studies that are more broadly cross-national in nature also confirm the social network hypothesis across a range of contexts and time periods (e.g., Clark et al., 2007 ; Hatton & Williamson, 2011 ; Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).
Despite the importance of social networks, it is, again, important to qualify their role in framing the choice of destinations. It seems that the existence of co-ethnics in destination countries most strongly influences emigration when they are relatively few in number. Clark et al. ( 2007 ), in their study of migration to the United States, find that the “friends and relatives effect” falls to zero once the migrant stock in the United States reaches 8.3% of the source-country population. In addition, social networks alone cannot explain destination choice because their explanatory power is context-dependent. For instance, restrictive immigration policies limiting legal migration channels and family reunification may dampen the effectiveness of networks (Böcker, 1994 ; Collyer, 2006 ). Social networks are not an independent force, but also interact with economic and political realities to produce the global migration patterns we observe.
For ease of presentation, we have up to now treated migrants as a relatively homogeneous group that faces similar push and pull factors throughout the decision-making process. Of course, not all migrants experience the same economic, political, and social incentives in the same way at each stage of the decision-making process. Perhaps the most salient differentiating feature of migrants is skill or education level. Generally, one can discuss a spectrum of skill and education level for current migrants, from relatively less educated (having attained a high school degree or less) to relatively more educated (having attained a college or post-graduate degree). The factors presented here that influence destination choice interact with a migrant’s skill level to produce differing destination choice patterns.
A migrant’s level of education, or human capital, often serves as a filter for the political treatment he or she anticipates in a particular destination country. For instance, the American public has a favorable view of highly educated migrants who hold higher-status jobs, while simultaneously having an opposite view of migrants who have less job training and do not hold a college degree (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010 ; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015 ). Indeed, the political discourse surrounding migration often emphasizes skill level and education as markers of migrants who “should be” admitted, across both countries and the ideological spectrum. 6 While political tolerance may be a condition of entry for migrants in the aggregate, the relatively privileged status of highly educated and skilled migrants in most destination countries may mean that this condition is not as salient.
While it is still an open question to what extent immigration policy influences international migration, it is clear that not all migrants face evenly applied migration restrictions. Most attractive destination countries have policies that explicitly favor highly skilled migrants, since these individuals often fill labor shortages in advanced industries such as high technology and applied science. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all employ so-called “points-based” immigration systems in which those with advanced degrees and needed skills are institutionally favored for legal entry (Papademetriou & Sumption, 2011 ). Meanwhile, the United States maintains the H-1B visa program, which is restricted by educational attainment and can only be used to fill jobs in which no native talent is available (USCIS). Even if destination countries decide to adopt more restrictive immigration policies, the move toward restriction has typically been focused on low-skilled migrants (Peters, 2017 ). In other words, even if immigration policy worldwide becomes more restrictive, this will almost certainly not occur at the expense of highly skilled migrants and will not prevent them choosing their most preferred destination.
This article began by asserting that international labor migration is an important piece of globalization, as significant as cross-border flows of capital, goods, and services. This section argues that migrant flows enhance flows of capital and commodities. Uniquely modern conditions such as advanced telecommunications, affordable and efficient international travel, and the liberalization of financial flows mean that diasporas—populations of migrants living outside their countries of origin—and home countries often re-engage with each other (Vertovec, 2004 ; Waldinger, 2008 ). This section reviews some of the newest and most thought-provoking research on international labor migration, research that explores diaspora re-engagement and how that re-engagement alters international flows of income, portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and migratory flows themselves.
As previously argued, migration is often driven by the prospect of higher wages. Rational, utility-maximizing migrants incur the cost of migration in order to earn increased income that they could not earn at home. But when migrants obtain higher wages, this additional increment to income is not always designated for individual consumption. Often, migrants use their new income to send remittances, direct transfers of money from one individual to another across national borders. Once a marginal financial flow, in 2015 remittances totaled $431 billion, far outpacing foreign aid ($135 billion) and nearly passing private debt and portfolio equity ($443 billion). More than 70% of total global remittances flow into developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ). In comparison with other financial flows such as portfolio investment and FDI, remittances are more impervious to economic crises, suggesting that they may be a countercyclical force to global downturns (Leblang, 2017 ).
Remittances represent one of the most common ways in which migrants re-engage with their homeland and alter both global income flows and distribution. Why do migrants surrender large portions of their new income, supposedly the very reason they migrated in the first place, to their families back home? New economics of labor migration (NELM) theory argues that immigration itself is motivated by a family’s need or demand for remittances—that remittances are an integral part of a family’s strategy for diversifying household financial risk (Stark & Bloom, 1985 ). Remittances “are a manifestation of informal contractual agreements between migrants and the households from which they move,” indicating that remitting is not an individual-level or purely altruistic action but rather occurs in a larger social context, that of one’s immediate or extended family (European Asylum Support Office, 2016 , p. 15).
The impact of migrant remittances on countries of origin is multifaceted yet somewhat ambiguous. Most scholarly work focuses on whether remittances positively or negatively influence existing economic conditions. A number of studies find that remittances modestly reduce poverty levels in developing countries (Adams & Page, 2005 ; Yang & Martinez, 2006 ; Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzybler, & Lopez, 2008 ; Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, & Glinskaya, 2010 ). On other measures of economic well-being, such as growth, inequality, and health, the literature is quite mixed and no definitive conclusions can be drawn. For instance, some studies find that remittances encourage investment in human capital (Yang, 2008 ; Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010 ), while others find no such effect and suggest that families typically spend remittances on non-productive consumption goods (Chami, Fullenkamp, & Jahjah, 2003 ). Here we can only scratch the surface of the empirical work on remittances and economic outcomes. 7
Some of the most recent research in the field argues that remittances have a distinct political dimension, affecting regime support in developing countries and altering the conditions in which elections are held. Ahmed ( 2012 ), grouping remittances with foreign aid, argues that increased remittances allow autocratic governments to extend their tenure in office. These governments can strategically channel unearned government and household income to finance political patronage networks, which leads to a reduced likelihood of autocratic turnover, regime collapse, and mass protests against the regime. More recent research posits nearly the exact opposite: remittances are linked to a greater likelihood of democratization under autocratic regimes. Escriba-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright ( 2015 ) argue that since remittances directly increase household incomes, they reduce voter reliance on political patronage networks, undermining a key tool of autocratic stability.
Remittances may also play an important role in countries with democratic institutions, yet more research is needed to fully understand the conditions under which they matter and their substantive impact. Particularly, remittances may alter the dynamics of an election as an additional and external financial flow. There is evidence of political remittance cycles : the value of remittances spikes in the run-up to elections in developing countries. The total value of remittances to the average developing country increases by 6.6% during election years, and by 12% in elections in which no incumbent or named successor is running (O’Mahony, 2012 ). The effect is even larger in the poorest of developing countries. Finer-grained tests of this hypothesis provide additional support: using monthly and quarterly data confirms the existence of political remittance cycles, as well as using subnational rather than cross-national data (Nyblade & O’Mahony, 2014 ). However, these studies do not reveal why remittances spike, or what the effects of that spike are on electoral outcomes such as vote share, campaign financing, and political strategy.
Remittances represent a massive international financial flow that warrants more scholarly attention. While there are numerous studies on the relationship between remittances and key economic indicators, there remains much room for further work on their relationship to political outcomes in developing countries. Do remittances hasten the downfall of autocratic regimes, or do they contribute to autocratic stability? In democratic contexts, do remittances substantively influence electoral outcomes, and if so, which outcomes and how? Finally, do remittances prevent even more migration because they allow one “breadwinner from abroad” to provide for the household that remains in the homeland? While data limitations are formidable, these questions are important to the study of both international and comparative political economy.
The argument that migrant or co-ethnic networks play an important role in international economic exchange is not novel. Greif ( 1989 , 1993 ) illustrates the role that the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century played in providing informal institutional guarantees that facilitated trade. This is but a single example. Cowen’s historical survey identifies not only the Phoenicians but also the “Spanish Jews [who] were indispensable for international commerce in the Middle Ages. The Armenians controlled the overland route between the Orient and Europe as late as the nineteenth century . Lebanese Christians developed trade between the various parts of the Ottoman empire” (Cowen, 1997 , p. 170). Rauch and Trindade ( 2002 ) provide robust empirical evidence linking the Chinese diaspora to patterns of imports and exports with their home country.
A variety of case studies document the importance of migrant networks in helping overcome problems of information asymmetries. In his study of Indian expatriates residing in the United States, Kapur ( 2014 ) documents how that community provides U.S. investors with a signal of the work ethic, labor quality, and business culture that exists in India. Likewise, Weidenbaum and Hughes ( 1996 ) chronicle the Bamboo Network—the linkages between ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China and their homeland—and how these linkages provide superior access to information and opportunities for investment.
Connections between migrant communities across countries affect cross-national investment even when these connections do not provide information about investment opportunities. In his work on the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century , Greif argues that this trading network was effective because it was able to credibly threaten collective punishment by all merchants if even one of them defected (Greif, 1989 , 1993 ). Grief shows that this co-ethnic network was able to share information regarding the past actions of actors (they could communicate a reputation)—something that was essential for the efficient functioning of markets in the absence of formal legal rules. Weidenbaum and Hughes reach a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of the Bamboo Network, remarking that “if a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted. This is far worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese networks will refrain from doing business with the guilty party” (Hughes, 1996 , p. 51).
Migrants not only alter the flow of income by remitting to their countries of origin, but also influence patterns of international portfolio investment and FDI. Most existing literature on international capital allocation emphasizes monadic factors such as the importance of credible commitments and state institutional quality, failing to address explicitly dyadic phenomena that may also drive investment. Diaspora networks, in particular, facilitate cross-border investment in a number of ways. They foster a higher degree of familiarity between home and host countries, leading to a greater preference for investment in specific countries. Diaspora networks can also decrease information asymmetries in highly uncertain international capital markets in two ways. Firstly, they can provide investors with salient information about their homeland, such as consumer tastes, that can influence investment decision-making. Secondly, they can share knowledge about investment opportunities, regulation and procedures, and customs that decrease transaction costs associated with cross-border investment (Leblang, 2010 ). This place of importance for migrants suggests to the broader international political economy literature the importance of non-institutional mechanisms for channeling economic activity.
Although the hypothesized link between migrants and international investment has only recently been identified, the quantitative evidence available supports that hypothesis. Leblang ( 2010 ), using dyadic cross-sectional data, finds that diaspora networks “have both a substantively significant effect and a statistically significant effect on cross-border investment,” including international portfolio investment and FDI (p. 584). The effect of bilateral migratory flows correlates positively with the degree of information asymmetry: when informational imperfections are more pervasive in a dyad, migrants (especially the highly skilled) play a disproportionately large role in international capital allocation (Kugler, Levinthal, & Rapoport, 2017 ). Other quantitative studies find substantively similar results for FDI alone (e.g., Javorcik, Özden, Spatareanu, & Neagu, 2011 ; Aubry, Rapoport, & Reshef, 2016 ).
Many questions still remain unanswered. Firstly, does the effect of migrants on investment follow the waves of the global economy, or is it countercyclical as remittances have been shown to be? Secondly, how does this additional investment, facilitated by migrants, affect socioeconomic outcomes such as inequality, poverty, and economic development (Leblang, 2010 )? Does the participation of migrants lead to more successful FDI projects in developing countries because of their ability to break down information barriers? Within portfolio investment, do migrants lead to a preference for certain asset classes over others, and if so, what are the effects on bilateral and international capital markets? These are just a few directions in an area ripe for additional research.
Besides financial flows, migrants themselves directly contribute to global flows of capital by returning to their countries of origin in large numbers. This phenomenon of return migration—or circular migration—can come in a few temporal forms, including long-term migration followed by a permanent return to a country of origin, or repeat migration in which a migrant regularly moves between destination and origin countries (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ). While comparable data on return migration is scarce, some reports suggest that 20% to 50% of all immigrants leave their destination country within five years after their arrival (e.g., Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996 ; Aydemir & Robinson, 2008 ; Bratsberg, Raaum, & Sørlie, 2007 ; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007 ). An independent theoretical and empirical account of return migration does not yet exist in the literature and is beyond the scope of this paper. But in the rational actor framework, motivations to return home include a failure to realize the expected benefits of migration, changing preferences toward a migrant’s home country, achievement of a savings or other economic goal, or the opening of additional employment opportunities back home due to newly acquired experience or greater levels of economic development (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ).
While most migration literature treats the country of origin as a passive actor that only provides the conditions for migration, new literature on return migration gives home country policies pride of place. Origin countries can craft policies that encourage diaspora re-engagement, incentivizing individuals to return home. Dual citizenship, for example, is an extension of extraterritorial rights, allowing migrants to retain full legal status in their home country. Dual citizenship “decreases the transaction costs associated with entering a host country’s labor market and makes it easier for migrants to return home” (Leblang, 2017 , p. 77). This leads migrants to invest their financial resources in the form of remittances back home as well as their valuable human capital. When states provide such extraterritorial rights, expatriates are 10% more likely to remit and 3% more likely to return home. Dual citizenship is also associated with a doubling of the dollar amount of remittances received by a home country (Leblang, 2017 ). These striking results suggest that in addition to the power of migrants to affect cross-border flows of money and people, countries of origin can also play a significant role.
This brief article has attempted to synthesize a broad range of literature from political science, economics, sociology, migration studies, and more to construct an account of international labor migration. To do so, the migratory process was broken down into distinct stages and decision points, focusing particularly on the decision to migrate, destination choice, and the re-engagement of migrants with their homeland. In doing so, the article also discussed the interlinkages of international migration with other fields of study in international political economy, including cross-border financial flows, trade, and investment. Through a multiplicity of approaches, we have gained a greater understanding of why people decide to move, why they decide to move to one country over another, and how and why they engage with the global economy and their homeland. Despite this intellectual progress, there remain many paths for future research at each stage of the migratory process; we highlight just a few of them here.
We know that income differentials, social ties, and local political conditions are important variables influencing the migration process. Yet the question remains: why do a small but growing number of people choose to leave while the overwhelming majority of people remain in their country of birth? Here, individual- or family-level subjective characteristics may be significant. There are a handful of observational studies that explore the relationship between subjective well-being or life satisfaction and the intention to migrate, with the nascent consensus being that life dissatisfaction increases the intention to migrate (Cai, Esipova, Oppenheimer, & Feng, 2014 ; Otrachshenko & Popova, 2014 ; Nikolova & Graham, 2015 ). But more research on intrinsic or subjective measures is needed to understand (a) their independent importance more fully and (b) how they interact with objective economic, political, and social factors. For instance, do those who are more optimistic migrate in larger numbers? Do minority individuals who feel they live in an environment in which diversity is not accepted feel a greater urge to leave home? Synthesizing these types of subjective variables and perceptions with the more prominent gravity-style models could result in a more complete picture of the international migration process.
For the “typical” migrant, one who is relatively less educated than the population in the chosen destination and does not have specialized skills, social networks are key to minimizing the risk of migrating and quickly tapping into economic opportunities in destination countries. Does this remain true for those who are highly educated? Although little empirical research exists on the topic, greater human capital and often-accompanying financial resources may operate as a substitute for the advantages offered by social networks, such as housing, overcoming linguistic barriers, and finding gainful employment. This would indicate that the “friends and family effect” is not as influential for this subset of migrants. Economic considerations, such as which destination offers the largest relative wage differential, or political considerations, such as the ease of quickly acquiring full citizenship rights, may matter more for the highly skilled. Neoclassical economic models of migration may best capture the behavior of migrants who hold human capital and who have the financial resources to independently migrate in a way that maximizes income or utility more broadly.
Since we have focused on international migration as a series of discrete decision points in this article, we have perhaps underemphasized the complexity of the physical migration process. In reality, migrants often do not pick a country and travel directly there, but travel through (perhaps several) countries of transit such as Mexico, Morocco, or Turkey along the way (Angel Castillo, 2006 ; Natter, 2013 ; Icduygu, 2005 ). There is little existing theoretical work to understand the role of transit countries in the migratory process, with much of it focusing on the potential for cooperation between destination and transit countries in managing primarily illegal immigration (Kahana & Lecker, 2005 ; Djajic & Michael, 2014 ; Djajic & Michael, 2016 ). Another related strand of the literature focuses on how wealthy destination countries are “externalizing” their immigration policy, encompassing a broader part of the migratory process than simply crossing a physically demarcated border (Duvell, 2012 ; Menjivar, 2014 ). But many questions remain, such as the following: how do we understand those who desire to enter, say, the United States, but instead relocate permanently to Mexico along the way? How do countries of transit handle the pressure of transit migrants, and how does this affect economic and political outcomes in these countries?
Finally, the focus of nearly all literature on international migration (and this article as a byproduct) implicitly views advanced economies as the only prominent destinations. However, this belies the fact that 38% of all migration stays within the “Global South” (World Bank, 2016 ). While there is certainly some literature on this phenomenon (see Ratha & Shaw, 2007 ; Gindling, 2009 ; Hujo & Piper, 2007 ), international political economy scholars have yet to sufficiently tackle this topic. The overarching research question here is: do the same push and pull factors that influence the decision to migrate and destination choice apply to those who migrate within the Global South? Do we need to construct new theories of international migration with less emphasis on factors such as wage differentials and political tolerance, or are these sufficient to understand this facet of the phenomenon? If we fail to answer these questions, we may miss explaining a significant proportion of international migration with its own consequences and policy implications.
1. Our use of the term international labor migration follows academic and legal conventions; we use the term migration to refer to the voluntary movement of people across national borders, either in a temporary or permanent fashion. This excludes any discussion of refugees, asylum seekers, or any other groups that are forced to migrate.
2. We do not have space in this article to delve into the theoretical and empirical work unpacking the effect of demographic characteristics—age, gender, marital status, household size, and so forth on the migration decision and on subsequent flows of migrants. For comprehensive reviews, see Lichter ( 1983 ), Morrison and Lichter ( 1988 ); United Nations Population Division ( 2013 ); and Zaiceva and Zimmerman ( 2014 ).
3. Zelinsky ( 1971 ) originally identified this relationship and termed it mobility transition curve . A wealth of empirical work supports Zelinsky’s descriptive theory in a number of contexts (see Akerman, 1976 ; Gould, 1979 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ; and Dao et al., 2016 ).
4. For a review of the arguments as well as some empirical tests, see Miller and Peters ( 2018 ) and Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, and Schiff ( 2018 ).
5. Transparency International. “What is corruption?”
6. For example, former United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage has called for the United Kingdom to adopt an immigration system that only allows in highly skilled migrants (“UKIP launches immigration policy”). In 2014, US President Barack Obama emphasized that he wanted to attract international students to American universities and that they “create jobs, businesses, and industries right here in America” (USA Today: “Full text: Obama’s immigration speech”). A key issue in Germany’s 2018 government formation was the creation of skill-based migration laws (Severin & Martin, 2018 ).
7. For a more comprehensive review, see Rapoport and Docquier ( 2006 ); and Adams ( 2011 ).
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date: 27 August 2024
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Here you can find advice how to structure IELTS essay and IELTS model answer for immigration topic. Question type: reasons and consequences .
Here is the question card:
Immigration has a major impact on the society.
What are the main reasons of immigration?
To what consequences can it lead?
To write a band 9 essay you should first of all choose your arguments to answer the questions from the topic. You don't have to find some complicated ideas. Remember: you won't be judged upon the quality of your thoughts, you will be judged upon the quality of your writing. So even simple, but well-written arguments can often give you a band 9 writing .
Some of the possible arguments :
How to structure my answer?
Of course, there are a lot of ways to organise this essay. But here is one possible way of structuring the answer to produce a band 9 essay :
Introduction : simply rephrase the topic and say what this essay is about. When your essay question asks you about reasons/consequences or causes/solutions, you shouldn’t try to describe all that in your introduction. Instead, state that you’ll describe them later in your essay.
Body paragraphs :
Conclusion : sum up the ideas from body paragraphs and briefly give your opinion.
Band 9 essay sample (immigration)
Immigration has a significant impact on the contemporary society. Each year, more and more people from all over the world decide to leave their home countries and move to another place. This essay will examine the reasons and the consequences of immigration.
In my view, the main reason of immigration is a strong desire of better life quality and safe future. A lot of people from so-called Third World move to developed countries in search of better employment opportunities, and therefore, higher incomes. Moreover, living in a wealthy country implies living in a country with stable economy, so risks of losing their savings also lessen. For example, labour migration from Mexico to the USA is caused by these facts. Other reasons that force whole families to cross borders are wars and various cultural conflicts in their homeland. Many people migrate, seeking security and safe future for their children. For instance, most of the refugees who arrived in the European Union were escaping from wars.
However, sometimes immigration causes more problems than it solves, resulting in negative consequences for both immigrants and their countries of destination. First of all, most of the refugees can’t find jobs because of the lack of language skills and difficulties in adaptation. That’s why the countries have to run various refugee assistance programs to help those people. But disproportionate burden of maintaining the immigrants leads to tension in the society. Secondly, not all of the refugees receive proper asylum, food and medical care. So they are at risk even after crossing the border. Finally, even highly qualified specialists, who seek better employment, often don’t get what they are looking for.
In conclusion, I think that people immigrate to have better life prospects. However, life after immigration may not always meet people’s expectations. So it’s very important to consider all the possible outcomes and decide whether leaving your homeland is worth it.
(315 words)
Useful vocabulary
better employment opportunities – opportunity to find a better job
burden of maintaining immigrants – difficulties in helping immigrants faced by the governments
country with stable economy – rich and safe country
to cross the border – immigrate
labour migration – when people migrate to find better jobs
refugee – person who is forced to leave his birth place because of war
refugee assistance programs – when the government gives to the refugees asylum and food
to seek better employment – look for better job
Third World – developing countries
to meet expectations – if something doesn’t meet your expectations, it’s not as good as you have thought
Contributions immigrants make are an economic boost we cannot overlook.
Immigration has emerged as a top issue in the presidential campaign. The timing is odd since immigration into the United States has slowed sharply.
Issuance of green cards, or permanent resident visas, to new arrivals has been largely flat since 2008, but dipped in 2013 to a six-year low. Illegal immigration is near record lows, with migrant apprehensions along the Southwest border at levels last seen in the 1970s. Temporary work-based visas have risen slightly in recent years but remain below their 2007 peak. Plotting visas and migrant apprehensions as a share of the nation’s working-age population, reinforces the point that immigration is slowing in both absolute and relative terms.
A NATION BUILT BY IMMIGRANTS America is strengthened by the contributions from immigrants. Read stories from American immigrants, debunk immigration myths, and read the Bush Institute policy recommendations.
ECONOMIC GROWTH INITIATIVE: IMMIGRATION Pro-growth immigration reform can raise the pace of economic growth. Learn more about the Bush Institute’s work in immigration.
A lack of legislative action on immigration reform, rising border and interior enforcement of immigration laws, and the slow-growing U.S. economy have combined to stem the inflow of immigrant workers. The Mexican case is particularly striking, with demographers suggesting net inflows from Mexico were negative over the five-year period following the Great Recession. Economic stability in Mexico, and slower population growth, has dulled the “push factors” that generated mass emigration for four decades.
Against this backdrop of slowing immigration, it’s surprising that presidential politics are heating up around this issue.
Immigration fuels the economy. When immigrants enter the labor force, they increase the productive capacity of the economy and raise GDP. Their incomes rise, but so do those of natives. It’s a phenomenon dubbed the “immigration surplus,” and while a small share of additional GDP accrues to natives — typically 0.2 to 0.4 percent — it still amounts to $36 to $72 billion per year.
In addition to the immigration surplus, immigrants grease the wheels of the labor market by flowing into industries and areas where there is a relative need for workers — where bottlenecks or shortages might otherwise damp growth.
When immigrants enter the labor force, they increase the productive capacity of the economy and raise GDP. Their incomes rise, but so do those of natives. It’s a phenomenon dubbed the “immigration surplus.”
Immigrants are more likely to move than natives, and by relieving these bottlenecks to expansion, immigrants increase the speed limit of the economy. Growth accelerates as slack falls, a desirable scenario that follows from the improved allocation of resources in the economy.
There are many examples — nationally and regionally — of immigrants moving to where the jobs are. During and after World War II, Mexican immigrants were instrumental in alleviating shortages arising from the war effort. During the oil boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was record migration to Texas. In the 1990s, it was the fast-growing South and Mountain West states that received immigrants, many for the first time.
In terms of occupations, immigrants flowed into high-tech jobs during the Internet boom and construction jobs during the 2000s housing boom.
Immigrants grease the wheels of the labor market by flowing into industries and areas where there is a relative need for workers — where bottlenecks or shortages might otherwise damp growth.
In 2013, the George W. Bush Institute honored America’s immigrant heritage with an official immigration naturalization ceremony and a half-day event.
In addition, the rise in high-skilled immigration, a pronounced trend since the 1990s, has been linked to innovation, specifically to higher patenting rates among immigrants. Interestingly, greater innovation among immigrants appears to boost it among natives, too. Immigrants innovate more than natives because they are concentrated in STEM occupations where there is lots of R&D and entrepreneurial activity
Forty-four percent of medical scientists are foreign born, for example, as are 42 percent of computer software developers. Immigrant workers are also overrepresented among college professors, engineers, mathematicians, nurses, doctors and dentists, to name a few.
If immigration makes the economy larger, more efficient and productive, what’s the problem? Why do we, as a nation, strictly limit immigration?
Immigration changes factor prices — it lowers the wages of competing workers, while raising the return to capital and the wages of complementary workers. In other words, the immigration surplus does not accrue equally to everyone. It goes primarily to the owners of capital, which includes business and land-owners and investors.
Complementary workers also benefit. The demand for these workers rises with more immigration. They may be construction supervisors, translators, pharmaceutical reps, or immigration lawyers. And consumers benefit from the lower prices of the goods and services that immigrants produce. But competing workers’ wages fall, at least in the initial transition period as the economy adjusts to the new labor inflow.
Research suggests that previous immigrants suffer more of the adverse wage effects than do natives. Prior immigrants are more like current immigrants.
Research also suggests any negative wage effects are concentrated among low-skilled and not high-skilled workers. Perhaps that is because high-skilled U.S.-born workers are complementary to immigrants to a greater extent than native low-skilled workers, who hold jobs that require less education and fewer language skills.
Last year, the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the George W. Bush Institute partnered to release this book containing an in-depth analysis of the correlation between immigration and economic growth.
Immigration is thus a positive but also disruptive change. There are lots of historical examples of positive yet disruptive economic change. The Industrial Revolution displaced millions of farm workers and resulted in the great urban migrations and the birth of mega-cities to which we now ascribe all kinds of positive attributes, including creativity and innovation and higher wages.
No great change is without some short-term cost. What is costly in the long-term is preventing market forces from funneling resources to their best use. The adjustment of wages and prices to the changing demand and supply in the economy are the levers of capitalism that direct resources to their best allocation.
Immigration has net benefits. The fact that it has some costs is not a reason to bar it, but rather to manage it. Mechanisms can be found to benefit from immigration’s gains while making up for the losses of some workers. International trade has similar effects, and workers adversely affected by trade are eligible for federal programs such as Trade Adjustment Assistance.
Immigration has net benefits. The fact that it has some costs is not a reason to bar it, but rather to manage it.
International migration is not much different than domestic migration, at least not in terms of economics. We Texans often celebrate Californians and others who move to Texas for the abundant jobs, lower house prices and lesser tax burden. In Texas, we have depended on this inflow of labor from other states to grow as fast as we have — about twice as fast as the nation since 1990. The state has benefited from the migration as have those who moved here.
Would wages have been higher without the inflow of labor? Perhaps temporarily. But wage inflation and skill shortages would have choked off investment and firms would have expanded elsewhere, in places where they could readily find more competitively priced resources.
Immigration is a net positive, even for those who don’t move, but the gains are not distributed equally. The next step for policymakers is to structure immigration reform to take advantage of immigration’s many benefits while mitigating the costs.
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1. Increased economic output and living standards. Net immigration will lead to a growth in the size of the labour force and an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Immigration leads to higher economic growth with a corresponding rise in tax revenues and potential for government spending. 2.
In this essay, we will delve into the disadvantages of immigration, addressing concerns such as job competition, strain on resources, and cultural tensions. While welcoming immigrants can enrich a society in many ways, it is important to acknowledge the challenges that can arise from large-scale migration.
This essay will examine the advantages and disadvantages of immigration. It will discuss the economic, cultural, and social impacts of immigration on host countries and immigrants themselves, providing a balanced view of this complex issue. At PapersOwl, you'll also come across free essay samples that pertain to Immigration.
Immigration Pros and Cons Pros of Immigration. 1. Economic Growth: There is consensus among mainstream economists (e.g. Ehrlich & Pei, 2021) that an absorbable rate of immigration leads to a phenomenon called the "immigration surplus", at least in the short-term.This is an observable phenomenon whereby immigration tends to cause an increase in the wages of locals.
By increasing the cultural awareness of everyone, more moments of common ground can be found. 3. Immigration helps to create a global market. Immigrants do more than create stronger local economies. They also help to contribute to a stronger global economy. Remittances are common in nations that invite immigrants.
1. "Immigrants will take American jobs, lower our wages, and especially hurt the poor.". This is the most common argument and also the one with the greatest amount of evidence rebutting it ...
The most cost-effective policy for reducing illegal immigration remains the expansion of opportunities for legal entry and work. Five Myths and Realities of Immigration. 1. Myth: America is being flooded with mass immigration. Reality: The rate of US immigration today is well below its historical average and below that of many other advanced ...
Immigration has always been a hot topic of debate, with people holding strong opinions on both sides. The issue of immigration is complex and multifaceted, with numerous pros and cons to consider. In this essay, we will explore the advantages and disadvantages of immigration, examining the implications it has on various aspects of society.
In conclusion, immigration has both advantages and disadvantages that must be considered. It provides economic benefits, fills labor gaps, promotes cultural diversity, and supports the global economy through remittances. However, it can also create pressure on public services, impact wages, and give rise to social challenges.
This essay about the cons of immigration explores the economic, social, and cultural challenges that can arise in host countries. It discusses how immigration can increase job competition, particularly in low-wage sectors, and potentially suppress wage growth. The essay also examines the strain on public resources such as healthcare, education ...
Mass Deportations. Economic Burden. Terrorist Threat. Disadvantage American Workers. Higher Crime. 1. Path to Citizenship - Overview. "There are an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United States. It is unrealistic and inhumane to deport these individuals from their families and lives in the United States.
Economists generally agree that the effects of immigration on the U.S. economy are broadly positive. 18 Immigrants, whether high- or low-skilled, legal or illegal, are unlikely to replace native-born workers or reduce their wages over the long-term, though they may cause some short-term dislocations in labor markets.
Introduction. Immigration has been a touchstone of the U.S. political debate for decades, as policymakers have weighed economic, security, and humanitarian concerns. However, Congress has ...
Immigration: Advantages and Disadvantages Research Paper. As time progresses, more and more people from different countries come into the United States. They help combating demographic issues, resolve worker shortages and help the economy by participating in a number of fields. However, some people fear that they may cause crime in America ...
Immigration Advantages And Disadvantages. The immigration of many people to Britain has its advantages as well as disadvantages. A rather negative impact of the ethnic diversity in London is the demand for housing after the arrival of immigrants. Immigrants usually arrive in large numbers, meaning that there is a sudden high demand for housing.
The topic, "Advantages and Disadvantages of Immigration to the Economy as perceived by the Economics Students" will describe the impact of immigration to the country/economy. This will also describe how immigrants adapt to the country/economy. The target number that the researchers will survey is 30 people.
List of the Pros of Illegal Immigration. 1. It provides local economies with a boost. Illegal immigrants might cross the border without permission, but they can still contribute to local society. Many of these immigrants find work in cash-under-the-table positions that are needed, but not often worked, by those with citizenship or a legal ...
Researchers Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri actually found that in the long run, increased immigration had a very small positive impact, 0.6%, on the wages of native-born Americans. But even ...
Read more samples of argumentative essays about immigration. Immigration - advantages and disadvantages. In demography migration is defined as mechanical movement of population between two different territories, therefore, external immigration could be specified as moving from one's own country to another.
Introduction. The steady growth of international labor migration is an important, yet underappreciated, aspect of globalization. 1 In 1970, just 78 million people, or about 2.1% of the global population, lived outside their country of birth.By 1990, that number had nearly doubled to more than 150 million people, or about 2.8% of the global population (United Nations Population Division, 2012).
Pros of Immigration. Immigrant workers send money home. Immigrants return home with an expanded skillset. Host nations become a wonderful melting pot of cultures. Host nations eliminate shortages in the labor market. Cons of Immigration. Reduction of potential workforce in home countries. The immigrant's home may experience gender imbalances.
To write a band 9 essay you should first of all choose your arguments to answer the questions from the topic. You don't have to find some complicated ideas. Remember: you won't be judged upon the quality of your thoughts, you will be judged upon the quality of your writing. So even simple, but well-written arguments can often give you a band 9 ...
The Bush Insttitue hosted a naturalization ceremony honoring 20 new citizens from 12 countries, July 10, 2013. (Grant Miller / George W. Bush Presidential Center) Yes, there are downsides. Immigration changes factor prices — it lowers the wages of competing workers, while raising the return to capital and the wages of complementary workers.